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A B S T R A C T  
Canadian unmigration law has traditionally relied upon broad p t s  of 
discretionary authority as a tool for immigrant application processing. Such authority has 
had two facets - a procedural aspect allowing for fiexiiility in methods and processes for 
handling applications, and a substantive aspect relating to actual decision making. This 
thesis examines such discretion in the particuiar context of the hdependent category of 
migration that is provided for under the current Immigration Act  and ReguCations. 
Chapter One begins with a discussion of the concept of discretion generally. An 
ovemiew of the extremes of jurisprudential opinions which affect this topic is provided, 
together with an examination of the rationale for existence of discretionary authority and 
a review of the various f o m  that it may take. Chapter Two highlights use of 
discretionary power in overseas processing, where most Indepemdent selection occurs, 
and traces recent developments in the immigration bureaucracy that appear to impact 
upon its availability and usage. Chapter Three scrutini;i:es the current Iimits on usage of 
discretion that have derived from the process of judicial review and the courts' treatment 
of this topic. Additionaiiy, certain extra-judicial influences and the hctiona.1 limits they 
impose upon discretionary power are identified. 
This thesis argues that discretionary power has recently been significantly afXected 
by two evo1Mng trends. Hampered by fiscal constraints, the bureaucracy has sought to 
reduce usage of positive substantive discretion which, by its very nature, is a resource 
intensive processing tool. ConverseIy, since negative substantive discretion retains some 
functiond benefits, not much official disdain has been focused upon it. Meanwhile, 
procedural discretion has been enhancd because of the resource savings it has delivered 
up. The courts, on the other hami, have worked to restrict negative substantive discretion 
while simdtaneously guarding the m e s s  of its positive variant. These dual purposes 
are rooted in a traditionai mistnist of discretionary authority and a modem trend to favour 
ri@. While the courts have been proactive in constraining negative discretion, their 
protection of positive substantive discretion has followed a more passive and traditional 
course, focusing only on whether it has been unduly fettered. They have not gone so far 
as to tïnd any vested rights in applicants to draw upon policies allowing for inclusion 
outside of normal requirements. Concurrently, procedural discretion has only been of 
interest to the judiciary with respect to any adverse impact upon applicant rights. 
The conclusion drawn in Chapter Four is that the developments descnbed al1 push 
dtimately in the same direction. Though the bureaucracy and the judiciary each have 
their own reasons and interests in the matter, yet they are united in desiring a more d e s  
based selection system, that is less reliant upon substantive discretion. Recognizing that 
such a move is in harmony with the spirit of the current post-Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms era, a consideration of how refom may be undertaken and some specific 
initiatives in that regard are recommended. In particular, 1 note that the complete 
elimination of ail dismtionary authon@ may be neither possible nor desirable and offer 
some suggestions for its containment and structuring that may serve to enhance its 
beneficiai qualities and limit its offensive aspects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
7. Purpose 
This is a study of the use of discretionary powm in contemporary Canadian 
immigration law and practice. It is, most centrally, a story of change and transformation. 
Unremitting change, occunhg with almost lightening speed, appears to be one of the few 
constants of life today in Canada. It is a pace of change that stems nom developments 
and innovations that seem to feed one upon the other to fuel ever more evolution. The 
phenornenon of globalization and advanca in information and other technologies have, in 
many ways, made the world a smaller place. Closer to home, the social and legal 
landscape has similarly been subjected to powerful forces that have reshaped many 
aspects of our society. The advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedorns in the early 
19807s, for example, has had profound and far-reaching consequences that have left few 
areas of law and social policy unaffected. More recently, the restricted economic means 
of governments in Canada, both provincial and federal, has harbingered s e ~ c e  
reductions and bureaucratie restnicturing whose full effects remain to be seen. 
As I attempt to demonstrate in this work, these same forces, as  weli as others, 
have worked in recent years to reshape our understanding and acceptance of discretionary 
authority within the particular field of immigration law. unmigration law and policy, of 
course, are simply one small part of a larger whole that is our legal system. And, since 
the legai system exists to serve the needs of sociev, it cannot be immune to the 
innuences and events that rework society as a whole. 1 have endeavorrred in this thesis to 
examine and explain some of the theories, jurisprudence, and praçticai considerations 
about discretion that affects its place and usage in our law. However, in order to tell the 
complete story of discretion, 1 have also found it important to do so with reference, not 
just to the law and jurisprudence, but aiso to the wider political and social context. The 
use of discretionary power has as much to do with attitudes and opinions that can be 
shaped by a wide variety of factors and influences beyond the law itself. 
The current Immigration Act and Regdations have been in place for some twenty 
years and reflet thinking of a .  earlier, perhaps less complicated, or at lest more stable, 
period. At that tirne, legislators saw fit to incorporate express grants of broad substantive 
discretion in the Independent selection rules as a sort of panacea for c u ~ g  any defects in 
the way the d e s  actuaiiy operated. Wnting just after the current immigration regime 
was put in place, J.H. Grey, in a study of discretionary power in Canadian law, noted that: 
If administrative law is seen as the study of the use of power, one of its most 
important interests is discretion, since the limits on discretion are at the same t h e  
the limits on the power that anyone c a .  have in our type of democracy. The 
massive expansion of the powers of the state, and the growth of immensely 
powerfid conmittees, commissions and other bodies, against which may be 
juxtaposed a new and fervent interest in civil liberties and human rights, renders a 
re-examination of discretion and discretionary powers both essentiai and 
inevitable. ' 
Much has changed in society and in the law since Grey wrote these words and 
there is now even more cogency and urgency to the need for a re-examination of 
discretion. Indeed, as one of the more controversial parts of immigration law, it is 
surprising that so little attention has been accordeci it in the academic fiterature. That may 
' J.H. Grey, "Dismtion in Administrative Law" (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.L 107 at 107. 
be changing, however. A recent legislative review commissioned by the Minister of 
Immigration, for example, thol-9 cursory in its treatment of the topic, has serveci to focus 
some attention on discretionary authority. That report has suggested vast changes to the 
availability and handling of discretionary power in immigration matters. These changes 
involve not just restruchuing of discretion, but also its reduction. The proposals offered 
by the Review Committee reflect the tealities of a 'hew-think" which has taken hold of 
immigration law in Canada. 
However, broad substantive discretion has increasingiy fden  into disfavour, not 
just with the courts and the bar, but also with the bureaucracy that administers 
immigration law. Though the two sides have approached the issue fiam different 
perspectives and for different reasons, their views have converged to place broad 
substantive discretion in something of a tightening vise. Discretion is a labour intensive 
selection tool, requiring a substantial commitment of time and energy nom decision- 
makers to render individualized decisions. In an era of cutbacks and reductions, 
administrators have found it increasingly difficuit to reconcile such a commitment with a 
diminishing resource base. Meantirne, the courts and the bar have also worked against 
broad substantive discretion, prefming instead that immigration decisions should 
proceed h m  the strict application of expiicit des. Because of their peculiar interests, 
the two sides have chosen to focus on différent aspects of substantive discretion. The 
bureaucracy's desire to resile h m  discretionary decision making is concentrated on 
positive discretion, used to gant exemptions nom the ordinary rules, while the judiciary 
and bar have sought to limit its negative use, as a tool for denying qualification. A 
combination of bureaucratic expediency and judicial fomialism has combineci to restnct 
the ambit and scope of substantive discretion- Procedural discretion, used to d u c e  
processing steps, however, has simultaneously enjoyed something of a renaissance. 
Offering advantages for administrative corivenience, it has been only of passing interest 
to the courts and the bar, who have acted prirnarily just to ensure that it is not used in a 
way that negatively impacts upon applicant nghts. 
Though this paper examines the handling of both procedural and substantive 
discretion, it is obviously the uncertain situation of substantive discretion that is the story 
of the hou. It is compelling reading precisely because it is a story of paradox, with two 
sides working for Merent reasons to hem it in fiom opposite directions. It is curious, 
perhaps, but not unusual. Discretion, by its very nature, seems to be dominated by 
paradox and inconsistency. It is a subject involving strong opinions which, while largely 
polarized, are yet also inconsistent. Those who decry use of negative discretion in one 
breath, for example, are dso often heard to cal1 for more ample positive discretion in the 
next? Discretion is about exceptions to the ordinary d e s  for qualification as an 
immigrant. In the past, the human condition worldwide seemed to be simply too diverse 
to be readily and adequately captured by a set of des ,  no matter how ample and dl 
encompassing they purported to be. Though the 'hew-think" involves an emerging 
consensus favouring a more complete, comprehensive set of d e s  as the basis for 
immigrant selection, no one seems to have quite figured out how to dispense with 
discretion altogether. The Legislative Review Cornmittee, for example, while 
highlighting that discretion remaius an uneasy and troubling component of our 
- - - -- 
For a discussion of this apparent double standard, see for example, JM. Evans, H.N. Janisch & David J. 
Muilan, Administrative Law.- Lares, TText and MatmkLs, 4th ed, (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, I995), at 
immigration law and practice, still recommends retention of some residual discretion to 
protect against the possibility of d e  faiiure. And therein lies the irony of discretion - 
widely conceded to be essential and ubiquitous yet not much loved. 
The problem, of course, is that immigration involves tough choices. Though we 
prefer d e s ,  we don't always seem to Like the effects that their application cm have upon 
the lives of individuals. Rules seem fair because they suggest everyone will be treated 
the same. The choices become tough, however, when the application of rules moves 
£tom the abstract to the particuiar. Thae is no shortage of candidates seeking entry as 
immigrants to Canada who are able to cite some personal circumstances involving 
disadvantage, misery or hardship. It matters not whether the problem is seen to arise 
fiom application of the niles themselves or h m  the peculiar situation of the applicant. 
Either way, compassionate people must inevitably be moved by any example of distress. 
But what to do? The reality of hard choices is in fact the raison d 'etre for the existence 
of substantive discretionary power in our immigration Law. Existing dongside, between 
and around the black and white d e s ,  its ability to relieve against any hardship arising out 
of application of the niles is that which renders it indispensable. It is important to note, 
though, that because of the restrictions placed upon its negative use, the tough choices 
today seem to be mostly of one variety - when to allow an exemption fiom the strict d e s  
for qualification. 
The grant of an exemption nom the rules involves larger issues which make the 
choices even tougher. Relief is not simply a matter between the applicant and the 
decision-maker. Rather, it also strikes at certain fûndamentals of our legal system, such 
102 1 (heremaIter referred to as "Evans"). 
as notions about the d e  of law and the supremacy of Parliament. This is evident in the 
decision of Muldoon J. in the Ormiter case', where the applicant argued that the Act 's  
prohibition on entry of persons unable to support themselves constituted irnpermissible 
age discrimination, con- to the Gzmter of Rights and Freedom. In dismissing the 
application, the Court stated: 
This nation is a parliamentary democracy, which means that the elected 
tribunes of the people are those who must lawfbily enact the legislation. It means 
that Parliament, by legislation under the rule of law, may choose which 
foreigners, if any, may be legaiiy stlmitted for pmanent residence in Canada. It 
means that if parliamentary democracy is to survive in Canada, Parliament must 
make those choices and not become helpless in the face of assertions by aliens, no 
matter how sympathetic their cases. . . . 
It takes a certain degree of inteliectual toughness to support the principles 
of parliamentaxy democracy in face of various individuals who seek migration 
into Canada against the wili of the democraticaiiy elected representatives of the 
people (not to disparage the Senate of Canada). If the Charter be interpreted in 
such a marner as to obviate the will of Parliament in a matter nich as this, it is the 
sort of fiutration which would ultimately destroy national government by 
amputating the lawful means of govername.' 
Notwithstanding any cornmitment to the will of Parliament, however, the 
evolution of discretion in recent years appears to have involved a downplaying of the 
public interest in immigration matters. Again, it seems to be an issue where the three 
major players in immigration have been in agreement, albeit for different reasons. The 
bureaucracy, for example, has encouraged a paradigrn shift amongst its decision-makers 
where the only bbclient" to be considered in immigration matters is the individual visa 
applicant.' The bar, on the other hand, has encouraged a devotion to rules, at least on the 
negative side of the discretion equation, without regard for consequences that may flow 
' Orantes v. Conada (Minkte~ ofEmp~oyment & Immigration) ((1990), 34 F-TJL 184. 
fiid. at 188. 
' See in& note 740 and a c c o m p ~ g  text for a diswsion of this phenornenon. 
h m  the d t .  It has been an effective strategy in the courts, since the oversight 
mechanism available to Independent immigrants, judicid review, is ostensibly only 
concemed with procedure. The devotion of ail sides, therefore, has himed predominantly 
to procedure. Discretion, though, is more about substantive justice than procedure. Thus, 
it is not surprishg that it has been something of a victim to be s d c e d  at the altar of 
procedure. 
T'us, in descnbing the current trend to move away fÎom discretionary power and 
to have more particuiarization in the des, I have attempted to sound a note caution. 
Though critics may be vocal in their disdain for discretionary power, the case, as 1 
attempt to show is not all one way against discretion. Shouid we move too far towards a 
niles based system, we need to recognize that it may well be gained at the expense of the 
responsiveness and humanity that has been a hallmark of our immigration processes. We 
may be able to devise d e s  that exclude sutnciently welI, but it is also clear that we will 
never devise inclusionary niles sufEiciently clever to capture al1 those who are seen to be 
desewing. It is important, therefore to ask whether the potential downsides are consistent 
with the public interest and whether we, as a people, are prepared to make any Me-offs 
in our immigration program that may be necessary. Certdy ,  before we have the more 
d e s  based system that seems to be favoured, it is important to understand more fUly 
what discretion is, how it is used in our system and what implications are likely from 
current developments. My hope is that this study wiIl contribute in some measure to that 
end. 
2. Scope 
'7s it true that immigration policy is often in conflict with the nile of law? . . . The 
answer is only too often ' Y ~ S . ' ~ ~  So begins an article by Toronto immigration lawyers 
Cecil Rotenberg and Mary Lam, detailing their views of a conflict between the 
immigration law promuigated by Parliament and the immigration policy devised by the 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). Their assertion dernonstrates 
vividly the philosophical gulfthat oflen separates the bar and the bureaucracy. It is also a 
ciear indication of the hold that the "rule of law" principle maintah over the hearts, 
rninds and imaginations of Canada's immigration lawyers.' Particularly in this post- 
Charter era, that principle is the shibboleth for our time that marks the h n t  h e  of the 
struggie between philistine discretion and the righteousness of niles. But what exactly is 
C.L. Rotenberg & Mary Lam, "Busmess Immigration and Poiicy - A Revîew of Some Aspects of the 
Entrepreneur Program", (1995) 26 immLX(2d) 100 at 100. 
'The importance of the d e  of law principle is one that stretches across ai i  areas of law. One of the more 
prominent curent Canadian issues in which it is implicated concems the matter of Quebec secession. In 
particular, the d e  of law is a central theme of various intervenors' arguments before the Supreme Court of 
Canada m Refkence Concming Certain Questions Relating to the Secession of Quebecfiont Canada, 
Supreme Court File No. 25506, initiated by ûrder-in-Council P.C. 1996-1497, dated September 30, 1996. 
For a pair of recent articles, published under a joint titie of '"The Rde of Law'', discussing the role of the 
nile of law m this reference, see H. W. MacLauchlan., "Accounting For Democracy and the Rule of Law in 
the Quebec Secession Reference" (1997) 76 Cam Bar Rev. 155; and Robert Howse & Alissa Malfcin. 
"Canadians Are a Sovereign People: How the Supreme Court Shouid Approach the Reference on Quebec 
Secession" (1 997) 76 Can. Bar Rev. 186. 
The ubiquity and fundamental nature of the concept of the d e  of law is such that it has even crept into 
the lexicon of the inteniationd lawyer. For example, James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International 
Law at the University of Cambridge, in demiing human rights law and practice at the international level 
uses the term to typiSr a middle ground position between three potentiai theones. In his modei, the first, 
and most traditionai, position is what he terms the "convemtionai" model. There, huma. rights are derived 
h m  the content of treaties and have no special simiificance beyond that. At the other extreme is the 
"constitutional" position, where human rights become the centrai organking idea of the international 
system, with states' rights subordiaated to it, In ktween, there is what he caik the "de of iaw" model. 
Under this model when states enter into treaties or other promises concerning human rights, the situation is 
changed, with the result that those rights become vesteci in individuals. T'us, a set of state-individual 
rights is added ta the traditional conception of international law as simply a collection of states' rights. In 
this way, hwnan rights can affect states' fieedom of action, as seen in the conventional model. J. 
Crawford, 'Wuman Rights and the State" (Lecture of 8 Jmuary, 1997, Erom "The Bertha Wilson Corne in 
Human Rights", Speciai Visiting Lecturer series held at Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., 6 - 17 
this 'hile of lad '  and what is its relationship to Canadian immigration law and policy? 1s 
it tnily the hdamental comerstone that underpins our legal system? Moreuver, is the 
paradox that is discretionary power, being both undesirable and indispensable, 
fimdamentaily incompatible with it? What concessions have been necessary to allow the 
two to coexist within one system? What adjustments might stiU be necessary to effect a 
better balance between the d e  of law and discretionary power? And what of the courts 
who act as arbitas between the opposing views? Are they really in the middle between 
the positions of the bar and the bureaucracy? Why does discretionary power have such a 
bad reputation? What are the influences that t d y  affect its exercise? These are just 
some of the questions that are examined in this study. 
As may be apparent, discretion is an enormous topic. Accordingly, 1 have felt 
compelled to impose limits, wherever possible, so as to contain the ambit of this work 
w i t h  what was realisticaily possible, given the various collsfraints and limitations 1 
faced. The major Illniting device employed, of course, is that 1 have chosen to focus only 
on so-called Independent immigrants. The Immigration Act and Regdations provide for 
three broad classes of immigration - Refugees, Farnily Class and Independents. Though 
discretionary power affects al1 three to some extent, neither of the other two classes is so 
overtly subject to it as are Independents. Independent immigrants are selected largely as 
a matter of unabashed national self-interest and it is this which provides much of the 
rationale for leaving their selection process most directly subject to discretionary power. 
CIC's Immigration Manuals define "Independents" as ". . .persans who intend to enter the 
labour market and have the intention and ability to be self-supporthg upon their arriva1 in 
Canada'' The point of the exercise is to select in only those who wiU not be a drain on 
the public purse and are capable of contributing to the economy. Likewise, since this 
category is dealt with, for the most part, outside of Canada, it is overseas processes that 
are particularly considered in this study, though 1 have drawn upon examples developed 
in the context of the other immigrant classes, wherever they seemed to have broader 
application or illustratecl particular points weU. 
Further, I have limitai this study to identifj/ing and descniing only those factors 
and forces, presently affecting discretionary power, which 1 believed to be particularly 
significant In my estimation, those forces are not yet fully played out and the 
complexities of their inter-relationships are such that their h a 1  outcome remains largely 
to be detennined. Further, the influences that rnight potentially affect any given exercise 
of discretion are simply too rnany to be practically dealt with in a study of this nature. 
Accordingly, this work does not purport to be either di encompassing or the last word on 
the subject. 
Additionally, this study proceeds out of m y  seven years experience as a visa 
officer and daily exposure to the application of discretion in practice. This experience 
obviously imposes certain biases about this topic which 1 have attempted to recognize and 
reconcile. Nonetheles, it is also an experience which, 1 beiieve, has equipped me well to 
venture some opinions as to the practical realities of discretion. Thus, while I have 
attempted an academic treatment of the topic, yet 1 have also striven to ground it in the 
ways and methods of actuai usage by using real examples whenever possible. 
* CIC immigration Manual (hereinaftcr IM), Chap. OP-5, para. 2 2  'Who is eiigible to apply?". 
3. Layout 
This work begins in Chapter 1 with a review of some of the fiindamentai 
characteristics and attributes of discretionary power and its treatrnent in Canadian 
jurisprudence. In particular, the two schools of jurisprudence, positivism and 
fiinctionalism, which have had the greatest impact upon its perception in our law are 
considered. The discussion then moves on to examine why discretion is thought to be 
necessary and what it is exactly. In Chapter 2,1 examine how the overseas selection 
process for Independent immigrant works and the ways in which discretionary power is 
imported into that process. Attention is then paid to the restmcturing exercise that CIC 
has undergone in recent years and the particular initiatives that have corne out of it. 
Particular emphasis is placed upon the mamer in which such initiatives may have 
impacted upon discretionary decision-making. Chapter 2 concludes with consideration of 
sociological theories and the insights they may offkr as to how discretion is af3ected by 
the institutional setting in which it is employed. Chapter 3 opens with a consideration of 
the role of the courts and judicial review in Independent immigrant matters. The courts' 
handling of discretionary power within the selection process, and the impact that judicial 
decisions have had on its availability and usage, are considered in the middle part of this 
chapter. In particuiar, attention is aven to the limitations that have proceeded from 
judicial intewentions. The remaining portion of the chapter nnishes with a discussion of 
the role and influence of other actors, outside of the courts, in setting Limits upon the use 
of discretionary power. Chapter 4 then offers my wncIuions as  to the current 
availability and usage of discretionary power, both substantive and procedurai. 1 also 
consider the proposais for reform that have recently been suggested by the Legislative 
Review Committee. Finaiiy, 1 conclude by providing some thoughts and 
recornmendations as to possible directions for fùture reform. 
CHAPTER 1 - FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRETION 
"Discretion is the means by which law - the most consequential normative 
system in society - is translated into action? 
1.1 How is discretion understood? 
In the British legal tradition, jurisprudence and philosophy have tended 
historically to portray discretionary authority as a sort of ill-defined law, compriseci of 
plenary power usually subject to few restrictions or controls. This image of discretion as 
an unstructured and largely m t r a i n e d  power has left an indelible image in legal circles 
of the character of discretion that is bleak and unsenling. Certaùily, as a sort of semi- 
despotic power, the necessity for abiding wariness and constant vigilance over 
discretionary power has been a predominant theme of academic literature. 
Though recent scholarly literature has begun to pierce the veil of doubt 
srnoundhg discretionary power, the roots of mistrust run deep and are difficult to shuck 
off. Grnerations of lawyers have been inculcated with a pejorative view of discretion that 
remains widespreadI0 and which has far reaching consequences. As Evans observes, 
"[n]o aspect of the administrative state has attracted a worse press nom lawyers than the 
discretionary powers regularly conferred on, and exercised by, agencies and officiais in 
Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses of DrSctetion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) at I l  (hereinafter refemed 
to as cT3awkins''). 
'O See for example, JM. Evans, "Controiiing Administrative Discretion: A Role for Rules?" in The 
Cambn'dge Lectures 1991, edited by F.E. McArdie (Cowwviiie, Que,: Yvon Blais, 1993) 209 at 209, 
where the author observes ''Lawyers are by instinct deeply suspicious of broad dismtionary power 
exercisable by public officiais and institutions.. .. if one were to ask lawyers what words they associate 
the course of carrying out statutory ~chemes."~' In faimess. it must be conceded that it is 
a suspicion that has beea pmven well-founded in too many instances, over too many 
years. In the particdar field of immigration law, historical examples of broad misuse and 
abuse of discretionary power are not hard to kd.12 
However, it is possible also to discern a sort of "spill-over" effect fiom those 
examples of misdeeds, that readily ascribes blame to discretion for any illicit activity by 
govemmental authorities. It is a process of popular demonization, whereby every 
injustice is credited to discretion, regardless of whether such wrongs trdy involved 
application of a lawhilly granted statutory authority. An example of this is found in a 
postscnpt by R Sampat-Mehta to his book, bteniationul Barriers.l3 In iî, he describes 
an abrupt change in Canadian immigration policy in late 1972, whereby visitors to 
Canada were no longer pennitted to apply for permanent residence fiom within Canadai4 
with "discretion", most would be negative: "arbitrary", "capricious" and "abuse" would, 1 expect, figure 
prominently m their replies." 
" Evans, supra note 2 at 1019. 
l2 An obvious example would, of course, be those polies  and procedures which were used in the part to 
exclude persons on the basis of racial and ethnic ongins. For a brief description of such poiicies, see Carol 
Turner-Tnisca, "A Short History of Immigration to Canada 1869- 1995" (1995) 12:3 Bout de Papier 1 1. 
See also R. Sampat-Mehta, International Barriers (Ottawa: Harpeil's Press, 1973), at 13 1- 136, where a 
number of instances of the use of discretionary power to discximinate against Asian peoples during the first 
part of this century are cited For example, prospective immigrants were required to demonstrate that they 
possessed a certain stipulated rninmiuxn amount of unencumbered b d s  available to aid their settlement. 
Likewise, a requirement of "continuous jouniey" was interpreted so that only those amving directiy h m  their 
country of origin could be landed. The lack of ciirect commercial transportation h m  Asia to Cana& made it 
impossible for Asians to sati* this m m ~ t  The reguIations containing these provisions were ostensibly 
applicable to a l l  immigrants. However, they containeci a grant of discretionary power to Mgra t ion  officiais 
allowing th& waiver. Sampat-Mehta notes ample evidence h t  such provisions were regularly waived for 
European and Amencan immigrants, but never for Asians. 
l3 Id. 
l4 Id. at 3 19-325. A general prohibition against applying fkom within Canada for permanent residence has 
been in place, as Sampat-Mehta descni ,  since November 3, 1972, It is enshrined in S. 9(1) of the current 
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, which mds: "Except m such cases as are presmibed,. . ,every 
immigrant and visitor shaU make an appiication for and obtain a visa before that person appears at a port of 
entry." 
Apparently reacting to an unanticipateci tide of would-be arriving immigrants1: the 
govemment suspended y~oa?&r?z +&& wt!e6 vEk= t2 ~hange their status to 
immigrants, fkom within the couutry.l6 This had the effect of shifting significant 
discretionary power to port of entry unmigration officers to detemiine the bona fides of 
visitors. In particular, the officers were empowered to refuse entry, and summarily retum 
to their point of origin, any arriving traveler detennined to be an intending immigrant. 
In Sampat-Mehta's view, "[bly executive action, the govemment has again placed 
unrestricted discretionary powers in the han& of Immigration Ofncers in deciding who 
are and are not to be aâmitted to the ~ountry."~ He desmies the consequences of this as 
'hiany faceted abuses"18, and goes on to relate an account of two port of entry 
immigration officers convicted of extortion and dereliction of duty for importuning an 
arriving visitor for sex, in retum for a gant of entry. While this certainly describes a 
despicable event, it serves also to illustrate how opponents of discretionary power are 
able to find abuse where they wish. An alternative view of this episode is to recognuie 
that while it involves abuse, it is not one involving the exercise of a statutonly accorded 
power. The convictions that were registered clearly demonstrate that the duo was not 
acting within any sort of lawful authority. Rather, the malefactors obviously relied upon 
the aura of authority attacheci to their positions to achieve their illegitimate aim. 
Unfortunately, this is the type of abuse of authority which can and does occur 
even in the presence of the clearest de s .  But why is it then that such incidents are so 
'%anqat-Mehta, id., a s m i  a racial motive to the policy change. h his visw, it was not just a case of 
overwhelmiag numbers, but rather the predominantly Asian characteristic of the movement, which caused 
most conceni. 
l6 Id. at 320. 
readily seized upon as illustrative of the dangers of discretionary power? The answer lies 
in the jurispnidential thought that has shaped our administrative law. Certauily, it is in 
jurisprudence that the mots of curent law and practice regarding exercise and control of 
discretionary power are found, and it is there that its usefhhess and utility as an 
administrative tool has been molded. Since "[n Jothing is more practical than theory"19, it 
is appropriate therefore to begin a study of the use of discretion in Canadian immigration 
law by considering briefly the jurisprudential footing upon which it rests. 
Accordingly, this chapter commences with a consideration of the role and 
innuence of legal positivism, the philosophical foundation h m  which the concept of the 
'hile of law" s p ~ g s .  In particular, 1 explore development of the concept of the rule of 
law, with its favouritism for codification and the seeming certitude of d e s ,  and the effect 
that this has had upon acceptame of discretionary authority. 1 then go on to consider the 
functionalist Line of jurisprudence which has encourageci a more pragmatic understanding 
of the administrative world generaily, and of discretionary power in parti~ular.~ This 
chapter then concludes with a discussion of the %hy" and the 'khat" of discretion - why 
it is seen as necessary in our law and what it is exactly. 
"ld. at 323. 
id. 
19Evans, supra note 2 at 33. 
Though there are other schoois of thought that offer insights upon disaetionq power, I have 
deliberately chosen to limit consideration ofjurispmâence to these two alone. Quite smiply, they have had 
the greatest impact in shaping cumnt attitudes and t6rmmig about discretion and pmvide sufflcientiy 
contrasting viewpohts to ïkstrate something of the range of opinions that obtain on this abject. 
Moreover, my purpose for considering jurisprudence is simply to provide essentiai context for the real 
focus of this paper - considnation of the cumnt usage and practice rtspecting discretionary power in 
overseas seIection of Independent immigrants. 
1.2 Dicey and the Rule of Law 
In any system of law, there are really ody two options for the expression and 
enforcement of law. The involves discretion, which invests legal authonties with 
latitude to determine the ambit and scope of activities that are under the legal punriew. 
. The other entails resort to d e s ,  usually collected and codified in statutes, that typicdiy 
specify with some precision what is to be regulated, the extent to which it is regulated, 
and the consequences of any breach of the de. Though they seem to be opposites, the 
two are actually just reverse sides of the same coin. This is so since even the clearest rule 
often requires some judgment in its exercise. As a result, the fundamental question is one 
conceming which of them is to enjoy primacy. In modem Canadian practice, it is 
obvious even to the casual observer that d e s  are pre-eminent. 
This pre-eminence is seen clearly in the following paragraph fiom a judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Canada: 
The rule of Law, a fundamental principle of our Constitution must mean at least 
two things. First, that the law is supreme over officiais of the govemment and 
thereby predusive of the iduence of arbitrary power.. . Second, the nile of law 
requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive law which 
preserves and embodies the more generd principle of normative order. Law and 
order are indispensable elements of civilized life.2' 
This passage contains two important ideas bearing upon discretionary power, both of 
which are grounded in the concept of the 'hile of law". These are that the Iaw is 
composed of expücit d e s  and that such d e s  act as  a check on the authonty of 
govemmental officiais. By implication, that which is not part of the express law is 
included in the potential for arbitmy power. Discretionary authority, of course, exists 

ensured that it was to have long and lasting influence? Dicey's own distaste for official 
discretion was nowhere more evident than in his classic staternent expounding upon the 
d e  of law, where he explaineci it as meaning that: 
. . .no man is punishable or can be made to suffer in body or goocis except 
for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legai manner before the 
ordlliary courts of the land. In this sense the d e  of law is contrasted with every 
system of govemment based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, 
arbitrary? or discretionary powers of constraint? 
Certaialy7 by use of the word "discretionary" in the same breath as 'uride7' and 
"arbitrary", Dicey left Little doubt as to his pejorative sentiments? More importantly, the 
continuhg influence of the several principles expresseci in this paragraph is difficult to 
overehate.  Through his formulation of the d e  of law and its restatement of the 
histoncal bias toward discretion, Professor Dicey was able to reinvigorate the prej~dice.'~ 
And indeed, he remained ever vocal in his suspicion of discretionary power, though in 
later writings he softened somewhat by allowing that state provision of social welfare 
programs required some freedom for action by administrative officiais. Nonetheless, 
even this concession was accompanied by the warning that such powers were always 
subject to abuse, if not closely constrauied by law." Similarly, the bias against discretion 
in his staternent of the 'hile of lad' was reinforced by the requirement that only a 
n ~ h e  t nth edition of that book, consuitcd for this treatise, is sureIy evidence of longevity, and 
circumstantially at least, of continued influence. 
Supm note 26 at 188. 
BEvans, supra note 2 at 1019, observes for example that "...Dicey seemed to regard the presence of 
discretion as inimical to a system of govenmient that was subject to the d e  of law." 
mSee H.W. Arthws, "Reethinking Administratitive Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17 Osgoode Bail 
L J. 1 at 22, where the author identifies 3 themes in Dicey's work: (1) that discretion is the antithesis of 
law; (2) that generality of legal d e s  is identined as an important safeguard of individual rights; and (3) 
that resolution of disputes by the ordinary courts, rather than ofncials or a Conseil d'Etat, is said to be a 
hailmark of legality. Ironicdy, he notes that courts have always had a good deaI of discretion, for 
example in detennining what is k i r  inherent jurisdiction (ie. fact hding, sentencing and review of 
"'distinct breach of law" could provide a legitimate basis for ofncid action. It ensured 
that fiuziness in Iegd language and standards, regardless of whether they were regdatory 
or pend in nature, was to be eschewed. Clarity and certitude were rendered synonymous 
with justice and fair play in the English Iegal mind. 
Aithough in many ways Dicey got it wrong, with many of his ideas and theories 
discredited or discarded over the years, his views on the illegitimacy of discretionary 
power were not so easily forgotten? The influence of those views was such that they 
were taken up with some fervour by others. In 1929, Lord Hewart, then Chief Justice of 
England, wrote in his book, The Nav Desp~tisrn.~ about the need to bring administrative 
tribunals under the sway of the courts in order to check what he called "collectivist 
tendencies'? A s W a r  rebuke to administrative fieedom was delivered a couple of years 
later by Oxford scholar, Sir Carleton Kemp Men, in his work, Bureaucracy 
TnumphantJ5 
The practical outiet for al1 of this mistrust was the development of an overarching 
theme in academic riterature on how best to controf administrative discretion that remains 
i n f i o r  tn'bunals). 
'' Evans, supra note 2 at 1019. 
" See for example, Eric Barendt, "Dicey and Civil Liberties" [l985 1 Public Law 596, where the author 
observes that Dicey's real contri'bution was not that he gave an accurate account of the common law. In his 
view, Dicey's description was, in fact, wrong in many respects. Thus, at 596, he States that what Dicey 
"...wrote about individual rights and fkecdoms mnains important, not so much because it is still a tolerably 
accurate account of the basic constitutional position of these h i e s ,  but rather because his outïook - a 
paean of praise to the wisdom of the common law - continues ta innuence modem thinking on these 
matters*" 
33 (reprint 1929 ed,  London: Ernst Benn, 1945). 
Y The influence of this work apparently reached also m the Canadian side of the Atlantic. See for example, 
F E  Scott, Comment [193q Can. Bar Rev. 62, where the author uses a reference to this work as the lead-in 
to an article decryiug both arbitrary use of deportation powers by Canadian immigration officiais and 
unwillingness by the courts to check exercise of such power, 
'' (Oxford: M o r d  Univ. Press, 193 1).
evident today. For example, in his autboritative tome, Administrative L m S M  Sir William 
Wade b e g k  by describing administrative law "...as the law relating to the control of 
govemmental power'ln Like most traditional legal texts dealing with this area of law, 
Wade's emphasis is on control and circllmscription of delegated discretionary power, 
with little concession to any positive or beneficial aspects that may follow from the 
delegation. As such, he describes two inherent characteristics that attach to 
administrative agencies. 'Tirst, they are ail subject to legal limitations; there is no such 
thing as absolute or unfettered administrative power. Secondly, and con~equentially~ it is 
always possible for any power to be abused"? Thus, in Wade's view, it foilows that 
"[tlhe primary purpose of administrative Law.. . is to keep the powers of govemrnent 
within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citizen39 against their abuse"? This 
statement is now so commonplace as to be something of a mantra for administrative 
I W ~ ~ S . ~ '  
f6 Sir William Wade & Christopher Forsyth, Admini$trative Lm,  P ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Wade7'). 
"Id. at 4. 
''Id. at 5. 
39 Or, very reIevantiy in the immigration law context, even the non-citizen. 
Wade, supra note 36 at 5. The use of the word "abusen to descrii misuse of admhhative powers is 
perhaps an unfortunate one, since every misuse of power is thus imbued with an aura of deviousness or 
malicious intent It is, however, simply a tenn of art that has corne to desmie any use of power not strictIy 
permitted within the terms of the delegation that delivered it. Wade does note that govemment is ody 
human and so makes &es k e  any citizen might. Thus, he notes h t  while "abuse" is bound to occur, 
that tenn does not ipso facto require the existence of any moral turpitude. 
'' See for exampIe, the 1968 Report of the Royal Commission, An Inquis, in20 Civil Rights: Report No. 1 
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, Ontario, 1968), chaired by the Honomble J-C. McRuer who, while accepting 
the need for discretim in the modem -te, also warned that it needd to be strictly limited. Writing at page 
95, Vol. 1, No. 1, he urged h t  such power be delegated only to the extent that is ". . .necessary and 
unavoidable in order to achieve the social objective or policy of the statute. It ought not to be conferred 
where d e s  or standards for judiciai application can be stated Where an administrative power is necessary 
aad unavoidable, the power should be no wider in scope than is demanded to meet the necessity." For 
simila. views, see also generdy, Kenneth Culp Davis, Dkretiuncuy Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton 
Rouge, L a :  Louisiana State University Press, 1969)and Denis J. Gaiiigan, Diwretionary Powem A Legal 
S&dy of O~@iàl Discretion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
Dicey's influence on the attitude of our legal system toward discretion was 
important, but it was not his only achievementt4 Perhaps even more significant was that 
his ideas were able to influence the very structure of that system. This was so, since he 
would make no concession to the uniqueness of administrative Iaw and the nature of the 
issues and problems that are its province. Dicey asserted that English cornmon Iaw 
would not countenance any such bifurcation as was present in the French legal system, 
where the droit administratïfexisted as a unique branch of law, complete with a separate 
judicial structure concerned only with the activities of administrative agencies. 
Consequently, he brooked no "special treatment" for this branch of law, holding that its 
subject matter and issues were on the same plane as any other dealt with in the regular 
courts. For him, the d e  of law was simple and neat. One law and one system of justice 
for dl, so ". . . that government and citizens alike.. . [were] subject to the generd law of the 
land adminstered in the ordinary  court^".^ Regardless of whether the parties to a dispute 
consisted of govemment and governed, or just two private citizens, the rule of law meant, 
in theory at le&, that all were fkee to corne before the same courts, as equals, to receive 
the same measure of justice. This homogenous conception of the oneness of our legal 
system has ensured the supremacy of the "ordinary" courts as the pinnacle of our legal 
system. Irrespective of whether the subject rnatter involves an issue of broad social 
policy, or a bit of legal minutia conceming statutory interpretation, the ultimate venue for 
**For an interesting discourse generally on the influence of "Diceyan values", see the judgment of Wilson 
J. in National Corn Growers Assn, v. Canada 119901 2 S.C.R. 1324. 
"Evans, supra note 2 at 28, where the authors also note that this conception of government under law has 
been the basis for objections to broad discretionîry power granted to the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration to expel non-citizens or p d t  or refuse entry to persons, irrespective of whether or not they 
have met general admission crite&. Evans desmis the o h  open e n d 4  nature of such power as 
unsettling for those whose preferences lie wiîh a fixed set of universaUy applicable d e s .  
resolution is the sanie. 
Since at least the Great Depression of the 1930's, the administrative legai system 
has grown explosively and now regulates and manages ever more aspects of daily Me. 
Throughout this growth, however, the possibilities for and limitations on administrative 
action have been dominated by ideals and principles laid d o m  in Dicey's formulation of 
the d e  of law. In particular, it has provided the jurisprudential basis for courts to 
maintain a supervisory role over administrative agencies, even where it has been 
expressly denied by legislation." A uniquely legalistic worldview, with the litigation 
model as its prirnary paradigm, has, therefore, served to shape much of the form, 
fimction, processes and structures that make up cwrent administrative law. Of course, as 
with any matter of public policy, there are a number of opinions regarding whether 
society has been well served by Dicey's model of the nile of law and the uniforrnity it 
wrought? It is just such questionhg which prompted development of the fûnctionalist 
critique. 
1.3 Dicey Undone - The Functionalist Approach 
Aithough Dicey attempted to flesh out the bones of the ideal of the nile of law, yet 
it remained something of an inchoate concept, more significant in foxm than substan~e.~ 
* Id. 
45 See for example, Evans, id. at 29, who note that the courts' patterns of thought and undmtancüng of law 
and Iegd processes have been superimposed upon the administrative machezy for delivery of pubJic 
services. To their mind, however, the effort has not been entnely smooth, particularly withrespect to 
interests created by the a-tive state, such as licenses and welfare benefits. They suggest that legai 
notions of procedural propriety in decision malring, favouring litigation and more f o d  judicial process, 
have often left the courts rnyopic to oîher modeis for admhktmtive action. 
Evans, id at 27, for example, offecr the following observations: 
The d e  of law is an i d d  to which appeals are regularly made by proponents, and their critics, of 
measures relating to the design and delivery of public programs. Like the concepts of lrberty and 
This seeming defect has perhaps been its greatest strength. Because it was not one thing, 
it could thereby be al l  things to weryone. In 1979, &W. Arthurs noted that while a lot of 
the shitnng had been knocked out of Dicey's theories over the years, yet the 'hile of law" 
remaineci a d y i n g  c y  for any who view delegated authonty and discretion suspiciously, 
as the fkst and worst breach in the defense of individual liberty." It is precisely because 
of its wispy definition that it continues to be a popular catch-al1 rubric for disparaging any 
displeasing govemmental action implicating discretionary authority. And it is precisely 
this sort of attitude which Dicey intended to stir up, since his prejudices agahst 
administrative law prevented him h m  viewing it as other than an illegitimate branch of 
law. Certainiy, this flavour is captured, as Arthurs points ouf in Dicey's characterization 
of administrative tribunals as somehow ''ideriof' and regular courts "superior"? Even 
in the face of criticisrns that the concept of the ' M e  of law" is more theory than 
substance, it continues to be a very innuential force in shaping lawyers' and judges' 
opinions of the proper d e ,  ambit and structure of ndminishtive And it is, of 
course, a cnticd view of discretion which lies at the core of those opinions. 
However, the case against discretion is not all one sided and it was this realization 
which spawned the functionalist movement. Functionalism proceeds fkom the 
assumption that administrative law should be viewed as facilitative and legitimizing, 
democracy, the rule of law has no generally agreed rneaning as applied to law and administration, 
The nile of law is also like h i  anddemocracy in that it is rejected by few, although particula. 
versions of it are keedy contested. . . . However, the root idea, namely that government shouid be 
subject to law, is one that, lüce democracy and ri'berty, wilI not go away. 
" See Arttiurs, "Rethdchg Administrative Lawn, supra note 30 at 4-5. 
1d 
491d. at 5. 
rather tha. limiting and restrictive, and that govemment action can be a source of good.' 
Developed diiring the 1930's as a reaction to what was seen as the misguidecl premise 
upon which Dicey's positivist formulation was based, its leadhg early proponent was 
Rofessor John Willis of Dalhousie University Law School. Willis observed that the 
Diceyan approach was kated on the fact that a power was granted, and that it was this 
point alone which garnered lawyers' attention most, playing to their fears of big 
govemment and apprehension of any curtailment of individual liberty. He saw this as a 
shallow, knee jerk reaction that missed the t d y  salient point. Instead of concentrating on 
the fact that a power has been granted, WiEs felt the real focus should be on the uses 
power is actuaUy put to. In this way, its most humane and efficacious application might 
be ensured. To further this goal, he took issue with the central pillar that held Dicey's 
unitary mode1 of the d e  of law together - narnely, that "ordinary law" and "ordinary 
courts7' were the only legitimate components of the English legal system. 
Willis began by noting that the need for delegation of authoriw was a necessary 
and established practice, since it was practicdy impossible for Parliament or the 
legislatures to directly legislate, adjudicate and regulate the minutiae of the myriad 
activities within their j~risdictions.~ Contrary to Dicey's assertions that Parliament was 
the ultimate and only source of law, WiIlis cited a long tradition of other bodies 
a Functionalists concede that mistakccs and emrs can and are made by tribunais. However, they emphasize 
that such mistaka are naturai in any human activity and need not necessarily be the r e d t  of iii will or 
maiice. Such mistakes, therefore, are not cause for viewing suspiciously ail govemment activity. It is 
simply a case of providing the best possiôle procedure, including appropriate scrutiny mechanisms, to 
ensure fair and reasonable outcornes m accordance with the mandate for which the power was grantd 
" See for example, Wiiiis "Tbree Approaches to Admhktmtive Law", supra note 22 at 55, where he 
observes that ''[tJhe deIegation of power to a goverrunent department, a practice of very respectable 
antiquity, is now u n i v d y  recognized by respomile persoas as a practicai necessity if the work of 
govefnment is to be d e d  on at ail, Why waste the thne of parliament on details or on technical matters 
". . . laying down general rules for fbture action.. . .'- Arthurs, a later proponent of the 
fûnctionalist approach, picked up on this train of thought and put it even more forceMy, 
. . .Diceyys assumption that recourse to "ordinary Law" and "ordinary courts" was a 
constitutional right sanctified by actual practice in b~re-collectivisty' England is 
insupportable. Ch the contrary, history and modem practice coaiesce around the 
proposition that what is "ordinary" is a situation in which law ernanates fiom 
many sources, including judges who do aot sit in, and are not part of the hierarchy 
of, the superior courts; statutes which perversely and persistently fail to confom 
to Dicey's constitutional strictures; and customs and private arrangments which 
similarly sink below Dicey's plimsoll he. In short, Dicey's view of the legd 
system.. . was both partial and partisan: partial, because it ignored so much; 
partisan, because it emphasized the legitimacy of the common law over ail other 
parts of the sy~tem.~ 
Although fiuictionalists obviously disagreed with the picture that Dicey painted of 
the structure and sources of law, they maintained that this did not necessarily place them 
at odds with the fundamental principles upon which the d e  of law was based. In 
Arthurs' words, "[tlhe d e  of law does assume a different vision of the legal system than 
does administrative law.. .[but] [wlhat divides these visions of law is not a fùndamental 
disagreement over the relevance of such basic values as procedural fairness, adherence to 
appropriate normative d e s ,  or accountability; rather, the source, meaning and practical 
which it cannot understand? [footnote omittedr 
Id. See &O for example, Evans, supra note 2 at 30, where the authors cite the example of ûiiunals, 
active already in Dicey's t he ,  which were dedicated to worker d e t y  in factories, mines and the me. 
Arthurs "RethrmSng Admbistmtive Law", mpra note 30 at 13-14. Notwithstanding such criticisms, it is 
not difncult to h d  examples of the sway which Dicey's d e  of "ordmary law and ordinary c o u . "  
continues to hold over common law mincis. For example the most recent edition of Wade's text on 
Administrative Law, supra note 36 at 12, still d e s m i  the fact that ordinary courts, rather than special - .  
admmtstrative triiunals, determine cases invohing the vaIidity of g o v m e n t  action as the ". . .outstanding 
characteristic of the Anglo-Amcrican system. . .. The ordmary iaw of the land, as modifïed by Acts of 
ParLiament, appks to ministers . . , local authorities, and other agencies of govemment, and îhe ordinary 
courts dispense it." 
implementation of these values are the focus for debate? Accepting then that power 
must be delegated, shared or o t h d s e  distriibuted for reasons of practicality and efficacy, 
the focus instead is to ask the question - to whom has a particular statutory power been 
granted? Such a line of questioning, they postulate, promotes maximum efficiency in 
administration by matching power to the body or tribunal best suited to exercise it. 
Having settled the initial h e  of inqujr, fimctionalism goes on to propose a 
subsidiary branch of questioning conceming the oversight process to which exercise of 
any discretionary power might be subjected The quest is to determine to what extent and 
by what sort of agency such review should be conducteci? It is, of course, a b t  order 
tenet of the d e  of law that "ordinary" courts have exclusive jurisdiction to oversee and 
review aU legai processes. For fiuictionalists, however, it is hardly a foregone conclusion 
that the courts should, by default, be favoured for the work of administrative review. 
Arguing that courts are, in fact, il1 equipped and ill-suiteci to the work of reviewing 
statutory discretions, WiIlïs and others have been especially critical of the judicial 
straitjacket that has been imposed upon the administrative field by Dicey's parochial 
prescription? Functionalism stresses the importance of recognizing that administrative 
tribunals are delegates of powers granted by elective assemblies. Because those bodies, 
unlike the courts, denve their authority k t l y  nom the people, t h ~ y  have a more 
immediate comection to democratic legitimacy. While the courts clearly have a 
constitutional and moral position as supervisors. neither should they be empowered to 
thwart legitimate poficy objectives enunciated by the legislature. Insteaâ, law should be 
Arthurs, id. at 42. 
" WilIk "Three Approaches to Administrative Law", supm note 22 at 59. 
the means for facfitating the achievement of public policy ends and courts shouid give 
the widest deference in this regard? Functionalists assert, however, that courts have not 
shown such deference in façt. 
The reasons cited for this are many, and include the mistrust that Dicey laboured 
to n m e  a g a k t  discretionary power. However, the problern goes beyond this, touching 
upon areas involving court structures and processes that do not necessarily implicate a 
deliberate judicial effort to confound and disnipt the administrative machinery. It is 
simply that cour!! by nature iII-suited and ill-equipped for the task of administrative 
review. Accordhg to WiIiïs, "@]egaI rights are normdy decided by a court for the 
reason, and no other, that they are best fitted for the work of finding fa& and absorbing 
new interests into the existing social structure* But the legal mind is not trained to 
interpret legislation on subjects of which its possessor is entirely ignorant."' The 
complex and far reaching policy issues present in many tribunal decisions, he argues, are 
rnatters typically beyond the ken and experience of the classicdy trained judicial mind. 
In particular, the formative process that lawyers and judges undergo fosters a preference 
for facts and strict detennination of rights in an individualized decision-making setting 
that induces a sort of judicial tunnel vision. Because of it, courts tend to ignore the larger 
social purposes and fidl panoply of equities that should properly be part of the equa t i~n .~~ 
56 Evans, supra note 2 at 30. 
Id at 31. 
' Willis ‘mec Approaches to Administrative Law", supra note 22 at 76. 
s9 4 as Evans, supra note 2 at 30, notes the hnctionalist argument: 
Dicey's disapprovai of broad administrative discretion and his support for giving the   or^ 
courts a key position in the resolution of disputes between the individual and the admbbtntive 
state thwarts the effective UnpIernentation of legisîatively eaacted public mterest programs of 
reguiation and redisûiiution. The litigation process reduces to a ''question of law" or an issue of 
procedural "fiaimess" complex poiicy choices that are more hclpfiilly considered in the context of 
Though often guided by a sense of justice and fgir play, the hation of courts in this 
regard leads to confusion and uncertainty in many areas of administrative law and 
exacerbates the difficulties for agencies to develop comprehensive, effective strategies for 
carrying out their overall mandatesw 
As Arthurs observes, the obsession with individual justice can and d o a  produce 
the opposite effect of what may actudy have been intended by the legislation concemed. 
In his words: 
At.. . [the] root [of incoherence in the judicial review system] is the inevitable 
tendency of good judges to want to do the right thing, to shield citizens against 
perceived injustices, to vindicate legal values. These tendencies are so strong that 
they lead judges to reach results by whatever means corne to hand: strict or 
purposive interpretations of the governing legislation, technicd or liberal attitudes 
towards the triiunal's procedural and evidentiary requirements, conservative or 
creative use of the courts' remedial powers, and most importantly, selection of a 
restrained or interventionist attitude towards the judges' own role. What happens 
on the sudace of the judgment is, in the end, detemllned not so much by text-book 
maxims as by the judges' conviction that the interest of justice will or will not be 
served by a particular result? . . .But this conviction gives rise to a serious 
the program t b t  the agency is administerhg, than of generd legd principles and the inevitable 
distortions of iitigation. 
Evans, id., notes that the functionalist camp: 
... has.. .argued that the positivist legal tradition, of which Dicey's thought is part, has failed to 
appreciate that law is inextricably intertwmed with policy. Given the limitations of legislative 
foresight and the inherent ambiguities of Ianguage, it is normaliy not possible to determine, when 
contesteci, the meaning of a provision in an agency's enabling legislation without aIso considering 
the consequences that one interpretation, rather than another, would have for the program that the 
legislation had been created by the legislature to deliver. The specialist agency is more likeiy than 
any reviewing court to be in a position to make an infomed assessrnent of the interpretation that 
will enable the program to be most effective. It foiiows, therefore, that if judiciai intervention on 
the ground of illegality means h t  a reviewing court is encouraged to substitute its interpretation 
of legislation for that of the agency, the agency's ability to develop a coherent strategy for 
discharging its policy mandate is liable to be undeminecl 
A statement which suggests t h  d e  of law's prescription for one law and equal justice for al1 is stronger 
in theory than praetice. The quite mdefSfatl&ble sentiment descriid in this passage by Arthurs is 
doubtless common in practice. At a Iuncheon address to the 1996 CBA. immigration Law Conference, 
for example, 1 recall a FederaI Court Justice ncountmg bis eXpenence in reviewing a particular case 
decision. As he e x p h e d  it, he felt comgeiied by the law to confirm the removd of an immigrant 
applicant fiom Canada, though the equities of the case apparently troubled him thereafter. He W y  
admitted that should the same scenario present itseffagain, he would have no hesitation to decide the case 
otherwise. The implication was clear that "justicen wodd be made to prevail over law. 
problem: a court's view of '.justice" wiU not necessarily conform to that of the 
legislature or of the administrative tribunal it is reviewing." 
Functionalists are quick also to point out a number of other significant problems 
associated with the practice of judicial review, as it has developed. For example, 
although review is said ordinarily not to be concenied with questions of fact, it is 
generally a facile matter to convert issues of fact or policy to questions of law." 
Moreover, the reality of having courts supervise administrative practices has the practical 
efféct of forcing subordinate tribunais to adhae more closely to formal court-like 
processes, than may have bem intended. In particular, the commitment to the adversarial 
process, resting as it does upon the notion of individualized processing, robs the 
administrative sphere of flexibility in striking ". . .an appropriate balance between 
efficiency and efféctive nghts of participation.'" Sirnilarly, the judicial preference for 
published reasons, rooted in the cornmon law principle of stare decisis, has the effect of 
reseicting delegated discretion, since its exercise is thereby subjected to more rigorous 
Wiiiis, "Three Approaches to Administrative Law", supra note 22 at 74, echoes the views of Arthm 
when he observes that common iaw and equity developed largely h m  judges doing what they thought 
'%est" under the citcums&nces. It is for this reason that he derides the rule of law as being stronger in 
fonn, than in substance. Were it othemkc, he posits that the nile of law's abhorrence of broad powers 
vested in public authorities might have stymied the developrnent of the ample social policies for which 
Canada is renowned. 
H.W. Arthurs, "Protection agaiost Judicial Review" (1983) 43 Revue du Barreau 277 at 284-285. 
Willis, "Three A p a c h e s  to Aclministrative Law", supra note 22 at 74. 
Arthuis, "Protection against Judiciai review", supra note 62 at 289. See also, for example, the Supreme 
Court of Canada's decision in Singh v. Minister of Empfoynient and Immigration, 11 9851 1 S.C.R. 1 77, 17 
D.L& (4&) 422 (S.C.C.), where arguments conceming administrative efficiency and cost were dealt with 
-Y* 
65 W i k ,  '%e Approaches to Admhktrative Law", supra note 22 at 74. Willis' views obviously hark 
back to a differe~lt era and it is doubtfuf that many today would argue that such scrutiny is necessady a bad 
thing. Rather* the argument may have M e d  focus to suggest that published reasons may aUow 
intervention for the wrong reasons - that because courts have so elevated mdividuai rights, smtiny of 
published reasons may tend to focus only on mhor faults and be oblivious to assessrnent of overall justice. 
Functionalists maintain that the use of procedural faimess as the prhary tool for 
defending individual liberty and rights actuaiiy misses the point altogether and causes as 
much h m ,  as good. The demands of "natural justice" and "faimess", they argue, are 
more suited to the adversarial processes of the court than of some administrative b o d i e ~ . ~  
Rather than enhancing liberty, the procedural f e e s s  imposed by courts may actudy 
have a dampening effect, inhibiting effective delivery of public pro gram^.^ They point 
out that the tendency of bureaucracy is to follow the path of least resistance. Thus, the 
true probiem is not that individual rights are in jeopardy, but d e r  that the agency 
concerned will do as little as is needed to meet the thresholds set by the court.' The 
greater threat, therefore, is that public programs will be under-delivered, with too much 
time and energy expended on form and not enough devoted to substance. The problem is 
exacerbated by a narrow judicial focus on procedures and immediate parties only, which 
effectively forecloses senous consideration of the real purposes for which the legislation 
was promulgated. It is a viewpoint that often leads to good individual decisions, but 
overail bad law, since both the wider body of intendeci beneficiaries and the public 
interest are minor considerations, if considered at dl." The absence of a broader outlook, 
involving consideration of the context and totality of the particular program, means that 
procedural fairness becomes a substitute for substantive justice. In such a game, there 
may be individual winners, but the reai goals and purposes of the program are left to rest 
66 Arthurs, "Protection against Judicial Reviewn, supra note 62 at 288-289. 
6' Evans, supra note 2 at 30. 
" Arthufs, ''Rethdchg Achinhative Law", supra note 30 at 24, notes a devehping body of literature 
îhat suggests that administrative decision-makers are not ody theoretically committed to obeying law, but 
in fact may tend to aiiow discretion to c x y d h e  so completely into d e s  that they sometimes cease to 
fundon effectively, or at least as orighdly man&ted 
" Evans, supra note 2 at 30. 
on a house of cards, more substantial in appmrance than in d t y .  
The matter of limited understanding is compounded aiso by judicial procedures 
and practices which, though of great antiquity and impeccable pedigree, hobble the 
court's ability to expand its horizons and, by extension, those of the administrative world. 
In reviewing for legai error, the courts apply canons of statutory interpretation that 
assume a word or phrase can have a universal legal rneaning. It is an assumption that 
proceeds h m  a certain chauvinism that while poiicy may be the province of 
administrative agencies, yet it remains for courts alone to interpret legislation and its 
application and eEect upon individual rights. The result is that if the agency adopts a 
different interpretation to that prefmed by the court, then a reviewable error has 
occ~rred .~~  However, the courts have traditionally operateci under a canon of construction 
that prevented them h m  seeking interpretive guidance outside of the statute itself." 
Discretion created under statute must be exercised in accordance with the statute that 
creates it. In determinhg whether a body has strayed fiom the limits of what Parliament 
intended a power to be exercised for, the canon holds that Parliament's intent is to be 
gleaned only fiom the statute, and not nom any traauxprepcruîroires or other secondary 
source. This results in the so-cailed Wack box" problem of statutory interpretation, 
which can often create a yawnùig gap between policy intent and actual practice, as 
pennitted by the courts. 
The peculiarities of judicial interpretation have another deleterious side effect. 
Statutes are created to teil laypersons how to conduct themselves. However, the arcane 
Evans, id. at 29 
n Arthu~s, '%thinking Admm~stra . . tive Law", supra note 30 at 1 8. 
processes of judicial interpretation actually serve to obfuscate, since what is apparent on 
the face of the statute rnay w t  dways accord with actual court sanctioned practice. 
Judicial pronouncements, therefore, may serve to render the law even more 
incomprehensiile and inaccessible to the very persons it is meant to serve. Arthurs 
suggests a number of reasons for the traditional reluctance of courts to go outside the four 
corners of a statute in their efforts at interpretation. These include a preference for 
symmetry and consistency over actual objectives, a sense of devotion to ancient common 
law dictates that eschew resort to extrinsic evidence and the possibility of a low yield in 
results insuiEcient to justify the effort needed to pick through extraneous e~ idence .~  His 
own inclination, however, is for a theory which suggests that the bias against outside 
evidence actually springs fiom a desire to remain true to the Diceyan ideal of one law for 
dl, which does not countenance development of separate rules for specialized groups or 
interests? 
Whatever the reason, Arthurs argues that the courts' attitude to interpretation 
should Vary, depending upon whether it is exercising primary jurisdiction or a review 
hction.  He notes that ifreviewing a tribunal, then the court should be sensitive to the 
fact that parliament chose to repose its trust in the interpretation of the îribunal, which 
may be expert in the matter. Though there is now a developing trend in this direction, at 
least in the case of tribunah considered expert by the courts, it does not enjoy wide 
application since only a very few specialized tribimals have actudy been accorded 
" fiid. at 19. 
" f i id See also ibid. at 26, for example. whae he notes that one component of the d e  of law is that the 
same legd d e s  be appiicablc to ail equalIy. He chmisses this as "nonsense", citing the example of C m  
immunities, and asserthg that it is in fact a common practice to nnd iaws that are meant to be applied 
"expert" status." Interpretation of legislation is the business of the courts and so they 
continue to prefer their own judgment to that of ''infaor" tribrmals. Coincidentally, this 
preference for court-like interpretations arrived at through court-like methods has a 
homogenizing effect that may serve to stifle innovation and creativity in bureaucratie 
procedures and processes? According to Arthurs: 
Having judges review administrative processes may have fesulted in a tendency to 
teil administrators "do as we do" as well as "do as we say". The legacy of 
Dicey's rule of Iaw clearly has developed a culture that produced predictable 
results. The structure and staffing of tribimals, the specification of their fimctions 
and procedures, and the provision of broad rights of appeal are molding tnbunals 
which tend to be more court-like. Life is comllig to resemble art." 
In particular, the courts' Litigation mode1 focuses attention primarily on the 
individual parties to a suit. The result is an emphasis on processes for protection of 
individual nghts which tends to downplay the public interest component of public 
programs. Certady, in the immigration sphere, the courts in recent years have been 
vigorous in circumscribing discretionary power, both substantive and procedural, usually 
citing the right of applicants to faimess as the ju~tification.~ One teliing result of this 
selectively to particular individuais or groups. 
74 The question of curial deference to tribunai expertise, and the related issue of pnvative ciauses, are 
matters of some controversy. However, they are not ones which directly affect the subject matter of this 
study and so are not be canvassed in aay depth. Suffice to say that there are no pnvative clauses affkcting 
immigration. See, for example, Connor et al. v. Canada (Min. of Cirizenship & Immigration) (1995), 95 
F.TR 66 at 68 where the Court noted that "...the statutory provisions of the Immigration Act indicate that 
privative-clause type deference is not intended" Speaking of the I U .  in particular, the Court added tbat 
it did not accord a high degree of deference to decisions of that tri'bunaî, since it did not consider the 1.R.B. 
to be expert in the same way that a securities commission might be expert in a  technical area. Similarl~~ 
the courts have not k e n  inclined to regard visa officers as any sort of expert decision-makers and so have 
no hesitancy in reviewing overseas immigration decisions. For more information on the subject of 
precIusive clauses and judicial defmnce to t n i i d  expertise generally, see Evans. supra noh 2 at 813 - 
965. 
" Arthurs, "Retfiinlcing Admmisnative Law", supra note 30 at 28, notes that there is Little dispute that 
giving supervisory jurisdiction to courts has affected the development of administrative iaw. 
76 Id. at 38. 
For a more detaiied discussion and specific examples of this phenornenon, see g e n d y  Chapter 3 
below. 
attitude is perhaps seen in fkquent amendments to the Act and Regu2ation.s that have been 
undertaken to preserve administrative flexiiility and eniciency. Where the loss of 
discretion has had serious resource or other implications for CIC, legislative amenciments 
invoking new d e s  to replace the discretion have been necessary. Administrators have 
thus been forced into a situation of creating an ever more detailed, court-like regime of 
intncate rules and obscure procedures to meet judicial objections conceming discretion. 
Fominately for administraton, however, d e s  c m  be fashioned not just to 
safeguard appiicant rights, but also to preserve administrative convenience. Though 
statutory and regdatory changes have been necessary in some instances, these are more 
of a nuisance than an obstacle. On the 0th- hand, however, there must be some doubt as 
to whether the court driven move to a p a t e r  mass of more explicit niles has been a 
victory for applicants and the protection of their interests. A more complex 
administrative regime appears to do litt1e to facilitate greater access to the immigration 
system or to enhance overall substantive justice in that system. This is particularly so 
when one considers the clientele involved and the barriers many of them face in terms of 
their geographic location, language ability, access to competent legal advice on Canadian 
Law and the like. An ever more detailed regime of intncate d e s  and obscure procedures, 
spelling out in more particularity what may or may not be done, simply adds additional 
complexity difficult for many applicants to overcome. It is ironic to consider that the 
singuiar focus on individual rights, rather than making immigration processes fairer and 
more user fiendly, may have had the opposite result. It is not surpnsing, therefore, that 
the use of private immigration advisers has spiraleci as  applicants find themselves 
increasingly unable to comprehend the myriad rules now applicable even to a "routine" 
application. At the same time, a spint of increasing litigiousnessn has focused ever more 
judicial attention on immigration law with the d t  that opportunities for judicid 
intervention have also expanded. And so it is that the circle becomes complete, with 
more attention and intemention begetting more detailed nile making. 
Functionalists, however, wouid prefer less emphasis on individual nghts and more 
on the purposes of the legislation and the public policy it is rneant to fbrther. In their 
view, the methods and processes of the administrative agency shouid be shaped mostly 
by the needs of its mandate and public. Ifthis means a large amount of autonomy and 
divergence in the practices of administrative agencies, then so be it? AU of this wodd 
simply be a reflection of the reaiities of the mandate and more likely to carry forward the 
mission of providing greater good to more persans? 
" Se+ for example, External Affairs and International Trade Cana& - Al1 Immigration Mission Message 
ORD-0074 (18 October 1991) "Federal Court Challenges". That message descnies a reahtion by 
departmental officiais of a change in the ways of overscas immigration processiog, raarked chiefly by an 
atmosphere of increased litigation. The document desm'bes a number of departmental strategies for 
dealing with same, including mation of a "Litigation Advisoi' position at Headquarters to liaise between 
Department of Justice cowisel (who conduct immigration Litigation on bebalfof CIC) and visa officers in 
the field. Other initiatives rneant to hclp officers cope with the workload flowing fiam increased litigation 
include more training on litigation, human rights and privacy matters, provision of more detailed guidelines 
and better reportmg on and analysis of court decisions impactmg field operations 
7s See for example. John WiiIis, "The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values" (1968) 
18 U.T.L.J. 35 1. In his reply to the McRuer report, supra note 41, Willis states that its recommendation to 
have a mandatory code of statutory procedures goveming administrative maters is simply wrong. In his 
view, one of the essentiai features of administrative t r i i d  is a less complicated process. At 358-359, he 
notes: 
If you set up mandatory statutory codes of minimum procedural decencies, however devised, you 
di, in my view, inevitably reintroduce into 'non-court' deciding authorities the 'court' 
atmosphere that they were created to avoid - where foliowing the presmied ritual is more 
important than gethg at the rnerits, and strings of procedural objections are reguiarly made for no 
other purpose than to give the Iawyer who loses on the ments a second string to his bow in the 
court of review." 
Instead, he argues for what he cab the princïple of 'iiniqueness". "Inat the question of who, ifanyone, 
shouid have the nght to overturn the decisions of what authorities on what issues is one that can be 
answered only in consideration of ail of the circumscances of the situation at hand The factors are m a -  
and varied and include cornmonsense considerations such as speed, expense, expertise? 'public opinion' 
and many other factors too numemus to mention." 
* Arthum, ''Rethhking Admhhtmtivt Law", supra note 30 at 29. 
Thus, while fimctionalists have serious misgivings about the appropriateness of 
courts as a review forum for administrative action, they do not question the need for a 
review mechanism. It is simply that the courts' inadequaîe understanding of the 
particular subject matter leaves them best suited to deciding questions of law or 
jurisdiction, but nothing more? Particularly in the case of exercise of a discretion, they 
feel that what is needed is broader training and experience than just that of pure law and 
legal practice. In short, the position is that review panels supenking discretions require 
members whose background and expexience encompass the totality of administrative law 
and the special purposes for which the particular legislation was enacted Only with 
proper appreciation of the entire context in which the decision-making was rendered, is a 
reviewing body in a proper position to pass upon the propriety of a specific decision.'* 
And indeed, there is some reaiization on the part of courts that they are effectively 
outsiders, asked to peer into the b e r  workings of a clock whose operation they do not 
f U y  comprehend. It is for this reason, for example, that they daim no overt interest in 
the substance of a reviewed decision and limit their supervision to matten of procedure 
alone." This is not to suggest that the administrative realm is entirely fiee of its own 
'' There are, of course, other opinions as to the fitness of courts as review panels for administrative 
decisions. Wade, supra note 36 at 12, notes some advantages in favour of CO-, includmg that: 
The citizen can turn to courts of high standing in the public esteem, whose independence is 
beyond question; 
Highly efficient rernedies are available; 
There are none of the demarcation problems of division of jurisdictions; and 
Goverment is seen to be subject to the iaw of the land 
* Wüh,  "The Approaches to Administrative Law", supra note 22 at 80. 
* Willis, id. at 61-62, who also notes an increase in the classes of discretions that courts were prepared to 
control, expansion in the grounds of error for which review wodd lie and the courts evasion of privative 
clauses that purportcd to deprive them of jurisdiction to conduct review. In his opinion, such developments 
are indicative of "judicial hostility" toward discretionary power. Of course, thmgs have moved on since 
Willis wrote tfus more than 60 years ago, and the range and breadth of areas now covered by administrative 
tn'bunais has increased as complexity in society has incrcased Simuitaneously, however, the court's 
problems. One of the dangers cited against administrative tribunals by Dicey, for 
example is acknowledged by fiinctionalists as a serious concem. It is the problem of such 
tribunals being too subject to political influence by the legislatures which establish 
h m . "  However, for them, it is simply a case of ensuring that proper precautions, such 
as sufncient autonomy, are enshrined in any enabhg statute. The danger is not W c i e n t  
to justify the courts being the only suitable oversight mechanism. 
Although criticizing courts on the one hand as ill-suited to review of 
administrative tribunals, fiuictionalists have not shnmk fiom offering suggestions on the 
other as to how review by courts might be improved. Presumably, their advocacy for an 
alternative review mechanism has been tempered by a certain pragmatism as to the actual 
likelihood of courts being completely separated h m  this activity. This may in fact be 
the strength of fhctionalism and the reason for its continuhg relevame. Though 
advocating an alternative vision, yet it has also offered insights for improving the existing 
regime." Nonetheless, it is clear that a more positivïstic, d e  of law approach continues 
to prevail as the dominant approach of the courts in their consideration of discretions in 
immigration law and the resuits are manifested in the emphasis on individual rights that 
presentiy obtains. 
1.4 Why have discretion? 
In the Canadian constitutional tradition, Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
- - -- -- 
jurisdiction to mpenrise procedurai error has not slackened It is particularly interesthg to note principles 
and attitudes developed years ago may continue even today to show vigor and vitafity in the modem 
practice of admbistmtive law. 
~4 Arthurs, "Rethinlcing Achhktrative Law", supra note 30 at 34. 
rss See for example. Evans, supra note 2 at 3 1, who observes that functionabm has become a significant 
are sovefeign within their own defked areas of legislative cornpetence. A consequence 
of this sovereignq is that they are fke to delegate some or aU of their authorïty to a 
subordinate agency or body, as they deem appro~riate.~ Thus, legislation is often drafted 
in a %are bones" fashion, with authority for creation and implementation of compendious 
regulations setting out the procedures and niles by which an Act is to be carrïed out 
passed on to a subordinate body? And indeed, it is delegation of authority that is the 
very heart and soul of administrative law. As Wade notes, the reality is that very few 
legal objectives are a c W y  achieved by the mere enactment and promulgation of 
statutes, regulations and orders? Rather, the real work of împlementing legislative intent 
and delivering public programs is generally carried on outside of the legislat~re.~ The 
creation of boards, tnbunals and other authonties, to whom power is delegated, is the 
ordinary means by which that end is accomplished. So it is, in particular, that the 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (RB) have been created and empowered to carry out goals and objectives 
set out in the Immigration AcP (hereinafter the "Act '7 and Immigration ReguIations9' 
innuence in Canadian administrative law m recent years, ameliorating some of the shortcomings of Dicey's 
positivist approach. 
'6 David P. Jones & Anne S. deVilïars, Pnnciples of Administrative Lmv, 2d ed. (Scarborough: CarsweU, 
1994) at 27. 
* Peter W. Hogg, Cunrtihctional Lmv of Canada, 3d e d  (Scarborough, Ont: Carsweii, 1992) at 339-340, 
notes a practicai justification as to why delegation occurs: 
It is impossible for the federal Parliament or any provincial Legisiature to enact al1 of the laws that 
are needed in its jurisdiction for the purpose of govemment in any given year. When a Iegislative 
scheme is estabiished, the Parliament or the Legisla- will usuaiiy enact the scheme in outline 
oniy, and wiü delegate to a subordinate body the power to make laws on matters of detail, The 
subordinate body (or delegate) to which this iaw-malring power is delegated is most cornmonly 
the Governor in Council or the Lieutenant Govemor in Councii; each of th- bodies is in practice 
the cabinet of the govemment concerned [footnote omitted]. 
' Wade, supra note 36 et 4. 
IEJ See generally Evans, supra note 2 at 4-20. 
90 Supra note 14. 
(hereinafter the "Regulations '3. Although the former is an actual department of 
government and the latter a semi-autonomous boardg2, both are subordinates of and must 
take instruction h m  Parliament, in order to carry forward the aims and objectives of 
Parliament in respect of immigration matters." 
In the words of the curent Minister of Immigration, Lucienne Robillard, 
"[i]mmigration issues are rarely cut and W.'" Because of this, while black and white 
mies provide the foundation of the immigration program, their imprecision is recognized 
and provided against by the device of discretionary authority. Without question, the 
central justification for grants of broad administrative discretion has been the 
impracticality of devishg legislation sUaciently ample to deal with every possible 
contingency and permutation of circurnstances which c m  and do occur in the course of 
administering of legislation. As Evans no tes: 
When they enact a regulatory statute, legislatures cannot foresee or answer many 
of the policy questions that will inevitably arise in the course of delivering the 
'' immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR178- 172, as  am- 
" See S. 66 of the Act which provides that the IRB shall report to Pariiament through the Minister for 
Citizenship & Immigration. See also CIC, Canada 's lmnigtation Law (Ottawa: Ministem of Supply and 
Services Canada, 1992), at 23, footnote 2, where it is stated: ''The Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) is 
an independent decision-making body. It is empowered under the immigration Act to hear appeals in one 
division and detemime refugee status in the other. . . . Ali board members are appointed through the 
Governor In CounciI." 
There are, of course, signincant differences between govemment departments and independent or semi- 
autonomous administrative tribunais. 
"Civil servants . ..are normally subject to the instructions of their supenors in the hierarchy and to 
departmental policy, for which the müister is dtimately responsïble. in contrast, members of 
independent administrative agencies are in law immune h m  directions fkom coiieagues, 
including the agency chair, on how they should decide a givm case.. .A well publicized exarnple 
was the resignation in 1995 of the deputy chair of the IRB following degations by members that 
he had tried to "pressure" them over decisions that he regarded as out of line with Board policy. 
The problem is that it is very difflcult to reconcile the notion that members shodd enjoy the sarne 
degree of autonomy as judges, with the need to ensure that agency decisions made in the 
implementation of a public program a .  both consistent and mformed by the collective wisdom 
and experience of the agency as an institution-" Per Evans, mpra note 2 at 13, 
p. CK, News Release # 98-20, "1997 Report Shows the Niimber of Minister's P d t s  h e d  Holding at 
the 1996 Lever' (2 April1998) at 3. 
program that they have established. Hence, the broad grants of discretion given 
to many independent administrative agencies that they may exercise to make 
additional d e s  or formulate policies, or case by case?' 
Thus, while the Immigration Act and RegrrZatiom paint a reasonably detailed picture of 
who may immigrate to Canada, and under what circumstances, they still are insufncient 
to provide complete and specific guidance as to the appropriate disposition in every case. 
Proper fblfillment of the goals and aims of the Act and Reguiations would be impossible 
without a delegation of at least some discretionary authority over the subject matter of 
immigration law to the bodies that administer it. Such authority provides essential 
latitude for tailoring extant rules to suit irregular situations. for extrapolating beyond the 
d e s  to deal with cases not directly envisioned or encompassed by the statutory regime or 
to permit a determination whether the d e s  are at dl applicable in any given instance. 
The problem of formulating laws and d e s  that cm anticipate and respond 
appropriately to every potential scenario is particularly acute in the case of immigration 
law, which mus& be capable of implementation both domestically and abroad. 
Regdations that seem to make sense in a domestic setting often c m  prove difficult of 
appkation and interpretation in a foreign context. The matta is M e r  complicated by a 
sometimes parochial view possessed by legislators. Manbers of Parliament corne nom 
many waiks of life and of€en possess a wide variety of professional backgrounds. But 
few have significant experience working or living outside Canada and, more particularly, 
Little practical understanding of the diversity of environments within which our 
immigration legislation operates abroad. Likewise, the legislative agenda is sometunes 
manipulateci in favour of domestic political concems that pay scant attention to the 
- - - -  - 
9s Evans, supra note 2 at 17. 
problems of global application. AU of this leaves Parliament somewhat myopic to the 
problems of implementing and attministering extemalîy law created in Canada, largely 
pursuant to a domestic worldview. 
Two examples serve to illustrate the problem. Under a former version of the 
Regu~ationPY permanent residents or citizens of Canada were entitIed to sponsor for 
immigration to Canada ail of their "dependents", which group included children, parents 
and grandparents of the sponsor. The sponsored immigrants were entitled to have dl of 
their dependents accompany the- as weil. The term "dependents" was defined to 
encompass all of the immigrant's children of any age, so long as those children had never 
been rnarried. Those children were entitleâ, in nirn, to bring with them ail of their never 
married children, of any age, and so on down the line. The policy objective sought to be 
fkrhered by this d e  was (and still is) ". . .to facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian 
citizens and permanent residents with their close relatives nom abroad.. ..[emphasis 
added]'" Given this, it is unlikely that legislators had in mind groups of fifty or sixty 
people, spanning several generations of a family, being sponsored for immigration to 
Canada by a single sponsor. Yet, this was the not uncornmon result when the rule was 
put into practice abroad. This led to two concerns about constitution of the family class. 
The first centered on who should nghthilly be a member of it and the second related to 
just how large a sponsored group of family members shodd be. In choosing the phrase 
% SO W88-286,19 May, 1988 ( o h  referred to as "J88'3. In particular, see paragraph 1 of the Schedule 
which amended the definition of "dependant" so that a sponsor m Canada codd sponsor ail of then never 
d e d  children of any age, as well as any iinmarr;ed children of such a chiJd, 
The Act, supra note 14, s3(c). 
9g 1 recall king told that the unofficiai record for a single p u p  migration under this rule was over 70 
persons, though 1 have not been able to verify this number. Sunice to say, in my experience, 1 have seen 
single groups of up to 20 persans. 
'hever m&ed children" to d e s d e  those who might be sponsored, it is doubtfid that 
parliamentarians intended that one sponsor should assume the burden for settling so many 
people, at one t h e ,  into Canadian society? Likewise, parliamentarians came to realize 
that some persons intended to be in the family class were being excluded and other 
persons, not meant for inclusion, were in fact being found eligible.'" It seems evident 
that the traditional Canadian normlO1, where marriage in the third or fourth decade of iife 
is common, was the conceptual foundation for the mle. Legislators iikely failed to 
* The problem of sponsorship breakdowns doubtless contriiuted in part to the later reformulation of the 
"dependent" definition to lîmit it to persons who, in addition to bemg unmatried, are under 19 years of age. 
See s- 2(1) of the current Regulations. Because selection in this category took no account of an 
immigrant's skills, resources, language abiiities and other factors relatmg to settlement potential, even 
someone without any hope of self-sufficiency in the domestic economy could be granted entry. Even for a 
prosperous sponsor, the reaIity of providing for a large number of unemployable persons posed significant 
burdens that could sometimes overwheIm both incIination and ability to provide support. In such 
instances, the faiIure of sponsorship support was disastrous for both the immigrants and the public purse. 
The problem of sponsorsbip breakdowns remains an ongoing one, with an estimated 14% of sponsored 
immigrants continuing to seek social assistance after arrivai in Canada. See for example, CIC Doily Wrap 
- Sommaire Quotidien fiereinafier Daiiy Wrap), "Departmental IssuedQuestions Propres au Ministre" (15 
December 1997) 1 at 3, detailing a plan by the Peel Region m Ontario to bring action in court against 
sponsors who default on their obligations to cover the expenses of persons they have sponsored for 
permanent residmce in Canada. Citing stories carrïed on 13 December 1997 in the Ottawa Citizen, London 
[Ontanq Free Press and Winnipeg Free Press, the report notes that sponsorships are generally entered 
into for a ten year period, during which the sponsor is liable for the settlement of the immigrant Peel 
Region intends to set up a pilot to sue sponsors to recover welfare payments made to any immigrant 
covered by a sponsorship agreement that is still in effkct. 
'O0 The incongrnous results possible under the J88 Regdations were illustrated by an example given in a 
press release by the (then) Minister of EmpIoyment and immigration, Bernard Valcourt, announcing 
changes to the Famiiy Ciass definition in 1992. See Employment and Immigration Cana& (EIC), News 
Release 92-1 1, "Changes to the immigration Regulations on the definition of dependency" (20 March 
1992). In that release, the Ministet is quoted as saying that changes were to the Family Class definition 
were undertakm in order to more accutely "..,reflect the Canadian concept of f a d y  dependency." An 
example of the type of situation that o h  occurred under 588 is given, at 2, where it is stated: 
The new regdations replace existing rules which state that children of any age could be sponsored 
or included in Family CIass applications as long as they had never marrieci. The current d e s  [ie. 
J 88 d e s ]  bave created situations where, for exampIe, pafents could bring in a self-sufficient, 50- 
year-ald bachelor son but not a dependent, 18-year-old daughter who had been widowed 
'O' It is beyond the scope of this papa to a d y z e  Canadian marriage mnds. The phrase 4'traditional 
Canadian norm" is used in recognition of the fact that, Wre so many other aspects of society, b a g e  
pattenis and conceptions of w h t  constitutes a family unit are not static. 1 am reiafotced in my view, 
however, that a more traditional view of marriage was involveci in the formulation of the family class 
definition by the fact that no accomt was taken of so-cailed "cornmon Law" and "same-sex" rnarriages. 
For more on this, see infia note 120 and accompanying text. 
account, however, for the fact that in some comtrieP, formal marriage ties of the type 
common in Canada (and hence recognized under the Immigration Act), may be 
u n c o ~ ~ ~ ~ n o n *  'O5 
Another illustration concerns the method by which Independent category 
immigrants are selected.Iw Such applicants are chosen precisely for their potential to 
become quickly established in Canada and immediately participate in and contribute to 
the economy. To qualim, each applicant is assessed according to a number of factors that 
cover such items as level of education, language abihty and vocational training and 
e~perience.'~ Under the assessment process, each factor is gauged according to a regime 
that allocates a certain number of points for every level of attalnment or achievement. A 
score of 70 points is seen as indicative of likely success in the Canadian economy and so 
is the minimum ordinary threshold for an application to be approved. 
Educational assessment provides one example of the difficuities of interpretation 
and application of our immigration Iaw abroad. Since a reasonable level of educationai 
For example, my &st foreign assignment as a visa officer was to Jamaica After ody a short time living 
and working there, it became apparent that a paradigm of marriage and f d y  different fiom the Canadian 
nom, was widespread, û d y  in a minority of cases were formal marriage ties of the type common in 
Canada, involving elaborate wedding rituais and the necessity of a license, seen. Instead, the "common- 
lad'  scenario was much more common, Of course, this is simply anecdotal evidence fiom rny own 
observations and there is an obvious question as to how much inauence Canadian immigration d e s  may 
have had upon marriage patterns amongst intending immigrants. Again, such a question is beyond the 
focus of this study. 
'O3 It shouid be noted that the regdation was absolute, pennitting of no discretion. Once the famiiy 
relationship was pmven, the entitlement to the immigrant visa was subject only to universal statutory 
requirements relatmg to public heaith and safety concerns. 
Three broad categories for Qualification as an immigrant are established under Canadian mimigration 
iaw. These include the family class (persons within a prescribed degrec of consanguinity who have been 
sponsored by their Canadian resident relative), refiigees (persans fleeing persecution) and independents 
(persans applying on their own initiative). See generally S. 6 of the Act and Cànadz 's Immigration Law, 
supra note 92 at 6-10. Also see Lorne Waldman, Immigration Law and Ractice, vol. 2 (Markharn, Ont.: 
Butterworths, 1992) at 13.1- 13.2. 
'Os Schedule I, Immigration Regulations. See aIso below, Appendix A to this study, which sets out the 
selection factors. 
attainment is generally recognized to provide a greater Ucelihood for successfùl 
establishment in the current economy, the points awarded under this factor increase in 
proportion to the level of education. However, educationai systems can Vary 
considerably even within a single country and so it is no surprise that there may be even 
more variation between corntries and regions of the world. What might seem at fïrst 
dance a simple matter of specifjing, say a high school diploma, as the minimum 
acceptable level of attainment, may become an unusually complex matter to determine in 
practice. Since the Canadian nom is twelve years of education for a high school 
diploma, one rnight think that s p e c w g  twelve years of education would be the end of 
the matter. In Yang v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Imrnigrati~n)'~, however, the 
applicant presented evidence to show that, in Taiwan, n o d  secondary schooling ends 
d e r  a total of nine years, with many applicants often proceeding to a college thereafter 
for up to five more years. In this case, the court had to detemine whether the equivalent 
of a Canadian high school diploma was gained after the nine year period of secondary 
fornation, or whether it was dependent upon a further five years of ~o l lege . '~  This 
exampte illustrates, in a minor way, the difficulties often encountered when a system of 
niles seeks to rneasure foreign equivalents against domestic standardS.la Ifthere is to be 
17 III1IILLK (2d) 229. 
Irn In this case, the court fouci, sensibly, that the couege was also to be considered part of the secondary 
education for which uni& of assessrnent were to be awarded under the educationai assessrnent system then 
in place under the Act. That system aliowed a maximum of 12 points for eclucatioa, being 1 unit for each 
year leadmg to completion of secondary schooling. The system did not award points for any years of 
education beyond high school and so it was m r t a n t  for the applicant to have the college considered, in 
order to obmin fbil assessment uni&. 
" Even pater diffIculties are encountered m the area of vocationai experiencc and guslincation, which 
are assessed pursuant to Factors 2 and 3 in Scherhile 1 of the Regdations. The system for qualification in a 
parti& occupation in one country may bear iittie resembiance to that of another country. Likewise, an 
occupation calleci one thing in one locale may be entirely different fiom a similarly titled occupation in 
another country. 
a fit, inevitably some flexibility and common sense is needed to square the two. A more 
fade course of action, of course, rnight be to simply disregard personai and professional 
quafitities md me&, and simply select on the basis of a quota or some other objectively 
and readily identifiable criterion. Howeva, such a method does not facilitate selection 
for those qualities and attributes which, over time, have been determined to show the best 
results, vis-à-vis selecting immigrants possessing the skilis and talents to contniute 
readily and meaningfidly to the Canadian economic and social milieu. It is unlikely 
therefore, that the basic scheme of individuai selection will soon be abandoned for 
independents, notwithstanding the difficdties inherent in such selection pro~ess.~~O 
The Immigration Act and Regulatiom are f ikd  to overfiowing with laws and 
d e s  and regulations.Ii1 Stili, they are inadequate to deal with the multitude of potential 
situations and permutations that mut  inevitably mise in the course of dealhg with an 
extremely diverse cross-section of humanity, hailing h m  every corner of the world. A 
combination of personal circumstances and individual characteristics. affecteci by 
indigenous conditions, cultures and traditions, and acted upon by local laws, standards 
'O9 See for example, CIC, Into the 2 l a  Cenîury: A Strategyfor Immigration and Citîzemhip (Ottawa: Min. 
of SuppIy and Services, 1994) at 28. One justification for selection on the bas% of skills and abilities is 
that "[r]esearch shows that immigrants sefected for their slcills and abilities are more likely to earn higher 
incomes than other immigrants, and more k l y  to contribute to the economy without resorting to welfare 
or making use of publicly-fiinded settlement programsw. The independent category thus is seen as 
something of a counterbalance to the more humani- onented programs found under the refugee and 
family classes. The independent class is a dehierate attempt to focus on and boister the economy, which is 
not a devant consideration in the otha two categories. 
"O Indeed, the government's plan is to a c W y  increase the proportion of independent immigrants in the 
overaii immigration p h  See CIC, Into The 2P* Century, ibid., at ix, in the Executive S v  where,
amongst other initiatives, it is noted that, m future, CIC intends that "...a greater &are of immigrants will 
be selected on the basis of their ability to contriiute to Canada's economic and social development, 
reducing d e d  on integration services...." 
' I L  Certainly, the weaIth of d e s  that now govems immigration law appears to be borne out by the sheer 
size of the cunent Immigration Act. See for example Margaret Young, Background Paper, "Immigration: 
Constitutionai Issues" (October, 199 1) (Lib. Of Parliament - Restarch Branch) at 3, where the author 
and qualifications, aii conspire to ensure that e v q  applicant is unique. Under such 
circumstances, application of any immigration law or rule, no matter how cleverly and 
clearly devised, wili inevitably be faced with tough cases - classic problems of "square 
pegs and round holes". It is for this reason that legislative drafting, paaicularly in 
immigration law, tends to be more of an exercise in the law of averages, rather than one 
of microscopie precision. The situation was succinctly cap- by Dickson C.J.C. (as he 
then was) who, though speaking more g e n d y ,  once noted that, "[aJbsolute precision in 
the law exists rarely, if at alI."t12 
Related to the impracticality of devising sufficiently comprehensive niles to cover 
every contingency is the problern of legislative intent- A slippery concept at best, 
legislative intent is a perennid source of frustration to courts and administrative tribunals 
alike. Even the best example of legislative craftsmanship will nequently be found 
wanting in clarity and specificity as to the intent of its fiamers. Yet, it remains a sine qua 
non of our legal system that intent is to be given effkct to, no matter how obtuse or 
obscure it may be. Perhaps hoping to avoid such obfuscation, Canada's Immigration Act 
incorporates a somewhat unique section, at les t  for Canadian law, detailing the 
objectives that Parliament hoped to firrther- The Act provides as follows: 
. . .Canadian immigration policy and the d e s  and regdations made under this Act 
shall be designeci and administered in such a manner as to promote the domestic 
and international interests of Canada recognizing the need 
(a) to support the attainment of such demographic goals as may be established by 
the Government of Canada in respect of the size, rate of growth, structure and 
geographic distribution of the Canadian population; 
obsaven that the Canada's nrst immigration statue in 1869 had 14 pages, while the 1952 Act had 34 pages 
and the present Act posscsses 122. 
"' Attorney ~enerd of Quebec v. Invh Toy Dd.; Moreau et aL. Inteneners (1989) 58 D.L.R. (4"') 577 at 
617. 
to enrich and strengthen the cultural and social fabric of Canada, taking into 
account the f d d  and bilingual character of Canada; 
to facifitaie the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent 
resident with their close relatives h m  abroad; 
to encourage and faciltate the adaptation of persons who have been granted 
admission as permanent residents to Canadian society by promoting 
cooperation between the Govermnent of Canada and other levels of 
govemment and non-govemmental agencies in Canada with respect thereto; 
to facilitate the entry of visitors into Canada for the purpose of fostering trade 
and commerce, tourism, cultural and scientific activities and international 
understanding; 
to ensure that any pason who seeks admission to Canada on either a 
permanent or temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not 
discriminate in a manner inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms; 
to fulnl Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees and 
to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and the 
penecuted; 
to foster the development of a strong and viable economy and the prosperity 
of al1 regions in Canada; 
to maintain and protect the health, safety and good order of Canadian society; 
and 
to promote intemational order and justice by denying the use of Canadian 
temtory to persons who are likely to engage in criminal a~tivity. '~~ 
Each of these ten objectives is Iaudable and sensible. Taken together, however, 
they achially exacerbate the challenge of discerning legislative intent and rnay even 
hinder the possibilities for precise subordinate d e  formulation. Some of the objectives 
are rneant to be facilitative, some are control oriented, and still others contain elernents of 
both approaches. There is no stipulation, however, as to whether they are al1 to be 
considered of the same urgency or priorw. Likewise, they are also not mutudy 
exclusive, with the result that any two or more may potentially be applicable in any given 
case. It is in this flurry of f k q  objectives that CIC goes about its work of interpreting 
and applying rules of general application on a global basis. Can a system that is founded 
upon a desire to be "ail things to ail people" work without some discretionary authority in 
its interpretation and application? Not Likely. 
The only workable solution, therefore, is a relativistic approach, with objectives 
shifting up and d o m  a scale of prionty, depending upon the particda. facts at hand. 
Whether the f d y  reunification objective is to be favoured over the public safety 
objective, for example, may depend upon the seriousness of the threat to public safety 
that a paaicular applicant poses. A senal killer poses a more serious risk than does a 
habitua1 thie£ In the latter case, the deleterious consequences of dorced family 
sepration may be seen to outweigh the risk of fbture criminal activity in Canada With 
the example of the serial killer, however, it is difficdt to imagine the existence of 
sufEcient equities to tip the balance away from the public protection objective.I1' It is 
apparent from these examples that discretion is axiomatic to a sensible, defensible and 
sustainable application of the diverse objectives of the Act. A rote system, listing 
objectives in descending priority, might provide greater certsiuity but, in practice, would 
be likely to resuit in much hardship and dissatisfaction. It would aiso be less likely to 
accord with fundamental societal notions of how justice and faimess are to be achieved. 
Similarly, the Act S objectives reflect the broad base of understanding and popular 
support upon which our immigration program is founded. Eliminating any of the 
objectives, or blindly favouring one over another, might well imperil that support. 
"' For a recent example of the public safety objetive bemg favoured over famiIy teunification, see 
Estanisho Opewicz, Tamily ties trip up wodd-be immigrant" ï7ze (Toronto) Globe and Mail (30 June 
1997) A 1. The article details the case of Gerlando Sciascia who was sponsored m the f d y  class for 
immigration to Cana& by bis son. Mr. Sciascia is alleged to be a Mafia member, connected to the Cosa 
Nostra Bonnano organized crime family m New York. Nthough he withdrew his application for 
immigration after the degations surface4 the Canadian C o d  in New York is noted as stating that "no 
h u m a n i e  or conipassionate grounds would overcome Mr. Sciascia's inadmissibility to Canada." 
The consequences of inadequate balancing of objectives are not to be understated. 
Aùnost invariably, a poor weighing of objeçtives resuits in significant and SuSfained 
media notoriety that leaves public confidence in immigration policy shaken. Even where 
the favouring of one objective is inadvertent or perhaps even unavoidable (say, for 
example, an applicant has skilfully misled immigration authorities), the nature of the 
media is such that oniy the most sensational aspects of a case will be reported. Although 
such instances are comparatively few, they always garner much attention and generaiiy 
make nont-page news headlinesn5 From a practical standpoint, therefore, discretion is 
essential to achieving a delicate, and yet fluid, balancing and weighing of priorities that 
must occur in each and every case. 
Words are the building blocks used to construct d e s .  Yet words are ~ O ~ O ~ O U S  
will O' the wisps, drawing as much fiom context and background, as fkom inherent 
meaning. Qwte commonly, words which have a particular and specific meaning in 
ordinary parlance may suddeniy be found, by judiciai interpretation, to mean something 
entirely differmt, or even opposite, to that ordinary meaning.lI6 Likewise, the meaning of 
words has a tendency to change and shift with tirne, usage and context. It is impossible, 
Il5 See for example, Miro Cemetig, " h g  suspect let into Canada'' The (Toronto) Globe and Mail (22 
December 1993) A 1. ui that case, Lee Chau Ping, the so-cded '?ce Queen of Southeast Asia", obtained 
an immigrant visa as a busmess immigrant in the Independent category. Ms. Ping is aUeged to have been 
the kingpin behind an organization that manufactured and cüstri'buted worldwide an illicit drug known as 
"ice". She apparently has gone underground since "fanding" in Canada and has yet to nirn up. 
Nonetheles, the sustained media notonety that this case has engendered weli illustrates the need for 
careful bdancing of objectives in every instance. This case is a .  example where, whether advertenly or 
not, the econornic development objective that guides the business immigration program was given 
precedence over the pubiic protection objective. The resultant fhor leaves iittle doubt that few would 
agree with the *%aiance" that was struck. 
'16 See for example, the word "shall", which is ordinarily understood to be mandatory. However, in certain 
conte* courts will fïnd it, instead, to be merely permissive. The same is tnie &O for the word "may" 
which is ordinariiy undersfood to be permissive. "'In the interpretation of statutes, it has often been ruled 
that may is to be mderstood as @valent to &al1 or must". R. v. S. (S.) (1 WO), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1 1 5 at 128, 
therefore, for legislative drafters to conceive of every possible twist of circiunstsnce, 
interpretation and usage in advance. In the end, they are often forced to settle for doing 
what can feasibly be done; create laws premised upon and dealing with the "average" 
case. 
At the same tirne, however, the inadequacy of d e s  remains troubling. Inevitably, 
it seems, not all desenhg cases are included by the d e s ,  nor all unworthy ones 
excluded. These are the situations it is presumed that the legislature intended, or should 
have intended, to capture, but which the vagaries of language and paucity of draf€er's 
imagination coospired to prevent being reduced to paper. Our sense of justice and 
propriety do not permit a complete abandonment of responsibility for equity and fairness 
to the shortcomings of statutory drafting and interpretation.'17 The result is that legislative 
intent is fixed upon as a way to make up for the deficiencies of words. Lf parliamentary 
intent is to be favoured, and there is iittle doubt that we do favour intent over black and 
white words, then some means of "supplementing" the d e s  must be incorporated into 
the system. It is here that the "'equity" of discretion meets and comrningles with the 
"common law" of formal, ngid rules. Discretion is the modem 6'chancellor's foot" and 
comes in a size suited to fit every shoe. It is just the item to infuse some common sense 
into the rules, ensuring that justice and fair play are not heedlessly overlooked, nor 
unduiy taken advantage of '18 Flexibiiity, then, is the inhaent, dominant characteristic of 
129,77 C R  (3d) 273.1 IO N E  32 1, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254,49 C.R.R 79,41 O.A.C. 8 1, per Dickson C.J.C. 
This sort of thinking is even part of a ' s  own corporate d h u e  and is captured in the foliowing 
statement: "Canadians' belief that every human king should be treated with fairness and dignity must be 
reflected in the policies and practices of their governmat." CIC, Into The 2ls* Centwy, supra note 109, at 
xiv. 
Il8 See for example Ca11 Schneider, '?>iscretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View" in Keith Hawkins, ed, The 
Uses of Discretion, supra note 9,47 at 56, where the author maka the ironic point that our common Iaw 
discretionary power, allowing the blunt edges of the law to be sofieneà to suit our own 
notions of what may be just in any given situation. 
But discretion is more than just flexibility. It is also innovation. Once cast in the 
stone of statute law, d e s  are sometimes difncult to manipulate or mcind, even after the 
rationale for their formulation is no longer apparentt119 In our parliamentary system, it is 
commonly the case that broad consensus and agreement is needed before an outdated d e  
can be varied or replaced. And yet, particdarly on thomy issues of social policy, 
legislative consensus can be difficuit to assemble and sustain. Formal laws excel in 
following societal developments, but only rarely do they lead. In those instances when 
political leadership is absent, broad consensus elusive, or legislative time mavailable, 
discretion sometimes is applied in the breach to provide a workable solution. 
A case in point is to be found in CIC policy on processing of same sex partners for 
permanent residence in Canada. The Act and Reguiatiom do not formaily recognize 
homosexud marriages for purposes of Family Class spons~rship.~~ Likewise, in the 
cment climate of polarïzed debate generally on the topic of acceptame of gay nghts, 
legislative reworking of the definition of marriage in the Reguiatiom has not been a 
political priority. Nonetheless, the governent has not been altogether insensitive to the 
-- 
system, while viewing discretion with suspicion, nonetheiess seems ". . . & n o ~  designed to promote the 
exercise of discretion." He notes that discretion is founded in a concern to preserve doctrinal fiexibility, 
which is evidenced in a preference by judges "...for making fine distinctions so that justice can be done in 
each case." 
'le Sec for example, G l a n d e  Williams, ''Discretion in Prosecution", [1956] C e .  LR 222 at 224 - 23 1, 
where he discusses this problem in the crimulal law context He notes that discretion is sometimes used by 
police, prosecutors and even courts to decline enforcement of obsolete or controvemial Iegklation. 
Although exercise of this power sometimes generates criticism, he observes, at 226, that most often what is 
criticized is actually insuff?cient use of discretion, rather than ovemse. 
Neither, for that maiter, does the legislation recognke the so-called "common law mamiage" which is 
widely pmaient in Canadian society today. See the definitions of "member of the family ch", 
"marriage" and "spouse" at S. 2( 1) of the! Regtrlations and the policy guidance on pmcessing of same sex 
hardship that cm foliow h m  enforcecl separation of partners in contrnitted relationships. 
Responding to susfaineci lobbying and an increased propensity to litigation by individuals 
and gay rights groupsJZ1, the govemment has &en its tacit approval to a creative 
deplopent of discretion by the immigration bureaucracy that has relieved some of the 
pressure for a f o d  legislative solution1? 
Section 2.1 of the Reguiutiom pennits the Minister to exempt any person h m  any 
immigration regdation, where she is satisfied that an exemption should be granted 
because of the existence of humanitarian or compassionate grounds. In June 1994, a 
messageJP was sent to ail immigration processing missions advising them that 
homosemal partners of Canadian citizens or permanent residcnts might be processed for 
lauding under S. 2.1, where ". . .undue hardship couid r d t  h m  separation.. ..".lu The 
result was that what could not be accomplished directly through Parliament by a bold 
and "common law" partnm contained in CIC IM, "Oveneas Processing", Chap. OP-1, para. 4.2.2, at 6-7. 
"' Most noticeably, by LEGIT (The Lesbian and Gay lannigration Task Force), located in Vancouver B.C. 
See generally "LEGIT lobbying gets the word out" LEGïï News (The Newsletter of LEGIT), Fall1995 at 
1. 
1t2 And thus resolving, at least for the time being, the govemment's conundnun of being forced to alienate 
one segment of the population in order to appease another. For a brief overview of the question of sexual 
orientation and its treatment under Canadian immigration law, see John A. Yogis, Sexuai Orientation and 
Canadian Law- An Assesment of the Law Agecting Lesbian and Gay Persons (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 1996) c, 8. 
'" CIC AU Mission Message ORDO150 regarding processing of same sex partners; ais0 see generaiiy CM: 
All Mission Message ORDO 149 on use of humanitarian and compassionate discretion. 
CïC IM Chap. OP-1, Section 4, "Principal Applicants and Dependants" Paragraph 4.2.2, (ver. 12-95) at 
6. Ln reatitty, use of R2.1 authority is directcd by this manuai to be used only as a last option. Instead, 
officm are directed fnst to consider whether the appiicant might qualify as an ordinary independent 
applicant. Faiting this, positive discretion under R. 1 l(3) is mandateci. This is genefauy used where an 
independent applicaut falls a few points short of the p a s  mark needed, but otherwise appears to have good 
settlement potentia.1. Failing eitha of these two options, then R 2.1 may be invoked Li recognition of 
''undue hardship" which might resuit fiom enforced separation of the partners. See also CIC IM, Chap. 
OP-5, Section 2, para 23.1 (ver. 05-97) "Commw law and same-sex partners". 
legislative stroke, instead was done by judicious application of discretionary authority, 
with little fatlfare or notoriety.lu 
The problem of volume provides yet another aspect to the flexibility and 
innovation justitications for discretionary power. Handling large numbers of applications 
is a featwe cornmon to many adminimtive tribunals. In the case of immigraiion, the 
government has implernented a five year plan to up to two hmdred and fifty 
thousand immigrants yearly.ln As mentioned, these immigrants are selected based upon 
their ability to qualify in three broad categories; Refbgees, Family Class and 
hdependents. Though the specific requirernents Vary from category to category, most 
immigrant cases are likeIy to entai1 at least some assessment of educational, language, 
employment and other criteria relating to potential for resettlement in Canada? In 
addition, the Act and Regulatiom stipulate other exigencies, such as those relating to the 
protection of public health and safety, which must be undertaken for every applicantl? 
'= This raises the issue of politicai accountability of the discretion holder, an issue which those opposed to 
discretionary power are most sensitive to. The obvious answer is that R 2.1 discretion resides ultimately 
with the Minister. Since she is directly accountable in parliamen5 the power must inevitably be exercised 
in a mamer she is prepared to defend, 
Defined at S. 2(1) of the Act as being "lawful permission to establish permanent residence in Canada". 
ln The figure of 250,000 is simply a "target", with the a d  number of immigrants landed varying h m  
year to year, according to a number of factors such as number of applications received, resources avaiiable 
to process them and the like. In 1996, for example, there were actually 225,3 13 immigrants landed 
although the official target had not changed- See CIC, You asked about ... immigration and citirenship 
(Ottawa: Min. of Public Works and Govemment Services, 1997) at 5. Likewise, the target is adjusted fkom 
year to year to reflect what is considered feasible in any givem year, Pursuaot to S. 7(1) of the Act, the 
Minister is required to lay before Parliament yearly an immigration plan deciiling the projected 
immigration levels for the coming year. Thus, for 1997, the total number of immigrant and refbgee 
landings is expected to be between 195,000 and 220,000 persons, CIC, Staying the Course= 1997 Annual 
Immigration Plan (T'bled on Dctober 29, 1996) (Ottawa: Min, of Supply and Senrices Canada, 1996) at 3. 
'* Sûictly speabg, f d y  class immigrants and refbgees seleetcd within Canada by the IRB are not 
"assessed" on these criteria for purposes of detemiining their ability to qua1i.Q for immigration, as is the 
case with independents and refugees selected abroad, However, some assessment of them is conducted 
pursuant to these criteria for statistical reasons and for purposes of deka. - g their need for any public 
settlement assistance, language training, etc. 
'= For example, medicai examinations and amiinnl and security sacaimg. 
These are fïxed statutory requirements, set down by Parliament, which CIC cannot 
ignore. In the meantirne, CIC has not been sheltered h m  the effects of the debt crisis 
facing the Goveniment of Canada Like most other departments, it has been called upon 
to share in the burden, with $75 million cut fiom its budget in recent years.Im The result 
has been the need for "restruchiring" and the inevitable "downsizing" With a fixed 
legislative mandate, a static caseload volume and reduced fiscal and human resources, the 
department has been placed between the rock of reduction and the hard place of unabated 
senice expectations. Mer years of cutbacks, the euphernism of "doing more with less" 
is simply no longer tenable. The chosen way out of the dilemma has been resort to the 
twin options of 'ke-engineering" and "restrU~turirg".~~~ Reducing overall workload, 
automating processes, and concentrating resources to achieve economies of scale and cost 
savings have al1 been implemented under this regime. Though application volumes and 
legislated requirements have remained largely unchanged, discretion vested in the 
department as to how best to meet those needs has proven to be the essentid grease for 
keeping the wheels of immigration processing tuniing. On a more fundamental level, the 
availability of discretion to individual officers as to how best to implement the reductions 
and new procedures on an individual case basis has resuited in signincant savings. For 
example, in some types of routine cases, officers may waive interviewst3* that are 
'30 For a more detailed discussion of the d a c k s  and the effects they have wmught, see g e n d y  below, 
Chapter 2, and also CIC inteniet home page at http://cicnetxi.gc.ca. 
13' For more particulars, see CIC You asked about .... supra note 127 at 7-9, where initiatives such as 
standardkation, the role of Case Processiag Centres and Caü Centres, and seE-assessrnent are discussed 
See also below, Chapter 2, for more detailed discussion of the effect of the reductions on use of discretion. 
13* For example, the Immigration Regionat Procesmg Ccnm in Bunalo, N.Y., which receives a i l  
applications for immigration to be processed by Canadian visa offices located in the United States, advises 
that interviews are waived in more than hai€ of aîi such cases. See "Applying for Permanent Residence in 
Canada: Changes to Immigrant Processing m the USA", insert dated April 1, 1996 placed m immigration 
determined unnecessary, saving the,  money and fiutration for both the client and the 
department.'" Without such discretion, both on a department wide and an individual 
officer basis, it is doubtfid that even "doing the same with lessy7 would have been 
possible. Quite simply, flexibility in detexminhg its own procedures has enabled CIC to 
prevent a massive caseload f b m  overwhelming the system and choking off altogether the 
flow of completed cases. 
A M e r  rationde for discretionary power concems the problem of interpretation 
for enforcement purposes. It is here that the notion of discretion as equity, descnbed 
earlier, is most apparent. As Evans states: 
Because many situations are not foreseen at the time of enactment, statutory 
provisions require interpretation by officials. The process of f i b g  in the silences 
and resolving the ambiguities in statutory language that interpretation so often 
involves can be described as the exercise of an implicit discretion to elaborate 
unclear or incomplete legislative instructions. Second, even the most detailed and 
precise regulatory codes are not self-enforcing typically, officials are left with 
ample, and unstated discretion about the circurnstances in which they will actually 
be enforced against individu al^.'^ 
It is discretion, wielded as  an implement of interpretation and enforcement, which takes 
the rough edges off of the law and nI1s in the mvices and cracks between the legislators 
appiication kits provided by the Processing Centre, at 3. 
'33 This is just one aspect of an overail strategy of reducing intensive case processing requirement that was, 
at one point, captured in the slogan '%ve serve you better by seeing you less." CIC's response to fiscal and 
other imperatives is dealt with more fùiiy in Chapter 2, below. 
Evans, mpra note 2 at 102 1-22. Discretion in enforcement is a partidarly relevant issue in the 
criminal law field. See for example, Kenneth Culp Davis, Dkcretionq Jwtice, supra 4 1. Davis notes the 
considerable discretionary power g e n d y  wielded by police officers with respect to enforcement of the 
law and was concemed about its abuse. For a more recent example of discretionary law enforcemen& see 
Sheni Aikenhead, "Daring to bare: How long béh: ~.71zien go topless in HaIifax?,, The (Hai@itj Dail& 
News (22 June 1997) at 21. The article discusses a ment court niling in Ontario which is cited as 
permitting women to legaily doff their tops in that province. Nova Scotia police, however, do not appear 
to appreciate the Iogic of the judgment in question and are quoted as  being ready to continue to force 
women to cover up. Their strategy for enforcement, however, evidences a certain amount of enforcement 
discretion. According to a Halifax regional police spokeswoman, "If somebody is wallcing down Spriug 
Garden Road [in Halifax] topless, they'll first be asked for identification and then asked to cover up.. . . if 
broad brush strokes of rneaning. It rem&, therefore, for officiais in the field to provide 
interpretations and applications that best meet the intended objective or purpose of any 
given provision. While the Act and Regdations often provide blanket d e s  that seem 
mandatory in nature, yet it is understood that legislative intention rarely wishes to have 
such provisions rigorously applied to even the most trivial innaction. A case in point 
concerns medical insdmissibility. Section 19 of the Act baldly provides that no one 
suffering h m  diseases or disordm which might endanger public health or safety, or 
which might lead to excessive demands on health or social services, may be gmnted 
admission to Canada~3~owever, policy guidance provided by CIC makes clear that this 
d e  is not absolute. lx Thus, visa officers are directed in dl such cases to consider 
whether any extenuating circumstances exist to justiQ admission, prior to issuing a 
refusal.ln Selective application and enforcement in such cases ensures that particular 
decisions are made in the context of overall intent and objectives, rather than the vacuum 
of a specific rule. 
DBering levels of entitlement to nghts or privileges is another reason for 
extensive use of discretion under immigration law. This is perhaps most clearly 
illustratecl in the example of criminal inadmissibility . Under Canadian immigration law, 
the person refiises to cover up and says no, they'il be arrested 
13' Section 19(l)(a)(i) and (ii). 
IJ< Liltewise, the courts have held that medical inadmissiiility m u t  be assessed in each case against the 
purposes for which enûy is sought. Thus, greater latitude is to be shown m sponsored dependent cases, 
since applicants in that category wiU benefit fkom close family support. A Iess discretionary approach, 
however, may be appropriate in independent category cases, since they wiU tend not to have such support 
avaiiable. Deol v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration) (1992), 18 ][mm. L A  (2d) 1 (Fed. C.A.). 
ln See CIC IM Chap. OP-5, para. 3.3.1 (ver. 05-97), "What to do in m e d i d y  inadmissi'ble cases", which 
advises visa officers that "[wjhen the appficant or dependent is found to be inadmissible for medicd 
reasons.. ., you may consider whether there are humanitarian, compassionate or economic grounds for 
issuing a Miilster's permit to allow the person to enter and remain m Canada notwithstanding the medical 
hdmissiiility." See ais0 CIC hi Chap. OP-19 for factors to be considemi in recomending issuance of 
persons with criminal records, or who are guilty of comrnitting acts or omissions which 
would be crimes punishable domesticaliy, are prohibiteci to enter Canada.IY Exception is 
made for those who have satisfied the Minister that they are rehabilitated or that their 
entry wodd not be detrimental to public safety or other national interest concems. The 
Act prescribes a yardstick for gauging the gravie of the crime, which is somewhat 
reminiscent of the summary/indictable split used under the Criminal Code.'3g Offences 
considered "less serious" are dealt with more leniently, while more stem treatment is 
reserved for those considered "most serious". But even within these two categones, there 
is a vast array of offences evidenced. Thus, in the less serious category, we might find a 
destitute student convicted of shoplifting a sausage for bis supper, a college professor 
guilty of an assault on his spouse, and an incomgible, unernployed alcoholic with a 
lengthy record for dnink driving offences. Each raises unique concems and equities and 
it wouid clearly be inappropnate to treat them all with the same level of vigorous 
bureaucracy. A single, minor act done in extremis is rnanifedy less deserving of short 
shnft at a border entry point than is behaviour which forms part of an identifiable, 
prolonged pattern and which poses signincant nsks to public safety. Likewise, a minor 
offence against property is vastly different than an offence involving violence against the 
person. But here again the problem of formulating a rule that is sensitive to al1 of the 
nuances and subtleties of each specinc case arises. And, the problem is intensifid by the 
a Minister's permit, 
See g e n d y  subsetions 19(l)(c) to (I) and 19(2)(a) to (b) of the Act. 
Ii9 RS.C 1985, Chap. C-46. Admittedy, the Immigmtion Act yardstick is only roughly equivalent to the 
summary/iidictable split used in the Criminal Code. While a range of punishments are available with 
respect to both sunmiary and indiaable offences, the Immigmrion Act relies upon a potential penalty under 
or over 10 years as the set point for distmguishmg between "Iess serious" and "more serious" cases. See 
the Act, S. 19(l)(c) & (c. 1) (max tenn of 10 years or more) and 19(2)(a) & (a.1) fmax. term of less than 10 

decision-maker to sort out equities and to priontue entitlements, without the necessity of 
conferring fixeci entitlements that might prove unpopular or embarra~sing.~~ 
. . 
The example of a cnminally inadmissible visitor and an ordinary Family Class 
immigrant provides a vivid contrast for illustrating the notion of differing entitlement, but 
the notion of a sliding scale also works on a more subtle level. Différing levels of 
entitlement are present even within and across immigrant categones. Refugee claimants 
who are in Canada143, for example, are accorded an assessment process that is less 
discretionary in nature than that provided for Independent applicants. The rationale is 
found in the basis for selection in each of the categories. Refugees are persons in fight 
fkom persecution." Canada has assumecl an international obligation to protect any such 
persons who enter its territory1* Because of the urgency of their circumstances, and the 
potential dire consequences of a remal of sanctuary, a formai, court-like determination 
process has been implemented for assessment of these cases. It incorporates safeguards, 
like the nght to be assisted by counsel at hearings, which are similar to those found in 
ordinary courts of law." Likewise, once a determination of Refugee statu is made, there 
"' Young v. Canada (Min. of Employment & immigration) (1987), 1 Imm. L.R. (26) 77 (F.C.T.D.). 
14* For more on the use of discretion as a means for sorting out entitlement and the Merences between 
visitor and immigrant categories in that regard, see infia note 176 and accompanying text 
" Even within the g e n d  category of "refiigee claimant", Canadian law makes a distinction between 
those cfaiming status in Canada and those claiming abroad Those claiming abroad are subject to a more 
discretionziry process- See infia note 153 and accompanying text 
'" See the denaîtion of "Convention Refugee" contained at S. 2(1) of the Immigration Act. 
'" Convention on the Status of Aejigees, (1951), 189 U.N.T.S. 138; 1969 Can, T.S. No. 6 as am- by  
Protocol Relating to the Status of Reficgees ( 1  96ï), 606 U.N.T.S. 267; 1969 T.S. No. 29. 
See for exampIe, Gatgano v. Canada (Min. of Citrzenship & Immigration) (1994), 25 hm. LK(2d) 
292,85 F.TX 49. There, the court observed that whik the right to counsel was not absolute, yet unfair 
deniai of the opportunity to be represmted codd redt  in a denial of naturai justice. Failure m this case to 
provide an adjournment in order to retain counsel prevented the appiicant h m  receihg a fair hearing. 
By contrast, an irmnigrant applying for a visa abroad bas no generai right to be represented by counscl in 
any interview. 
is no discretion in the decision-maker to withhold the grant of status for reasom such as 
lack of ability to settle successfully or h u d  in obtaining entry to Canada.In 
A similar proposition holds true for Family Class applicants. These are close 
family members sponsored by relatives in Canada who have agreed to assume 
responsibilïty for their settlement. Once the requisite family link has been established, 
the immigration official is, in efféct,functus ofleio. She has no discretion to withhold 
the immigrant visa despite concems, perhaps, as to settlement prospects for the particular 
individual, or the depth of the sponsor's personal commitment to the settlement 
obligation. lu The case is otherwise with Independent immigrants. Selected precisely for 
their personal abilities to establish in Canada, their acceptance or rejection rernains 
subject to discretion in the visa officer. Processed on the basis of a points assessment 
scherne, the decision-maker retains authority to ignore the points tally, where she believes 
that it does not accurately reflect settlement p~tentia1.I~~ Because selection as an 
- - 
14' There is, of course, an exception in any case where crimimd or secufity concems are present Kowever, 
this is Iargely a matter of statutory requirements, rather than exercise of discretionary power, though there 
is admittediy some discretion as to whether the statutory provision shodd be applied m any given case. 
For the present discussion, 1 am focusing on the example of discretion relahg to assessment of settiement 
potential and fiaudulent entry, for purposes of contrasting its use in relation to levels of entitlement and 
rights. Once rekgee status is granted m Canada, it is subject ody to the statutory exceptions for serious 
criminality and the Like. This is to be contrasted with the U.S. position where the grant of asyhun (U.S. 
terminology distiaguiçhes between a ''person seeking asylum", being someone that appiies h m  within the 
country, and a "refiigee", who applies fiom abroad) is much more discretionary. In the U.S., since the 
grant of asylum is entirely discretionary, any pre or post entry misconduct may be used to justi@ 
withholdiug of status. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 1 S8(a) which provides that an 
"aiien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General". See ais0 A. T. Fragomen, Jr. and 
S. C. Bell, Immigration Fundament&: A Guide tu Law and hactice, 1992 ed. (New York: Practisïng Law 
Institute, 1992) at 6-33; and S.H. Legomsky, Immigration L m  and Policy (Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation 
Press, 1992) at 840-84 1. 
14s Assuming the sponsor has given an undertakmg, pursuant to section 6 of the Reguiutiom, that she will 
assist the immigrant. In assessmg such undertakings, immigration officers consider a schedule that sets out 
a suggested minimum income that a sponsor should have to give such an undertaking. There is no 
guarantee, of course, that even with such a minimum income, the sponsor will honour the undertakmg or 
tbat it will be sufficicnt to provide for the particular needs of both the sponsor and the immigrant, 
'" Regulations, S. 1 l(3). 
Indepeadent immigrant is merit based, these applicants simply have less entitlement to 
landing than do Refugee or Family Class applicants, and this is reflected in the 
discretionary power accorded the decision-makers. 
Aithough the privilege - right dichotomy is somewhat out of favour t ~ d a y ' ~ ~ ,  yet it
continues to animate the use of discretion in immigration  la^.'^^ At common law, 
immigration was conceived of purely as a privilege. No one had a nght to enter, except 
at the Merance of the sovereîgn and even then, only on terms imposed by the 
sovereign? Doubtless, this notion of pnvilege fostered the tremendous reliarice upon 
lm See for example, the judgment of Wilson J. in Singh, supra note 64, 17 D.LX (4&) 422 at 46 1, who 
declined to apply a 'Yights-privilege" mentality to interpretation of the Charter- She states, "[tlhe creation 
of a dichotomy between privileges and rights played a significant role in narrowing the scope of the 
application of the Canadian Bill of Righfs.. .. 1 do not thmk this kind of analysis is acceptable in relation to 
the Charter." Generally, the distinction is no longer seen as a justification for withholding a minimum 
level of fairness to aii applicants. Regardless of whether a 'kight" or a "privilege" is implicated, our law 
wilî require that any determination shodd be anived at ody in accordance with requisite procedural 
faimess. The specifics of such procedural fairness, of course, Vary in accordance with the level of 
entitiement, considerations of justice, etc. So it is that refugees are entitled to a more court-like process, 
with substantial safeguards, whiie an independent appiicant is entitled ody to a more informal process, 
possîbty even without benefit of an oral hearing. Everything depends upon the interests at stake and the 
possible repercussions that may f i  o w  fiom the decision. 
IS' See for example, D. Bagambüre, Canadian Immigration and Reficgee Law (Aurow: Canada Law Book, 
1996) at 365, footnote 2, who notes that the tendency to create a rights and privileges dichotomy continues 
even to&y, notwithstanding the adrnonition of Wilson 3. This attitude is evident even in the pracîichg bar. 
In "Medical Inadmissibility: Selection Without Standard?,,, Paper presented to The 1996 Immigration Law 
Conference (Vancouver: Canadian Bar Association, 1996) at 2, Cecil L. Rotenberg, a senior Canadian 
immigration lawyer, states the foiiowing: ''The writer does not d e  the laws but only want (sic) a 
universally fair and legal application of the laws to aU prospective immigrants mile immigration is a 
prM'Iege, proposed immigrants are entitled to legd and fair processing. It is up to us as their Iawyers to see 
that this happens. [emphasis added]" 
'" In the Canadian context, Attorney G e n d  of Canada v. Cain [1906] A.C. 542 (J.CP.C.) rernains a 
classic statement of the comprehensive and wide ranging nature of state power to regulate entry by non- 
nation&. The court said there, 542 at 546, that '[olne of the rights possessed by the suprme power in 
every State is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter h t  State, to annex what conditions it pleases to 
the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport fiom the State, at pfeasure, even a fnendly aiien, 
especially if it considers his presence in the State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or its 
social or material interests." See aIso Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration (1975), 52 D.L.R. 
(3d) 383, [1974]: 1 SIC& 376,3 N R  3û4 where the court observed that at common iaw, an alien had no 
right to enter or remain m Cana& except with leave of the Crown. The common law has been essentially 
codined in S. S(1) of the Act, which states: 'Wo person, other than a person descriid in section 4 Cie. 
citizens, permanent tesidents, convention refbgees and uidians registered under the Indian Act], has a right 
to corne into or remain in Canada." 
discretion in immigration matters which continues to be evident in cunent law and 
practice. The common law concept of the complete sovereignty of the Canadian Nation 
State to resist incursions by foteigners has slowly been chipped away at on several hnts .  
An obvious example concems the case of Refügees. The United Nations Refugee 
Con~ention'~ resulted in recognition of rights of asylum and sanctuary for displaced 
persons. Having acceded to the convention, Canada has a duty to provide refuge to 
persons within its ambit The duty thus translates into a right belonging to Refugees to 
c l a h  and obtain sanctury. Interestingly, though, the nght is one belonging only to those 
Refugees who are able to make theV own way to Canada For those not so fortunate as to 
possess the ability or resources to get to Canada, there is no nght to refbgee status and 
asylum. Canada's convention obligations extend only to persons physically present on 
our soil. While we do select Refugees nom abroad for resettîement on our own initiative, 
this is done as a voluntary act of compassion only. It is not the fulfillment of any legal 
duty. Consequently, there is an element of discretion pervading the foreign seleetion of 
Refugees that is not present in the domestic conte- Like Independent Class immigrants, 
foreign selected Refugees are assessed as to their ability to successfully settle in 
C a n a t s  
More recently, the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and FreedmtYs 
(hereinafter the Charter) has led to a m e r  erosion of the common law primacy of the 
ln Supra note 145. 
" See ''Convention Refugees Seeking Resettlmenf', S. 7, Inunigmton ReguIations, which mquires visa 
officers to consider various economic and educational factors in amviag at an opinion as to whether a 
convention refugee is capable of becoming successfiitry estabiished. 
lSs Canadim Charter of R i g h  and Freedoms, Part 1 of the ConniMion Act, 1982, being Schehilc B of the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 1 1. 
State to ded with foreigners as a matter within its complete d iscre t i~n.~~ In Re Singh and 
M.E.1 ln, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the Charter S guarantee under section 
7 to "life, Liberty and securiv of the person" was applicable to any person physicdly 
present in the country. Aithough thaï case dealt with the situation of Refugee claimants, 
it ensured that anyone, including a non-citizen, wouid be entitled to a reasonable measure 
of procedural fairness in any processes Ieading to their removai. 
In summary then, discretion is used as a tool to permit a fluer level of sïfüng, 
according to entitlement, both within and across categories. In cases where entitlement is 
deerned to be low, then the presence of discretionary power is generally greater. Where 
entitlement is high, a duty exists which tends to displace discretionary authority. Thus, 
depending upon notional entitlement, the existence of discretion will fluctuate across a 
spectrum that spans the rights and privilege dichotomy. Figure 1 provides a graphic 
representation of this situation, which might be termed a righwprivilege continuum. 
Figure 1 - RightslPrivilege Continuum 
Nondiscretionary Discretionary 
1- 1 
Right = Duty Privilege = 
Power 
f.5 Wïat is discretion? 
Examination of the 'bvhy" of discretion highlights the fact that it is both 
ubiquitous and, arguably at least, indispensable. But what exactly is it? Definhg 
'% For a discussion of the effeçts of the Charter on immigration law generaUy, see Bagambiire? supra note 
151 at 365-391. 
discretion is a difficult ta& at best, largely due to the fact that it is a multi-dimensional 
concept, with shades of meaning that depend upon the circumsfances in which it is used. 
Unlike d e s ,  which are hard and fast (or at least relatively more so than discretion) and 
easi1y coilected, analyzed and quantifieci in volumes of legd texts, discretionary power 
SUffers fiom an amorphous nature. This is so since discretion beguis where Iaws and 
rules leave off.1s6 Since primacy of d e s  is favoured in our Liberal democratic legd 
tradition, it is inevitable that discretion should reside only in the space not taken up by 
rules. Existing, therefore, only in relation to d e s ,  discretion necessarily dwells in a 
penumbra of fluid uncertainty on the edges of those d e s .  More cogently, it is also an 
inescapable fact that where there are d e s ,  there wili be di~cretion.'~ 
There is sornething of a presumption in our legal tradition that niles are "safer" 
than discretion, since their rneaning and scope of application appear to be more precise 
and focused. This, in turn, suggests that rules are less arbitrary, more predictable and, 
ultimately, fairer. Such a concIusion, however, may not be quite as  certain or reliable as 
it seems.Im In reality, our legal tradition, with its preference for certainty and fked 
boundaries, actually demands that d e s  and discretion should infoxm one another. 
Moreover, though dissimila. on a superficial level both draw their guidance fkom one 
common pool of fundamentaI legal principles. Accordingly, there tends to be a 
sutpnsingly Worm, cornmon scope for legitimate action, regardless of whether niles or 
Supra note 64. 
in K e ~ e t h  Cuip Davis, Discretlbnary Justice, supra note 41 at 3. 
' ~ 9  See for example H a w h ,  supra note 9 at 35, where the author notes that d e s  and discretion are not 
discrete, opposing entities. Rather, in bis view, discretion sufhcles the interpretation of d e s  and their 
application. 
" A point which 1 atampt to make hughout  this work. In particular, however, socioiogical work m 
ment years has attanpted to debbuiil the notion that discretion is as arbitmy as traditionally pfesumeci. 
discretion are implicated. The limits for one tend to foreshadow the iimits of the other 
and so the discrepancies between the two may be more apparent than r d .  Likewise, 
though the virtues of written laws are often extolled as the ideal model for regulation of 
our society, the reality is that discretion is stiU an essentid part of that model. The 
difficulties of ever devising a complete set of d e s  of absolute clarity and precision are 
such that discretion must always be present, to some degree or other, in any system of 
d e s .  Thus, it exists as both a procedural device, assisting interpretation and application 
of des,  and as a substantive tool, supplementing shortcomings in the d e s  themselve~.~~' 
Typically, both types of discretion are present in some measure in any regime of d e s  or 
laws. In practice, therefore, d e s  and discretion, occur in tandem and may be as much 
identical as fiaterna1 in their exercise. 
Like d e s ,  discretionq power is a ubiquitous substance, pervading every area of 
law and every field of legal endeavo~r.'~~ At a fundamentai level, Iaw is an exercise in 
rationalization of facts, values and influences and it is these three ingredients which Davis 
- 
This point is examined in greater depth below, at section 2.3 Discretion and Sociology. 
16' This distinction is deait with more M y  below, at h p t e r  2, section 2.1 The Selection Process. 
Indeed, a 1975 study by the Law Refonn Commission of Canada, upon a review of the revised statutes 
of Canada, reckoned ttiat those statutes contained 14,885 grantts of discretiomy power. See Phiiip 
Anisman, A Catalogue of DrSmetionary Powers (Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1975) at 23. The 
powers bestowed by such grants were classifïed as "judicial" (5938), ' ' d e  rnaking" (3467), 
"administrative" (2933) and "investigative" (1 298). Within the Immigration Act, Anisman calculated there 
were a total of 173 grants of discretionary power, broken down as foilows: "judiciai" (lOl), 
"administrative** (20), "investigative" (19) and 'hile mafring" (33). AIthough the Act contained in the 1970 
revision of statutes was repiaced in its entirety by the current Act (ie. Immigration Act. 1976), there is no 
m o n  to believe that the situation in respect of discretionary powers is any different now, as then. In 
considering these statistics, it is p ~ d e n t  as well to bear in mind Anisman's caution, given at page 23. 
'Wevertheless, it shouid be stressed that powers enumerated show onLy the tip of the iceberg. Many 
express powers are not included m the tables, none of the discretionary powers granted in the regdations 
themselves were considered, and, most important, no attempt was made to discover the numba of impiicit 
powers capable of exercise or actually exercised [footnote omitted]." 
amibes to the make up of dimetioda The facts include actions (or even inaction) and 
rules which mut be applied to those actions. Values are the grease dong which the 
interpretive exercise slides, buffeted ali  the while by influences such as the characteristics 
of the litigants, the manner in which the suit has arrived in court or even, one supposes, 
by the state of the judge's digestion. Given the diverse factors which can influence the 
make up and exercise of discxetionary power, it is inevitable that the end result is a multi- 
faceted mature existing on various planes cutting across our legd system. 
There is, nonetheless, a single thread running through every attempt at definition 
which le& inevitably and inexorably to one notion alone - power. Thus, Evans offers 
that discretion is ". . .an express legal power to choose a course of action fiom a range of 
permissible options, including the option of inaction".'" Grey takes this a step fiirther by 
asserting a sort of complete independence in the decision-maker. He postdates that 
"[d]iscretion rnay best be dehed as  the power to make a decision that cannot be 
determined to be right or wrong in any objective way."lU Similarly, in the view of 
Kenneth Cuip Davis, discretion occurs "whenever the effective iimits on the power of a 
public official leave freedom to choose between possible courses of action or inaction".'" 
Regardless of how the precise statement is formulated or expressed, it is apparent that the 
idea of power lies at the root of every attempt to define the concept of discretion. 
1.5.1 'Of Doughnuts and Discretion' - The Relationship to Rules 
While power may be something of a given, the more intricate and subtle question 
Davis, supra note 41 at 5. 
Evans, supra note 2 at 102 1. 
la J.H. Grey, "Discretion in Administrative Law", supra note 1 at 107. 
about discretion concerns its relationship to niles. Although it entails power, yet it is not 
an absolute or unbridecl power. The traditions of our legai and political systems have 
engendered a lively and enduring suspicion of umegulated power, which is thought to be 
anathema to democratic society and the 'hile of Iaw". Accordingly, discretion does not 
exist freely in our society without reference to standards and prin~iples.'~~ It is for this 
reason that much jurisprudential time and energy have been expendeci in defining and 
describing the proper relationship between d e s  and discretion.'" 
For John Austin, a lgm century proponent of the positivist school of thought, 
discretion existed at the ' furry edges'Iw of d e s ,  where decision-makas are empowered 
to make new d e s  or to rework old niles to deal with unique or unanticipated difficult 
cases."0 Here, discretion obtains as power to devise or refashion d e s .  H.L.A. Hart, 
though developing an even more elaborate description than Austin of rules as a system, 
still clung to the basic tenet of Austin that d e s  were everything. Hart's version of the 
de-based system was comprised of primary and secondary mles.17' The primary d e s  
are the laws, orders and ordinances themselves, which confer rights or impose 
obligations. The secon- rules are rules of recognition, dealing with how and by whom 
'66As cited in Hawkins, supra note 9 at 16. 
16' The exact nature of those soindards and principles is discusscd below, Chapter 3 "The Limits of 
Discretion". 
See for example Hawkins, supra note 9 at 14, who observes that obsession with rules is the major 
difference in approach that law and social science bring to the study of discretion. Legal philosophers 
think in terms of the relation&@ between rules and discretion while s& scientists prefer to focus on 
decision making. 
'" As descriid m h d d  M. Dworkin, "The Mode1 of Rules," (1967) 35 W. Chicago L.R., 14 at 18, citing 
J. Austin, The Province of Jurirprudence Detennïned, 1832. 
17' This is, of course, simply an older version of Kenneth Culp Davis' assertion, see supra note 41 at 3, that 
'bvhere iaw ends, discretion begins." This is the optimist's view. Davis also quotes a more pessimistic 
version, a s c r i i  to Wi lhm Pitt and engraveci on a stone m front of the Justice Building in Washington, 
D.C., that States: 'Where law ends tyranny begins." 
17' H.L.A. Hart, The Çoncept of Law (Oxford: CIarendon Press, 1961) at 77-96. 

1 call both of these senses weak to distinguish them h m  a stronga sense. We 
use ""discretion" sometimes not merely to Say that an official must use judgment in 
applying the standards set him by authority, or that no one will review that 
exercise of judgment, but to say that on some issue he is simply not bound by 
standards set by the authority in question.174 
Applying these senses to Canadian immigration law, we find that the nrst weak 
sense, a decision dernanding the exercise of judgment, is one that is found throughout the 
immigration program. V W y  every application for a visa, regardless of whether it is in 
an immigrant or a non-immigrant category, involves some level of discretionary 
judgment. The only variable concerns the level of dismtionary power that may be 
present in any given instance. In some cases, it may be more open-ended, while in others 
it will be greatly restncted. For example, in the Family Class, an applicant's right to an 
immigrant visa crystaUizes upon proof of the requisite f d y  link. Discretionary 
judgment in such an application is Limited to the adequacy of the proof offered. It does 
not extend so far as to perrnit any judgment regarding the motivation of the applicant in 
seeking entry to Canada.175 
In contrast, a visitor visa applicantm is dso required to provide proof as to certain 
substantive requirements, such as possession of a valid passport or travel document'n or 
suficient fun& to facilitate the traveP However, it is not enough for such an applicant 
'' Ibid-at 32-33. 
''' This is not to make light of the difndties that can sometimes be present in proving relationships m 
family class cases. For an example of such diffïdties, see Secretary of State for Externui Affairs & 
Minakter of Employment & Immigtution v. Menghani and Canadian Human Rights Commission ( 1  993) 2 1 
CHJLR. D/427 (F.C.T.D.), rev'g in pari (1992) 17 C-HJUL Dl236 (Cdn. H. Rîs. Tni.). As this case 
illustrates, when the applicant is h m  a counûy or region where record keeping and documents are not 
reliable, proving f d y  ties can be almost as difncult as proving intent in viçitor cases. 
"6 The term "visitor" is dehed at s. 2(1) of the Act as "a person who is tawfb.üy in Canada, or seeks to 
corne into Canada, for a temporary purpose." 
ln Regulations, S. 14(3). 
See for example, Toor v. Canada (fi. of Employment & Immigration) (1987), 1 Imm L.R. (2d) 104,9 
F.TR 292 (Fed T.D.), where the applicant's inability to &ord the travel in ~uestion was found to be a 
just to prove these prerequisites. They mut also satis@ an O fficer of the temporary 
nature of th& proposed visit.'" This is an additional element, which involves judgment 
and assessrnent of intent. Intention is very obviously a more dinicult criterion to assess 
than is a claimed relationship to another person. There is often no single best piece of 
evidence that an applicant can present to ver@ that she intends only to travel to Canada 
for a finite period and purpose. Since intent is only a state of min& the adequacy of the 
proof will be dependent upon ai l  of the circumstancw. Moreover, in practice, the result 
may well be that what satisfies one officer may prove insunicient to another. The 
absence of a fixed standard to be mechanicaily applied in every case invariably vests 
considerable latitude in the examining official. The nature of what is to be proved in 
visitor cases creates a greater scope for discretionary decision-making in those cases, than 
is apparent in Family Class immigrant applications. ui the end, however, both examples 
concern the measure of discretionary power available with respect to the sufnciency of 
proof, and so the only real clifference between them is simply the size of the hole in the 
doughnut. 
The second weak sense, where an official is not subject to review, is also present 
in the operation of Canadian immigration processes, as it is in most areas of 
administrative laws. In our legal tradition, decisions of administrative O fficials are not 
- - - -- - ---- -. - - - - - 
legitimate ground for denial of a visitor visa 
'" The discretionary nature of the grant of a vintor visa and the minimum indicia of a temporary purpose 
are set out in section 13(2) of the Regulutions which States: 
A visa officer may issue a visitor's visa to any pason who meets the requirements of the Act and 
these Regdations if that person estabiishes to the satisfiction of visa officer that he will be able 
(a) to return to the country fiom which he seeks to corne to Cana* or 
(b) to go h m  Canada to some other country. 
lm ''Wealr" is perhaps a poor choicc of terms for a seme of discretion which imports the sort of power that 
unreviewabilty speaks to. Dworkh might have been better advised to draw a clearer distinction of this 
generaily reviewable on the merits, only on the matter of jurisdiction, which uicludes the 
process by which a decision was reached.lS1 While an error in process will aUow the 
courts to intervene (most ofien ordering that the matter be reheard), they will not 
ordharily examine the equities or substantive features of the case. These are for 
consideration and assessment by the hearing officer alone. In this sense, then, an 
immigration official is not subject to review. Their decision as to the merits and demerits 
of a case is beyond dispute, both by the courts and by higher level of fi ci al^.^^ 
FinaUy, Dworkin's thUd strong sense, discretion unbounded by any standards, 
though mer in practice than the nrst two, is stili evident in immigration practice.lu For 
example, section 2.1 of the Regulations empowers the Minister to ". . .exempt any person 
fiom any regulation made under subsection 1 14(1) of the Act [pursuant to which the 
Immigration Regdations have been promulgated] or otherwise facilitate the admission to 
sense by r e f d g  to it as  a rnid-level or medium type. 
181 Grey, "Discretion in Administrative Law", supra note 1 at 1 12; see also JH. Grey, Immigration Law in 
Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) at 1-5. There is some inconsistency in the Iiteraîure regarding the 
grounds for judicial review. Some authors, such as Bagambiire, supra note 15 1 at 346 -349, refw to many 
grounds for review, such as abuse of discretion, breach of natural justice or procedural faimess, acting 
beyond jurisdiciion, without jurisdiction, fading to exercise jurisdiction, error of law and so on. Others, 
like Grey, simply lump aii such distinctions under îhe broad notion of jurisdiction. For reasons of 
economy and practicality, 1 am here adopting the latter approach, 
182 This is, of course, the theory. In reality, however, it is not u n d  for higher level officiais to intervene, 
at les t  where a negative decision is concerned if that decision is thought to be indefensible, senior 
officials may direct that a positive decision be substituted, or if the case has been appealed to the courts, 
CIC will oAen consent to a judgment in the applicant's favour. The contrary, however, is not true. 
Because the d e s  of fairness dictate that "she who hears must decide", higher level officials are not able to 
dictate negative d t s ,  since this wodd be an unwarranted fettering of the decision-der's discretion. 
Such cases are ripe for review in the courts, who will not hesitate to find a breach of the principles of 
fainiess. Thus, wMe discretion may apparently be fettered in a manner h t  benefits an applicant, the 
converse resuits in misconduct that will not be toterakd. In theory, one supposes that a lower level official 
who is overturned by supaïor level officials might have justifiable cause to appeal such actions, 
particuIarly where those overhirning the decision have not otherwise been directly involved in the 
assessment process. In practice, however, it is unheard of for lower level officials to appeal such 
occurrences. 
'O Although some argue that is extremely rare. See for erample, David Feldman, Book Renew of The 
Uses of Diwetzon, by Keith Hawkins, ed, [ 19941 Public Law 279 at 289 who notes that ". . .it is central to 
Dworkin's thesis that strong discretion in law is cxtremely rare, if it exists at aE" 
Canada of any person where the Minister is satisfied that the person should be exempted 
fiom that regdation.. Clearly, while the Minister possesses the authority, or 
discretion, to waive a requirement of the ReguIatio~ts, she may not be compelled to do 
soY This is so because the legislation provides no standard to guide the exemption 
power. The lack of any standards for the exercise of this extraordinary discretion 
effectively renders it immune to any sort of review. A dispensation fiom the Regdations 
is an exceptional matter that remains entirely within the judgment of the Minister and her 
delegates? Neither the courts, nor any other official, are in a position to substitute their 
own opinion for that of the Minister in these decisions.Im It is this type of authority 
Supra note 91. 
las This is very clearly evidenced in the case of Khalon et al. v. Canada (Min&- of Citizmhip & 
Immigration) (1995), 101 F.T.R 297 (F.C.T.D.). That case dealt with a request for exemption from the 
application of the rules for immigration contahed in the Act and Regulations, pursuant to a humanitarian 
and compassionate review under S. 114(2) of the Act. The applicanîs had been denied a favourable review 
and so applied for judicial review. In dismisshg the appiication, Muidoon J. noted the extraordinary 
nature of the exemption to be granted under S. 1 14(2) and was criticai of attempts to bring its operation 
under the p u ~ e w  of the courts. In his judgment, at 301, he states that 
Applicant's counsel keep attempting to expanci and over-judicialize the application of the H&C 
[humanitarian and compassionate] review. ft is well to rem& what was stated by Strayer, J. 
(as he was), in Vida2 [Vidal and Daàwah v. Minister of Employmen t and Immigration (199 1), 4 1 
F.TE 1 18, 13 irnm. L.R. (2d) 123 (TD.)], ... on the nature of subsection 114(2) of the Act. Three 
of the six propositions stated by him are: 
(1) In subs. 1 i4(2) Parliament has authorized the Governor-in-Council to make exceptions to the 
rules found in the Act and in the Reguiationr. There is therefore nothing inconsistent with the 
Act in the Governor-in-CounciI creating such exceptions by regulation. 
(2) The exceptions so made are for the benefit of those in whose favour they are made and do not 
detract h m  the n o d  application of the general d e s  to aU others. ïïzose who me 
complaining that they have not been made a beneficiary of a regdation adopted under subs. 
114(2) are in @et compluining that they have not received u special ben@. . . . 
The H & C review is a sort of last resort after having failed the legal Miteria: it is a privilege. One 
wonders if some newly devised last, last discretionq mort were to be mvented, if the bar would 
attempt to judiciaiize it, too. 
See also Christopher Vicenzi, "Extra-Statutory Ministenal Discretion in Immigration Law" [1992] 
Public Law 300, where he discusses existence of a prerogative in the Minister to "underdorcen the 
immigration des. While the Minister may choose to waive a d e  for rasons for compassion or justice or 
any other reason deemed sufficient, the detexmination is entirely within the Minister's purview and may 
not be compelied. 
See for example, Young v. M.E.1 et al., supra note 141, where the applicant sought a Minister's Permit 
on the basis of a departmental policy. The court found such poiicies do not mate  legd rights enforceable 
by way of mandamus. 
which undoubtedly most rankles opponents of discretionary power. But even this 
apparentiy unbridled authority does not lead automaticdy to despotism. As Dworkin 
states, this type of discretion does not mean that an official ". . .is f?ee to decide without 
recouse to standards of sense and faimas, but only that his [or her, as in the case of the 
current Minister of Immigration] decision is not controkd by a standard funiished by the 
particdar authority.. .."lm More precisely, while there is no legal standard to guide the 
exercise of discretion in this instance, yet there may weU be other standards in play.Im 
The salient feature is that while this type of decision may be subject to criticism as UIlfair, 
stupid, illsonceived and so on, yet it cannot be said to have deprived an applicant of 
either a substantive decision or a procedural cornmitment to which he or she had an 
entitiment under law . 
1.5.2. Explicit and lrnplicit Discretion 
Dismtionary power is bestowed in two manners; as an explicit delegation of 
authority and as an implicit, but necessary, adjunct to any rule-based decision-makùig.lp0 
An example of this duality is to be found in section 1 l(3) of the Immigration ReguIatiom, 
1978, which states: 
'" 'The Model of Rules", supra note 169 at 34. 
'" The immigration Manuals do provide policy guidance as to whm and how this authority should be 
invoked. Though this is mere departmental policy, and not law, it is still signifïcant that some guidance is 
thought necessary. Likewise, there may be other controis of a more practical nature, such as public opinion 
and political oversight by Parliament. For more on this generaliy, see below, section 3.4 Extra-Judicial 
Influences on Discretion. 
'O The ïxplicit fonn of discretion is often seen to be a cornponent of the notion of "jurisdiction" that is 
used m admmistrative iaw. See generaliy Evans, supra note 2 at 1021-1 022, who notes that d e s  often 
contab implicit discretion regarding how they are to be interpreted and enforced. See also Stanley de 
Smith, The Right Honourable The Lord Woolf & Jeffiey Joweli, Judicial Revïew of Administrative Action, 
5'" e& (London: Sweet & Maxweii, 1995) at 300 - 302 (hereinafter refnrcd to as "dc Smith"). The authors 
specificaliy note, at 302, that because of the necessity for mterpretation, statutory discretions "..-y be 
conferred impiidy as well as expressly." 
A visa officer may 
(a) issue an immigrant visa to an immigrant who is not awarded the number of 
uni6 of assesment required by section 9 or 10 or who does not meet the 
requirements of subsection (1) or (2) [all of which relate to the immigrant 
having received sufncient uni& of assessment on the independent immigrant 
point selection system], or 
(b) refuse to issue an immigrant visa to an immigrant who is awarded the number 
of units of assessment required by section 9 or 10, 
if, in his opinion, there are good reasons why the numba of units of assessment 
awarded do not reflect the chances of the particular immigrant and his dependents 
of becoming successfully established in Canada and those reasons have been 
submitted in writing to, and approved by, a senior immigration o f f i ~ e r . ~ ~ ~  
Here, discretionary authority is expressly delegated to the visa officer to make 
determinations as to whether an assessment under the Independent category selection 
system accurately refleçts settlement potential. While the visa officer is ordinarily 
required to apply the d e s  in orda to arrive at a determination, there is an express 
discretion hanging over the process which can be employed to overcome any perceived 
defect in the d e s .  The visa officer may take, or may refuse to take, action to relieve 
against the rules, where she is of the opinion that there are good reasom for doing so. 
The opposite proposition also holds me. The visa officer has authority to deny the 
benefit of the d e s ,  if there is sufficient justification to believe they have inordinately 
favoured an applicant Either way, this delegation involves a classic grant of express 
discretion and could hardly be any clearer. The visa officer may take a certain course of 
action, but is not necessarily compeiied to do so. She has a choice to exercise that 
depends upon al1 of the circumstances. If she is not properly satisfied of the propriety of 
the case for action, she rnay refuse relief. 
19' Supra note 91. 
hplicit discretion, on the other hd, though more subtle, is equally extant in this 
example. The entire gant of explicit discretion is premised upon the conduct of a points 
assasment'" Assessing the applicant on the points selection system requires that the 
visa officer take stock of the personal and professional background of the applicant, with 
a view to determinkg how many points are appropriate. Every applicant wili, of course, 
present a unique combination of personal qualities and qualifications. The object of the 
exercise in Independent migrant processing is simple - to h d  and select those persons 
who are likely to "becorne successfully established in Canada".'93 Fomulating a set of 
universal rules that will consistently achieve that object is, however, decidedly less 
simple. In many cases, it may never be possible to devise d e s  of general application that 
are absolutely certain and clear in theu meaning and application, in every situation. Such 
generality o h  gives nse to vagueness that necessarily leaves interpretation of the 
meaning of niles somewhat unpredictable. As a wnsequence, some discretion in 
interpretation and application of the rules in each individual instance is indispensable. 
But even procedural discretion to interpret the meaning of the d e s ,  according to the 
facts, rnay not be enough. Vague d e s  also encourage grants of substantive discretion, 
such as that seen in section 1 l(3) of the Regulatiom, as a means of reconciling 
idiosyncrasies or failings in the d e s  that prevent them nom achieving the object of the 
statute. 
Thus, section 1 1(3) allows that the visa officer may ignore the rules, where good 
reasons exist. In this instance, 'good reasons' are stipulated as those relating to the 
The workings of the points seiection system is descnied in greater detail below, section 2.1 The 
Selection Process. 
Likelihood of the immigrant and her farniiy of becoming succasficlly estabïished in 
Canada. Although this prescription is rneant to provide guidance in the exercise of the 
explicit discretion, it is not entVely obvious what successful establishment entails. 
Likewise, there is no exhaustive iist of factors under the Immigraton Act, *ch 
enurnerate when successful establishment is conclusively proven. Since some 
interpretation of the phrase "successful establishment" is necessary, it is not surprishg 
that the d e  requiring it cannot be self-executing. Some interpretation of its meaning is 
necessary . Such interpretation inevitably involves a range of possibilities within which 
choice may be exercised. Likewise, facts and other evidence must be assembled and 
categorized, and their individual weight and collective relevance assessed. The power to 
conduct an assesment of evidence and apply d e s  to that evidence entails an implicit 
gant of discretion, inherent ab Nlitio in the decision-maker's jurisdiction to perform the 
task. This is Dworkin's nrst weak sense in action. Wherever a diversity of potential fact 
scenarios is combined with a requirement for assasment of sdciency and cogency of 
proof, the rules will be incapable of mechanical application. Choice, or discretion, will 
need to be exercised in sorthg out the relevant and the probative fiom the superfluous 
and the irrelevant. The choices made in this process are very much subject to review and, 
if indefensible, then they will be overturned. However, this does not deny that the 
decision-makex has an irnplicit fieedom to interpret and apply the d e s .  It is simply that 
this type of implicit discretion is more closely controlled than is substantive discretion, 
which may also be granted implicitly or explicitly? 
See section 8 of the Regufutions. 
Indmd, discretion in interpretation and application of d e s  is one of the more rigorously scrutinized 
Returning once more to Dworkin, it is interesthg to note the place that discretion 
in interpretation and enforcement occupy in bis analogy. Suggesting that they fit neatly 
into a hole surrounded by a ring of niles, does not adequately capture their tme nature as 
sinewy entities that act upon the d e s  themseives. It is for this reason that some criticize 
the doughnut as  deceptively imprecise, conveying an image of distinction and dennition 
that does not obtain in all cases.[eS Given that interpretative and enforcement discretion is 
perhaps better analogized as commingling with the fibers of the ring of d e s ,  the 
doughnut may actuaily look like a sponge cake,'% with a large hole in the middle and a lot 
of little holes shot al1 through it. 
Applying this to immigration law, the hole in the xniddle of the doughnut can be 
likened to the explicit discretion wielded by immigration bureaucrats. Within that middle 
void, they are free to choose fioom among any assembled options. Their power of choice 
is relatively ample here, being immune to review, at least on the merits. This is 
Dworkin's second weak sense. Within the surmunding band of nila, there are also often 
choices to be made among and between the rules. This type of discretion is most ofien 
granted as an implicit matter, though it may also occur as an overt matter. The necessity 
forms of discretion, primdy because courts see themselves as expert in this field. Lnterestingly, section 
1 l(3) represents an u n d  example of an explicit version of substantive enforcement discretion, which 
more often exists an iinplicit power. tmplicit enforcement discretion is most oflem associated with criminal 
law, where police, prosecutors and courts have authority to detennine whether or not charges should be 
laid or, if- laid, whether they should be withdrawn. See for example, Glanville Williams, "Discretion in 
Prosecutingn, supra note 1 19 at 222, where the author states that "[i]t is completely wrong to suppose (as is 
sometimes done) that the institution of prosecutions is an automatic or mechanical matter." 
l* See Galligan, DUcretiormy Powers supra note 41 at 32 where he notes h t  the doughnut analogy 
". . .cm be misleading in suggesting . . .a clear division between the surrounding standards and discretion; in 
the clearest cases of discretion that division may be clear, but more typicdy the two are interwoven, with 
discretion ocamhg where there are gaps in the standards, or where the standards are vague, abstract, or in 
conflict" 
'% For another interpreeaton of the doughnut, see Lame Sossin, "Redistrr'buting Demoaacy: An Inquiry 
into Authority, Discretion and the Possïbitity of Engagement in the Welfare State", (1994) 26 Ottawa L . k  

A final aspect of implicit discretion that bears mention concems power to set 
procedures, methods, forms, timing, degrees of emphasis and a host of other subsidiary 
factors. Aithough these appear at hrst glance to be relatively trivial procedural matters, 
yet the* manipulation cm have a significant impact on how substantive choices are 
effected? Again, the ability to exercise discretionary control over these items arises 
either by implicit or explicit conferra1 of authority. Under S. 1 14 of the Act, for example, 
express authority is delegated to the Governor in Council to create regulations dealuig 
with a wide range of matters affêcting who may qu&@ for immigration and in what 
manner. On the other hand, the local manager of a visa office abroad, or a CIC in 
Canada, wili also have significant latitude to set processes and procedures that can impact 
upon deiivery of services. Matters such as office hours, preferences as to documentary 
evidence that should accompany an application and the lk*, al1 have an affect on 
immigration processes. If unreasonable, such stipulations cm result in deIaym3, or even 
denial, of service. It is apparent then that this implicit bureaucratie discretion can be as 
powemil, in its own way, as an explicit gant of discretion. 
Canada (Min* of Ernployment and Immgration), [1990] F.C. 722,9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 243,34 F.TX 26 
(F.C.T.D.). There, the Court found departmental guidelines to be unddy restrictive as to the sorts of 
matters which might be considered upon a humanitarian and compassionate review. 
Davis, supra note 41 at 4, 
See for example, Bunalo APC appiication kit insert, supra note 132, where stipuiations of this sort are 
enumerated. 
An exampIe of this can bc seen in the ment experience of a Nova Scotia man who sponsorrd his 
Americau spouse for permanent residwce in Canada. The matter is detaiied m Parker Bass Doduun, "For 
better, for worse" The WaIrlf~] Sunday Dai& Navs (22 June 1997) at 4-5. The story purports to recount 
what happened ". . .when a happy bride's bid for Ianded-immigrant status became a 14-month ordeai when 
the red tape ran amok.'' In particdar, this couple was dealing with two different CIC offices at one point, 
one in Canada and another located abroad. One bit of delay in the case is ascnid to the fact that whiie the 
Canadian office would accept payment by charge card, tbe foreign office would not. The Canadian office 
was apparentIy unaware of this diffefence in procedure and had counseled that credit card payment was 
indeed an option at the visa office. 
1.5.3 MinisteMl and Delegated Discretion 
At the federal level, legislative authority for creation of regdations to flesh out the 
procedures and d e s  by which a statute is to be camied out is most often delegated to the 
Govemor in Corncil." The Governor in Council is, in reality, simply the executive arm 
of govemment, commonly known as  cabinet? It is composed of the Prime Minister and 
other ministers, including the Minister of Immigration." In the case of immigration law, 
some of Parliament's legislative authority has in fact been delegated to the Govemor in 
C o ~ n c i l . ~  It is pursuant to this authority that the Govemor in Council has created the 
Immigration Regulatiors, which provide a mass of fine detail supplementing the more 
g e n d  overall scheme set out by the Act. 
It is salient to note also that the Minister of Immigration is herself a delegatee of 
power. Though she is a cabinet member, and hence "part" of the Govemor in Council, 
she has no direct authority of her own, Save that which has been accorded to her under the 
xu Evans, supra note 2 at 9-10. 
205 Pm Hughes J. in South- West Oxford (Township) v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1985), 18 O.M.B.R. 2 1 
at 24,50 0.R. (26) 297,S C.P.C. (26) 92, 15 Admin. LX. 1 (HC.), w h m  in speaking of the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council (the provinciai cornterpart), he observed that "...the Lieutenant-Govemor in Council 
is the expression of a fiinction and not of any group of mdividual ministers.. .." See ais0 section 35(1) of 
the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21 which provides this definition: 
"Govemor General in Councii" or "Govemor in Cound" means the Governor General of Canada 
acting by and with the advice of, or by and with the advice and consent of, or in conjunction with 
the Queen's Frivy Council for Canada 
Hogg, mpra note 87 at 26, terms it a "strange practice" in Canadian Iaw that statutes never refer to the 
Prime Minister or cabmet, preferring mstead to donate power to the Governor in Councii, No matter what 
the delegatee is called, however, he notes that the conventions of responsibIe government ensure that 
effective power is always shifted "into the han& of the elected m i n h y  where it belongs". 
See Hogg, id at 343-345, where the author states that because of retention of the British mode1 of 
government in Canada, there is a close Lintr between the executive and Iegislative branches, which con- 
dmply with the United States or Austraiia, where the sqaration of powers is more compIete. Thus, he 
observes h t  there is no general doctrine regarding separation of powers in Caaada and so no requinment 
that legisiative and executive powers be exercised by différent bodies. 
Section 1 14(1) of îhe Act sets out a Iirt mat- ova  which the Govemor in C o d  isempowered to 
make reguîations. 
legislation? Nonetheless, as a hinctiond matter, it is she, rather than the Governor in 
Council, who heads up the immigration bureaucracyy Accordingly, it is to hm that 
immediate responsibiliiy and authority for the &y to day workings of the Immigration 
Department falls. This authority necessitates delegation to the Minister of a broad range 
of powers to enable her to administer and enforce the Act. and ensure that govemment 
policy on immigration is carried f o r ~ a r d . ~  
While many powers are nominally accorded to the Minister in her role as 
functional head of the immigration bureaucracy, few of them are a c W y  exercised by 
her directly. Instead they are usually delegated in tum to s~bordinates."~ The reality of 
the size and complexity of the immigration program is such that it is inconceivable that 
the Minister herself could deal persondly with every case that might implicate her 
discretionary power. As a matter of practicality, therefore, she is permitted to delegate 
some of her authority, either as an express or implied matter."' 
Thus, for example, S. 1 14(2) of the Act contains an express provision permittting the Govemor in 
Coucil to authorize the Minister to exempt anyone h m  any regdation. 
For a discussion of the potential checks on the authority delegated to the Minister of immigration, see 
below, section 3.4.1 The Minister. 
''O Section 12 1 of the Act provides: 
(1) Subject to subsection (1. l), the Minister or the Deputy Minister, as the case may be, 
may authorize such persons employed in the public service of Canada as the Minister or 
Deputy Minister deems proper to exercise any of the powers and perfonn any of the duties 
and functions that may be or are requircd to be exercised or pdormed by the Minister or 
Deputy Minister, as the case may be, under this Act or regulations, . . . 
(2) Any power exercised or duty or function performed under subsection (1) by any 
person authorized to exercise or perfonn it W be deemed to have been exercised or 
performed by the Minister or Deputy Minister, as the case may be. 
Courts WU imply an authority to delegate because of practicd concerns. See for exampie, Vidal v. 
Cmtada (Minister of Employment and Immi'ation) (1 99 l), 4 1 F.T.R. 1 18,13 hm. L A  (2d) 123 
(F.C.T.D.). There. the applicant contended that a lack of explicit wording permithg delegation obligated 
the Governor in Councii to persoaally p a s  upon appiications for exemption b m  the Regdations under S. 
1 14(2) of the Act. The Court dhnissed this contention summarily, however, noting the practical 
Mpossitbility of the Govemor m Council personally deaihg with thousands of such apphcations, Because 
of this, it found tbat an extensive deiegation system must be impiied. This system dows  review of 
individual cases by immigration officers who, in tiirn. provide recommendations to the Minister. AAer 
Express delegation arises in those instances where the Immigration Act and 
Regdations distinguish between discretionary powers wielded by the Minista of 
Immigration and those exercised on her behalf by other officiais, such as visa offi~ers."~ 
It is accomplished by way of delegation instnunents, which are made public. In order for 
the Minister's delegate to be lawfully constituted, they m u t  corne within the class or 
category of O fficials who have been appmved to exercise the particula. power on the 
Minister's behalf,2I3 On the other han& there also exist certain powers which the Act 
prohibits the Minister h m  re-~ielegating.~~~ As a delegatee herself, she is not entitled to 
re-delegate h a  authority d e s s  there is a specific provision to permit her to do so, or the 
circumstances of the Act suggest that this is permi~siblef~~ 
Thus, in some instances, where no explicit characterization is made as to who may 
receiving those recommendations, the Minister, usualiy acting through other officiais within her office, is 
fiee to decide cases as  she deems appropriate in the circumstances. See &O Minirter of Employment & 
Immigration v. Jiminez-Perez (1984), (19841 2 S.CR 565, Cl9851 1 W . W R  577,9 Admin. LX. 280, 14 
D.LR (49 609,56 N R  215 (S.C.C.). 
See for example, S. 2.1 of the Inimigmrion Regulatiionr which aiiows the ". . .Minister to exempt any 
person fiom any regulation made under subsection 1 14(1) of the Act or otherwise to faciiitate the 
admission to Canada of any person where the Minister is satisfied that the p a o n  should be exempted fiom 
that regulation or that the person's admission should be facilitateci owing to the existence of cornpassionate 
or humanitarian considerations." On the other han& see text of S. 1 l(3) of the Regulations accompanying 
note 19 1, supra, which accords a discretion exercised directly by visa officers. 
2'3 See below, section 3.3.3.1 Protecting Discretion, discussing the concept of "Deiegatus Non 
Potest Delegare" and the importance of a properly constituted deiegation of power. 
'14 These are prescribed in the Act. at subsection (1.1) of section 121, which reads: 
(1.1) The Mïnister or Deputy Maiister, as the case rnay be, may not authorize the exercising of 
the powers or the performing of the duties and hctions referred to in [thk Act 
under]subsection 9(5), paragraphs 19(l)(c.2), (f), (k) and (l), subsections 39(2), 40(1) 
and 4O.l(l), subparagraph 46.0 l(l)(e)(ii), paragraph 53(l)(b) and subsections 8 l(2) and 
82(1). 
Essentialiy, ail of these provisions reiate to persons who pose security or serious criminal risks. 
Apparently, because of the sensitive nature of these cases, the Minister (in cooperation with the Solicitor 
Genend, in some cases) m u t  personally determine whether to deny admittance or, if the penon is already 
in Canada, to diow deportatioa 
'" See John Willis, "Delegatm Non Potest Delegaren, (1943) 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257 at 259. "A discretion 
confmed by statute is prima facie intendcd to be exercised by the authority on which the statute has 
confemd it and by no other authority, but this intention may be negatived by any contrary indications 
found m the language, scope or object of the statute.. ,." 
exercise a power, it may still be mderstood that the Minister has authority to delegate her 
powers to lower level officials. This implied delegation will be 6 s e d  fiom ali  of the 
circumsfatlces attendant upon the grant. Ifdelegation is not expressly prohibited, then 
even considerations of practicality and necessity may be cited by the courts as 
justification for implying a ri@ in the Minister to pass on her authonty? The reality, 
therefore, is that many of the powers and duties granted to the Minister are actudly 
exercised by officials acting on her behalf. In such cases, "[tlhe officia1 is not usually 
spoken of as a delegate, but rather as the alter ego of the Minister or the department; 
power is devolved rather than delegated.[footnotes omitte~i] '~~~ 
Regardless of who actuaily exercises a power, the propriety of a discretionary 
decision may be challengeci by way of an application for judicial review. The centrai 
question in any judicial review concerns the nature of the power in question, whether it 
was exercised in a fit and proper fashion and whether it is amenable to review by the 
courts. Certainly, there exist some discretionary powers that the courts will decline to 
supervise too closely. In particular, those characterized by the courts as purely 
discretionary are often found not to be amenable to judiciai interference. This is even 
mer where exercise of the power implicates broder political questions or considerations 
See for example, Vidal v. Canada, supra 21 1 where the court readily implied an extensive delegation 
system, In doing so, it rejected an argument by counsel for the applicant tbat applications for 
"humanitarian and compassionate" consideration pursuant to S. 1 14(2) of the Act required pers04 
consideration by thc Governor in Councïi. For practical Rasons stezxuxing îkom the volume of such 
applications, the Court found it 'Snconceivable" that ParLiament should have intended to prohibit 
delegation of authority and responsibility over such matters to the Mmister. 
2 1 7 ~ e  Smith, supra note 190 at 369, where the authors note alsa: 
In generai, &=fore, a M .  is not obliged to bring his own mind to bear upon a matter 
entnisted to him by statute but may act through a duly authorised officer of his department, The 
officer's authority need not be conferred upon him by the Miaister persody;  it may be conveyed 
g e n d y  and informaIly by the officer's hierarchid superiors in accordance with departmental 
practice. 
that exceed the scope of the particular case at hand. 
In Winn v. Canada (Attorney G e n e r ~ l ) ~ ~ ~ ,  for exampie, the applicant applied for 
mandumus to compel the Attomey General to provide consent to institute a prosecution. 
The court noted that a decision to prosecute was entirely discretionary on the part of the 
Minister and that there were no statutory or other guidelines as to when, how and under 
what circumstances that discretion should be exercised. h the face of such a broad 
discretion, the court declined to make an order. In its view, judicial restra.int was 
warranteci where a purely discretionary power, ill suited to judicial review, was in issueF9 
Such powers generally implicate a special privilege not ordiaarily avaiiable. In the 
absence of a duty on the discretion holder to act, or a right in the appLicant to compel the 
exercise of a discretion, the courts will not act This is especially so where the matter 
involves questions of politics or public policy, which are more suited to the political 
arena than the co~rtroorn.~ 
The hesitancy of the courts to act in the face of a so-called "pure discretionary 
powei' is reinforced by the nature of the remedies available. Judicial review in the Trial 
Division of the Federal Court is the primary vehicle by which overseas immigration 
'18 (1994), 28 Admin, L R  (2d) 254,84 F-TK 11 S. 
For a similar result on similar facts, see also Balhtyne v. Duplessis (1938), 76 Que. S.C. 448 (Que. 
S.C.). There, the Attorney General failed to noti€y an appficant as to whether consent to commence an 
action, which was needed pursuant to a statute goveming employment, wodd be given. The court noted 
that the giving of consent was discretionary- Under the circumstances, it was found that the Attorney 
General's lack of response indicated that discretion had been exercised with a negative d t .  
See for example, William v. Canada ('Mjnister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1997), 35 Imm. L.R. 
(2d) 286 (F.C.A.). In that case, the respondent had been declared a "danger to the public" pursuant to S. 
70(5) of the Act. The court reviewed the process by which the "Minister" might form an opinion that an 
individual poses risks to the public generaily. Strayer J.A. observed tbat mch an exercise involves a 
prognostication of potena fiiture activity, which cannot be proven dennitively. As such, the Minister is 
required to engage in a weighing of the factors, both for and against the appficant. In his view, however, 
this is an activity perfectiy suited to the Minister, since "...there is dways a risk [in such cases] and the 
extent to which society shouId be prepared to accept that risk can involve poiiticd considerations not 
decisions may be challenged.*' The usual remedies in such cases include writs of 
ceMorari, mandamus and prohibition, which may be sought aii together, or in any 
c~mbination.~ Certioruri is used to quash a decision of a tribunal, while prohiition 
issues to prevent an anticipatory breach of the law. Mandamus, on the other hand, issues 
to compel performance of a duty owed to an applicant." Though it may be used to 
compel the exercise of a discretion, it cannot be used to dictate a particular o~tcorne.*~ 
AU of thae  writs are prerogative rernedies whose issuance is discretionary in the 
court? Thus, a court is under no obligation to afford them, even where aprUna facie 
case has been made out by the appl i~ant .~~~ Indeed they may be refbsed despite that the 
public authority in question has been found to have acted in contravention of the l a w F  
Likewise, the ". . .scope of the prerogative orders reflects the general principle that it is 
not the role of the.. .Court on judicial review to substitute its own decision for that of the 
inappropriate for a minister". 
"' There are, of course, exceptions to this proposition. One of the most obvious is the right of appeai, in 
sponsored immigration cases, to the Immigration Appeai Division (1AD)of the Tmmigration and Refiigee 
Board (IRB) under S. 77(3) of the Act. However, any chabmges of LAD decisions are also dealt with by 
judicial review in the Trial Division of the Federal Court, pursuant to S. 18.1 of the Federal Court Act. 
Bagarnbiûe, supra note 151 at 356. 
" For morr on the nature of thae remedies and the circumstances unda which they may issue, see 
generaiiy Bagambiire, ibid.at 335-363; and de Smith, supra note 190 at 693-704. 
* POU- v. Ward. [1947] 2 W.W.R. 193,55 Man. R 2 14, [194q 4 D.L.R. 3 16 (Man. CA.), revershg 
[194q 1 W.WK 807 (sub nom. Pozier, Re) (Man. U.). 
zzs De Smith, supra note 190 at 695; J.H. Grey, "Discretion in Admhkîmtive Law'', supra note 1 at 1 13, 
footnote 40. For a discussion generally of discretion m the court upon judicial review, see de Smith, id. at 
805-820. 
zx See, for example, Sashi v. Outuda (Min of Employment & Immigration) (1987), 3 hm. L.R. (2d) 288 
(Fed. T.D.). In that case, the appîicant sought to sponsor his adopted ûaughter. However, the application 
was denied on the basis that the strict requiiements of the foreign adoption had not been complied with. 
The court noted that the conclusion of the visa officer, though not unrtaso~ble, involved some 
interpretation of foreign Iaw. Accordingly, procedrual fairness required that the applicant shouid have 
been given some opportimity to respond to the mterpretation. This was not done. Under the 
circu~ll~fances, however, the court saw no substantid injustice and, since the relief sought was 
discretionary, dismisseci the action. 
De Smith, supra note 190 at 695. The Lemedies may also be denied because the conduct of the applicant 
is such as to warrant a denial of relief, See Bagambiire, supra note 151 at 355. 
original deciaon-maker[footnote ~mi t ted] . '~  Accordingly, in order to meet with success 
on an application for review, it is incumbent upon the applicant to demonstrate some duty 
owed to her. If the decision in question entails a pureiy discretionary power, then such 
duty is absent. Mandamur, in particular, will not issue except where the applicant 
possesses a legal interest in the duty whose compulsion is sought. This fact was evident 
in Robinson v. Canada (Minister of CitPzmhipl2Lq where the court set out the elements to 
be demonstratecl for a successful application. "[T]he applicant must show that: 1) it has a 
clear legal right to have the thing sought by it done; 2) the duty whose performance it is 
sought to coerce is actuaily due and incumbent upon the officer at the t h e  of seeking the 
relief; 3) the duty is purely ministeriaP in nature; and 4) there has been a demand and a 
refusa1 to perform the duty"P1 Frankly, therefore, if the matter involves a "purely 
discretionary" decision, the Minister or her delegate will be fiee to act in a highly 
subjective fashion. 
As an elected official responsible for shaping, implernenfing and administering 
govemment immigration policy, it is inevitable that political considerations wil1 be 
present, to a greater or lesser extent, in ahost  every decision that the Minister of 
Immigration is cailed upon to make. Accordingly, courts are more iikely to show greater 
deference to discretionary decision making engaged in by the Minister, than that of a 
lower level official acting pursuant to a delegati~n.~~ In this light, it is pertinent to note 
-- 
De Smith, ibid. at 698. 
" [1990] 1 FC. 362, 10 Imm. L.R (2d) 224 (F.C.T.D.). 
The Court is not using the tenn "ministerialw bere to connote a power wielded by the Minister of 
Immigration, Rather, its meaning in this context relates to a mandatory act or duty that admits of no 
personal discretion or judgment m its performance. 
t5' Supra note 229,lO Tmm- L R  (2d) 224 at 227. 
232 This is made abundantly apparent in the decision of Nguyen v. Canada (1993), 18 1mm.L.R. (2d) 165, 
that, by wtue of S. 114(2) of the Act and S. 2.1 of  the ReguIutions, the entirety of the 
selection criteria established by the ReguIati0n.s have been lefi subject to a broad, 
overriding discretion in the Minister. She is authorized to reiieve against the regdations 
whenever she is satisfied that an exemption should be granted or that humanitarian and 
compassionate rasons for doing so exist. It is a sort of statutory "escape valve" which 
empowers the Minister to "under-enforce" the law as she deems expedientB3 The 
plenitude of this discretion cannot be overemphasized. There are simply no criteria k e d  
100 D L R  (49 15 1.151 N K  69.14 CRIL (24  146 (Fed CA.). In that case, a permanent retident was 
summoned to an msuiry under section 27(3) of the Act to determine whether he should be deported for 
having been convicted of a serious criminal off'ce, contrary to section 27(1)(d). The inquiry was 
adjoumed when the appiicant mdicated that he wished to seek refiigee status. Subsequentiy, the Minister 
of Immigration issued a certifïcate pursuant to section 46.01(I)(e)(ii)(B) [now section 46.01(l)(e)(iii)] 
declaring the appiicant to be ineligible for refigee status because he constituted a dangex to the pubiic in 
Canada. Upon resumption of the inquiry* the c d c a t e  was tendered in evidence and the applicant was 
ordered deported Upon judiciai review of that deportation order, the applicant's counsel argued, in part, 
that the legislative provisions which permitted the Mioister to issue such a certincate violated the 
applicant's rights under section 7 of the Charter not to be deprived of his liberty* except in accordance with 
the principles of hdamentai justice. In counsel's view, the lack of any specific criteria in the legislation 
to guide the .Uinister m her decision to issue a danger certificate was contrary to fundamental justice. in 
the Court of Appeal, this argument was quickly disposed in a manner that made clear that the COLU& had no 
qualms about a wide and unstructurcd discretion being granted to the Minister. Speaking for the court, 15 1 
N.R. 69 at 74, Marceau J.A. stated: 
With respect to the Iegislation itseif, it is argued that the absence of legislative safeguards to 
protect against the issuance of an di-advised certificate, such as a requirement that dangerous 
conduct be likely to continue and that the dangeruusness be intractable, coupled with the fact that 
there is no provision for a court review of the Minister's opinion, renders the whole legislative 
scheme disrespectful to the principles of fimdamental justice. 1 disagree. I do not beliwe that the 
Min ister needs tu be cornpelled to follow formai guidelines as to the factors he should take into 
account in forming Lis opinion, and I consider the Minister 's opinion in respect of public danger 
as reliable as that of a court- [emphasis added] 
U3 This ir to be contrasted with the situation in Britain where, arguably, the Minister has not been accorded 
statutory authority to 4îmder-enforce'' mimigration law. See Vice- "Extra-Statutory Ministerial 
Discretion in Immigration Law", supra note 186, who notes that the Secretary of State (who has 
responsibility for immigration in England) exaises a discretion to under-enforce the immigration mies. 
In his view, however, English law does not acaially accord power to the Semtary of State to grant 
dispensation in the thousands of cases that he actudy does every year. However, he does also note some 
case law, at 3 17, which seems to suggest tbat a broad construction of one statutory section may provide the 
necessary authority. Whether or not such statutory authority exists, the Secretq of State assumes he has 
this power and, of course, those who benefit from it do not challenge i t  On the other han4 since it is a 
pure disaetion, there is no basis to apped refusal to exacise the discretion. in practice, therefon, this 
discretion is immune h m  judicial supervision, since successfùi parties do not appeal and unsuccessfai 
ones have no basis for a@. 
by statute or regdation that the Minister must f o i l o ~ . ~  
Moreover, in reviewing exercises of discretion, it is clear that the courts show 
pater  deference to Ministers than to rank and file civil servants. This cm be seen, for 
example, in cases involving crimllial inadmissibility. Where the prospective entrant to 
Canada has a CnminaI record of any sort, they must seek a gant of "rehabilitation". The 
authority for granting such rehabilitation, at least with respect to more serious offences, 
has not been delegated by the Minister and so she retains direct responsibility for each 
determination. The mai procedure is for the applicant to be intewiewed by a visa 
officer who, if satisfied genuine rehabilitation has occurred, rnakes a positive 
recommendation to the Minister for exercise of her discretion to grant relief. In the 
Leung case5, the applicant had been convicted in 1989 in Hong Kong of the& forgery of 
a document and uttering a forged document and sentenced to four months irnprkonment 
on each count. Upon his later application for permanent residence under the Independent 
category, Leung was able to satisfy the visa officer of his genuine rehabilitation, with the 
result that the visa officer forwarded an enthusiastic positive recommendation to the 
Minister? The Minister, however, without giving reasons, deched to exercise her 
234 Tho@ admittedly, this discretion may not be compIetely devoid of criteria guiding iîs exercise. 
However, the criteria applicable usuaiiy are those set by the Minister herself, in the fonn of poiicy 
statements contained in the Immigration Manuals, Operations Memoranda and the me. The Minister is 
under no obligation to formulate such policies to guide exercise of her diçcretion. However, once adopte& 
the courts wiU act in the intefests of fairness to ensure that they are applied evenly and consistently. For a 
fiiller discussion of the legal position of policy statcments, see text accompanying note 556, infia, 
Chi Wah Anthony h n g  (14 April1998), Federal Court File No. IMM- 106 1-97 (F.C.T.D.) 
[unreported], as cited in Labase - The National Infonnutton Network for Immigration Practitioners 
(hereinafter refened to as "kbase") 9 5  (May, 1998 Sending) at 14. 
236 The enthusiasm of the officer is evident in an extract h m  the rehabilitation recommendation forwarded 
to the Minister. It reads: "It is rare in the course of an Immigration Officer's career that an applicant for 
permanent residence in Canada exudes so ~damentally the features of rehabilitation, remorsefulness, and 
contriteness as portrayed to myself as the interviewhg officer and miter of this rehabilitation submission." 
Id.., 14 at 15. 
power in favour of the applicant After apparently failing to obtaui leave to directly 
challenge the Minister's determinationm, the applicant applied for judicial review by 
questioning the visa officer's d e  in the matter. The central issue concernai the duty of a 
visa officer to question the reasonableness of the Minister's decision. Though the 
Minister's apparent disregard for the ringing endorsement provided by one of her own 
officials seems on its face somewhat perverse, the completely discretionary nature of her 
authority and the deference courts will pay to it is seen in this statement by Gibson J.: 
It is worthy of note that the responsibility for rehabilitation decisions has been 
vested in the Minister, not in officials such as visa officers. It was for the 
Minister to detennine whether or not she was satisfied and the fact that the visa 
officer who prepared the submission to her was himself satisfied is of no 
~onsequence.~ 
Accordingly, the Court found no obligation on a visa officer to inquire d e r  the propriety 
of a Ministerial decision. hdeed, the Court went so far as to distinguish a Ministerial 
decision fiom those rendered by officials employed in her department, by using the 
example of a medicd officer's opinion. Medicai officm provide opinions to visa officers 
as to whether applicants meet statutory requirenients respecthg health. Such opinions 
often involve a significant elernent of discretion in their formation. Though visa officers 
have no medical training, the courts nonetheless have found a duty in them to assess the 
reasonableness of Medical Officer opinions. 
The result is somewhat incongrnous. The very expertise of visa officers lies in 
assessing the personai quaiitia, achievements and general character of visa applicants. 
The selection factor of personal suitability, for example, applicable to al l  Independent 
=' Id. 
== Id. 
migrants, requires officm to fomi opinions regarding the adaptability, motivation, 
initiative, and resourcefüiness of individual appli~ants?~ These are very closely related 
to the sorts of qualities that might be assessed in detemiining whether genuine 
rehabilitation has a c W y  taken place. Assessing the fitness of medical opinions, 
however, draws upon a whoie different skill set and howledge base than visa officers are 
likely to possess. The oniy explanation for the differing roies of visa officers in these two 
scenarios is the laissez faire attitude of the courts toward Minister7s discretion. 
The point is furthex illustrateci by the case of Bhatnage?, which showed that 
courts are wi lhg to be pragmatic in the context of Federal Court practice, at least where 
senior govexnment officials are involved as iitigants. Faced with the question of whether 
or not to hold goverment ministers personally responsible for the actions of their 
departments, the majority of judges in the several levels of court traversed by the 
Bhatnager case reiied upon their own judicial discretion to avoid a result that the mie of 
iaw seemed to dictate. 
In Bhatnaget, the applicant had been sponsored for permanent residence by his 
wife, a Canadian citizen. Though the application was submitted in 1981, it was still 
under consideration in the Immigration Section of the Canadian High Commission in 
New Delhi, India in 1985. Understandably ktrated with the pace of matters, the 
sponsor filed a Notice of Motion in the Trial Division of the Federal Court for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the Minister of Ernployment and Immigration to process Mr. 
- 
239 Schedule i, Factor 9, Regrclationi. 
Canada (Min. of Employmmt & Immigration) v. Bhahager, [1986] 2 F.C. 3 (Fed T.D.), rev'd 11 9881 1 
F.C. 171 (Fcd. CA), aff'd [1990] 2 S.C.R. 217,44 Admin. L X  1,111 N.R. 185,71 D L R  (4th) 84,43 
CJ.C. (2d) 213,12 hm. L.R (2d) 8 1. 
Bhatnager's application. In the course of the mmrdamus proceedings, an order for 
production of the visa office file was made by the Trial Division to facilitate cross- 
examination upon a£fïdavit.ul The order, addressed to the respondent Minister of 
Employment and Immigration and the Secretary of State for External A f f ' ,  stipulated 
that they should give direction to their officials for production of the file. In the result, 
however, the file was not produced with sufncient almity to meet the deadline set by the 
Court. As a resulf Bhatnager sought to have the respondent Minister and Secretary of 
State held in contempt of court for failing to heed the order. Although the order for 
production had not been personally served upon the respondents, fomal s e ~ c e  of it had 
been accepted on their behaifby counsel, in accordance with procedures set out in the 
Federal Court Rules governing such matters? 
The contempt proceedings placed squarely before the court a comerstone 
proposition of the mie of law - that no one, not even a govemment mlliister, is above the 
law. As was observed by the Trial Division of the Federal Court, "[tlhere has never been 
any doubt in this case as to whether ministers and other government officials are subject 
to the law, and therefore subject to duly issued orders of t h i s  Court. This is a principle 
which has been recognized for centuries in the system of public Iaw we inherited in 
At that point in the proceedings, the Secretary of State for External Mairs was also added as a party to 
the proceedings, since foreign service visa officers were then employees of the Department o f  Extenial 
AfEairs and International Trade Cana& (now the Department of Foreign M a E s  and International Trade). 
Bhatnager v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration and Secretary of State for Extemal Anairs), 
[1988] 1 F.C. 171 at 176 (Fed. C.A.). 
Ut There does not seem to have been any dispute concerning whether tüe Ministers ever had personaï 
knowledge at any tirne material to the question of contempt of court. As Strayer J. noted, supra note 240, 
119861 2 F.C. 3 at 19: "In the present case there was no suggestion that the orâer of the Associate Chief 
Justice of  August 15 [reqWring production of the nle] had ever been served personaiïy on the respondents 
or otherwise brought to their attention pnor to [the dedine of] September 3." 
C d a ,  It is an aspect of the d e  of law. [footnote ~ m i t t e d ] ' ~  Though the theory of 
that p ~ c i p l e  was beyond doubt, its actual application in practice was decidedly l a s  
certain, as  evidenced by differences of opinion in the Courts. In the Trial Division, 
Strayer J. relied upon the common law to reject the argument that the Federal Court 
Rules, perrnitting sentice of an order upon a party's solicitor of record, were sufncient to 
fix a party with knowledge of an order in contempt proceedings. Betraying a pragmatic 
k e  of minci, he stated the following: 
It is true that paragraph 3 1 l(l)(a) of the d e s  of court of the Federal Court 
provides that service of a document, not being a document that is required to be 
served persondy, may be effécted by leaving a copy of it at the address for 
s e ~ c e  of the person to be served. By virtue of the defuition of "address for 
service" in Rule 2(1), this term in the case of a party who has an attorney or 
solicitor on the record meam the business address of that solicitor, While the rule 
says nothing specific as to personal service of an order subsequently relied on as a 
basis for a proceeding in contempt of court, 1 believe that h m  the common law 
principles it must be deduced that in such cases the order must be served 
personaIiy on the party if s e ~ c e  is later to be relied on as the basis for knowledge 
by that party of the ordcr which he is aiieged to have violated. . . .I do not accept 
that mere laiowledge by the solicitor alone of the order is sufncient to afFuc his 
client with such knowledge of the order as to render that client guilty of the quasi- 
criminal offence of contempt of court? 
The Court of AppeaI, on the other haad, took a more positive view of the 
deference to be accorded to the d e  of law principle, revershg Strayer J. to fïnd the 
respondent ministers in contempt. Discounting any role for cornmon law principles, Une 
J. held that the Federal Court Rules were complete on the matter and entirely 
detenninative of the issue. In his opinion: 
. . .the Federai Court Rules.. .provide a comprehensive code for the mamer in 
which notice of court orders is to be effected. On the evidence there can be no 
- -- 
Per Strayer J., Cl9881 3 F.C. 383 at 384, m the assessment of penalty hearing following fiom the Court 
of Apped's decision, mpra note 240, reversmg his eariierj,dgment that conternpt was not made out. 
U* Supra note 240, [1986J 2 F.C. 3 at 20. 
doubt that those Rules were fùily complied with in this case so that both the 
pronouncement of the order in open court in the presence of the duiy authorized 
representative of the respondents, and its subsequent semice on him, constituted 
notice to them as surely as ifthey had been personally present and sened 
h e r e ~ i t h . ~  
tn short, the Court found the d e s  to be the d e s ,  and equaily applicable to all. Further, 
suice the rules mentioned no distinction concerning the nature of the proceedings, it made 
no difference whether they were quasi-criminai or civil in substance. 
The 1 s t  word, of course, remaineci for the Supreme Court of Canada. Speakulg 
for the Court, Sopinka J. prefened the more functional methodology adopted by the Trial 
Division. Advertkg to a long tradition in the common law requiring ". . .personal senrice 
or achial personal knowledge of a court order as a precondition to liability in 
contempt.. . -  he noted that in the absence of express provision to the contrary, the 
Federal Court Rules could not be taken to have altered that position. This was 
particularly true where a serious offence like contempt of court was implicated? He 
went on to add that a such approach was particulariy appropriate where, as here, the party 
to be cited was no ordinary litigant. 
In the case of Ministers of the Crown who administer large department5 and are 
involved in a mdtiplicity of proceedings, it would be extraordinary if orders were 
brought, routinely, to their attention. In order to infer knowledge in such a case, 
there must be circumstances which reveal a special reason for bringing the order 
to the attention of the Minister? 
The Court noted that there was no evidence nom which to infer actuai knowledge by the 
Minister and Secretary of State of the court order and that vicarious liabiiity did not exist 
US Supra note 240, Il9881 1 F.C. 171 at 185. 
U6 Supra note 240, (1990) 12 Imm.L.R (24 81 at 88. 
Id. at 90. 
U8 Id. at 89, 
in criminal Law to impute icuowledge and responsibility to a Party. In the result, the 
Minister and Secretary of State were exonerated of the contempt charge. 
Perhaps the most interesthg question conceming the existence of a wide 
discretion in the Minister of Immigration is why it was felt necessary to accord her such 
power. The obvious answer is one reviewed earlier in this paper, conceming the 
difnculty of devising d e s  that provide for substantive justice in every case. However, 
consideration must also be given to the question as to what extent this provision may 
have been innuenceci by political considerations. Anyone who has worked for any period 
of time in the field of immigration law and policy will appreciate the fact that they are 
perennial "hot" topics in the public agenda. Major newspapers camy almost daily 
accounts of individual immigration cases that present some sort of cnsis. Generally, 
these stories tend to portray the "system" as having fded in one of two ways - either by 
negligently omitting to keep out an undesirable or by obstinately and unreasonably 
keeping out a desirable. While the first case can only be made up by often protracted and 
notorious remedial enforcement action through the courts, the second is amenable to a 
deft exercise of discretion under section 114(2) of the Act. Thus, should the coverage on 
a refusa1 case become critical of departmental action, with significant public support 
mobilized in favour of the wronged applicant, expedience may dictate defiising the 
situation by judicious and timely discretion. 
Whether or not this is appropriate is likely a matter best left to the legislators. For 
in the end, it is in the House of Commons and the forum of public opinion that such 
actions are ultimately accountable. Fortunately for the Minister, the demand for 
discretionary action is usually more vocal and strident than any call against its use. Thus, 
there is o£€en l a s  political "damage" to saying "y& than 'ho". This is especially so 
since there tend to be few effective Iimits on positive discretion used to accord special 
benefits, outside of the operation of the ordinary rules of generai applicatioa Certainly, 
those benefiting h m  it are unlikely to cornplain. The other immediate party, the 
Minister, also is unlikely to appeal the use of positive decision by any of her delegates. 
Moreover, because of privacy concems, decisions in individual immigration cases are not 
ordinarily made publicly a~a i l ab le .~~  As a result, the public is unlikely even to be aware 
of when positive discretion has been exercised. 
1.6 Chapter Summaüon 
Evans asserts that "[ilt is obvious to aii that discretion is the very iife blood of the 
administrative state? Be this as it may, it does not mean that discretion as an 
administrative tool enjoys universal acceptance. In fact, it remains a subject of some 
controversy with a wide diversity of opinions and jurisprudential philosophies evident on 
questions conceming its propriety and the circum~fances of its usage. What is more 
certain, however, is that discretion occurs in many forms and on many levels; ministeriai 
and delegated, positive and negative, and implicit and explicit. Additionaliy, wherever it 
occurs and however it is employed, discretion must be conceded to be power. But it is 
more than that, and leaving the description there is, as one reviewer has noted, to paint it 
'"9 The Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, generally prohibits dtsclosure to third parties of information 
coilected by the federaI govemmenf except upon the consent of the individual concerneci. See ako 
Government of Canada, Access to Information Act and Privacy Act (Onawa: Treasmy Board of Canada, 
undated information pamphlet). For a fder discussion of the roIe of the A7vacy Act m immigration 
ma-, see below section 3.4.4 Human Rights, Privacy and Access to Infomtion. 
UO Evans, supra note 2 at 28. 
as  a caricature of itseIKs1 Choice is redy what discretion is most about It is the 
fkeedom that power imports to choose between alternatives. But they are not just 
arbitrary choices. Rather, the choices reqwed by our law are between procedural 
cornpliance and substantive justice. Discretion is that which can put autocracy into 
bureaucracy or forge compassion and empathy into administration. It is an animating 
essence that p d t s  a choice between blind adherence to d e s  or blindness to the 
sometimes othemise inflexible dictates of d e s .  It is dso a double-edged sword, 
allowing for both facilitation beyond the strict constraints of d e s  and for control withui 
the letter of the law. And in the end, it is this dichotomy which has ensured that 
discretion should remain a subject of enduring interest and controversy. 
CHAPTER 2 - THE OVERSEAS CONTEXT 
2.1 The Selection Process 
As noted in Chapter 1, immigration to Canada is camed out pursuant to three 
broad categories, comprised of the Family Class, the Refugee Class and the Independent 
category." The Family and Refugee Classes are intended to fbther goals centered on 
family reunincation and protection of persons from persecution.lo The Independent 
category, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the econornic and culturai 
development of CanadaLY While the nnt two proceed f?om a sense of compassion and 
humanity, the Independent category is unabashedly concerned with the best interests of 
the country. In a very reai sense, Independent immigrant selection is what Canada does 
for itself and this is reflected in the rnamier in which such immigrants are chosen. Family 
The Independent category itself contaias several sukategories. These mclude the Business Class, 
Assisted Relatives and ''regular" Independents. Business Class immigrants are persons whose intention it 
is to start a business or invest a specified minimum amount of capital into designated immigrant investor 
fun&. This class is, in turn, comprised of three sub-categones; Entrepreneurs, Investors and Self- 
Employed persons (See definitions for each contained at S. 2(1) of the Regulatiom). Assisted Relatives are 
persons who, though having a reIative in Canada, do not qualify for processing in the Family CIass. As a 
remit, they are made to q u e  according to the criteria for regular Independent immigmts. However, in 
recognition of the fact that they have a relative in Canada who is presumably willing to support their 
application, the overail total that they need for qyaiification is reduced by five points, as compared to other 
Independents (See section 10(l)(b) of the Regulutions). Tme Independents, on the other han& are those 
who have no close relatives in Canada and whose intention it is to enter the labour market. They must 
qualiSl soleiy on their own merits, according to a selection grid (See Section 8(1) and Schedde I of the 
ReguIatioris and the Selection Grid at Appendix A, below). In order to contain the ambit of this papei; I 
have dehberately chosen '?rue" Independen& as the principle focus for this paper. Accordingly, 
considerations relating specificaiiy to Business immigrants and Assisted ReIatives will not be discussed, 
otber than as an incidental matter. 
Sec objectives set out in section 3(c) & (g) of the Act. 
* See objectives set out in section 3(b) & (h) of the Act. To this, one might also add the attainment of 
demographic goals, as per section 3(a) of the Act. This is parlicularly true in the case of Independents since 
their n u m h  are, at least at present, the most closely controiîed of aay category. Such control is exercised 
primarily in the form of a demographic factor (See factor 6 of Schedule 1 to the Reguiations, below, at 
Class applicants need to show a close relative in Canada, willing to sponsor their 
migration, while Refuges must establish a "well-founded fear of persecution'? Once 
either of these propositions is satisfactorily demonstrateci, the applicant wiil quali@ for 
admission, regardless of their personal attributes, education, language abiiity, job skills or 
other similar qualificati~ns.~ 
The case is otherwise with Independent immigrants. They are selected precisely 
for those qualities and skills which are thought to ensure their swift and easy resettlement 
into Canadian society. In the wor& of the Immigration Manual, "[s]uccessful appiicants 
in the independent class wiii be selected primarily due to their ability to make a 
significant contribution to the economic, cultural and social fabric of Canada.'= The fact 
that hdependent selection is largely a matter of national self-interest is further connmied 
by the locus of selection. Unlike the other two categories, Independent selection is an 
activity carried out exclusively overseas. This facilitates a greater degree of control over 
who may enter and avoids the lengthy hvolvement and expense that deportation or 
removd of unqualified candidates can entail. And, quite simply, there are few equities 
that militate in favour of Independent migrants being granted entry in advance of 
sa t i smg entry requirements. It is the national interest, rather than the interests of 
applicants which is favoured and the requirement for application outside of Canada 
Appenduc A), which is applicable to hdependent migrants alone. S a  ten accompanying note 259, infu. 
=' 1 am just r e f e g  here to Refbgee claimants selected fiom witbin Canada pursuant to a decision of the 
Convention Refugee Detennination Division of the Immigration and Rcfùgee Board. Refbgees selected 
abroad for resettlemmt in Canada are subject to requirements not applicable to those who have been 
selected domesticdy. Sec subsections 7(1)(b) and (c) of the Regulatiom which stipulate, for example, that 
overseas refbgee appiicants must demonstrate some f;nanciaI resourccs available to aid their settlement and 
skills which suggest potential for becoming successfiilly settïed in Canada. 
zs Subject, of course, to any statutory requimnents under S. 19 of the Act, relating to health and public 
safety, that may be applicable. 
shply reinforces that ody those with the qualities sought will be granted entry. Thus, 
pursuant to section 9(1) of the Immigration Act, every immigrant or visitor to Canada 
must apply for and obtain the appropriate visa, before presenting tbemselves at a port of 
entry. Aithough exemption is granted for those cases which are "prescnbed", no such 
prescription exists for Independents as a class? 
Moreover, this self-interest ensures that overall management of the flow of 
Independents to Canada is conducted on a more discretionary basis than is the case with 
, 
other categories. This is done through the device of the "demographic factor"." 
Sometimes called the "levels control", it is one of nine factors contained in Schedule 1 to 
the Immigrution Regulutiom~, which provides the basic assessment scheme under which 
Independents are selected. The "levels control" exists to facilitate rapid policy changes to 
suit the political climate and the policy whhs  of the governrnent of the day. So long as 
the flow of such immigrants is seen to be an asset and beneficial to the country, the tap 
will be aiIowed to remain more open. Ifthe trafic is, however, suspected to be causing 
deleterious consequences in the economy, social Life or other aspects of society, then it 
can be quickly reduced. Only the Independent class is subject to the use of the device of 
demographic factor."' This control device is easily manipulateci and is effective by its 
CIC iM, Chap. OP-5, para. 1.1. 
" Though there is the possibility for Lndependents to be selected from withiu Canada pursuant to a 
''humanitean and compassionate" review under S. 1 14(2) of the Act. However, the emphasis in such cases 
is on exigent personal circumstances that jus* extraordinary processmg, rather than the normal selection 
criteria employed when selection occurs abroad. On the other han& whiIe F a d y  Class applicants are 
subject also to the general d e  that they should apply fiom abroad for their visas, spouses and chilchen of 
Canadian citizens or permanent residents are routinely granted exemption b m  this requkement, The 
family connection is ordinariiy deemed to provide SuffiCient evidence of compehg circumstances. 
U9 Regulations, Schedule 1, item 6. 
For a table xtting out the selection factors, see below, "Appendix A - Independent immigrant Selection 
&idv7. 
"' The number of units awarded unda the demographic factor is a matter cmtirely within the discretion of 
sheer simpiicity. AU Independent immigrants must obtain a score of 70 points or greater, 
according to the selection grid, for a successful application. By raising the demographic 
factor, the number of applicants who might qualify is increased. The reverse situation 
holds where the demographic factor is reduced? 
While the dernographic factor allows for control over the gross number of 
applicants that will qualify for immigration to Canada, a m e r  selection criteria, known 
as the c'occupational factofW, is used to exercise control in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative way." hirsuant to S. 11(2) of the Regulntiom, every applicant must score at 
least one unit of assesment for the occupational factor in order to be successful. In this 
regard, a "General Occupations List" of occupations open to potentiai immigrants is 
maintained, which accords an occupational demand factor, from 1 to 10, for every lïsted 
occupation. If an occupation is not listed, then it is considered a "zero demand" 
occupation and so will not facilitate Unmigration. By reducing either the number of 
"open" occupations, or the occupational demand factor assigned to particular 
occupations, the flow of immigrants can be increased, reduced or cut off altogether. 
Within the selection process itself, discretionary power occurs in many places, 
either overtly, as express statutory grants, or implicitly, as a matter of procedural 
practices and interpretation. Numerous examples are found throughout the Act and 
Regdatiom, the policy manuals and Ui the daily practices of visa offices. Without 
- --- - - - -- - - - 
the Minister, notwithstanding that factor 6 states that such "[ujnits of assessment shall be awarded as 
detenniued by the Minister c@er consuitation with the provinces and such ottier persons, organilations and 
institutions as he deems appropriate.. .," [emphasis added] 
" Se+ CIC IU, Chap. OP-5, para. 4.1.6 disnwing the demographic factor. 
'63 Regulatiom, Schedule I, Item 4. 
" Of course, the selection system as a whole operates so as to effcct qualitative seletion, according to the 
stipuiated criteria 
attempting an exhaustive Iist, this section will provide an overview of the selection 
process and the presence of discretion, as it occurs in the light of statutory grant and in 
the shadows of procedure and interpretation? 
2.1.1 Procedural Discretion 
Discretion enters the seiection process as a factor of procedural practices and as a 
consequence of delegated authonty for administering substantive requirements and 
stipulations. When employed as a procedural device, it affects the marner in which an 
application will be handled and the steps that it may be required to undergo, in order to 
satisQ the substantive requirements for qualification. Substantive discretion, going to the 
merits of an application, detennines whether it is ultimately successfil. 
Unfortunately, the distinction between the two is not always obvious in practice. 
Procedural discretion may be implicated in the exercise of a substantive discretionary 
power and vice versa For example, a decision to waive a selection i n t e ~ e w  implicates 
both a procedural and a substantive step. By waiving the interview, the officer has opted 
to make a substantive decision that the applicant is qualified and that points awarded 
upon paper-screening are an accurate portrayal of settlement potential. This decision 
necessarily imports some substantive discretion concerning sufnciency of the evidence 
oEered, weight to be attached to the individual pieces of evidence, and so on. But it also 
involves procedural discretion - interview, a significant procedural step, has been waived 
to aUow the applicant to move M e r  dong the process. As is apparent, there rnay only 
- - 
2+s See Appendix A "Independent Inrmigrant Selection Grid" for a List of the qualifymg factors agamst 
which Independents measured. See &O Appendix B "Independent immigrant Selection Process Chart" for 
a schematic overview of the seIection process. 
be shades of meaning sqatating procedurai and substantive discretion in any particular 
situation. Despite the difficulties of providing definitive characterizations in every 
situation, the distinction between procedural and substantive discretion is perhaps most 
useful to au understanding of discretion in everyday immigration practice, and so it is one 
I use for the balance of this study. 
The burden of proof in al l  immigration cases rests squarely upon the shodders of 
the applicantB This is so since section 9(4) of the Act makes clear the discretionary 
nature of the power of a visa officer to issue any type of visa It mandates that an officer 
must be satisfied that issuance of a visa is not contrary to the Act or Regulations. 
Applicants attending overseas selection interviews are not entitled to be represented at 
such hearings, as the attendance of counsel is an entirely discretionary matter in the visa 
officer?? In the view of CIC, since it is the applicaut's own qualifications and personal 
qualities that are under review, it is for her to put her own best case forward. The 
presence of an advocate, acting as an intermediary between the client and the interviewer, 
would be Likely to distract the focus of the inquiry and perhaps add unnecessary 
formality? Thus, notwithstanding that she may have retained counsel to assist her, it is 
the applicant's responsibility to present cogent and clear evidence at interview of her 
ability to qualify. 
~6 See Act, s.8(1), which provides: "Where a pemon seek to come into Canada, the burden of provïng h t  
that person has a right to come into Canada or that his admission would not be contrary to this Act or the 
regdations rests on tbat persoa" 
47 ûn the discretion of a tn'bunaI to permit or deny the presence of counsel at a "hearing", see generally de 
Smith, supra note 190 at 450-454. 
" Tbere is an analogous problmi associated with interviews requiring interpretm. In such cases, the 
officer may end up, in effect, interyiewing the interpreter rather than the appiicant, if sufficient care is not 
taken to ensure genuine communication. 
This was evident in the Hajarhala c a s e  for example, where the court 
highlighted the need for provision by the applicant of al1 justification and documentation 
relevant to a determination of admissibility. The Court observed that the Act and 
ReguZations impose no positive obligation on a visa officer to provide information, 
counseling or other assistance to an applicant, though these may be O Eered as a matter of 
departmental policy or individual officer initiative? Thus, there resides a discretion 
within each officer to follow the dictates of her conscience and the demands of her 
workload, as to how far she may be willing to go to assist any applicant to meet the 
requirements of the legislation. Obviously, in an environment where officers carry heavy 
caseloads and feel harried and pressed, they will lücely possess less time and inclination 
to go beyond the minimal requirements for assistance placed upon them by law. Practical 
matters, therefore, such a s  institutional pressures and constraints, caseload and personal 
initiative may legitimately, at least according to law, influence accessibility to the 
immigration system. 
To put an application into process, an applicant m u t  provide sufïïcient 
information and documentation to meet a procedural threshold that varies somewhat nom 
~9 HajanivaZa v. Canada (Min. of Ernpioyment & Immigration) (1988), 6 Imm. LA. (2d) 222,34 Admin. 
L.R 206,23 F.T.R. 241, Cl9891 2 F.C. 79 (Fe& T.D.). 
It is a m m g  to note that there is no obligation in law to be "helpful". Couid Hajariwala be said to 
stand for the proposition that it is la- to be bureaucratie? Contrast the HajanwalZa decision, however, 
with that of Choi v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration) (1991), 15 Imm. L A  (2d) 265, (19921 1 
F.C. 763 (CA.) where the court was drawn to the "irresistrile" conclusion that CIC poiicy was to withhold 
information fÏom applicaats about the possibility of making a fùU appiication forthwith, without the need 
for a prehnhary assessment via a Pre-Application Questionnaire (PAQ). Although the court viewed the 
PAQ pejoratively, seeing it as a means by which the department avoided the work burden associated with a 
fidl appiication, this does not teil the whole story. While there c m  be no dispute that the PAQ was 
intended to deviate some burden on the department, it also was meant to save tirne, money and fiutcation 
for those applicants who were iinlikely to quam. Unforhmately, Choi and Haja~waia suggest that the 
department is better off to be unhelpfhi, than to attempt something that may later be conmed as 
mischievous- For a fuiier discussion of the Choi decision and its implications, see text accompanying note 
office to office. The level of that threshold is adjusteci by each office according to a 
number of factors, including administrative convenience, the type of documentation 
common in the office's jurisdiction, the reliability of same, and so on."' Ifthat threshold 
has not been met, the application may be retumed by the office concemed without the 
case having been acknowledged and c'locked-in".m Once the lock-in hurdle has been 
cleared, the application is launched on a pmcessing track that concludes only when a finai 
disposition is rendered. There are just three possible dispositions - gmnting of a visa, 
refusd, or withdrawd of the application by the applicant herself. 
The handihg of applications for immigration by Independent category applicants 
has been described as a ". . .two-stage assessrnent process during which it is the visa 
officer's duty to apply criteria set forth in the legislation and award points based on the 
ability of the applicant to become successfidly established in Canada? The first of the 
two stages is a file review, or ccpaper-screening'' as it is often called. This entails an 
660 infia. 
'7' CIC M, Chap. OP-5, Para 2.1.1 (Ver. 09-97), "What is a completed application?' provides the 
foiiowing guidance to visa offices with respect to Independent cases: 
A completed application consists of: 
a signed IMM 0008 for the principal applicant, M e r  spouse and a l l  dependents 18 years of 
age and older; 
supporting documentation to aliow you to render a decision on the selection criteria; 
the correct cost recovery fees. 
As a technical, legd matter, it is a dubious proposition that a visa office requires more than just the 
correct cost recovery fees and IMM 0008 application forms at the outset, at lest  for purposes of locking in 
the me. While some visa offices may require more documentation to accompany the initial application, 
this is a matter of preference that an insistent applicant may choose to ignore. Howcver, providmg only the 
minimum wiii not aid the exercise of procedural discretion, such as a decision on whether or not interview 
should be waived, for example, 
* For more on lock-in and k importance, see in* note 371 and accompanying text Again, "hile 
individual visa offices may stipulate particular items that they expect to be included with an initial 
application, there is no statutory authority for this As a dt, an applicant may submit only his completed 
IMM8 application form and the correct processing fees, Failure by the visa office to accept these, at l es t  
for lock-m purposes, would result in a reviewable error. 
Zeng v. Minïkter of Employnzent and Immigration (1989), 27 F.TR 56 at 57 (F.C.T.D.) per Jerome, 
A.C.I. 
examination of the application for completeness of the submissionn4, categorization as to 
class of application and, rnost importantly, substantive assessrnent as to ability to meet 
selection criteria. 
An Independent applicant who fails to obtain at least 60 points at paper-screening 
rnay be refused without i n t e ~ e w . ~ ~  The matter is not quite so cut and dried, however, as 
simply securing the requisite number of points. The paper-screening officer may exercise 
a discretion that is both procedural and substantive in character to put an otherwise failed 
application into process. Of her own initiative, or at the request of the applicant, the 
officer rnay determine that there is some aspect to the case which militates against strict 
adherence to the cut off suggested by the points regime. There may be any number of 
reasons that will impel an officer to exercise her authority in this regard. Typically, 
however, the decision proceeds fiom a conclusion that the points t d y  has somehow 
failed to adequately reflect tme settlement potential. 
The second stage of the assessrnent process involves an intemiew of the applicant 
by a visa officer. In reality, this stage is most ofien skipped by those who have obtained 
the outrîght p a s  mark of 70 points at paper-screening. Waiver of interviews is now 
commonplace6 and so an important hurdle for most applicants is simply the question of 
whether an interview will even be convoked. This decision is entirely discretionary 
" Although C E  attexnpted at one point to introduce the concept of "one-step application" as a matter of 
unifonn worldwide procedure, it has now largely been abandoneci, in part because of the difflcdties of 
providing a single set of instructions that accoimt for aii of the local conditions that each overseas visa 
office must wrestle with. For more on the one-step application, sce infi-a note 370 and accompanying text. 
Regulationr, section 1 1.1. 
n6 See for exatllpIe, Buffalo APC application kit hsext, supra note 132. mentioning a waiver rate in excess 
of 50%. 
though, as a policy matter, the Department endorses waiver whenever p ~ s s i b l e . ~  The 
advantages of a waive~ of interview are many for both CIC and appiïcants. Waiver saves 
workload for CIC and improves processing times since the matter of case processing is 
rendered an entirely paper exercise. For the applicant, it means that time, effort and 
expense associated with attending an i n t e ~ e w  are avoided. 
Waiver is generally granted when it is clear that the applicant obtains sufficient 
points to qualify and is not obviously affecteci by any statutory bar. Recognizing the 
imprecision of the selection grid, however, departmental policy does permit waiver of 
interviews, even where the applicant has not obtained the 70 points needed for a clear 
pass? For example, where the applicant indicates experience in an occupation for which 
there is apparent demand in Canadam, significant work or study experience in a North 
American conte*, and sufncient hancial resources for establishment, or at least 
reliable support nom a f d y  member in Canada, waiver of i n t e ~ e w  may still be 
granted. In such circumstances, CIC recognizes that there is little '%due added" to 
--- 
rn See CIC iM Chap. OP-5, Para. 3.7 (Ver. 06-97) "Intewiews", where the following guidance is offered: 
R22.1 provides officers with the right to c d  any applicant andfor any of the applicant's 
dependents (wheîher îhey plan to accompa. or not) for an interview provided the interview is for 
the purpose of assessing the appkation. 
Applicants who meet one of the followhg criteria would not normaUy be interviewai: 
a) if the information provided on the application f o m  and accompanying documents clearly 
shows that an applicant will accumulate sufficient unit. of assessrnent to meet the pass mark 
for their particdm occupational group; 
b) ifappiicants fail to accumulate SuffiCient uaits of assessrnent and have no chaiice of 
accumuiating sufficient additionai uni& during an interview. 
AU other cases should be considered for interview. 
This is particularly tme for cases where the ilpplicant obtains between 64 and 69 points on paper- 
screening, since 5 to 6 points is the average taiiy for personal suitability awarded at intewiew. Thus, if 
there is nothing on the nle to suggest that an appiicant would obtain l e s  than the average number of points 
for personal suitability at interview, holding an interview adds little value to the selection process. 
Either pursuant to the General Occupations List or an of fa  of employment that has been confmned by 
way of validation through a Cana& Employment Centre (CEC) in Canada. 
Which tends to confïrm language ability, adaptabitity and other factors pointing to potential for 
s u c c e d  settlement m Canada. 
processing in routine cases by holding an intewiew. 
Waiver of interview connmis that the selection criteria have been met. Though an 
application may still be refused thereafter for failure to clear statutory requirernents 
relating to health and public security, it would be u n d  for a negative decision on 
selection criteria to follow a waiver decision. That said, however, such a circumstance 
might arise, for example, where it appeared that the assessment underlying the waiver 
decision had been somehow erroneous and that the selection criteria had not been 
properly satisfied. Because it is entirely discretionary, the decision to waive intenriew 
can be revoked at any time so as to require an applicant to appear at an interview. Thus, 
if the waiver decision was thought somehow to be faulty, the likeliest result is that the 
applicant would be called to interview since, most often, they would have gained at least 
enough units of assessment to clear the papa-screening threshold of 60 points. 
The importance of providing fidl and complete information with an initiai 
application is obvious then for several reasons. Fht ,  it prevents delay due to the 
application being retumed for more information or documentation and facilitates lock-in 
at the earliest possible opportunity. Second, it assures that a fully infomed paper- 
screening is conducted, thereby maximuing the potential points an applicant might 
receive. Third, since the legai burden rests upon the applicant to prove her case, a weli- 
supported application reduces the nsk of outright refirsd at paper-screening."l FinaUy, a 
wealth of infornation facilitates the possibility that positive procedural discretion wii1 be 
exercised to waive the necessity for a personal interview. 
"' This, of course, raises an issue about the importance of good counseling mataials being provided by 
CIC to potential applicants so that they are M y  informed as to what ought to go into the application. 
Although intentiew can be waived at any stage of the process, the best chance for 
obtailiing sarne occurs at the outset, at paper-screening. Once a file has been set for 
interview, responsibility for it usually shifts fiom the officer who has conducted paper- 
screening to another who will conduct the interview. At this point, a sort of institutional 
inertia can take hold to make waiver decisions difficult to obtain. Between the time of 
paper-screening and interview, there rnay be no one individual who has responsibility for 
it. Even where the file has been assigned to a particular officer. that officer rnay have 
Little time for case review outside of their interview schedule and rnay not have 
familiarity with the file much in advance of the interview. As weU, since t h e  has been 
set aside in the interview roster for deaihg with the matter, it rnay appear just as easy to 
resolve any outstanding issues at that tirne. 
Interview itself imports a significant degree of dimetion, both as to the range of 
issues that might be canvassed and the depth to which they will be explored. To a large 
extent, the parameters of the i n t e ~ e w  cm be influenceci by the care taken in paper- 
screenuig. A meticulous paper-screening usually guides the interviewing officer to 
examine just one or two, often very focused, issues of concem. A cursory paper- 
screening, however, provides no such guidance and often leaves the interviewing officer 
to conduct an open ended examination that only becornes more focused as the interview 
progresses. In either case, it remains to the discretion of the interviewer to determine the 
issues and the extent to which they will be examined. Since paper-screening rnay not be 
used to fetter the interviewing officer's discretion, they are fkee to pursue even those 
matters that only become apparent at interview. Likewise, while paper-screening is used 
to point out areas of concem, it rnay not be used to suggest an outcome fiom any 
intewiew. As such, insofar as ïntenriew is concernecl, paper-sCreening senres just two 
purposes - determining whether interview rnay be waived and, h o t ,  then identifying 
relevant issues of concems so as to reduce the amount of time that may be needed at 
interview. 
2.1.1 Substantive Discreüon 
Selection 
In the case of Independents, the assessment proccss involves cornparison against 
the selection grid found at Schedule 1 of the Reguiutionsm There are nhe factors 
contained in the grid for which Independents eam points. Some of the factors are purely 
objective in nature* while others contain a blend of subjective and objective elements. Of 
course, any activity importing an ekment of subjectivity inherently gives rise to some 
scope for discretionary power. 
Education and occupation are examples of two selection factors that implicate 
both subjective and objective elements in their assessment. Under the education factor, 
applicants are awarded points according to the highest level of schooling they have 
completed. As noted earlier in this workm, assessment of educational attainment is not 
nearly as clear cut as it might seem at h t  glance. What passes for a high school diplorna 
in one country rnay not be the sarne as in another country. Inevitably, therefore, some 
assessment and interpretation of local scholastic standards and levels of achievement may 
be needed if the proper points are to be awarded. The same is true of assessment of 
292 See Appendix A below. 
For a discussion of the difflcuities of educationai assessment on a global basis, see text a c c o m p ~ g  
note 106, supra. 
occupationai experience and training. An occupation descn'bed as an engineer in one 
country might only be equivalent to an engineering technician or technologist in another. 
Indeed, the generic nature of the term ''enguieei' is such that it is often used in some 
countries to describe occupations that would not ordinarily be associated in Canada with 
any type of engineering. In assessing occupational formation and experience, form is not 
nearly so important as substance. Eveiything depends upon the circumstances of the 
training and experïence and what they actually entailed. Regarâless of what the 
educational or occupational attainment is caUed, it is the formative program and process 
by which the designation or title was attaùied that is most important. Cogent and clear 
proof that qualifications are equivalent to a particular level of attainment in Canada can 
sometimes be difficult to obtain. In the absence of such proof, the assessing officer wili 
have a greater scope for exercising subjective judgement, or discretion. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the greatest scope for adjudicative discretion Lies in evaluation of the 
sufnciency of the proof that wili cause the points to be awarded. 
A number of factors on the selection grid, such as the demographic factor or age, 
are entirely objective and so admit of no substantive discretion. The former is awarded as 
a matter of course, while the latter involves a simple calculation of points according to 
age. Perhaps the most discretionary of the selection factors are language ability and 
personal suitabilïty. In both instances, the latitude for discretion is a result of the lack of 
statutory or regdatory guidance given for their assessment. For example, though the 
selection grid in Schedule I of the Regdations mandates that language ability in French 
and Enghsh should be assessed against the standards of "fluently", '%veil" and 'bvith 
difficulty", no instructions are provided in the Scheduie as to the differences between 
these three levels of proficiency. In addition, there is no standard test for language ability 
recognized under the Act or the ReguIations. The only guidance on this matter is found in 
the policy statement contained at Appendix A to Chapter OP-5 of the departmental 
immigration Manual. However, even the instructions there leave a wide scope for 
discretion. For example, the Appendix distinguishes between the three levels of ability in 
the context of spoken language by offering the following: 
Fluent& - The applicant speaks and understands oral communication with 
approximately the same ease as that of an articulate native speaker. 
WeZI - The applicant is able to comprehend and to communicate effectively on a 
range of topics. 
With DzBculty - The applicant is able to communicate only in a very limited 
way? 
Quite obviously, the imprecision of these gauges for language ability ensures there are 
many applicants who fali somewhere between any of two of them. And, in the absence of 
a standard test, there is significant scope for debate as to whether mch an applicant is 
closer to one level than another. 
The assessment of personal suitability is likewise more subjective and hence more 
discretionary because of a paucity of guidance in the legislation. And again, the 
Immigration Manual provides little more policy guidance as to assessing personal 
suitability than is apparent in Schedule I of the Regulationr. The entire Manual passage 
deahg with this factor is as follows: 
Determination of the number of uni& of assessment to be awarded an applicant, to 
a maximum of 10, rests on the judgement of the intewiewing officer. The 
qualities of adaptability, motivation, initiative, resourcefulness, and such other 
attributes, admirable or otherwise, as the applicant may display, are characteristics 
on which the officer may base his determination? 
- . -- 
" CIC IM Chap. OP-5, Appendix A at 37 (Ver. 06-97). 
'U CIC IM, Cbap. OP-5, para. 4.1.9. See ais0 the guidance provided thcre for assessment of reading and 
As is evident, where the Act, Regulotiorts or policy have specified more criteria, the scope 
for discretion is reduced. Where the criteria are comparatively few, however, then 
discretionary authority is inevitably greater." Against this, however, it must be 
recognized that the scope for discretionary action in the selection grid is subject to some 
h t s .  The N o  elements of language ability and personal suitability are still guided by 
some criteria, no matter how loose they may be. Thus, even with the factor of personal 
suitability, for example, which is undoubtedly the most discretionary factor on the g d ,  
the scope for discretion is not unlimited? 
2.1.3 R. 1 1 (3) Discretion 
Officially, discretionary decision-making in overseas immigrant selection by CIC 
runs at two percent a n n ~ a l l y . ~  However, this does not disclose the tme story. This 
figure only represents actuai selection decisions which c m  be tracked in the Cornputer 
Assisted Immigration Processing System (CAPS) used by visa offices abroadYg In that 
system, immigrant selection decisions, whether positive or negative, are assigned a 
numericai value which can be monitored, collected and andyzed. Such tracking is 
effective only for decisions entered into the system as selection decisions. Thus, what is 
writing skills, which is simiiarly imprecise. 
U6 By way of contrast, see Waldman. supra note 104, at 14.9 in 0 14.25, for an assessment as to the 
discretionary nature of a visitor visa. In bis view, the visitor visa is highiy discretionary because of the 
minimal criteria applicable to its issuance. As he States: "Clearly the Act provides the visa officer with a 
discretion. The only requirement on the visa officer is that he or she consider the application, act fairly in 
his or her decision and not unduiy fetter his or her discretion." 
The iïmits on the selection factor of pmonal suitability have been the subject of much attention by the 
courts and so is discussed in -ter depth, beIow, at section 3.3.5 Personal Suitability. 
E-mail discussion with R Kurland, Barrister & Solicitor, April1997, citing idonna1 discussions with 
CIC officiais. This is evidently comparable to similar figures for U.S. immigration processing. 
i s C  offices in Canada use a different cornputer system, called the Field Operational Support System 
(FOSS), than that used in visa offices. 
captured are simply those cases involving a discretionary substantive discretion pursuant 
to sections 2. lm or 1 l(3) of the Regulations. None of the discretionary procedural steps 
upon which a selection decision may ultimately be founded are recorded. They are 
simply beyond the capability of C A P S ,  and possibly beyond the desire of the 
bureaucracy, to record. 
R. 1 1(3) provides the primary vehicle by which substantive discretion is injected 
into the selection process. It is a discretion directly tied to the selection factors and is 
intended to deviate any perceived situations of rules failure, either because the selection 
factors have overestimated or underestimated settlement potential. Thus, it exists as both 
a positive tool for selection and a negative tooi for exclusion. Positive discretion, 
pursuant to R 11(3)(a), is used to waive the interview of an applicant who has obtained 
less than 70 ~ t s  of assessment, but whose o v d l  application indicates a high likelihood 
for successful establishment. It rnay even be used to put a case into process where 
insufficient units have been obtained to pass paper-screening.lgl Similady, it may be used 
to select in those applicants who have attended an interview, but who have still been 
unable to obtain sufncient units for an outright pas,  or who have failed to obtain at least 
one unit of assessment for occupational experience or occupational demand. Conversely, 
Discussed below commencing at page 1 15. 
See, for example, Shum v. Canada (Minister of Citlzmhip & Immigration) (1995), 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 
233 (FCTD.) where the applicant sought judicial review of a decision to refuse his application without an 
interview, where he obtained l e s  than the necessary 60 points to justrfj. his case being put into process. 
The appiicant had asked that discretion be exercised to him an interview, even though he had 
obtained insufncient units. The officer, citmg insufficient units of assessment, deched to exercise 
discretion and grant the intewiew. Upon judicial review, the court noted that discretion under section 
1 l(3) of the Reguiutions was not subject to the necessity of fïrst obtaining sufncient uni& for the "pass" 
mark that justined fiirther processing. AccordMgly, the decision was overturned wit a direction h t  the 
question of discretion be specificaiiy aûdressed, even in the absence of sunicient uni& to justifjl an outnght 
P a *  
negative discretion under R 1 1(3)(b) is available for similar reasons - namely, that 
although the required units of assessment have been achieved, they represent an 
overestunate of tme potential for successful settlement." Discretion under R 11(3), 
whether positive or negative, is exercised in the local visa office. It is qualified by the 
requirement for "good reasons" founding its exercise and is subject to the necessity of 
those reasons being put in writing to and concurred in by a senior immigration officer? 
By gloss of judicial interpretation, 11(3) discretion has aiso been found to be limited to 
consideration of potential for successful establishment in an economic sense only, and 
may not be used with respect to potential for social e~tablishment.~ 
2.1.4 R. 2. 1 Discretion 
While 1 l(3) discretion is meant to d o w  visa officers to reconcile inadequacies in 
the selection criteria, there exists a further tool that dlows consideration of factors not 
related to those criteria. Authorïty has been delegated to program managers at visa 
offices abroad to exercise power pursuant to section 2.1 of the Regdations to exempt any 
person fkom the requkements of any regulation, if humanitarian and compassionate (''H 
" Obviously, the more contentious of the two branches of R 1 l(3) concems the negative discretion 
available to refiise an otherwise successfil application. Examples of 1 1(3)(b) decisions are many and a 
few only provide a fair illustration of how the power is used in practice. See, for exampIe, Comg v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1997), 35 Tmm. L K  (2d) 128 (FCTD.) where the 
appiicant, a mechanical engineer by profession, was refbsed an immigrant visa despite having obtained 7 1 
points. At interview, the visa officer found that the appiicant "projected a distinct lack of energy and 
dynamism" which, combined with other factors, caused her grave concern as to his settlement prospects. 
Muldoon J. found, at 139, that the visa officer did not commit an error in considering ". . .that the 
applicant's hope1essness in the English language made him an economic and employment liabiiity in 
Ontario, his Ïntended destination." 
zm W e  ane x d e  of positive discretion under S. 1 l(3) remes that reasons justiQing same be put in 
writing, so as to obtain the concurrence of a senior immigration officer, there is no requirememt for written 
reasons with respect to a decision not to exercise positive discretion. Chmna v. Canada (Minbter of 
Cirizenship and Immigration) (12 February 1997), Federal Court Fiïe No. MM-1980-96 (F.C.TD.) 
[meportedl . 
& C') considerations exist to j- same.=* In essence, the humanitarian and 
compassionate review involves a request by the applicant for a dispensation h m  
application of the ordinary rules for qualification. As such, it is described by Muldoon J. 
as a "'special privilege" involving few countervailing rights or duties for compellhg its 
exercise. This is evident h m  the following passage, where the Court stated: 
When seeking a special privilege, as distinct h m  a cast-iron legal right, the 
applicants must bring before the V.O. [visa officer] all the data which the 
applicants think will move the V.O. to recommend H & C [humanitarian and 
compassionate] relief. If th& information be spotty, inconsistent, incornplete or 
UILforthcoming, they cannot be heard to cornplain that they were not accorded a 
çpecial privilege not generally accorded. The H & C revïew is a sort of last m o r t  
after having faiied the legal criteria: it is a ~ r iv i l ege .~  
H & C power exists domestically as well overseas, but the two types of reviews are 
subject to dinerent considerations and standards of fairness. This was made clear by 
Muldoon J. in the KhaIon c a s P ,  where he noted that, ". . .not only are there different H & 
C considerations in overseas reviews as distinct fiom inland r e ~ i e w s ~ ~ ~  but, . . .the V.O. 
[visa officer] is not required to put before the applicant any tentative conclusions which 
the V.O. may be drawing f?om the material presented to him or her.. ., not even apparent 
contradictioris which concem the visa ~ f f i c e r . ' ~  Accordingly, an applicant contesting a 
negative H & C decision must show the visa officer emd in law, proceeded on a wrong 
See the Chen decision, cited infia at note 605, and the discussion accompanying same. 
29s 'Tl & C' power was formerIy centraiized in the Governor-in-Council. However, the power was 
delegated to local program managers with the implementation of Phase 1 of C-86 regdations in February, 
1993. See CIC Aii Mission Message ORDO 149 "R 2.1 Humanitarian and Compassionate Discretion", 
supra note 123. For a description of the various changes wrought by Bill C-86, see infia notes 563 and 
629 and accompanying text. 
296 Mialon, supra note 1 85 at 3 0 1. 
297 Ibiù. 
For example, on an idand rewiew, one might consider how weU estabiished in Canada a famüy haç 
become, notwithstanding that they have no lawfiil status. Such a consideration is not as likely to arise m 
or improper principle or acted in bad faith. However, as Muldoon J. correctly obsewes, 
the absence of a Iegai entitlement to demand exercise of this discretion places a "heavy 
burden" on the applicant upon a judicial review application.' 
As is apparent, R 2.1 discretion is entireIy of a positive character and is used to 
relieve against hardshipM1 that might be caused by requiring strict compliance with some 
requirement of the Reg~iatiionr.~ The rationale for this power, the circumstances 
expected to be attendant upon its use and the rnanner in which it differs corn R 1 l(3) 
discretion, are set out in a message f?om CIC headquarters to a i i  visa offices. The 
relevant parts read as foiiows: 
. . .[The] Act, Regulations and delegation instrument (1-32) are silent on which 
grounds warrant use of [R. 2.11 H and C authority. This is no accident! 
During review of Bill C-86 much thought was put into whether H and C 
exemption of individual cases was appropriate. Parliament reached the 
conclusion that not only should H and C exemption be maintaùied but that Act 
should be amended to permit delegation of authonty below Govemor In Council. 
Result was arnended section 1 14(2) of Act and new section 2.1 of Regulations. 
Discussions within Department on drafting of R 2.1 revolved around view 
that one of strengths of CDN immigration regime has been its flexibility. 
Although Act and Regulations are always drafted so as to cover widest number of 
scenarios it is inevitable, given the diversity of our clients and their individual 
situations, that some worthwhile cases with compelling H and C circumstances 
will fall outside the system. With R 2.1, Ministers and Department have now 
overseas consideration of H & C. 
~9 Khalon, supra note 185 at 300. 
'Oo fiid. at 300. 
'Ot For example, it is regularly used to overcome a lack of flexibüity within the A a  and Regulatiom 
regarding non-traditional family groupings. See CIC IM Cbap. OP-1, Para. 4.2.2 (Ver. 06-96) 'What about 
cornmon-law spouses and same-sex partuers?" at 6, and also text accompanying note 120, supra. 
'02 More specincally, ovmeas it may only be w d  to overcome the requirements of sections 8 and 14(1) of 
the Regulations Sec CIC AU Mission Message ORD0149, supra note 123. Section 8 deais with the 
seletion criteria imposed on independent immigrants, while section 14(1) imposes the requirrment for a 
valid travel document on a i i  immigrants. Overseas, R 2.1 discretion is most ofien used to relieve refugee 
applicants h m  the need for a valid passport- Many of the refugees selected abroad fmd the requirements 
of section 14(1) difncult to comply with, since they wili typicaiiy have fled theU home country and no 
longer enjoy its protection. Accordingly, they may not possess a passport and may have no way to obtain 
one. For more on the use of R 2.1 discretion in t h e  cUcwllSfances, set IM Chap. OP-15, Para. 1.4 (Ver. 
1 1-96} "Exceptions for immigrants" at 1. 
provided Program Managers with authority to exercise theu judgements in 
facilitating issuance of visas in those cases where exemption of Regs 8 and 14(1) 
would be warranted. (To exempt fkom other requirements than R 8 and R 14( 1) 
visa officers may request H and C exemption h m  Minister via case 
management). 
Although department did consider restricting use of H and C discretion to 
list of defined circumstances it was quickly realized that no such list could either 
be sufnciently comprehensive or flexible. In the end Department places trust in 
the good judgernent and discretion of its ofXicers to recognize when H and C 
conditions are sufnciently compelling to warrant exemption of regulations. 
Program Managers have been given wide H and C authority with the fidl 
expectation that it wiIl be used to resolve these problems. 
In overseas context use of H and C exemption has been restricted to Regs 
8 and 14(1) which means that Program Manager has authority to overcome failure 
on selection points if there are compelling H and C reasons to issue a visa. . . . This 
is entirely different authority nom that provided in R 1 l(3) whereby senior 
immigration officer (LE. Program managers abroad and their immediate 
assistants) may use positive or negative discretion if in her opinion the selection 
points do not reflect applicants ability to successfdiy estabiish. In effect, R 1 l(3) 
recognizes that selection points system does nothot identifL al1 independent 
immigrants who can successfully establish. R 1 l(3) is nothot intended, nor 
should it be used, for passing for H and C reasons independent immigrants who 
fail to meet the selection system. On the other hand, R 2.1 recognizes that there 
may be compelling H and C reasons to issue visas to immigrants (of all classes) in 
spite of hadequate selection points. R 2.1 waiver of selection points is notlnot 
necessarily restricted to only those who apply as independent applicants. . . . 
[Paragaph numbering omitted]" 
2.1.5 lnadmissibility 
Even with respect to the statutory bars to admission found under section 19 of the 
Act, there exists a healthy elernent of discretion While the grounds for inadmissibility 
are written for the widest possible application, there is a recognition that it is not always 
appropriate to exclude, in every circUmSfitIlce, everyone caught by them. The bars 
include inadmissibility for reasons of public secur iv ,  poor healthMS, inability to be self- 
= CM: AU Mission Message ORD0149, n<pm note 123. 
" Set generally subsectiom 19(l)(e), (0, (g), (k) and (i), which deal with a wide range of behaviour 
ranging from espionage and tamrism to participation in a govemment that mgaged in gmss human rights 
violations. 
supporting"", criminaliv and non-compliance with the A c P .  Subsections 19(1) and (2) 
of the Act contain manda top  prohibitions on entry to Canada of any prospective 
immigrant or visitor who is described by any of the grounds for inadmissibility. 
Nonetheless, these grounds can be overcome by the exercise of discretionary powePO 
ernanating either fiom the local visa office or h m  a more centrai authority. Where the 
power is located seerns to be guided by a combination of factors. Beyond reasons 
relating to fiinctional practicality" *, these uiclude consideration of the comparative 
serioumess of the ground for inadmi~sibili~~: whether there is more than one reason for 
inadrni~sibility"~, the possibility of inter-jurisdictiond concerrdi4 and the fact that some 
305 Giving rise to concenis about public safety or excessive demand on health care facilities. See section 
19(l)(a) of the Act. 
'O6 Section 19( 1 )(b) of the Act. 
Subsections 19(1)(c), (c. 1), (c.2), (d), 0) and 19(2)(a), (a. 1) and (b). 
Subsections 19(1)@) and (i), and 19(2)(c) and (d). 
10> Both 19(1) & (2) use the word "shaii" in specifyiag that entry is to be denied to criminals. 
''O Note that the prohibition on admission contained in 19(2)(b) is the only barrier under section 19 that 
does not import an element of discretion, at least in so far as permanent relief is concerned I9(2)@) 
prohibits entry to persons who have been convicted, either in Canada or abroad, of two or more offences 
that would constitute summary conviction offences under any Act of Pariiament. Presumably because such 
offences are seen to be more minor in nature, mere efflwrion of thne will serve to overcome their effect as 
a ground for inadmissibiiity. According to CIC IM Chap. OP-18, para. 3.2 (Ver. 09-97), at 3, "Persons 
described in A l9(2)(b) do not need rehabilitation approval. Their inadmissibility is removed by the 
passing of the statutory five-year period." This differs, of course, f?om other grounds for criminal 
ioadmissïbiiity set out under section 19. In t h se  cases, it is not enough that the five year period has 
passeci. To obtain "rehabilitation" under the Act, the party will stiU have to satisQ the Minister, or her 
delegate, not only that the statutory period has passeci, but ako that m e  rehabilitation has, in fact, taken 
pIace. 
"' For example, since it is intent at time of admission that is relevant, the c o n c m  set out in 19(1)(h) and 
19(2)(c) are most cornmonly dealt with at a Port of Entry, at the time entry is sought See CIC IM Chap. 
OP- 17, Para. 1. I (Ver. 06-96), at 1. 
"' Subsections 19(1) and (2). for exampie, prohibit the entry of anyone who has been convicted of c r i a  
offences either abroad or in Canada, or even of persmi who there are reasonabIe grounds to beiieve have 
c o d t t e d  acts or omissions abroad that would constitute offences if c o d t t e d  in Canada. Section 19(1) 
deals with more serious offences, while 19(2) proscrik entry for persons @ty of less serious offences. 
As a g e n d  matter, the more serious offences desm'bed in 19(1) may ody be overcome by a direction 
fkom the Minister. However, for most criminal offences desrnid m 19(2), authority has k e n  delegated 
by the Minister to local program managers in visa offices to ovmome the inadmissibiüty. For more on 
eriminai inadmissibility, see generally IM Cbaps. OP-17 (Evaluating uiadmissibility), OP- 18 (Criminal 
Rehabilitation) and OP-19 ( M h k m ' s  Permits). 
"' For example, authority has been delegated to program managers in visa offices to appmve rehabditation, 
aspect of 'hational interest" or wider public policy may be invol~ed."~ In cases where 
bctionality seems to demand it, or the ground of inadmissibility is viewed as relatively 
minor or routine, discretionary authority to provide relief has been delegated to local 
offices. Power over ail other grounds of inadmissibiIity, however, remaius centraiized in 
the Minister's office directly or, in some cases, at a regionai headquarters level. In such 
cases, though a visa office may recommend favourable consideration, approval must be 
granted by the relevant higher authonty? 
As a general matter, discretionary relief under section 19 of the Act may be 
obtained in one of four ways, depending upon the type of inadmissibility involved. The 
purçuant to section 19(2)(a), for persons affected by a single conviction that i nvokd  a potential penalty of 
less than 10 years Unprisonment Where two or more such convictions arc extant, authority for granting 
rehabilitaîion may only be exercised by the Minister. See CTC Operations Memoranda (OM) EC 95-06e (2 
August 1995) "DeIegation of Authority to Grant Approval of Rehabilitation" describing the terms of the 
delegation of discretionary authority for rehabilitation approval to local program managers carried out 
pursuant to Bill C-44. 
The question of medical inadmissibiiity implicates provincial jurisdiction over health and social 
services. if a person with a serious h d t h  condition re-g expensive medical treatment is granted 
entry, medical costs may be inctured which wii pose a drain on the provinciaï public purse. It is for this 
reason that authority to grant entry to such persons mut be sought fiom a Director or Director General of 
the Tmmigration Regional Headcpmm servkig the intended province of destmatioa The process to be 
followed in such cases is set out in CJC JM Chap. OP-19, Para. 3.1 (Ver- 01-97), at 7-8 which states: 
The Director/Director General wiii seek concurrence or input h m  the responsïble provinciaI 
health authorities, w h m  they have indicated a desire for such involvement. The Director 
GeneraV Director will ensure all public safkty, quarantîne, heaith care access, eligiiility for 
provincial public health insumnce, financial and provincial jurisdictional faciors are satisfactorily 
addressed before concurring wiîh permit issuance. [emphasis added] 
'15 This may be the rationale, for example, underlying the prohibition m section 19(1)(1) on enw of senior 
officiais fiom regimes that have engaged gros human rights violations or crimes agakst humanity. In 
such instances, the Minister wiU need to be satisfied that entry 'bvouid not be detrimental to the national 
interest". Similarly, lg(l)(k) refers to persons, not otherwise desmbed under 19(1), who ccnstitute a 
danger to the security of Canada. The seriousness of this ground of inadmissiiility is such that it is one of 
the few instances under the Act where the concurrence of both the Mniisteer of immigration and Solicitor 
G e n d  of Canada are needed, before entry rnay be granted See CIC iM Chap. OP-17, Para. 5.3 (Ver. 09- 
97), at f 5, which provides the foiiowing guidance to visa officers: 
A19(1)(k) is a residual class. It desmies people who are a danger to national security, not 
covered by any other of these classes [ie. 19(l)(e),(f) and (g)]. 
You should not r e h e  [such] an application . . . without approval fkom Security Review (BCZ), 
Case Management, National Headquarters. You &O require writtm approvai of the Minister and 
the Solicitor Generai to use 19(1)(k). 
Which approval may be withheld, notwithstanding any favoitrable recommcndation by the mvestigating 
first, involving the so-called "dismtionary entry", is set out under section 19(3). It 
provides as foUows: 
A senior immigration officer or an adjudicator, as the case may be, may grant 
entry to any person who is a member of an inadmissible class describeci in 
subsection [19](2) subject to such terms and conditions as the officer or 
adjudicator deems appropriate and for a period not exceeding thkty days, where, 
in the opinion of the officer or adjudicator, the purpose for which entry is sought 
justifies admission. 
This power is only available at a Port of Entry and is meant to aiiow for handling of 
emergent, usually unforeseen circumstances."' Typically, the gromd of inadmissibility 
officer. See the decision in the Leung case, supra note 235. 
' I r  See CIC IM, Chap. PE-IO "Senior Immigration Officer Functions at a Port of Entry", Para. 4.4.2 (Ver. 
0 1 -94), at 7-8, where the foilowing direction is provided to Senior immigration Officers regarding exercise 
of this power: 
Factors to consider 
When you are exercising discretion under A19(3), you shouid consider the following factors: 
a) try to balance the reasons for inadmissibility against the rasons for which a person seeks entry. 
The more serious the deged inadmissibility, the better should be the reasons for just@ing en-. 
For example, a recent conviction for which a person might be found desrn id  under A 1 g(î)(a) or 
A19(2)(a. 1) is likely more serious than the lack of a document, 
b) avoid using A19(3) to overcome a recurring inadmissibiliîy. For example, an inadmisshle truck 
driver may be required to travel to Canada in the course of his or her duties; you should not issue 
discretionary mtxy each time the person seeks entry, but instead counsei the person on the 
requirement. for rehabiiitation or consider i s h g  a Minister's pennit. 
c) do not use A19(3) to refer persons inland. For example, ifa person who appears to be 
inadmissible wishes to enter Canada for three rnonths, it would not be appropriate to grant 
discretionary entry for 30 days and advise the person to go to an immigration office inland to seek 
a Miniçter's pennit The correct action in such a case would be to consider whether you should 
issue a Minister's permit at the POE. 
d) consider whether compassionate or other pressing considerations warrant use of your A 19(3) 
authonty to aUow entry or whether, in the circumstances, an inquisr wodd serve a useful purpose. 
e) you mut  be satisfied that the person seeking entry poses no threat or danger to the public. For 
example a person with a recent conviction for impaired &king who arrives by air with some 
finends to spend [a] weekmd in Montreal may be considered for 190') (sic) [ie. 19(3)] entry 
because the risk of committing an off ice is rninimized by the fact that the person will not be 
driving while in Cana&. Due to economic benefits the public mterest is served. 
You should also consider: 
a) whether the person seeking admission is desmbed in A19(2), 
b) the person's motive for seeking admission. 
C) the urgency of admission: why did the person f d  to comply with the requirements? In 
circumstances where a person is genuinely unaware of the visa requirement, if the reason for 
seeking atry is of such an urgent nature as to preciude obtaining a visa, or if the decision to enter 
Canada is spontaneous, it may be appropriate to use A19(3). For exampie, firiends or relatives of a 
visitor to the U.S. decide to enter Canada h m  Niagara Falls, N.Y. to see the Canadian f a ,  and 
relates to a procedural hhction, such as not possessing a visitor visa, or implicates a 
substantive ground not viewed too seriously, such as an old criminai conviction for a 
relatively minor offence. 
A second method for obtaining relief, reserved excIusively for those inadmissible 
by reason of cI.iminality, is known as "rehabilitation". This form of relief is permanent 
and may be used to overcome even the most senous criminal record. Effectively, it is the 
immigration law equivalent of a pardon.'<' Once granted, the applicant may no longer be 
denied entry because of the past misdeed. Since approval of rehabilitation is a 
discretionary matter, the applicant is required to afïkmaîively prove that any proclivities 
or tendencies which led to the offensive behaviour have, in al1 likelihood, been 
pemianently overcome and that genuine rehabilitation has occurred. As noted, authority 
to grant rehabilitation in minor cases has been delegated to visa office program 
the U.S. visitor meets ali requirements for entry, including re-admissibility to the U.S., but is not 
in possession of a Canadian visa. If you were satisfied that the decision to enter Canada was 
spontaneous, you might wish to use A19(3) to aiiow entry. If you fomed the opinion that the 
person seeking entry simply ignored visa reipimmmts, or had plenty of time to obtai. a visa, you 
might decide not to use A19(3) to authorize eatry. 
d) whether the purpose for which the person is seeking entry can be accomplished within the 30- 
&y tirne limit aliowed, 
e) the extent to which the inadmissibility can be attniuted to neglect or bad faith on the part of the 
person seeking admission. For instance, in a criminal case consider the &te of conviction 
compared to the date on which the person is seeking entry. 1s the conviction recent, or might the 
person be eligiile for relief h m  the inadmkibility? 
f )  whether the person seeking entry is k e l y  to Ieave Canada should discretionaxy entry be 
granted. Remember that removd costs become the liability of the department once entry is 
granted. 
g) whether the person appears in the Enforcement idonnation Index in FOSS. 
h) the recommendation of the examinmg officer. 
Note that although A19(2)(d) is broady worded, it refers ody to those persons who do not fiilfil 
or comply with any of the conditions or requiremenîs of the Act or its regulations. It does not refer 
to persons who fall within the inadmissible ciasses descriid in A19(1). 
"' Indnd, under Bill C-44, the pardel to pardons was made more cornpletc by shifting responsibility for 
granting of rehabilitation fiom CIC to the National Parole Board of Canada for any immigrant or visitor 
affectai by a aiminal conviction obtained in Cana&. Fomierly, even convictions registered in Canada 
were relieved against by the process of a grant of "rehabilitation" by the Minister of Immigration. Since C- 
44, however, a Pardon fiom the National Parole Board is the only permanent remedy available to foreign 
In other cases, where authority for rehabilitation has been retained by the 
Minister, the usud procedure is for the applicant to convince a visa officer that a 
favourable report and recommendation should be made to the Minister? The central 
determinant in such cases is whether the applicant is able to satisfy that fhther ". . . fùture 
unlawful activities are extremely unlikely . . . ?** In detamining whether or not 
rehabilitation has taken place, visa officers are given the folIowing guidance: 
You must take a number of factors into account to assess whether a person is 
rehabilitated. You may measure rehabilitation by the passage of thne and an 
examination of activities and lifestyle pre- and post-offence. Rehabilitation does 
not mean there is no risk of M e r  criminal activity, ody that the risk is minimal. 
The reason for coming to Canada is not a consideration for rehabilitation. 
6.1 Type ofoffmce 
. . . Applicants with a couple of minor offences may have little difficulty 
convincing you of their rehabilitation. Normally the offences are isolated, out of 
character and not indicative of criminal behaviour. . . . In some of these cases an 
interview may not be required. . . . Applicants with more serious or multiple 
offences require closer scnitiny- Normally, an interview will be required. . . . 
6.2 Rehubilitution considerations and evuluating risR 
nationals, under the Immigration Act, for Canadian convictions. 
Pursuant to BiU C-44, authority to gant rehabilitation under certain circwzlstances mvoiving lg(2) type 
offences was delegated to program managers of CIC's in Canada and visa offices abroad. See CIC OM 
EC-95-06e, supra note 3 13. The general scheme for rehabihtion under the Act implicates three different 
authorities potentiaiiy involved in a grant of relief that wiil overcome a criminal record as a statutory bar. 
Where the convictions were registered m Cana&, a pardon by the National Parole Board WU suffice to 
remove the inadmissibility. See CIC IM Chap. OP-1 8, Para. 3.2 (Ver. 09-97) "Who cannot apply for 
approval of rehabilitation?" at 3. For convictions registered outside of Canada, authority for rehabilitation 
is split between the Minister and her deiegates, according to the seriousness of the offence. CIC IM Chap. 
OP-18, Para. 1.2 (Ver. 06-96) "Legislaiive intent", at 1, illustrates this as foIiows: 
A12 1(1) alIows the Minister to delegate his authonty to public servants. instrument 1-53 in 
m g r a t i o n  Manual] IL 3 lists immigration officiais (delegated authonties) who niay grant 
rehabilitation to appiicants W i e d  in A l9(2)(a. 1). The Minister reserves sole authority to grant 
rehabilitation to appiicants describeci in A 19(l)(c. 1). 
'" Note that while this is the usual procedure, thae is noching to prevent an applicant from applying 
directly to the Minister for rehabilitation, Likewise, even where an applicant is unable to convince a visa 
officer to make a favourable recomrnendation, the applicant is still fiee to approach the Minister directiy. 
'*' CIC IM Chap. OP-18, Para. 1.3 (Ver. 06-96), at 1. Se+ also CIC OM EC 95-0% supra note 3 13. The 
discretionary nature of the relief is evident in the following guidance provided to program managers 
considering reques ts for re habilitation: 
Applicants must demonstrate clearly that rehabilitation has taken place. Consider the Litcelihood 
they will commit M e r  offences. Do not hesitate to r&e to recommend or approve on 
application, ifthe applicant U unable or unwilhg to demonstrate that there ïs a low rirk of 
recidivLsrn. [emphasis added] 
You must assess rehabilitation considerations to detennine the Iikelihood or risk 
of applicants' continued involvement in unlawful activities. These include: 
Acceptance of responsibility for the offence. 
Evidence of remorse for any harm done. 
Evidence of restitution, where possible, to victims of their crimes. 
Persons whose criminal involvement included, or was the result of, cirug or 
aicohol abuse, sexual abuse, psychologid disturbance, or a history of 
assaults, o h  require counselling (sic) or therapy in order to achieve 
rehabilitation. 
Evidence of successfiil completion of a rehabilitation program as well as any 
evidence of a change in l i f i I e .  
Evidence of stability in employment and family life. Applicants who have 
been involveci in a criminal Mestyle often exhibit instability in their lives. 
Participation in educational and skill training programs, steady employment 
and a positive family life may indicate a change in lifestyle? 
Since the question of what proof may satisfy an individual decision maker imports some 
latitude, albeit constrained by the bounds of good fith, relevant considerations and other 
elernents of the notions of naturd justice and fainiess, a large eiernent of discretion is 
inevitably present with respect to the granting of rehabilitation. 
Another type of permanent relief fiom inadmissibility is the "Minister's Consent". 
This tool is used to overcome the inadmissibility described in section 1 g(l)(i). which 
denies entry to those who have been previously deported or excluded fÎom Canada under 
section 55 of the Act." The consent of the Minister is available equally to visitors and 
immigrants. Little guidance is provided to visa offices regarding the appropriate 
circumstances for exercise of this power. Chapter 1 of the Oversear Processing portion 
of the Immigration Manuais provides the following: 
- 
' ~ 2  CIC M Chap. OP- 18, Para. 6 (Ver. 06-96) "Detennining Rehabilitation", at 9-10. 
Under subsection 55(1) of the Act, anyone previously deported must obtain the consent of the Minister 
before they rnay r e m  to Canada. Those affected by an exdusion order, pursuant to subsection 55(2), 
ody require the consent of the Minister during the twelve month period foiiowing their removal or 
departure h m  Canaâa. Once that period has elapsed, they do not require the Minister's consent. See CIC 
M Chap. OP-1, Para. 17.1 (Ver. 06-96) "Who needs Minister's consent?" at 28. 
You must obtain all available information about the removal from the responsible 
office in Canada. You should ask the removing office's recommendation about 
approving or denying the request. . . . Requests for Minister's consent are only 
appropriate when applicants are not inadmissible for any reason other than 
A1 9(l)(i).32.' 
The absence of detailed guidance, both in the statutory sources and the policy manuals, 
obviously leaves much scope for the visa office in determining whether or not to grant 
consent." Authority to grant the consent of the Minister has been delegated to program 
managers in visa offices abroad.'= 
More generally, a final, albeit temporary, type of relief fkom inadmissibility is 
available in the form of a "Minister's Permit"? Pennits are a sort of catch-al1 remedy 
which cut across al1 the grounds of inadmissibility containeci within section 19. They 
may be granted for periods of up to three years3= and are designed to allow the Minister 
to ". . .balance the control and facilitation aims of the Immigration Act.. that are set 
out at section 3. This is made clear in the policy manuals, which state: 
A3 states that policy, rules and regdations made under the Immigration Act need 
to sene a variety of aims. Minister's permits (IMM1263) exist to help balance 
competing aims in special circumsbnces. For this reason, they are the prerogative 
of the Minister."" 
Minister's delegates may issue pemits when people who are a minimal risk to 
Canadian society have a compelling need to corne into or remai. in Canada. . . . 
If our social and humanitarian cornrnitrnents, economic and cultural interests, or 
international obligations to protect refùgees and displaced persans.. . c m  be 
324 CIC IM Chap. OP-1, Para. 17.4 (Ver. 11-96) ''Reqyests for Minister's consent", at 29. 
' ~ 5  Further, there is no obligation on the Minister to provide reasons when refushg to grant consent. See 
Singh v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration) (1986), 6 F.T.R- 15 (F.C.T.D.). See ais0 Lemg, 
supra note 3'15. 
CIC IM Chap. OP-1, Para. 17.3 (Ver. 11-96) ''Who can grant or r e h e  Minister's consent?" at 29, 
states: "Instrument 1-8 lis& officiais delegated by the Minister to grant or refiise consent It inchdes 
officers in charge of visa offices." 
3n CIC IM Chap. OP- 19, Para. 2.3 (Ver. 0 1-97) 'Who is eligiale?", at 2. 
'* Immigration Act, section 37(3). 
' ~ 9  CIC Chap. OP-19, Para. 2.2 'When may a permit be issued?", Ver. 01-97, at 2. 
'30 Id., Para, 1.2 'Toiicy intent", at 1. 
advanced without unacceptable nsk to the health, safety and good order of our 
society.. .or the nsk that our territory will be used for criminal activity.. ., you 
may decide a Minister's permit is appro~riate.~~ 
It is clear then that issuance of a permit involves a process of weighing ri& against need, 
in order to achieve a proper balance between control and facilitation. Where the risk of 
danger to the Canadian public is low and the need of the applicant is compelling, a permit 
is likely to issue. Conversely, high risk generally militates against issiümce of a permif 
even when demonstrated need is high. Similarly, whiie authority to gant Pan i t s  has 
been delegated to visa offices abroad in some circumstances, there remain other instances 
where concurrence must be obtained directly h m  the Minister or a regional 
headqwrters. As noted earlier, the need for concurrence is related to the type of matter at 
hand and the various implications it may raise? In any case, the issuance of Minister's 
P e r d s  to allow admission outside of the ordinary requirements of the Act and 
Replations is a sensitive matter, not undertaken lightly. This is particularly so, since the 
Minister is required to give an annual accounting to Parliament for d l  Permits issued.'" 
Given the political nahue of this forum, a seemingly cavalier attitude to issuance of 
peRnits may leave her subject to accusations that she is UIlILllTldfbi of public health and 
safety or that she is soft on ~ e a l s . ~ ~  Accordingly, direction provided by the Minister 
33' Id., Para 2.2 "When nmy a permit be issued?", at 2. 
332 For a chart listing the lever of concurrence that may be required for issuance of a Minister's Permit, see 
Appendix C, below. 
" Immigration Act, S. 37(7), which specines that a report shall be tabled mually before Parliament 
detailing how many perrnits were issued and what the categories of inadmissibility were. 
3U See for example, CIC News Release #98-20, supra note 94. The emphasis of the news release on the 
reduction of Pennit issuance by 75% tiom 1992, and on the static nature of permit issuance fiom the 
previous year, is iikeIy more than coincidentai. Certaidy, there is political mileage for any Minister to be 
seen as f& but hn. In particular, the news release highlights that permits issucd to criminally 
inadmissible persons declined 4.8% over the previous year. OveraU, a total of 3798 Minister's Pennits 
were issued abroad in 1997 to persoas seeking to enter Canada. 
as to the circumstances under which Parnits are to be issued may influence whether a 
broad and large interpretation or a more restrictive approach is employed in local issuing 
offices. 
In reviewing the curent usage of discretion with respect to the miteria for 
selection and the grounds for inadmissibility, the central feature is clearly a split between 
the locus of authority over it. Where the matter involves considerations that are largely 
confked to the individual case at haud, discretionary power has been delegated, for the 
most part, to the local level. Where, however, wider considerations of public policy, such 
as heaith and safety of the general populace, are implicated, power rem* concentrated 
at the upper levels of the immigration bureaucfacy. Further, because the Act attempts to 
cary forward the dual, antagonistic objectives of control and faciiitation, a mass of 
complex considerations rnay be involved. Given the uniqueness of each case, obtaining a 
"proper" balance between these objectives is not a process that is readily reduced to a 
system of comprehensive niles capable of mechanical application in every case. While 
the factors to be considered can be easily enumerated, the process necessarily involves a 
weighting and pnontization that must shifi fkom case to case. It is this which allows for 
individualized justice. However, it also ensures that discretion remains inherent in every 
case of an exception. 
2.2 The Three "R's" and Discretion in the "New CE" 
2.2.1 Re-engineering. Reconfiguration and Renewal 
Visa offices are staf5ed primarily, though not exclusivelyY: by a cadre of 
It has long been the case that the number of regular foreign service officers is less than the actuai 
professional foreign service officers ernployed by the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC). CIC, in its cment fom, was created in 19933M, when the 
social affairs officer cadre fiom the (then) Department of Extemai Anairs and 
Intemational Trade CanadaU7 was reintegrated with the domestic immigration service. 
The social &airs cornplment was incorporated within CIC as a discrete unit under the 
organizational name of the 'Tntemational Region". This reintegration occurred during a 
tirne of profound change for the Government of Canada and was just one part of a greater 
reorganhtion and rationalization then underway. Beset by economic woes, the 
Canadian government was struggling to regain control of its &anciai affairs and so, not 
surprisingiy, cutbacks and efficiency rneasures were a central part of the design for 
putting the public trust back on a solid and sustainable fiscai footing. 
CIC was not exempted fkom austerity mesures invoked throughout the 
g~vemment.'~~ Over the fiscal years fiom 1995/96 through 1997/98, it was required to 
cut more than 75 million dollars fiom its expendituresm This necessitated massive cuts 
- - -  
number of overseas positions within CIC. As a r d t ,  a considerable number of "Canada based" visa 
officers serving abroad at any given time are actually personnel drawn fiom the idand senrice, generally 
senring on single assignments (ie. one tour abroad). In addition, the ranks of visa officers are 
supplemented by a group of locally fiired program officers, calied "Designated Iinmigration Officers", who 
exercise visa issuance authority equivalent to a regular foreign service visa officer (though it should be 
pomted out both groups typicaily work under the supervision of a senior visa officer). 
335 introduction to Deparimental W o o k  on Program @enditUres und Priorities for 1996-97 to 1997-98 
as found on CIC home page (http:\\www.cicnet.ingenia.com) as at 2 Fcbruary 1997. 
" Now the Department of Foreign Affaùs and Inteniational Trade Canada @FAIT). 
The pervasive nature of the govexnment wide expenditure reductions is too weii h o w n  to ~ q y i r e  
fiuther eiaboration here. As an example, however, see Erin Anderssen, "Canada to quit food, drug 
research - Scientists say decision pu& Canadian liveç in danger" Ottawa Citizen (1 1 Juiy 1997) Al. That 
article detaiis cuts in laboratory research in the food and dmg division of Health Canada's protection 
branch. Citing soaring research costs, the government anuounced that 123 research positions would be 
eliminated, 
339 Supra note 336. See also CIC, Departmental OutIook on Program Expenditures and Rionifies - 1996- 
97 to 1998-99 (Ottawa: W t e r  of Supply and Services, 1996) at 17, whae îhe foiiowing expenditure 
reductions, for Internationai Region in particular and CIC as a whole, are forecast 
and restruchiring on a sweeping scale. Right across the department, fimm headquarfers 
and inland offices to foreign outposts, CXC undertook signincant reductions in personnel 
and resourîes. International Region, in particular, was cailed upon to share in the 
austerity meames and did so by reducing its overseas positions by 20%." But simply 
reducing overhead was not enough. At the same t h e  that its budget was cut, CIC was 
still expected to maintain al l  of its core fiurctions, including delivery of a rate of 
immigrant landuigs fixed at more than 200,000 per yeaP1 Caught between the twin 
realities of declining resources and unrelenthg demand, the Department was placed in a 
bind. Simply cutting was not enough. New efficiencies fiom remaining resources were 
necessary, if the shortfd between demand and necessary output was to be bridged. A 
major rethinking, therefore, of how CIC's service was delivered, and exactly what that 
Approximately 50 visa officers, or about 20-25% of the total foreign service immigration officer 
complement, were laid off as of April30, 1996. For some apparent insight as to how the size of the cuts 
within International Region were arrived at, see 'The 20% Decree" Lexbase (October 1997 Sending) at 3, 
citing Access to Information Request 97-125, where an extract of a memo, dated 12 April, 1996, iÏom 
(then) CIC Assistant Deputy Minister Raphael Girard to Deputy Minister Janice Cochrane is given. 
Discussing the need for redution of costs in inland operations, that memo makes reference to the fashion 
in which cuts to International region were settied upon. In particular 
With Intemationai pegion], 1 simply decreed a 20% reduction in Canada based FTEs Y'Full Time 
Equivaleats", being permanent fidi time staffpositions located abroad] in the field because 
productivity gains of that magnitude were easily obtainable. it isn't so easy with the Canadian 
regions because the residual work is either enforcement onented or complex selection. What 1 am 
inclined to work toward is a d t s  oriented resource base formula that will scan amoss regions. 
At the moment, we are getting fewer outputs and more spending - Does that sound familia.? 
There are still peopIe out the= who think that if you nui up a backiog you will get more resources. 
Aiso, for a longer view of foreign service immigration personnel reductions, see 'Wew Tmmigration 
Approaches" (March 1997) 25 Backspace [Canadian Tmmigmtion Historicai Society Newsletter] at 1, 
where it is noted that over the preceding five years, the ". . .number of Cana&-based officers abroad feu 
h m  approximately 3 1 1 to approximately 21 1 in 1997, a reduction of 33%". 
The immigration plan for 1998, for example, will see a projected total number of immigrant and refugee 
landings that is between 200,000 and 225,000. See CIC, A Stronger Canada - 1998 Annual Immigration 
Plan (Tabled 23 October 1997) (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Governent Services Canada, 
1 997). 
Expenditures (CAD S) 
International Region 
Tokai CIC Expenditures 
1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
60,629,000 52,826,000 48,333,000 
6 1 5,00 1,000 554,28 1,000 534,176,000 
service should be comprised of was initiated The rationaikations that foilowed were to 
affect the entire spectnnn of program delivery. From facilitation to enforcement, 
virtually no aspect of immigration processing was left untouched. 
In 1994, proceeding nom public consultations, CIC issued its plan for longer- 
termJU strategic direction. Published under the name of Into the 21sl Centzoy, the theme 
of that document revolved around the mandate of CIC to meet government demands that 
the immigration program be ". . .accountable, affordable and sustainable"? '3usiness 
Process Re-engineering'- (BPR) was the name given to the initiative to h d  ways to 
solve the dilemma of meeting these disparate demands. Its mandate was not just to h d  
strategies for maintaining service while digesting cuts. More ambitiously, it was tasked 
with hding new and innovative ways to improve service, even in the face of those 
cuts? 
Budget reductions meant that staffhaci to be let go and offices closed, for 
example, but BPR meant that this period of upheaval could be viewed as an oppominity, 
rather than just as a challenge, with a seerning situation of adversity tumed to advanbge. 
Under BPR, dimption fiom reductions was CO-opted as a means for effécting 
CIC "hto the 2Pt  Centwy ", supra note 109 at iïi, where in an introduaory "Statement by the 
Honourable Sergio Marchi -Minister of Ctizenship and Immigration" it is mentioned that the document 
represents a strategic fhmework meant to provide guidance for program and policy development over the 
next ten years. 
"Interview with a Ministef: Tallring to Sagio Marchi" (1995) 12:3 Bout de Papier 8 at 9. See &O ibid., 
CIC "lnto the 2Pt  Cmîury", "Executive Summary - Prioritis for Action", at viii, where the following is 
given: 
[The] . . .world lis] increasingly characterized by sweeping and rapid change. . . . Part of this 
change is Canada's own fiscal reality. We must be mindfirl that resources once plentifid are now 
dear. In this context, our citizenship and immigration program must be more than f& and 
cornpassionate, it must be affordable and sustainable. 
U* CIC "fnto the 2Pt  Centtny", ibid. at 66. 
Ioid., where it is stated: "Signifiant productivity advances are a<pccted h u g h  CIC's Business Rocess 
Re-engineering Project, now entezing its system development phase. Notably, it will reduce coss at the 
rationalization and maximization of remaîning resources and to undertake a general 
"renewal" of CIC. So, for example, the need to close some offices to achieve savings was 
seized upon as a way to carry out a larger 'Le-configuration" of the network of CIC 
offices, both domesticaliy and abroad, in ways that would also facilitate productivity 
gains. 
Discretion was also a subject for BPR rethinkùig. It is, of course, a labour 
intensive selection tool that entails highly detailed and individualized case consideration. 
Obviously, such individualued processing is more "costly" than a comparable decision 
proceeding strictiy fiom an application of d e s .  Beyond mere economics, a confluence 
of other trends, including globalkation, fiscal realities, Charter-sensitivity and judicial 
notions of f h e s s ,  was also beginning to push the bureaucracy to conclude that broad 
adjudicative discretion was no longer appropriate in the selection process. Speakhg 
about the challenges that these presented and the need for new thinking they created, the 
(then) Deputy Minister of Immigration, Peter Harder, had this to Say: 
On the international side, if we are pursuing an Immigration and Refigee 
program in a world which has fimdamentally changed in terrns of globalization, 
we have to both deliver our program in that context and also provide a new 
context for public policy thinking. 
Let me just list a few of the implications. The 1976 Act, which is the 
fundamental Act of the Immigration Program, came into force at a time when we 
had 1200 refugee claimants in Canada a year. And they were al1 fleeing 
cornmunism. It was pre-Charter [of Rights and Freedoms] so you didn't need a 
lot of rules to Say yes or no. There was a lot of discretion in the system. Since 
then the world is people on the move. The collapse of communism means that the 
sorting out of good guys and bad guys in a refugee sense is complex and non- 
ideological. It is human rights based, not ideology based. The numbers are 
pater .  With the Charter, it is a more litigious atmosphere in which we manage 
the program. It means we have to have more Charter-proof and Charter-sensitive 
procedures. You need legislation to Say 'ho" and to pumie that in a meaningful 
same tmie it improves client service." 
way. 'Wo" has to have some W t y  and there has to be some ability for the 
program to manage the consequences of a negative decision both here [ie. in 
Canada] and abroad. We have had to adapt the Iaw and our h e  of reference 
significdy in the Iast number of y e a ~ s . ~  
Harder's comments highlighted a centrai difficulty facing CIC. Fiscal cutbacks 
required it to cut staff and reduce some senices, but ail of this had to be accomplished 
while maintaining a Ievel of faimess sufficient to satis@ the courts. Certaidy, as the 
Si@ case earlier illustrateci, courts are unimpressed by pleas of poverty as a justification 
for selection process inadquacies that compromise basic notions and standards of 
faime~s.~' Although citing the particular example of refugee selection, the generality of 
Harder's cornments makes clear that he envisioned a wider application for them, to 
immigration as a whole. As the senior departmental civil servant, his views were those of 
the bureaucracy and so provided ample evidence of the profound sea-change in thinking 
regarding use of discretion that was under way. Conceiving a more d e s  based, less 
discretionary, selection system was thus added as another goal of the BPR agenda 
The sweep of BPR did not end with simply reducing processing burdens and 
increasing efficiencies, however. That was still not enough to solve the fiscal side of the 
" "Immigration from the Top, the Inside and Abmad: Views h m  e Newcomer and a Veteran (Exceqt 
fiom an interview with Peter Harder)" (1995) 12:3 Bout de Papier 30 at 30. 
~4' Singh, supra note 64, 17 D.L& 422 at 469. in the words of Wilson J., ".. -1 have considerable doubt 
that the type of utilitarian consideration brought by M.. Bowie [that oral hearings for every refugee case 
would constitute an unreasonable straiu on IRB resources] can constitute a justification for a limitation on 
the righfs set out in the Charter." Courts generally are rinlikeIy to want to trade off rights for fiscal 
concem, particularly if they affect substantive consideration of a case, For example, in Johl v. Min. of 
Employment & Immigration (1987), 4 Imm. L E  (2d) 105,15 F.T.R. 164 (F.C.T.D.), the applicant appiied 
inland under the de facto iilegaI residents policy. The court noted that the shortage of personnel to handle 
such applications was no excuse for it not to be handled properly and fairIy. ConverseIy, see M a n i  v. 
Canada (Min. of CilizetlshIp & Immigtation) (1997) 36 ImmLR (2d) 47 (FCTD.), where a two year 
delay between intewiew and the issuance of a refusal letter for cri- inadmissibiiity was found not to be 
unreasonable. The difference in the result of these cases suggests that a cnishing work buden wiU not be 
fauited if it simply causes procedural deïay. However, if it goes to substantive consideration of the case, 
t'hm a reviewabIe error has occurred. 
dilemma, at least. As a generai stnttegy, govemment was increasingly resorting to user 
fees to offset program costs, on the theory that those ushg the service should be most 
responsible for paying its costs." Immigration was no exception. For some time, it had 
been apparent to govemment administrators and hance specialists that immigration need 
not be viewed simply as a cost item. Rather, because of the nature of its business, CIC 
held the promise of becoming a cash-cow, potentialIy capable of generating sufficient 
revenues to sustain itself? Accordingiy, in conjunction with program expenditure 
reductions, significant new fees were added and existing fees hiked. Govemment, at least 
in the case of CIC, was now truly in the business of business. And increased fees added 
to the quandary of doing more with less, since higher fees inevitably lead to greater 
expectations for prompt and efficient service." Although BPR promised client service 
improvements as part of its program, such a promise would obviously be difficult to keep 
when the means for delivering that service were to s W .  Clearly, the task before CIC in 
juggling these various demands and expectations was formidable. 
But what were the specific strategies adopted under BPR to meet the need for 
548 The importance of cost recovery fees to the goveniment's bottom he (and it is a governent wide 
bottom iine, since immigration fees are poured back into the government's general revenue fünd, rather 
than to a specfic CIC fiindl is evident fiom the fact that they now o a e t  a signincmt portion of CIC*s 
operating costs. According to CIC's own estimates, gross revenues [generated by processing fees] 
represent 54% of p h e d  program expenditures for 1996-97. This wiIl rise to 63% in 1998-99 as planned 
expenditures decrease. This is consistent with the approach of sbifting a iarger proportion of the cost of 
our program fiom the generai taxpayer to the direct beneficiaries." See CIC, Deparhnenttzl Outlook on 
Program Expenditures and Pnoritits, supra note 339, at 1 8. 
Y9 The pressure on CIC to generate sufncient fees to pay at least part of its own cos& a<ises h m  an 
agreement with Treasury Board, the Govemment of Cana& agency that controls fimding for ai i  
departmenîs, whereby CIC must generate a total of $330 &on in revenues fiom its various user fees. 
Under the agreement, if such revenues are not provideci, then shortfalls mut be taken out of CIC's own 
operating budget The importance of fees coiiected overseas is apparent by the fact they that represent 
more than 50% of ai i  revenues coiiected by CIC, totaling more than $200 million. See "Looking ahead- 
An intewkw with Gerry Campbeii, Director-Generai, Intemational Region" (Winter 1995lSpr9ig 1996) 1 1 
Entre-nous at 6. 
accountability, af3ordability and SuSfainability in the new CIC? And, more particularly, 
what was their effect upon the availability and use of discretion in overseas selection of 
independent immigrants? The balance of this section explores the various initiatives 
instituted and the changes they have wrought, and provides some comments and 
assessments on their efficacy and whether expectations have been met. 
2.2.2 Specific Initiatives 
BPR set out an arnbitious plan for revarnping and revitaiization of CIC operations 
and processes that was to be carried out in stages over a period of several ye;ars.'51 At 
National Headquarters, reorganization was carried out so as to focus dl activity on three 
central activities - "service lines" (relating to policy development and program design), 
"program delivery" (organized essentially dong geographic lines and cornpnsed of the 
International Region and five domestic regions) and "strategic support" (which includes 
branches providing Ministerid and executive support services, strategic policy and 
planning. and management of legal services, information technologies and human 
resources). Concurrently, redeployment of field resources was undertaken. The 
attainment of the imperatives of reduced costs and increased efficiencies was sought there 
principdly via a tripartite approach focused on centralizing resources, pushing work 
"down" to the lowest possible levels and standardizing methods, procedures and criteria. 
" Somewhat ironicaily, as  weU, the augmentation of fees has actuaUy added new work burdens associated 
with coilection, processing and, where necessary, rehds. 
''' "Lookhg ahead", supra note 349, w h m  it is stated that BPR was completed during the 1995-96 fiscal 
year. The projected savïngs fkom BPR initiatives is apparent in the following: "CIC completed its intensive 
BPR review which identified a series of principles for Departmental renewai and some % 35 - 45 miiiion in 
potential savings. Evaiuations of pilot projects are ongoing." 
2.2.2.1 Centralking Resources 
"We serve you better by seeing you less" was a slogan c o M  in CIC to descnbe 
the notion that there could be profit for clients in having a less intimate relationship with 
decision-makers. Though the slogan was soon abandoneci, the concept was not. One 
method of achieving savings was to strive for the economies that often mise fkom the 
sheer size of an endeavour. With this in min& a network of "super-visa offices" was 
conceived to replace many of the smaller, less efficient offices typical of CE'S overseas 
operatious. These new offices, called Regional Processing Centres (WC's) '5 are 
designed around the concept of bulk processing. Central to that design is the fact that 
their operations are restricted to processing of paper and so they are largely inaccessible 
to clients. These offices are intendeci to receive almost ail applications submitted 
worldwide for immigration to Canada. They are supplemented by a network of smaller 
offices whose job it is to conduct any interviews, ver@ documents and carry out other 
work that cannot conveniently be undertaken at the RPC's usually remote location.3a The 
ultimate configuration of the overseas office network is described in the following 
passage from a CIC publication: 
Immigration processing . . .wiU be centralized in eight to ten locations around the 
world. These Regional Program Centres (RPCs) will be supported by a network 
of Satellite offices which will assist RPCs with immigrant interviews, [and] 
perfonn other core functions. A number of standalone Full Service Centres wi l  
continue to deliver all aspects of the immigration program. Missions at which 
immigration applications cm be processed will be reduced while missions issuing 
'" Or, aitematively, "Area Processing Cenims" (APC). This, of course, reflects the mode1 that was 
similnily implemented in Canada through creation of two Centralized Processing Centres (CPC's), located 
at Vegreviïie, Aiberta and Mississauga, Ontario, that handle receipt of ail domestic applications. 
' ~ 3  in some cases, ntch as the Buffalo, N.Y. operation, for exampIe, a "sateIlite" visa office is CO-located 
with the WC. 
visitors visas will increase,fn 
The fkst pilot of an RPC was launched at the visa office in Buffalo, New York It 
sewes as the hub of a network of visa offices in the U.S. that includes satellites in New 
York City, Detroit, Buffalo, Lus Angeles and Seattle. Work patterns in the RPC revolve 
around case selection conducted in the absence of personal interviews. primarily on the 
basis of documentary evidence. Interview, once the heart of all Mmigrant selection, is 
now the exception rather than the d e ?  The rationale for this move is evident in the 
words of a former manager of the Buffalo RPC, Murray Oppertshauser, given at an 
immigration law conference hosted by the Law Society of Upper Canada: 
"Ail applicants used to be inte~ewed", Mr. Oppertshauser observed, but now, he 
tells his interviewing officers that they "can't Hord to bring in the folks and have 
a chat." We are moving the resources nom interYiewing out fiont to the analysis 
of the case before the interview. This is a fiindamental difference in how we do 
business", he oaid. Since the most expensive commodity he has are interview 
officers, the fewer interviews the better. If an applicant has easily venfiable and 
understandable qualifications, and the application looks good on paper, then an 
interview will be waivecL3" 
In cases where the interview can be waived, the RPC is tasked to process the file to 
conclusion as a purely paper exercise. In the event that an interview is deemed necessary, 
the RPC farms out the file to whichever satellite office was indicated by the applicant as 
her preferred location. 
Since the exercise in the RPC is confined to a simple review of the case on paper, 
'Y CIC, Departmental Outlook on Program Expenditures and Pnorities, supra note 339, at 14. Note that 
standalone Fuii Service Centres are to be retained in certain locations because of communications or other 
difficulties which render the RPC/Sateiiite office mode1 non-viable. See also "hoking ahead", supra note 
349 at 6, where the h a ï  contiguration of visa offices is envisaged to contain ". . .8-10 Regional Rocessing 
Centres (RPCs), 10-12 Fdi  Processing Offices (FPOs) and 30-35 satellite missions reporting to RPCs." 
'" See supra note 276 citiug a waiver rate in excess of 50%. 
'" Derek Luady "Assemble complete application package if s e e b g  waiver of intaview: lawyer" nte 
Lawyers WeeWy 16:30 (13 December 1996) at 12. 
staEat the RPC are not me- in the ordinary course of events, to have direct, personal 
contact with clients. Thus, clients no longer are able to persondy meet with immigration 
personnel to provide verbal explmations and descriptions of any unique circumstances or 
to request discretionary processing. More importantly, if the client is unaware of 
opportunities for discretionary processing, she may not even think to mention 
circumstances that might justiQ it? Maaiféstly, the W C  model works best with a 
ciearly dehed  set of d e s  for qualincation that are as objective as possible. As a general 
d e ,  substantive discretionary decision making is not rneant to be part of the role of a 
case analyst in an RPC and it is not something which would ordinarily be considered by 
them of their own initiative. 
One exception to this is where an applicant falls a few points short of a pass mark 
on paper-screening, but otherwise appears to be a "'good candidate" who is likely to gain 
those necessary few points on an interview. In such a case, the case analyst has authority 
to waive the interview, since it would add little '%due7' to processing of that application. 
In the event that the applicant f d s  short of the pass mark, but has positively asked for 
discretionary processing, the matter is most likely to be passed on to a satellite office for 
an interview to review ail of the facts of the case. 
Waiver of interview obviously lies at the core of the RPC/Satellite office model. 
The dnve to waive interview wherever possible was conceived of and developed under 
the concept of "risk management". The risk management policy is designed to reduce 
" The matter of availabüity of discretionary processing is not deait with adequately, or even at di, in 
many of the application materials provided by CIC. Given that the applicant bears the burden of providing 
su.cient information to cany her appiication forward, tbis deficit of information is ail the more 
significant For more on the applicant's bwden of proof, sec g e n d y  the discussion above, under section 
time and effort devoted to sifting and sorting of files so that resources are fieed up for 
other, more vaiuable work Thus, if it is clear on papa that an applicant is likely to be 
passed at interview, and no sipnificant security or safety issues are evident, then waiver of 
interview is appropnate. But risk management invoives more than just a simple 
calculation of points as a means for gauging the necessity for interview. More 
importanüy, it involves a radical new approach to processing that actually seeks to have 
decision-makers re- h m  an activist appmach in their handling of each application. 
This is evident in the words of a senior departmental officiai who described it as an 
oppominity for ". . . his officers to have the time to use their judgment on important, 
borderline cases - and not to get caught up in paperwork. Visa officers should not gel 
bogged dom in looking for every possible ground of inadmissibility or in checkhg every 
fum zly relationship". [emp hasis added]ln 
At the same tirne, nsk management has also been seized upon as an important 
method by which system integrity might actually be enhanced. Since aimost al1 
application intake is done in a lunited number of locations, with a limited number of 
persons conduchg paper-screening, an opportunity aises to capitalize on the fact of 
concentration. Fewer people looking at more cases can facilitate waiver decisions by 
allowing the case reviewers to develop skills for ascertainhg and assessing potential 
problems. Thus, "[a]n important element of the centrai processor is that a small number 
2.1.1 Procedural Discretion, cornmencing at page 102. 
3n Gerald Owen, "List of 'desipated occupations' for immigrant selection is king expanded" The 
LaYyers Weekly 1323 (22 October 1993) 10, quoting (former) Assistant Deputy Minister Raphael Girard. 
The context of the discussion quoted in îhis source specüically concemed use of discretion and Mr. 
Girard's cornments were meant to convey that the department wished a bmader appmach gmerally to be 
taken to case processing. Risk management necessarily hvolves a large element of discretion, since it 
entails a decision as to whether or not a particufar part of an application bears detailed investigation. 
of people - six case analysts in Buffalo - look at a large number of cases. As a result, 
they can pick up trends and identify questionable d~cuments. '~~ 
The development of waiver of interview as a procasing tool raises issues of 
concern for both the Department and the bar.- CIC, for its part, sees waiver a s  a 
discretionary tool that obviates work burdens associated with interview, but only where 
no problems are evident on the file. Lawyers, on the other hand, would prefer a more 
formal, rules based policy on interview waiver enabhg them to predict when a client is 
Likely to be called for interview?' It is the classic struggle between preferences either for 
positive rules or a more fhctional approach. The upper hand in the debate, of course, is 
held by CIC, since the matter of waiver is nowhere encoded in statute or regdation." As 
such, it remains an extraordinary exemption nom the ordinary requirements of the law. 
Thus, a whole new element of discretion, though primarily of a procedural nature, has 
' ~ 9  Lundy, supra note 356. 
MO Although lawyers generally favour the interview waiver policy, offerhg as it does speedier service to 
clients, the iack of personal contact between decision-&ers and applicants even causes them some 
anxiety. See Owen, supra note 358, where the reactions of some Iawyers to the advent of widespread 
interview waiver is discussed: 
. ..(Toronto iawyer Peter] Rekai suggested that a whole system of phantom immigrants is 
developing, with neither oficials nor lawyers meeting their clients. Eatlier [at a CIC-CBA 
meeting, lawyer Howard]. . .Gteenberg had said that he ofien deals with clients ody by fax and 
telephone: "1 can't tell you how many people I've never met" Carter C. Hoppe of Hoppe and 
Jackman remarked that he had spoken only to the v o i c e d  of one client. "Who the hell is seeing 
these people?" exclaimed Mr. Rekai. He reported that before the panel staxted ML Girard [the 
CIC official attending the meeting] had said i n f o d y  that the immigration departrnent wiii corne 
to look more like Revenue Canada. Correspondingly, immigration lawyers are king turned into 
accountants, in Mr. ReWs view. 
Both sides of this issue were canvassed in an iafonnal internet email "chat group" that the author 
participated in with members of the Immigration Subsection of the Canadian Bar Association in 1996. 
Because of the shifting membership of that group, it is impossible for me to achowledge the individual 
participants, other than collectively, for their contributions to the present discussion. 
~2 hirsuant to S. 8 of the Regulations, visa offices are required to asses applications from independent 
category applicants against the factors set out in Schedule 1, Section 1 1.1, however, merely uses 
permissive ianguage to say that an interview need not be held, if an applicant fails to receive certain 
required units of assessrnent set out in the Schedule. This device permits refisai of applications on paper 
without the necessity of i n t c~ew.  It does not purport to p u t  applicants dispensation fkom the 
requirement of interview. 
been injecteci into immigrant pmces~es .~  Further, while broad guidelines have been 
developed to inform and guide the application of waiver policy, it remains for each 
individuai office to fix the specifics of that policy, as it is appiied to its own caseload. 
Whatever the case, for professional immigration advisors, the visa "game" is no longer so 
much one of seeking out offices whose decision rnakers are most k e l y  to be sympathetic 
to applicants at interviews. Rather, it may be even more important for those advisors to 
figure out how best to influence the discretion inherent in the interview waiver d e c i s i ~ n . ~  
Quite naturaUy, a decision centre isolated h m  direct contact does little to inspire 
confidence arnong clients that their matters are being hanciied expeditiously and fairly. 
The distance between the decision-maker and the applicant has been M e r  increased by 
a drive to reduce direct contact even for routine matters, such as status requests on the 
progress of file processing. To make up for the lack of direct contact between decision- 
maker and applicant, cal1 centers were instituted to handle client queries that could no 
longer be handled at CIC counters." Such a strategy was consistent with the trend to 
363 The decision to waive interview, though ostensïbly just a procedurai step, contains also a substantive 
element, since it revolves around the selection decision that is so central to application processing. 
A too generous waiver poiicy does not properly balance the facilitaion and control objectives of the Act. 
For an example illustrating the importance of achieving a proper balance, see Dianne Rinehart , ''AUeged 
triad leader's entry traced to bid to save jobs" Vancouver Sun (4 Novernber 1997) as  found at 
btt~:/lwww.vancouvef~~ll.com. That story details the errors which apparently allowed Lai Tong Sang, 
aileged leader of the Wo On Lok or Shui Fong (Water Roorn) Macau triad to enter Canada as an investor 
immigrant A new program manager was sent out to the Los Angeles visa office in September, 1995, at a 
time when office closures and job Iosses at visa offices were under consideration, In an apparent effort to 
justif;, the existence of his program and its jobs, he actively recniited applications, including offshore 
applications. "His efforts were wiIdly successfiil. In the 1st  three months of 1995 the office received 
1,652 applications - more than the previous aine months or al1 of 1994.. . These figures indicate the office 
was feeling the pressure of its self-generated workload." According to a CIC mvestigator who examined 
the practices of the office after the entry of the alleged triad figure, the office was deaiing with 2,508 active 
applications by May, 1997. "Of these only 140 nles were h m  applicants who listed their last country of 
permanent residence as the United States!" In the haste to d d  with that volume, it appears that the office 
cut corners and failed to conduct a routine check with the visa office in Mr. Sang's country of ongin - in 
this case, the Hong Kong visa office. 
Rather than calling the particular office that is handling the file to inqui. as to the statu of their 
wfinping productivity gains out of the economy of scale that batching of like fiuictions 
was intended to produce. Cd1 centres, of course, are a phenornenon of our current so- 
cded "information age" They are designed to d o w  the delivery of services h m  a 
central location to widely scattered collsumefS366 and is a particularly cost effective 
solution where the service provided is information. 
In the case of CIC, call centres facilitated eknhation of counter staffdealuig with 
wak-in M c .  Instead, Canadian sponsors and applicants are given a toll kee number to 
call for updates and other information relating to processing of their applications. The call 
centre network, still under development, is envisioned to provide one-stop information 
for al1 cases in process worldwide. The downside for applicants, of course, is that call 
centre staff typically c m  provide only generalized information. They will not be 
intimately familiar with case specific details and are reliant upon clear and concise data 
entry by decision malcers to explain any uflusual features or difficulties encountered in 
processing. Likewise, call centre M m a y  have no direct case processing experience and 
so may be unaware of the subtleties and nuances of the processes they are describing to 
clients. This is balanced, however, by the fact that direct commUllj,cation between the 
client and the decision rnaker is stiil part of the processing continuum, at least in so far as 
problerns or difficulties become apparent on individual files. 
application, appiicants are directed to contact a " c d  centre". The client calls one of several regional toll 
fke telephone numbers where generai information as to the cunent status of the application is available. 
For an account of some of the relative merits and dernerits of telephone cal1 centre service, see Maxy 
Gooderham, ''W centres let consumers dia1 up service" The [Toronto]Globe and Mail (3 March 1997) 
Al. 
3t56 Id- This article notes benefits to both coqanies and consumers nom "dial up service". Companies are 
able to Save costs by ever greater centralization and automation. Simiiatly, at A8, it is noted that 
"[c]o~l~~mers short of tirne demand the convenieence of domg business on the phone and have grown 
codortabIe with telemarketing.. .." 
However, such contact is ordinarily initiated by the decision-maker, rather than 
the client. This is consistent with policies respecting transparency of administration that 
have been adopted primarily to alleviate some of the burdems associated with answerïng 
routine status queries. So, for example, an acknowledgement of receipt of application 
was mandateci to be sent out within four weeks of receipt of the application. The 
acknowledgement is intendeci also to give the appiicant an estimate of how long 
processing is likely to take and when they cm expect to receive M e r  communication 
fiom the visa office. Outside of these time fiames, applicants are discouraged fkom 
contacting the visa office, unless the need for contact is other than a simple status query. 
Thus, the policy serves to keep applicants informed and redistic in their expectations, 
while forestalhg more time consuming labour that can mise when no information is 
2.2.2.2 Pushing Work Down 
WC's and cal1 centres are not the only measures which have been seized upon as 
a means for reducing the number of staffdevoted to answering queries and providing 
counseling. Another initiative focused on finding ways to push work burdens down to 
the lowest possible level in the processing chain? The lowest link in the chain, of 
course, is the client herself. To this end, detailed client self-assessment kits have been 
3m See Lexbme (October 1997 Sending) at 3, cibing an imnamed CIC document accessed pursuant to 
Access to Information Request 97-226, where it is noted that the agreement on Standards on 
Representations ". . .mm be adhered to by di missions, barring unforeseen circumstances, as failure to do 
(sic) may result in the third party representative resorting to alternate means such as requests under the 
Access to Information Act." 
The notion of pushing work down to the lowest levels is sometmies also refemd to in popular 
management jargon as "empowennent", which imports the notion that it is not just work which has been 
shifted, but ais0 responsiiility or authority. 
devised. Since CIC can no longer provide in-depth, individuali;i:ed counseling, the 
purpose of the self-assesment kits is to enable the client to determine for herselfher 
chances for a successful application. In this way, the work butden and responsibility for 
counseling and application preparation was shified h m  CIC directly to the client? In 
conjunction with the self-assessment kit, CIC also devised the notion of the "one step 
application". The theory of self-assessrnent and one-step processing is evidenced in the 
following extract fhxn the Immigration Manuals: 
The one-step application procedure is designed, through the use of seLf- 
assessment kits, to reduce the number of times a file is reviewed pnor to a 
decision beina taken, to reduce ~rocessing times, and to dace the onus on the 
applicant to ensure that only completed applications, including the appropriate 
cost recovery fees, are submitted for assessment. Incomplete applications or those 
which are not accompanied by the appropriate fees will be retumed to the 
applicant and no file will be created? 
As is apparent , the one-step concept envisioned that evexy application submitted 
would be complete in every detail, thereby greatly reducing the administrative burden 
associated with piecemeal submission of information. This would serve at the same t h e  
to increase processing speed and client satisfaction. It was intended that incomplete 
applications would simply be retumed unprocessed, with instructions as to rnissing 
information. However, the plan was unworkable for several reasons, including the 
difficulties of specifying what was needed for every applicant, no matter their country of 
origin, and concem with the façt that applicants might be prejudiced by their inability to 
See CIC AU Mission Message OMSQ0002 (1 8 January 1994) advismg that: 
One of the objectives of the Independent self-help guide is to eliminate the PAQ by shifkg more 
responsibility to the applicants. Guides should contain sufficient infolmation to enabIe applicants 
to detennine if they are likely to be successful in abtainhg the visa category and if they should 
risk the cost of the fee to appIy. [paragraph numbetmg omitted] 
" CrC IM Chap. OP-5, Para. 2.1 b) (Ver. 05-97) "Self-Assesment Kit". 
"l~ck-in".~~ 'Zock-in" refers to the date that a completed application is received. Its 
importance is obvious where regdatory or statutory changes are about to take place, 
which might make qualification more diflïcult or onerousY In the dt, the matter of 
insistence upon a complete application up h n t  has been Ieft to the discretion of 
individual visa offices, to be determineci in light of local conditions and overall 
feasibility." 
In tandem with the move to &if€ more responsibility for application completion 
onto applicants, there was also a vision that a closer relationship with immigration 
advocates could be cultivated, to the mutuai advantage of clients, advocates and CIC. 
Thus, initiatives, such as publication of service standards and the development of 
directives conceming more open communications with applicants ' representatives were 
undertaken. The theory was that advocates, being better infonned and so better able to 
advise their clients, would also be less Iikely to make fiivolous inquiries wasteful of 
departmentai resources. Presumably, by promising greater communication and 
"' This was the major concem cited by the C B A .  and was the reason that the bar was mwiiling to support 
the one-step concept, See text accompanying note 708, infia. 
'n For more on the importance of the "lock-in" date, see CIC iM Chap. OP-1,4 (General Rocedurai 
Guideiines), Para. 3, "What is the lock-in date?", at 5, which notes that the lock-in date is used to fieeze 
certain factors. Ln the case of Independent immigrants, the lock-in date determines points to be awarded 
for items such as Occupational Demand and age. According to para. 3.4-1, id., "[tpe lock-in date is the 
&y the Department has physïcal possession of,. . an application for permanent residence in Canada (IMM 
8). . ., as well as the correct and complete fees (cost recovery processing fees)." 
" The complexity of the application fomis likely contriiuted to the necessity for some discretion at the 
local office level in this matter. The basic MM8 form itself nins to four pages and asks for an abundance 
of infoxmation touching upon virtualIy every aspect of an applicant's personal and professionai We. in 
addition, the applicant may be tequged to submit various supplernentary forms covering items such as 
family composition, consent to disclosure of information by foreign authorities, occupationai assesment 
and so on. Though the forms are available in French and English, they are daunihg enough for those 
conversant with these languages. The problems associated with thc complexity of the forms and 
application process are obviously m a g d e d  for those who possess ability in neither language. Likewise, 
the sophistication of clientele, at least in te!rms of deaihg with govennnmt and bureaucracy7 varies fiom 
p s t  to post and it was u n . c  to expect that a level of cornphce suitable to one region might be 
expected in another. 
transparency, CIC hoped too that advocates might corne to feel a sense of "ownership" in 
the program and so might exercise a greater degree of discrunination in the quality of 
cases presented. To emphasize the importance of the relationship, a senior officia1 was 
designated as the Assistant DepuSr Minister (ADM) - Partnerships." However, it may 
be that expectations were too high. A number of spectacula. incidents of fiaud amongst 
some of the less scrupulous advocates also raised concerns as to what sort of partnership 
was p o s ~ i b l e . ~ ~  Certainly, such incidents served to ranind that the interests o f  the 
Department and of private immigration advisors were not as CO-extensive on certain key 
issues as may have been desired. In the end, the ADM - Partnerships position was 
subsumed in the new post of ADM - Corporate sen ri ce^."^ 
Pushing work burdens "'down" was not just a case of ofnoading responsibility for 
''' Admittedly, "partnmhips" was envisioned as a broader concept that was not just restncted to advocates, 
but &O included other levels of govtmment, non-govemmental organktions and the like. The ADM- 
Partnerships was one of two ADM positions, the other being the ADM-ûperations. Both of these positions 
reported directly to the senior departmental civil servant - the Deputy Minister (DM). 
"s For a number of rasons, not least of which is the diffidty of proving a d  hud, it seems as though 
oniy the most egregious cases of dishonesty and deceit result in charges being laid against consultants. 
Nonetheless, the existence of a signincant nurnber of unscrupuIous immigration advisors is well known 
and is discussed in M e r  detail below in section 3.4.3 The Role for Counsel, commencing at page 
289. CIC's offloading of work onto appiicaats and their counsel raises interesting questions about how far 
the departmentai expectation can go that the applicant is properly represented. Quite simply, is 
administrative fairness observed where applicant's counsel is incompetent? What onus is there on the 
department to intervene where the applicant appears to be poorly represented? In one case, the federal 
court was prepared to hold that total mcompetence of applicant's representative at an immigration hearing 
was, on the facts, grou& for hoIding that there had been a reviewable breach of the d e s  of p r o c e d d  
fairness. Shirwa v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) 119941 2 F.C. 5 1 (F.C.T.D.), per 
Denault J. See also Canada (Attorney General) v. Sorkun (1988) 34 Admiu. L.R 131 (F.C.T.D.). In this 
latter decision, the court recognized the dangers of aliowing cases to be buik on allegations of 
incornpetence by representatives but felt that this could be controiled by carefiil exercise of judicial 
discretion and a requirement of exceptional circumstances for intemention. For a discussion of this 
problem generally? see Evans, supra note 2 at 147. The obvious criticism of this approach is the siippery 
slope argument that there wouId be difficuIty in getting finality in admmistrative decisions. 
''' See CIC Al Mission Message "Senior Management Structure" (04 November 1997). More recently, 
CIC has also issued new guidehes for dealing with client advocates that flatly rejects the notion of a 
"partnership", at les t  in a case specific context See CfC OM OP 98-1SIPE 98-13 (29 May 1998) "Policy 
and Instructions on Dealing With Client Representatives". In particular, para l(i) of that OM sates, 
"[cllient representatives are not our processing partuers whenever they represent individuai cases." 
application preparation on clients. It also meant that decision-making authonty was to be 
de~entralized~~ and devolved lower into the organi~ation.~~ In particular, more case 
processing decisions were to be made directIy by locally engaged staff, rather than by 
Canada based visa officers, who are viewed as one of the more expensive components of 
the immigration program. Thus, part of the redesign initiative involved evolution of the 
job package of Canada based visa officers away fkom actual processing decisions and into 
more of a managerial role. According to one senior official, "[tlhe hc t ion  of the 
[foreign service] visa officer will continue to change and the involvement of officers early 
in their career in actually doing the processing and making processing decisions will 
continue to shift towards managing the process using more locaily engaged staffand 
having technology do the work of screening and documenting people who want to corne 
here.'qm The implications for discretionary decision making remain to be fûlly 
deteRnined, particularly since the process of reorganization is yet to be Mly completed. 
However, the hiring cnteria for locally engaged program officers are less rigorous than 
for the foreign service? Accordingly, locally engaged officers may be less well 
educated than Canada based officers and perhaps more parochial in their outlook and 
experience, since they generally will not have had the same opportunities for travel and 
CIC, Depumental Outiook on Aogrmn Expenditures and Priorities, supra note 339, at 15. 
See for example the delegation of rehabilitation authority cited at note 295, supra. 
"Tmmigration fÏom the Top, the Inside and Abroad", supra note 346.30 at 35. 
Thae are several leveis of locaiiy engaged staff that may be involved in application processing. Most 
senior of these are the "Designated Immigration Officers" who have been accorded full visa issuance 
authority pursuant to section 109(2) of the Act. Such officers possess the same authority as regular foreign 
service visa officen. Then are various other local -positions below the level of  Designated 
Itnmigration Officer, such as Immigration Rogram Officers and Program Assistants. None of these, 
however, possess visa issuance authority. 
service in Merent 
2.2.2.3 Standardization and Simplification 
As may be apparent, an increase in standardization was essentiai to achieving 
success in pushing work burdens down. Such standardization is evident, for example, in 
procedural matkm such as the self-assessrnent kits (meant, as far as possible, to be the 
same worldwide) and the move to one-step processing. However, the scope of 
possibilities for standardization was limited in many ways by the procedural requirements 
placed upon the selection process by the courts. In particular, the doctrines of 
reasonableness and faimess have Limited the corners that could be cut. This is especidly 
tme for cases which involve featura or issues that are not straight forward. As a result, 
the greatest gains from standardization have been achieved in the handling of the majority 
of cases which are routine and ultimately result in approval and issuance of visas. That 
said, however, even the matter of refusals has not been untoucheci by the efficiency drive. 
For example, faUness does not require an oral hearing in every instance and CIC has 
incorporated this notion into the design of its processing strategy for completion of paper 
screening decisions. What fairness is reaiIy concemed wiîh is the adequacy of the 
opportunities provided to an applicant to put her case forward and to lmow the case she 
must meet.'= CIC has worked around the notion of administrative fairness by placing 
"' Aithough generalizations are, of couse, fiaught with penZ it has been my observation that locally 
engaged officers sometimes tend to be more critical of their own countrymen than is the case for Cana& 
based officers. 1 cannot say whether this is some sort of chauvinism or simply the product of a better sense 
of Iocal culture that enables a finer ability to sort the plausible fiom the fantastic. Who the decision-malcers 
are, thougb does seem to have a bearing on how and when discretionary decision making will be 
undertaken. For more on îhk, see generaliy section 2.3 Discretion and Sociology beginning at page 
165. 
See for example Wilson J. in Singh, supra note 64, 17 D L R  (4') 422 at 465, who givcs these criteria 
much emphasis upon development of adequate, standardized self-assessment kits. Not 
only do better kits shift some of the work of application preparation to the client, but they 
also provide more complete information as to the hurdles she must cross. Being better 
infomed at the outset, she has less cause for cornplaint if her application is not succasful 
at paper-screening. Fuller and more cogent information also gives less cause for the 
courts to intervene in the interests of procedural fairness. 
In addition to irnproving application materials, another important feature of 
standardkition involved enhancernent of computerization and use of computerized 
methoch to improve client service and elimuiate work burden. Thus, CIC has been 
innovative in adopting new technologies to provide better and more current information 
in more cost-effective ways. Application forms and counseling materials, for example, 
are now provided by some posts to their clients on computer floppy disks and CIC 
maintains an internet World Wide Web site for the same purpose. From an intemal 
administrative perspective, one computer standardkation project in particular held great 
promise for delivering the increased e fficiencies envisioned b y BPR planners. CIC 
currently operates with several different cornputer systems that are Iargely 
incompatible? A project was conceived, therefore, to develop a uniform, department- 
wide, modem computer system that would provide a continuum for following each client 
fiom initial receipt of an immigration application right through to an eventual grant of 
citizenship. The benefits and advantages of such a system are obvious - a file wouid be 
in relation to a refbgee hearing. 
'* The primary cornputer systemp employed by CIC for case processing are the Computer Aided 
immigration Processing System (CAPS), used exclusively overseas in visa offices, and the Field 
Operational Support Systw (FOSS), used by domestic CIC's. The two were developed independently of 
created only once and would be accessible nght across the spectrum of senrices that a 
client might require. Unfortunatelly. however, fùnding problems have put off this project 
indennitely. 
Standardization was not just limited to procedurai and administrative matters. It 
also included substantive components. In particular, a major initiative was to develop 
"generic9' selection criteria for the Independent category that were as objective as 
possible. Such objectification fiuthered severai goals, including a desire for global 
consistency. Because processing occurs in widely scattered offices, consistency of 
decision making has always been difficult to achieve. This is particularly so with respect 
to discretionary authonty which draws as much h m  mindset as nom legislation and 
written policy. By standardking the application process and objectifyuig the selection 
criteria, consistency would be enhanced. Just as importantly, by importing as Little 
discretion as possible, selection can be reduced to an almost routine application of well 
dehed  rules that could be carried out by even the lowest level of decision maker. 
Indeed, a clearly defked set of mles would even empower the client to effectively act as 
her own decision-maker, thereby potentially reducing work for CIC. If it were clear to an 
applicant at the outset that she would be unlikely to qualify. presumably she would not 
bother even to submit an application. Further, well-dehed selection criteria facilitate 
automation and more comprehensive use of cornputers and other technology for conduct 
of application receipt and processing work. The apparent incompatibility of discretionary 
each other, at a time when the immigration Foreign Service was still a component within the (then) 
Depariment of E x t d  Affairs and hteniational Trade Canada. 
decision making with uicreased efficiencies was made clear in a message nom CIC 
headquarfers to oveneas immigration ofnces. It reads: 
This is year one of the Departmental Strategic Framework. Although, 
within the ISG btemationai SeMce Group, now "International Region'l, it is 
very much a transition year in terms of how the program looks on the ground, our 
business this year is largely that of processing the remaining applications in the 
cment selection system while we attempt to shift gars and rebalance the 
program in a way that attracts a larger share of economic migrants? 
Concomitant with this change. we need to develop a selection system that 
is more transparent to the people whom we wish to attract. We simply do not 
have the resources to do a lot of sifting fiom among the millions of people who 
might be ternpted to give Canada a try. To me. th& means that we will not be able 
to rely too hemavr& on the use ofpositive discretion by an oficer should the 
selection system prove to be dysfuncfional. In the not too distant f h r e  there will 
be far fewer people whose job will be to smtinize applications that are initiaiiy 
rejected on basic selection criteria, and then to retrieve them, if the individuals 
concerned seem to have what it takes to settle successfully in Canada [Paragaph 
numbering omitted, emphasis addedI3= 
There was, therefore, a very conscious shift away fkom a more traditional view 
that positive discretion would be available as a remedy for system design and 
implernentation shortcomings. Recognizing also that the needs of the economy often 
shift faster than immigration law's ability to keep pace, the Department detemiined that a 
new standard for Independent selection was sorely needed. To this end, an initiative was 
undertaken to attempt to de-link the Independent movement fkom specific occupations, 
" A goal of the Strategic Framework is to redistniute the balance between humanibrim and economic 
categories for immigrants coming to Canada. In 1994, for example, economic migrants represented 43% 
of the total intake, wMe 57% was represented by ai i  other categories. The plan is to shift this balance so 
that by the ycar 2000,53% of the intake wiii be rqresented by economic migrants and only 47% by other 
categories. Sec CIC, 'Wghlights - Into the 21" Cmhiry: A Strategy for immigration and Citizenship" 
(Huii, Que.: Min of Supply & Services Canada, 1994). See also CIC Departmental Outlook on Program 
Erpenditwes a d  Pnoritiie, supra note 339 at 5, where it is noted that the ". . .projected rhift between the 
economic and famiiy categories, . . .expected to be achieved by the year 2000, was achially realized in 
1995." 
CIC Ail Immigration Mission Message OEB0049 (unclassified), 23 Febniary 1995, at para. 3-4. 
allowing for selection on a broader, more generic basis.Js The wisdom of devising more 
gen&ed selection criteria focusing on ski11 sets, rather than training and experience in 
a particular occupation, was obvious for labour market reasons. But such a selection 
system also held the promise of facilitahg selection processing to proceed on a less 
intensive basis, since genaic criteria, importing more objectivity, are easier to apply in a 
rote manner. In drafting a completely new set of selection criteria, emphasis was placed 
on devising and incorporating elements revolving around the basic premise of 
Independent selection - namely, that they are motivated persons who possess the assets 
and talents to establish quickly and easily as self-supporthg individuals, able to 
contribute immediately to the economic and cultural life of Canada This premise, of 
course, is the same one that has been the foudation of Independent selection since 
promulgation of the curent Act. The differmce was to re-jig the selection Cnteria to 
better emphasize those skills thought most important to successfûl establishment withh 
the economy particularly, and society more generally? 
The first step was to move Independent selection away fiom the specific job ski11 
focus that was the core of the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations 
(CCDO)? This occupational dictionary was imported into the selection critena, via the 
3u See for example, "Immigration from the Top, the inside and Abroad", supra note 346 at 3 1, where the 
Deputy Minister, respoading to a question about how immigration and domestic economic policies 
complement each other, stated that "[tlhe immigration program in Canada is no longer linked to specific 
job d m & .  . . . Immigration is linked to a more gmeraliy stated objective that "we are in the 
[independent] immigration buSmess for the economic interest of Canada.'"' 
'" This is a goal which bas recently been niterated in a report by a Legislative Review Advisory Group 
that was stmck by the Minister of Immigration to examine possiile reforms. For a discussion of the 
reco~~~lendations f this Group, see below, section 4.2 Reforming Discretion - Immigration 
Legislative Review Report, commencing at page 3 14. 
Manpower and Immigration, Canadiion CZassijication and Dictionq of Occupatiom 1971 (Ottawa: 
Monnation Canada, 1971). This main volume was supp1emented by five additional volumes, adding new 
occupations, reIeased between 1977 and 1986. In addition, a guide volume was issued annually up to the 
factors set out in Schedule 1 of the Regulatiom. It provided the standard against which 
potential unmigrants were required to demonstrate their training and experience in the 
particular occupation that was the basis for their sele~tion.~" The focus of the CCDO is 
on detail orienteci job descriptions, describing the training, qualifications and work 
elements that each occupation entails. In the late 1980's, updates to the CCDO were 
stopped dtogether. Although no longer updated, the CCDO was cemented by regdation 
into the selection cnteria as the backbone of the Independent selection system. The 
results were predictable. The selection system spiraled out of touch with the economy, as 
immigrants continued to be selected according to increasingiy antiquated job 
requirement~.~~ At the same tirne, restructunng in the Canadian economy and shifts in 
ninth and final edition in 1989. See Occupational and Career information Branch, CCDO Guide, 9* e d  
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1989). While supplements added new occupations fkom 
tirne to time, occupations descriid in the original 1971 vofurne were not as a mle updated. 
389 The importance of occupation to Independent selection is obvious fiom the fact that four of the nine 
selection factors listed in Schedule 1 reIate directly to occupation. These are specific vocational preparation 
(now "educationai training factor'?, experience, occupational demand and a m g e d  
employment/designated occupation. A fifth factor, education, also c o n t h  strong links to occupation, 
since points niay be awarded under this factor for certain types of occupational or professional training, 
'" The incongntity caused by outdated CCDO job descriptions and a judicial tendency to enforce the strict 
Ietter of the law, no matter the resuit, is seen in Hmrghton v. Canada (Minkter of Cituemhip & 
Immigration) (1996), 34 Imm. L.R. (2d) 284 (F.C.TD.). There, the applicant applied in the Independent 
category pursuant to the alternative occupations of "executive secremy", "secretary" and "administrative 
assistant". In refusing her application, the visa officer found, at 285-6, that Haughton lacked: 
. ..the requisite experience or training in the above occupations m that you have no experience or 
training in the operation of a personal cornputer; word processing, database andor spread sheet 
software applications, facsimile technology, local area networks, electronic mail systems, 
electronic voice maii or office telephone networks, all of which are standard equipment and tools 
of a secretary, executive secretary or administrative assistant in a Canadian office setting. 
The CCDO dennitions for these various occupations, having been written in the 19709s, made no 
mention of the technology and job duties cited by the visa officer. Rothstein J., in overturning the decision, 
noted that the CCDO definitions were imported as the standard for measuring specific vocational 
preparation under Factor 2 of Schedufe 1 to the ReguZations. Contrary to the Minister's position that the 
CCDO definitions were meant to be a guide, rather than a complete set of defÏnitions, he found, at 287, that 
the legislative scheme left "...no room for a Visa Officer to import his or her own criteria into the 
requirements for a specined job." 
It is interesthg to speculate what the result might have been, had the opposite facts been present. What 
if the secretary in question bad been expricnced in aU of the modern equipment and technology cited by 
the visa officer, but had no experience using a typewriter, did not know how to make multiple document 
labour market ne& were creating demands for new occupational skill sets and kmw 
how, iinknown and likely mimaginable to the authors of the CCDO at the time they 
crafted their work. Because of tbis discomection between the CCDO and economic 
realities, it was often the case that the particular occupation selected for was not 
necessarily the one that an immigrant would actuaiiy end up working in upon arriva1 in 
Canada.391 
The CCDO was replaced by a new standard for measuring occupational 
qualifications, the National Occupational Classification (NOC) guide? Unlike the 
CCDO, the NOC focused on skill sets seen to be common to a particular level of 
occupation. Under the CCDO, an applicant might be found to be unqualified in her stated 
occupation if she had no experience in a variety of functions that rnight be ascnbed to that 
occupation. However, with the NOC, the precise details of the applicant's experience or 
training in a particular occupation are no longer so important Rather, the salient question 
is whether she possesses the general ski11 set specified for that level of occupation. The 
NOC system was thus essential to the development of a more generic selection procedure. 
copies with a carbon paper and was g e n d y  unfamiliar with other office processes common when the 
CCDO description was written. This sort of scenario was not uncornon, particularIy toward the end of 
CCDO usage. In my experience, counsel were usually quick to ask for use of discretion to supplement the 
obvious siioricomings of the CCDO and one suspects h t  courts would have sympathy with an argument 
that discretion was improperiy fettered, if not exercised in such circumstance. 
See also Lee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1995), 29 hum L K  (2d) 222 
(F.C.TD.) (CCDO is a binding document and job requirements not specified therein are invaiid) and 
Prajaputi v. Canada (MinrSter of Citlzenship & Immigration) (1995), 3 1 Imm L.R. (2d) 182 (F.C.T.D.) 
(Visa officer is obliged to take the whole of a CCDO occupational description into account and to interpet 
it appropriately). 
'Ihe expanding disconncetion baween the occupational definitions of the CCDO and the r d  needs of 
the labour market inevitably phced ever more importance on the use of positive discretion as a means to 
supplement the shortcomings of the selection criteria. For example, many of the newer cornputer related 
speciaity occupations were not descn'bed at d under the CCDO and so visa officers were required to use 
some imagination in ascribing suitable occupations to individuals employed in such fields. 
Hul~tan Resources Development Canada, National Occupan'onal Clussrficatifion (Otîawa: Minister of 
However, while the NOC may have rernedied many of the defects of the CCDO, it is not 
abmdantly clear that it has displaced the need for discretion, at least in so fm as it relates 
to interpretation of qualifications and application of the selection criteria to same. Since 
skill sets are more personal than occupational experience and achievement, adoption of 
the NOC rnay actually have increased the necessity for adjudicative discretion. 
In the end, the drive to more generic selection aiteria SUffered a setback that has 
yet to be overcome. The NOC was just one element of the new selection criteria and 
other important changes were envisioned. In addition to honing the details of specific 
selection criteria, it was intendeci also to redistribute the weighting accorded to various 
factors, so as to place greater emphasis on those seen to be crucial to successful 
establishment. Increased emphasis, for example, was to be attached to knowledge of the 
English and French languages. Likewise, the factor of 'personal suitability", UivoIving a 
subjective assesment by a visa officer as to the applicant's "adaptability, motivation, 
initiative resourcefulness and similar qua l i t i e~ '~~~ was to be replaced by an "adaptabilitf' 
factor. Stiff opposition to these changes was encountered fiom immigration lawyers who 
found the new adaptabiiity factor, in particular, to be too "vaguely definecl and 
evaluated"? Their concerns about the poor definition of this factor were compounded 
by the fact that its value was pegged at16% of the overall points tally. This was an 
increase over the "personal suitability factor", which accounted for only about 10% of an 
applicant's potential score. According to a brief delivered to CIC by the CB.A.'s 
- - 
Supply and Services Canada, 1993). 
'O S n  Factor 9 m Column I of Schedule 1 to the ReguIarianr. 
'% Set Lila Sarick ''New immigrant seledon d e s  put on hold" Ine poronw Globe and Mail (9 January, 
1996) A8. 
Immigration Subsection, the new fxtor gave too much discretion to visa officers and 
made the setting of universd standards impossiile." Scheduled for implementation on 
Febmary 8,1996, the new selection criteria were put on hold indefhitely while CIC 
examined further the "cornplex issues related to selection standards'q% that they raised. 
The problems associated with the CCDO, however, were too pressing to wait for fbther 
study and so its replacement by the NOC went ahead nonetheless.'* Although the 
government still intends to corne forward with new selection criteria, the exact date when 
that will happen remab uncertain. 
CIC's move to standardization has also incorporated the conceptualization of 
immigrant services as product lines. For planning purposes, such lines are counted, 
tracked and tabulated through cornputer systems, as though they are UfLifonn units. The 
problem with this approach, however, is that it tends to view immigrants more as  a 
commodity and so may underestimate the iadividuality of each applicant. This is 
especially so with "problem" cases that present unique feahires or difficulties that take 
them outside normal processing parameters. In short, those cases where an exercise of 
discretion, or at least considered judgrnent, may be necessary. With the pressure to meet 
productivity targets that are relentlessly monitored as units of production by unbhkïng 
cornputer generated statistics, there is a danger for discretionary authority to be reduced 
to a mere coping mechankm for overworked officers. Saying "yes" is, of course, easier 
and faster than saying "no'' since the burdens of justifjing a positive decision are Iighter 
than those for a negative decision. Certainly, it is the case that most of the gains in client 
- 
39s Id. 
CIC Deparimental Outlook on Progrmn Erpsàitures anù Priorities, supra note 339 at 10. 
service have corne in processing that vast majority of cases which fit the mold of a square 
peg into a square hole, and scant attention has been paid to factoring in allowances for 
difficult cases. While tracking and tabulahg for purposes of resource planning and 
deployment is appropriate and indeed, necessary, the curent methods for devising those 
statistics are faulty and do not reflect the totaiity of the workload that is present in field 
offices. This is a cntical fact that central plamers must to be cognizant of when setting 
individual office workload targets. If nof the nature of "commodification" is such that it 
will force discretion to move in one direction, regardless of whether that direction is 
justifieci or intended. 
The importance of dialogue and information exchange between the field and 
headquarters during the implementation of BPR initiatives is obviously crucial, if 
expectations and results are to be matched. Certainiy, it has often been the case in the 
past that headquarters' initiatives that were too particularized in their detail, or which 
were instituted without sufncient regard for field input, have gone awry. The Right of 
Lmding Fee, for example, which was originally implemented as an up-fiont fee, 
collectable upon initial submission of an application, proved ill-conceived. As a 
"privilege fee", rather than a "fee for service", it had to be refunded in the event an 
application was not g~-anted.~~ The work in refiinding monies to failed applicants proved 
397 The CCDO was replaced by the NOC effective May 1,1997. 
'Ihc dinerence between the two fees is explained in the following pmgraph taken fiom CIC's 1997- 
1998 Expenditure Plan EsnMates, as cited in the Juiy 1997 Sending fiom LEXBASE, at 3: 'Under section 
19(2) of the Financial Adminirtration Act wS.C. 1985, c. F-101 ..., the level of fee cannot exceed the cost 
to provide a service. CIC's processing fees recover a différent portion of the delivery cos& for each 
service; for example, CIC recovers 82% of the processing costs of adult immigrant applications, 90% of the 
processing cost of visitor visa applications and 55% of the processmg cost of citizenship grant applications, 
based on the Ianuary 1997 fee schedule. The Right of LandMg and Right of Citizen&@ fees were 
established under the author@ of section 19.1 of the Financiai Administration Act. They are priviïege 
SUfficiently resource intensive to offset some of the gains firom the fee. Though it was 
apparent to the bar and officers in the field that the up-hnt nature of the fee would pose 
problems, fiscal imperatives and headquarfers' judgment were allowed to prevail over 
practical application issues. After much trial and error, the poiicy has recently been 
changed to allow for collection at the time of visa issuance or landing instead, thereby 
alleviahg r e b d  p r o b l e m ~ . ~ ~  
Fortunately, cenbralization of routine case processing in dedicated paper-screening 
units has siphoned off much of the rote workload, dowing those conducting inteMews 
more t h e  to concentrate on the unique aspects of those cases called for interview. And, 
in the end, dealing with such cases has been largely left to the creativity of individual 
missions, who are able to fashion solutions that work best for them. In fact, some 
recognition of the need for field sensitivity has been factored into BPR models for a 
reworked office network and processing system. Headquarters plannefs have explicitiy 
stated that they do appreciate that "a wide degree of operational flexibility''400 is needed in 
the implementation of specifics of the overall redesign. This is evident in the fact that 
there is no expectation, for example, that interview waiver rates shouid be the same at 
-- 
fees, not processing fees. Pnviiege fees are designed to partially compensate Canada for the many 
intangible econornic, social and Iegai rights and priviieges that Canadian residence/citizenship confers. By 
regulaîion, privilege fees are not associated with the delivery of any specifïc s e ~ c e  provided by CIC." 
'* The problem of the center dictating a course of action, however dficult or impraticai of application is, 
of course, not a new one. See for example, R Sampat-Mehta, Intmatiunul Barnmen, supra note 12 at 121- 
123, where he relates the situation of E. S. Doughty, a Special Tmmigration Officer for Canada m Hong 
Kong before and during WWTr. In 1939, Doughty cabled headquarters in Ottawa to seek direction on how 
to deai with a large number of dispiaced p o n s ,  most of whom were destitute, applying at his office to go 
to Canada. The response h m  H.Q. was simply not to offa any hope of admission to t h  As Sampat- 
Mehta obsmes, at 123, "[tlhis may have been one of the advantages to having an Immigration office 
thousands of miles away in Hong Kong - refusal was so easy for Ottawa officiais who did not have to be in 
contact with applicants.. . ." 
400 CIC unpublished discussion paper entitled "The Clverseas Network: Charting the Course" at 1. 
every satellite or RPC? This is also clear h m  the way conduct of interviews has been 
conceived of under the RPC/satellite office model. Where an interview is deemed 
necessary, it is expected that the WC would provide a rationale for the interview to the 
satellite office conducting the interview. The intention is to keep the interview short and 
focused. At one point in the BPR planning cycle, there was talk of a '20 minute" 
interview as the standard for such interviews. However, this expectation dwinciled off in 
the face of the realities that the new interview mode1 presented. GeneraUy speaking, only 
cases presenting unusual feahues or difncult issues wert to be called for interview and 
since no "easy" cases were to be interviewe& the intensity and complexity of interview 
loads was increased. Likewise, although the W C  is expected to specify the particular 
aspects of a case that should be the focus of the interview, it is recognized that such 
direction cannot serve to Iimit or restrict the in te~ewing officer's latitude. Thus, the 
following instructions were provided by CIC on this point: 
Notwithstanding a short, focused interview, applicants must still be accorded the 
elements of procedural fainiess and be given an opportunity to respond to issues 
unresolved at interview. None of the RPC's instructions are meant to fimit or 
prevent the interviewhg officer h m  reviewing any aspect of the file which is 
deemed necessary. The officer, naturally, retains the flexibility to go wherever an 
interview leads regardless of the focus initidy directeci by the RPCF 
On the other hand, though many of the ways and methods of case processing have 
changed, one thing has not. Each mission, regardless of whether it be an RPC, a satellite 
or a full processing mission, continues to be assigned a yearly target number of cases that 
it shouid complete (refmed to within CIC as "fininal dispositions" or "FD's"). 
Headquarters planners are most pre-occupied with that numba and it is one standard by 
"' Id. at 10. 
which the performance of individual offices and managers are judged. It is a number 
which presents both oppommities and challenges for each office. Since it is assigned as a 
global figurea, it remains for each program manager to rnarshal her resources, as she 
judges best, to meet the target. As a result, considerable needom remains for creativity 
within individual offices as to exactly how the required FD's will be delivered. This is as 
it should bey for local peculianties are always such that the inherent burdens of file loads 
differ fkom office to office. The real tnck in this process, of course, is for individual 
offices to realistically assess their own capabilities and to adequately convey this to 
headquarters planners. 
Unfortunately, the process for setting of FD targets is hampered by an incomplete 
appreciation by headquarters for the differing resource commitments involved in 
generating positive and negative dispositions, that has been alluded to elsewhere in this 
study. Likewise, dislocation between expectations and deliverables is heightened by the 
fact that more than one measure of FD performance is used within the department. Visa 
offices are expected to deliver FD's, regardless of whether they be positive or negative in 
character. The Minister, however, delivers a yearly plan to Parliament that prognosticates 
the total number of immigrants who will arrive, or "land', in Canada over the next twelve 
month period. The Minister's number is entirely based upon positive decisions, since it 
requins that a f%ed number of bodies actually tum up in Canada, and takes no account of 
any positive to negative ratio that might be involved in actuaUy delivering those bodies. 
402 Id. 
1 use the texm global in the sense that it is unially an absolute number that the partinilar post is expected 
to achieve. Withm the overail figure, an expected ntmiba of FD's within various categories, aich as 
Refiigees, Quebec destined cases, etc., may be specified. 
Though laadings and FD's are obviously diffaent mûasures, yet it is ultirnately the 
Ianding number that is used for purposes of setting Uidividual office FD targets. 
Merendy, there is a dislocation between the two that is susceptible of creating 
expectations that are difficult to W U .  This, in tum, may generate pressure on individual 
offices to produce FD's that exceeds what rnay be feasible under all of the circumstances. 
Not surprisingly, such pressure could foster a tendency for offices to focus on the Ieast 
difficult or tedious work with the highest FD retum ratio, and to ignore or put off 
complicated or difficult work with a lower FD payoff. This problem of two different 
measues, of course, is one that pre-dates BPR and has not been the subject of any 
research or discussion heretofore. It is impossible to Say, therefore, whether the problem 
is real in practice or not. What is important, though, is that CIC planners should be 
cognizant of if and should ensure that it is not inordinately impacting upon discretionary 
decision making, in pdcular. Similarly, as the renewal initiatives within CIC are rolled 
out to their conclusions, it will be important for the Department to be sensitive to placing 
too much emphasis on productivity and monitoring of statistics. 
2.2.3 Conclusions on BPR 
Credit must be given to CIC for the rernarkable job that has been done in meeting 
the many challenges thmt upon it and over which it had Little control. Budget cutbacks, 
increased pressures nom globalkation and ever more litigiousness, just to cite a few, 
have demandeci significant responses and serious rethinking of ways, means and methods. 
And clearly, the stakes have been high for CIC, since they implicate such fûndamentals as 
relevance of the program to the needs of the country and the economy, overall system 
integrity, and the crucial nature of a broad base of public support. In the hnal analysis, 
however, while some work burdens have been reduced and much efficiency achieved, the 
renewed CIC envisioned by BPR remains incomplete and may never be quite fully 
As noteci, a number of important initiatives, like one-step processing, adoption of 
new selection criteria and cornputerkition have d e r e d  setbacks, so that promised 
savings, both in terms of efficiency and reduction of work burdens, have not been 
generated. Likewise, many legislative bits of the puzzle m a i n  unfinished and so CIC 
has only incomplete control over the resoufces that it must expend on application 
proces~ing*~ Substantive discretion, too, remallis codified in the same places within 
legislation that it was before BPR, and the locations for its exercise in the process remain 
unchanged. The hope that it could be eliminated as  an adjudicative tool, or at least 
reduced, has not been fulfilied And, while institutionally its use may not be favoured, 
yet the reality is that it continues to be asked for by clients and exercised daily by line 
404 For example, there are few restrictions on when, where or how o h  an applicant may apply. Though 
section 10.1 of the Act gants the Miaister authority to dictate where an applicant might submit their 
application, CIC has been loathe to impbment same. The oniy exception has been its recent use to 
designate 9 visa offices as "Business immigrant Centres", tasked with receiving ail such applications. As 
of June 1, 1998, all applications in the Entrepreneur, Investor and Self-Eniployed classes may only be 
submitted at one of these Centres. The Minister is quoted as statiag that "[~Joncentrating the appropriate 
personnel in a limited number of centres provides al1 applicants access to our expertise in business 
immigration. At the same the ,  we cm beâter screen applications for h u d  or inappropriate business 
activities, thereby ensuring the intcgnty of the program is maintained globdy." See CIC News Release 
98-27 (26 May 1998) "Centres To Process Business Immigrants". 
However, no such restriction has yet been placed on any other immigrant category. Thus, a non- 
business category appiicant may legitimately have applications processing in two or more different offices, 
in separate regions of the world, in different immigration categones. Further, an appiicant is fiee to submit 
application after application, evni while another may s t d i  be in process or even immediately after a 
previous rehaL The reaiities of the legal doctrine of fairness, with its requirement for individuaiized 
processing requiring fresh consideration of each application, are such thaî a stubborn applicant need not 
necessarily be dissuaded by past experience. The oniy real deterrent to persistent applicants may be the 
significant application fees that are now part of îhe immigration hdscape. A possible suggestion for 
legislative change might be to litnit independent applicants to one application every year or two, so that 
officers. There is obviously much work left to be done if the renewal agenda on 
substantive processing issues is to be moved forward. 
The procedural side of matters, however. presents a ciiffirent story, with big gains 
having been realized. For example, consistency of decision-making, a cornplaint of long 
standing, has been enhanceci by the move to fewer decision centres. At the same tirne, 
dramatic improvements in o v d l  productivity, application processing times and general 
client satisfaction have also been registered. Perhaps the most interesthg observation 
to be made about these gains is that they have actuaUy served in many instances to 
invigorate procedural discretion. Indeed, it is fair to Say that this form of discretion has 
achially provided many of the efficiency gains reaiized. 
While the new system eschews the sort of intensive labour associated with 
positive substantive discretion that must be exercised in the setting of individual client 
interviews, it does favour use of such discretion as a procedural tool for batch processing. 
Ironicdy. this has only added justification for the retention of some rneasure of 
substantive discretion in the selection process. The desire to waive interviews, even for 
applicants who do not obtain suf6cient points for an outright pass mark, requires that 
some substantive discretion be exercised in tandem with the procedural discretion 
granting such waivers. Thus, BPR reductions and efficiency measures seem to have 
rendered positive discretion, of whatever variety, more essential than ever. 
Moreover, the changes are not just iimited to positive discretion. New thinking 
- - 
there is time for fie& circumstances to accrue. 
'Os CeRaialy, productivity incfea~s are evident in the fact that the same number of immigrant visas have 
continued to be issueci evm afler staff redutions w m  made. Likewise, waiver of interviews have helped 
to reduce processing timts, at least in routint cases, which has obviously increased client satisfaction. 
affects the use of negative adjudicative discretion as  weli. Just as the systern no longer 
has the resources to devote to sifting closely for those who have fallen through the cracks, 
so too it does not have the resources to closely scrutinize ail those who are winnowed in. 
Thus, fewer persom are Likely to be screened out by the negative exercise of substantive 
discretion. 
The revitalization of positive discretion has, however, wrought profomd changes 
on the ways of unmigrant selection which need to be recognized. In particular, it has 
fostered a situation where the "packagingy' of clients is emphasized more, while their 
intrinsic merits and abilities perhaps count for les. Though substance stiU has 
precedence, form has clearly been elevated in importance. C-y, a client who puts up 
a good h n t  on papa is more iikely to ease through the system than is an applicant who 
devotes less attention to completion of forms. This is hardly surprising, since one of the 
goals of re-engineering was to shift work burden nom CIC to its clientele. This has 
placed greater control over the supply of information to decision-makers in the hands of 
applicants and their advison. The perils of this are manifest, since the selection process 
may be more easily derailed and is in greater danger of not selecting those candidates 
who are seen as essential to the continued viabiiity of the economy and cultural life of 
Canadaa The situation is compounded, of course, by the fact of fewer people doing 
a For a critique suggesting that at least one part of the Independent immigrant program, the Immigrant 
lnvestor Category, has been seriously compromised for such reasons, see Shar Levine and Andrew Phillips, 
"Citizenship on sale" Maclean 's (1 Jdy 1996) 14. That article focuses on the hvestor immigrant flow 
fiom Taiwan and details problems caused by unscrupuious consultants taking advantage of CIC resource 
constraints. In parti&, at 14- 15, the foiiowing is stated: 
In effect, Say the critics, Canada has given up control of a major aspect of its immigration policy 
to foreign-based consultants, many of whom use unscmpuious methods including falsification of 
documents to qualifl their clients for Canadian visas. . . . Canadian officiais f m  with the 
trade Say that many consuitants operating in Taiwan have become so sophisticated in preparing 
more work. With less time available to spend on any one particular case, the possibility 
for mors and oversights by decision-makers is increased. 
It is a situation where increased vigilance by decision-makers and efficient, 
effective quality control methods are necessaryM Some of those measures are apparent 
in the system design, such as the concentration of case screening in the han& of a small 
number of case anaiysts who are well placed to spot trends and patterns.- Just a s  
irnportantly, CIC has shown a willingness to profit tiom its mistakes and to accept that 
some initiatives just don't work. This flexibility will be important as the full BPR 
program is rolled out in the next severai years, since other adjustments are sure to be 
necessary. For exarnple, the trend to specialization and the gains it has offered in ternis 
of productivity and protection of system integrïty must be offset by a realistic assesment 
as to feasible workloads. This wiil require ongoing monitoring and a willingness to 
adjust targets, as experience and under~taflding about the optimum outputs fkom the new 
methods is acquired. Likewise, given the fact that BPR changes have not been 
implemented to the extent originally envisioned, CIC might do well to consider a study to 
assess the trade-offs that have been made and their impacts on the selection system as it 
now exists. The effect that al1 the changes have had upon discretionary decision making, 
their clients' applications that they - not Canadian immigration officers - effectively control who 
can get into this country through the mvestor immigrant and entrepreneur programs. "There isn't 
staff to check aU the applications," says the Immigration ofncial. "It's mostiy a paper transaction 
between lawyer and consuitant. it*s a Potemkin village, a charade, and the taxpayer's interest is 
not being s e r v e  
Time will tell whether the perds of placing greater controf over the flow of information into the han& of 
applicants and advisors is ill advised or not. Cleariy, however, intemiew waivers present many 
opportunities for misleadmg and misinfonning decision makers. For an apparent example of interview 
waiver facilitating the entry of a crimmal in the busmess category, see Dianne Rinehast, supra note 364. 
This same justification was evidentfy behind the Minister's recent decision to designate nine visa offices 
as "Business Immigrant Centres". See note 404, supra. 
in particular, certainly merits in-depth assessrnent and stucïy. As 1 have attempted to 
dernonstrate, despite CIC's desire to move in the opposite direction, discretionary 
decision making seerns now to be even more central and essential to the way immigrant 
selection is conducted, than it was before BPR. 
2.3 Discretion and Sociology 
Sociological studies of discretion draw a strong Iink between organizational 
settings and the manner in which discretionary power is exercised. Admittedly, the full 
extent of the massive institutional and organizational changes underway in CIC and the 
ultimate impact they will have upon discretionary authority rem& to be seen. 
Nonetheless, during this period of transition, it is usefid to consider the insights offered 
by sociology and the possible implications they suggest for immigration discretion that 
aise  out of institutional renewal. 
Rather than focusing on discretionary power as an aberrant phenornenon within a 
system of d e s ,  sociologists have instead employed a holistic approach, much like that of 
the hctionaiist school of jurisprudence.* It is not just a case, however, of studying 
discretion in context. Sociologists take this a step M e r  by asserting that consideration 
must be given to the influence that context holds over discretionary power. In their view, 
while discretion is both pervasive and indispensable in any system of rules application, 
institutional, organizational and situational factors ensure that it is neither so 
unconstrained nor unpredictable as traditional jurisprudence might suggest. 
In the view of social scientists, the structure and values of an organization shape 
'09 For a discussion of this school of jurisprudence, see above, section 1.3 Dicey Undone - The 
and mold workers' understanding of their discretionary power and impose expectations as 
to appropriate outcomes that tend to make discretionary decision-making much more 
regular and predi~table."~ It is a viewpoint which asserts that discretion is more than just 
a property of rules - it is also one of behaviour and perception.41t While context is 
important as a background to the exercise of discretionary power, it is more than that. It 
is also a dynamic force, acting upon discretion to guide and shape its exercise. Thus, the 
factors that affect discretion are not just formal legal rules, but hclude a multitude of 
informal d e s  arising out of social, situational and pragmatic concerns. Recognizing this, 
one's eyes are opened to the fidl panoply of influences and dictates which can direct the 
use of discretion in any given case. Just as importantly, these factors tend to act much as 
formal legal d e s ,  leading to structuring and containment of discretion, and fosteruig 
greater predictability as to its exercise. 
Sociologists do not just acknowledge that discretion is an inevitable component of 
d e s ,  they maintain that it is actually good. They cite functional benefits for legal 
systems, such as filling in gaps between rhetonc and reality, and obscuring lack of 
consensus or ambiguities in the law and p01icy."~ Further, d e s  devised to attain some 
general purpose may give rise to conspicuous lack of justice when applied in a phcular, 
concrete case, dernanding a decision to mitigate or even to avoid their effects. Keith 
Functionaiist Approach commencing at page 23. 
*'O See generally Martha Feldmao, "Sociai Limits to Discretion: An Organizatiod Pmpective" in Keith 
Hawkins, ed, The Uses of Discretion, supra note 9,163 at 163-1 83. 
"' Richard Lempert, "Discretion in a Behavioral Perspective: The Case of a Public Housing Eviction 
Board'' in Hawkins, The Uses of DLscretion, id at 226. 
'12 Keith Hawkins, "The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives fiom Law and Sociai Science" in Hawkins, 
The Uses of Dimetion, id., 1 at 37. 
Hawkins refers to this as the "gap problem'"13, when notiondy impartial d e s  give rise 
to uiequitable or unjust results in a given case. In his view, it is an irony that viewing 
discretion as a concem in socio-Iegal studies has been to view it critically, as the reason 
for a lack of fit between the values and d e s  of the written law and the practices of legal 
actors. He asserts that legal actors tend to behave more consistently than is recognized, 
though he acknowledges that apparent inconsistency does exist. Arguably, however, such 
apparent inconsistency may achially be justice at work - that each case is individuai and 
so demands an individual, particularized result. Somewhat paradoxically, this is often an 
ostensible goal of d e s ,  too. However, d e s  are b a t  suited to mgendering consistency 
and uniformity in outcomes, but such outcomes may be derived without regard to the 
unique traits, characteristics and needs of each applicant. To atîain those outcomes, there 
is an emphasis on process, the theory being that fair process must inevitably give rise to 
fair results. Such a focus, however, sometimes leaves substantive justice sacrificed at the 
altar of procedurai faimess. 
Discretion, on the other hand, can act as the bridge between procedural faimess 
and substantive justice. Sociologists see it as the essential interpretive behaviour behind 
a sorting and prioritization that often must occur between rules and of discerning the 
applicability, meanhg and effect which should be given to them. But they dso see this 
process as a two way street, with use of discretion shaped and informed by d e s  though, 
again, these may be social and organizational in source, rather than legal. The 
signincance of this thesis is seen in the fact that, for sociologists at any rate, it explains 
the perception of despotic power which clings to discretionary decision-making. As 
4" Id. at 38. 
Hawkins explains: 
. . .the 'arbitrariness' or 'capriciousness' of discretion (as la- and others might 
see it) resides in the disjunction between expectations prompted by a reading of 
legal des ,  on the one hand, and the pattemed forms of behaviour engaged in by 
legal actors in their routine work, on the other. It is the lack of fit between the 
legal expectations about how a decision shouid be made and how it is socially 
detennined in practice which may give rise to accusations of arbitrariness or 
irrationality?" 
Thus, the differiug attitudes towards discretion, apparent between sociologists and 
lawyers, arise inevitably because of the disparate viewpoints Eom which they tend to 
conduct their investigations fiom. For legal philosophas, the primary focus is on words 
and d e s  and the choices these appear to allow for discretionary decisions, while social 
scientists orient their focus instead on the processes and goals that may be inherent in a 
system?" It is this ciifference in emphasis which causes Richard Lempert to argue that 
traditional jurisprudence has failed to account for the host of social and other factors 
which may contain and structure discretion. In his view: 
Legal philosophers tell us that, when d e s  authorize discretion, it means that 
decision-makers are fiee to choose fYom a range of legally permissible options. 
Yeî, if we look at how adjudicative discretion is actudly exercised - that is, at the 
pattern of decisions generated - Little advantage may be taken of this supposed 
fkeedom. . . . What the law gives in discretion - that is the authorkation to reach 
one of a number of possible decisions and the awareness of this fieedom - social 
forces may take away. This is not surpishg, for what legal discretion necessarily 
accords is the fieedom to be influenced by factors other than the law? 
But just what are these social forces and how do they act upon discretion? In his opinion, 
discretion is a factor of des, of behaviour, or of the sense that decisioa-makers have of 
- - 
Id. at 13. 
4'5 Id. at 14. 
'16 Lempert, supm note 4 1 1 at 226-227. 
their own scope for needom of action? Because any one or more of these factors may 
be present in any given decision, it is sometimes difncult to discern where one factor has 
left off and another has begun. However, some examples of these influences in action are 
not difficdt to provide. 
2.3.1 Serial Discretion 
Serial discretion occurs where an individual decision can be seen as just one in a 
sequence of decisions. While each decision may be conceptually or even legally 
conceived of as a unique creature unto itself, yet it does not occw out of context and so is, 
inevitably, a creature of that context. Thus, a decision-maker who is reliant upon another 
for the collection of information or preparation of reports upon which the decision is to be 
based, may be influenced by the fom of the evidence, the tone of the report and other 
factors."' The watershed case of Re Singh and M.E.L419' for instance, contains just such 
an example, albeit in the context of refugee determination. Under the procedures then 
extant under the Immigration Act, Refugee claimants were required to be examined under 
oath about their c l a h  by a Senior Immigration Officer. A copy of the c l a h  and a 
tmnsaipt of the examination were then focwarded to the Refugee Status Advisory 
Committee which reviewed these items and forwarded an opinion to the Minister as to 
whether status should be granted. In this case, the Minister's decision was predicated 
upon a pnor decision by the Refügee Status Advisory Committee. Though the Minister 
possessed discretion to disregard or accept the Cornmittee's opinion, quite obviously that 
4" Id. at 185. 
"' See Hawkins 'The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives fiom Law and Social Science'', supra note 412 
at 31. 
opinion was infiuential to the Minister's decision making process. Similarly, in the event 
that the Minister's decision was negative, the claimant was entitled to appeal to the 
Immigration Appeal Board for a reconsideration of the matter. However, that Board, 
beyond considering mataials and information supplied by the appellant, was also 
required to consider an opinion f?om the Minister of Tmmigration, who had previously 
passed on the merits of the claim. Beyond certain rudimentary reasons, the claimant was 
not afforded an opportunity to know the details upon which the Minister's determination 
was based and so to counter them. 
Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the applicant's 
right to "lfe, liberty and security of the person" under S. 7 of the Charier had been 
hfkhged, since the process was defective in ternis of fimdamental justice. The 
Immigration Appeal Board's mode of adjudication in this instance was serial in naturey 
depending as  it did upon receipt of an opinion by the Miaister." Though there was no 
suggestion that the Board was partial or biased in favour of the Minister, yet the 
procedure raised concems as to what weight and efféct the Minister's determination 
carried. Was the Board the Mciently independent not to be overly swayed by the 
Minister's opinion? Further, given the secrecy surrounding the Minister's detennination, 
it was impossible to say with certain@ what facts and matters had been considered by the 
Minister. In the absence of an opportunity for the applicant to respond to such facts and 
mattm and to counter any deficiencies, the Court felt that there was a danger that the 
Board would simply accept that the Minister's opinion was sound and shocld be 
- - -- -- - - - 
Supm note 04. 
Though, for that matter, the Minisîe~'s determination &O appeared to be of a scrial variety, depcndmg 
foiiowed. 
The problem of serial decision-making seen in Singh has since been obviated in 
Refiigee detemnination cases by the adoption of revamped detennination procedures that 
are much more judicial in nature than was formerly the case. NevertheIess, the type of 
serial decision seen in Singh is still a cornmon occurrence in Canadian immigration law. 
The issuance of a Minister's Permit to overcome inadmissibility, for example, often 
requires that field officers seek concurrence k m  senior officiais at headquarters. Those 
senior oEcials, having never seen the applicant, depend upon a report and 
recommendation h m  the examining officer to aid them in their decision. A similar 
situation obtains with respect to discretion mder sections 2.1 and 1 1 of the Regulations. 
In both instances, the determination by an examining officer that an exercise of discretion 
is appropriate requbes the concurrence of another more senior officer. Of course, the 
senior oficer typically has not seen the applicant and is reliant upon the assessrnent and 
recommendation of the examining officer. 
Another example of serid discretion which was considered in the BPR plan, but 
never implemented, centred on CIC's office network restmcturing plan. That plan has 
adopted a hub and spoke system of offices, with a central "rnother office" at the hub of 
the system, receiving all applications. The mother office processes to completion all 
routine cases. More problematic cases are farmed out to smaller satellite offices, where 
personahxi investigation and consideration c m  be completed. Although the satellite 
offices now have complete responsibility for the nle once received, under an earlier 
model, it was envisioned that they might ody investigate the particular aspect of a case 
as it did upon the recommendation of the Refiigee Status Advisory Cornmittee. 
seen as problematic. In this "split-inteniiew" scenario, the satellite was to undertake an 
investigation and report back with a recommendation to the mother office, which would 
then complete the nle as deemed appropriate. The theory of this model was that the 
investigations of the satellite office would be simply that - an investigation but not really 
a decision. Serial decision making, of course, is often anathema under our legal system, 
since it nuis contrary to hdamental notions of administrative justice and fair play seen 
in maxims iike "she who hears must decide". One assumes that the "split-interview" 
model was discarded for the reason that it was lmlikely to witbstand serious smtiny upon 
judicial review or appeal. 
Serial discretion is also implicated in situations where stafkg rnay be inadequate 
to keep up with volume. In those circumstances, resort rnay be had to a sort of binary 
typification system, whereby cases can be quickly disposed of by classifjmg them as 
either 'good" or '%ad"? Discretion in such situations rnay tend to err on the side of 
caution. Paper-screening at high volume case processing centres. in partïcular, rnay be 
highly prone to such caution. In the paper-screenhg vetting process, officers are required 
to categorize the application in one of the immigrant classes and then briefly wess  it for 
content, completeness and, most irnportantly, cornpliance with criteria for approval in the 
particular category. If the case appears to be within typical parameters for such cases, the 
officer rnay choose to waive the requirement for interview. If there is anything even 
slightly amiss or missing, the decision rnay be taken to convoke interview where more 
time is available to sort out such detds. The consequences of i n t e ~ e w  are substantial 
for both CIC and the client, involvkg outlay of additional resources and effort. This is 
particularly unfortunate if the matter is one of minor detail that might be easily resolved 
by a simple telephone cal1 or letter. However, productivity and other comtraints may 
lead to a sort of buck passing, where the case is sen t  on down the iine to a location where 
volume is l e s  valued. Likewise, productivity concems may put a case into a process 
where lack of personal responsibility leads to a total failure of discretion. In such an 
extreme, an application rnay flounder in limbo awaiting a small, but essential exercise of 
discretion. The lack of a single responsible decision center, coupled with absence of an 
effective oversight system, may leave a cornplete application in limbo, resulting in greater 
energy expendeci M e r  down the line to salvage the matter." It is important, therefore, 
for managers of high volume case processing centers to be sensitive to the balance that is 
necessary between short t e m  productivity goals and overall efficiency. Too much 
emphasis on the fonner can give nse to overly sïmplistic binary typification that may 
eventually obviate any gains. 
Somewhat related to the problem of binary typification is that of "consecutive 
discretion", a phenornenon which Lempert refers to as "familiarity breeding pre~edent".~~ 
As he describes it, high volume tribunals, in an effort to reduce work burdens, may 
actually restrict their use of discretion by developing shorthand ways of typifjhg cases. 
In his study of a public housing eviction board, for example, he found that the more cases 
the board heard, the less time was achially devoted to each case. He saw this tum of 
"' Hawkins, supra note 41 2 at 39-4 1.  
422 For an apparent example of ttiis, see Parker Bans Donham, "For better, for wone", supm note 203. 
There, a Nova Scotia resident married a U.S. citizen, whom he sponsored for permanent residence in the 
family class. The article details a "14 month ordeal of red tape" suggesting bad information, poor 
communication and absence of individuai responsibility by and withui CIC. The matter was apparmtly 
finalized only after direct involvement by the M W e r  of Citizensbip & Immigration. 
423 Lempert, supra note 4 1 1 at 208. 
events as  a factor of precedential experience being built up over As the board 
gained in e x p h c e  and as  its caseload increased, it relied upon precedent to reduce the 
work burden each case entaileci. He concludes, therefore, that authorities which process 
large numbers of factudy similar cases tend to act to curtail theu discretion as a coping 
mechanism." Discretion, it seems, rnay be a lwury reserved mostly for small volume 
tribunals which tend to hear factuaily dissimilar cases? 
Serial discretion may also be seen at work in more general instances as well. 
Where a client has been refused a particuiar service in the past, that r e k a l  may create 
presumptions that the client wili need to positively overcome in order to obtain a contrary 
decision. For example, a previous deportation suggests a willful disregard by the 
applicant for Canadian immigration law. This presumption speaks to credibility and 
character and so may well influence subsequent decisions on re-admissibility, at least in 
so far as there may be an elernent of discretion available in any such d e c i ~ i o n . ~  Further, 
because of institutional and other factors, immigration officers may be hesitant to 
countermand previous decisions made by colleagues in that office or other offices." 
4U Id, at 207. 
This observation presents an argument in favour of the importance of judicial review as a m e c h a n .  
for monitoring administrative triiunaIs. One of the most important grounds for review, of course, is the 
allegation that a tribunal has unduly fettered its discretion, 
426 He uses the example of the U.S. Supreme Court as such a tribunal, which tends to prefn to retain its 
discretionary authority, See Lmqert, supra note 41 1 at 208-209. See &O Schneider, "Discretion and 
Rdes: A Lawyer's V i d ,  supra note 118 at 82-83, who observes, for example, that "[tpe more work a 
court must do, the less time it wiii have for the work of exercising unfettered discretion. Such a court may 
then exercise discretion in deciding how to decide cases, but will have an incentive to consûuct principles 
of decision that are d y  applied and to foUow &ose principles as routinely as possible. Such a court will 
thereby have constrained (although not entirely prevented) its own exercise of discretion in the future. 
[footnote omittedr 
Se+ S. 55(1) of the Act d e t . g  the ~qukment for "Minister's Consent" to overcome the effects of a 
previous depon For a review of the discretionary nature of a grant of consent by the Minister, see Singh v. 
Canada (Min. of Employmmt & Immigration) (1986), 6 F.T.R. 15 (Fed. T.D.). 
This is partiCulady so, s* offices confronted by an application for Minister's Consent are advised to 
Certainly, where the fact of previous refusal surfaces, standard procedure is to investigate 
the circumstances giving rise to that refusal. Only where there has been a material 
change in circumstances, or the decision is shown to be in error, is the applicant likely to 
receive a different outcorne, 
Clearly, senal decision-making rnay implicate an untoward degree of fettering of 
discretion, if the subsequent decision-maker perceives herself to be bound by the previous 
decision. But where she considers that pnor decision as just one fact or matter arnong 
many to be considered, and so long as she stays alive to al1 of the circumstances as they 
currently exist, she is unlikely to be faulted for fettering her discretion. 
2.3.2 Rule Constraints 
Sociologists emphasize that d e  structure has important implications for the 
relative fteedorn or constraints that may aise in the delegation of a discretionary power. 
Where the delegation is accomplished by way of a simple d e ,  there is likely to be less 
relative fieedom for the exercise of discretion. Simple d e s  tend better to capture the tnie 
essence of what a power is actualiy about. A more complex rule, however, is more EeIy 
to obscure real intent and leave decision-makers with a wider scope for interpretation and 
action? It might be added, as well, that a simpler rule is less likely even to incorporate 
seek input fiom the deporting office. See CIC IM Chap. OP- 1, Para, 17.4 (Ver. 1 1-96) "Requests for 
Minister's consent", at 29, which provides the following direction for visa offices: 
You must obtain all avaiiable iafomtion about the removai fiom the responsi%Ie office in 
Canada. You should ask for the removing office's recommendation about approving or denying 
the request 
" See Hawkins, Npra note 412 at 36 who statw: "The fom and complexity of a d e  have importaut 
implications for the degree of discretion created . . . [Tlhe simpler the d e  the more likely it is that the 
principle embodied in it wiU be adhered to, whiie the more complex the d e  the greater the discretion 
available to individuai decision-makers in its mterpretation and application. Similarly, complex systems of 
des, though highiy specinc, may also have the effect of creating greater discretion in practice.. .." 
an element of discretion ab initio than is a convoluted rule, which may be accompanied 
by rems  of explanatory material. An illustration of this might be the poiicy conceniing 
processuig of applications for permanent residence h m  religious personnel. Nowhere Ui 
the Act or Regulatiom is provision made for handling of applications fkom priests, nuns 
and other religious personnel. While such applications are processed in the Independent 
category, no religious occupations are listed on the Open Occupations List. ûrdinarily, 
this would be fatal, as  lack of "occupational dernand" is a complete barrier to a successful 
Independent application? However, a single, short paragraph in a policy manual 
provides authority to overcome such a defect? So long as the religious official has an 
uifomal offer of employmentu' fiom a church in Canada. and it appears that adequate 
provision for a "reasonable standard of living" has been made, then the application has 
met the substantive requirernents stipulated for such cases. So short and cursory is this 
policy statement that it leaves little room for discretionary action. A letter signed by 
someone who purports to be an official associated with the particular church or 
congregation is generally sufficient proof of the job offer. Likewise, most church groups 
'30 See section 11(2)(a) of the Regdations which prohibits a visa officer fiom issuing a visa to Independent 
category applicants who do not obtah ". . .at least one unit of assessment for the factor [of occupational 
demand] set out in item 4 of column 1 of Schedule 1.. . ." A demand factor is attached to each occupation 
on the Open Occupations List. Those not on the list are considered to be "zero demand". 
O' See CIC IM Chap. IS 1.36. 
"' This is opposed to the more formal 'talidated job offer', which is the nom in Independent category 
cases. Validation is a two step process involving the Labour Market Services section of the Canada 
Employment Centres (CEC) and the overseas visa offices of CIC. If an employer is able to satisfy CEC 
that îhere is a paucity of domestically available workers willing or able to cske up the offered employment, 
then CEC will issue a validation that is of one of two types: temporary or permanent. A temporary 
validation will enable a foreign worker to obtain only an empIoyment authorization of a fixed, though 
usuaiIy renewable, duration, A permanent validation, on the other hanci, typicdy WU enable the foreign 
worker to q- for both permanent residence in Canada and an employment authorization to tide them 
over whiie the permanent rcsidence application is in process. See S. 20 of the Regdations and also, 
generaiiy, J.R Bart & B.J. Trister, Work Pennits and Visas (Scarborough, Ont.: Carsweii, 1995) at 191 - 
214. 
tend to be registered for tax purposes as non-profit societies and cm usually provide 
evidence of their existence by way of some sort of registration. There is dso little scope 
within the policy even to question the qualifications of the immigrant to engage in the 
calling of a religious minister.'" As a practical matter, therefore, the only real scope for 
discretion arises in relation to the question as to sufficiency of the hancial and other 
arrangements providing for a "reasonable standard of living". Although CIC occasionally 
publishes guidelines suggesting the amount of incorne a typical immigrant requins for 
success ful establishment in metropolitan areas of various sizes, these are mere guidelines 
only and everything is dependent upon the particular circumstances in each case. In 
practice, it is recognized that the support of a religious congregation may well mean that 
while the achial salary is low, yet the applicant will be able to draw upon considerable 
community support. Likewise, the nature of the religious calling may be such that the 
particular applicant may have relatively simple needs. Hence, discretion tends to favour a 
lower threshold than might be expected of regular Independent category applicants?* 
The concept of nile constraint, however, is not just as straightfomard as saying 
simpler rules leave less room for discretionary decision making. Changing the rules, for 
example, to eliminate discretionary power may not, in some cases, actuaily elhinate it. 
Instead, it may simply cause such power to be shifted to another location on the 
43' 1 recatl, for example, issuing an immigrant visa to a steelworker with no previous specializcd religious 
trainmg or experience as a miniskr. The policy contains no stipulation as to qualincations and so 
congregations in Cana& are fiee to hire whomever they see fit to minister to their spiritual needs. 
Indeed, this example may also s m e  to illustrate the difficuities that may be inherent Hi attempting to 
produce a fixed d e  for ai l  cases. Nuns and monks, for example, tend to follow a vow of povexty that 
requires them to eschew worldly possessions. Moreover, they may be required to forego any sort of 
regular income or even to rely entirely upon the largesse of strangers. Though not impossi%le, a fixed d e  
of g e n d  application dealing with d of the variety and complexity iuherent in the personal circumstances 
in each of these cases would tax the abilities of even the most imaginative legislative cirafier. 
The particular way in which discretion will be exercised may not be predictable 
kom the particulin forms of rules. . . . Since discretion is adaptive in character, 
niles may serve to displace discretion to other sites for decision-making within a 
legal system, and thereby possibly to enlarge it, or to create conditions for its 
exercise in more private, less accountable settings. A telling example of this 
effect is to be found in the efforts to curtail discretion selectively to release 
prisoners on parole in California by use of legislatively fixeci, presumptive 
sentences which served to push effective power to dispose of serious criminai 
cases into the han& of those who engage in pre-trial bargaining? 
In the context of CIC operations, the cost saving drive that has seen reduction of 
staff and centralization of processing in high volume offices, insulated fiom direct client 
contact, appears to have driven more control over discretionary authonty into the han& 
of applicants and their counsel. Interview waiver is heavily reliant upon case presentation 
and fom becomes almost as important as  substance, when the process of selection is 
cornpleted without any personal contact between the client and the decision-maker. The 
client, or her advocate, has greater control over what will be seen and considered by the 
decision-maker. Just as the California law pushed more power d o m  to offenders to 
achieve plea-bargaining, so does i n t e ~ e w  aiver push more opportunities into the han& 
of applicants to gain a favourable selection decision. Since the advocate representing a 
client may be the only person to actualiy see the client, the advocate's bargainhg position 
in 'hegotiation" for a positive selection decision is enhanced. Accordingiy, skilled 
lawyers and consultants understand that presenting cases in the "right" fashion is essentiai 
" See gennally Joel Handier, "Discretion: Power, Quiescence, and T d  in Hawkins, ed, n e  Uses of 
Discretion, supra note 9 at 33 1-360, who notes that the importance of discretion can arise in situations 
removed h m  the point where it might obviously be employed. 
Hawkins, supra note 412 at 36. 
to obtaining a favourable exercise of waiver discretion? This implies not just simply 
subrnitting a M y  completed application form and fbil documentation, but also 
emphasizing skills, qualities or attributes of the applicant that might be considered 
desirable in a prospective immigrant. This cm be done, for example, by including 
information or materials not strictly relevant to the selection criteria, but which may 
reinforce the notion that the applicant is a "good per~on" .~~  
Another facet of the d e  constn.int notion is the s m e  that decision-rnakers may 
have of beiug constncted in their discretion, even when the niles do not actually restrict 
them. That is, a multiplicity of d e s  may actualiy induce an mneous sense of Little 
effective fkeedom. Or, conversely, though the d e s  may specifjr a fkeedom of action, yet 
the decision-maker may misapprehend the scope of action available to them. This can 
arise for a number of reasons, including a lack of confidence arising through inadequate 
training or preparation, a perceived lack of support for "fiee-wheeling" judgment within 
an organization or even because of an undue regard for the possibility of appeal. 
See Derek Lundy, supra note 356 at 12, where the following is given: 
Toronto lawyer Joseph R Young told The Luwyers Weekly that to represent clients 
properly, lawyers should put together as complete an application as possible to increase the 
chances of getting an interview waiver of the personid interview. 
Waiver will expedite getting a visa, and could cut down the t h e  it wïli take a client to 
get into Canada to three or four months, fiom a year or longer if the client is put into the intewiew 
queue. ... 
ML Young noted that a completed MM8 form and fee payment was technicaUy an 
application, but that a complete appiication should inchde al i  the documents the government 
needs to decide on eligiiiiity and waiver of interview. 
Though such information may not be directiy relevant to the s e l d o n  criteria and qualincation for 
immigration, it may suggest that the applicant is a weii-rotmded individuai and wi i i  get on well irrespective 
of the number of points awarded on an assesment conducted pursuant to the selection criteria. This, of 
course, is the sort of information which may motivate a visa officer to consider a grant of positive 
discretion. in one case, for example, I recall seeing an applicant who had d e r e d  polio as a child, with the 
result that one Ieg was atmphied Nonetheles, he did not allow this to prevent him nom pumimg a 
passion for badminton to a semi-professional ievel. Any shortcomings in his application were rendered 
insignincant in light of the personal courage and drive this story reveaied In my opinion, it is exactly this 
sort of initiative and motivation that the selection criteria a<tempt, though inadequateiy, to descn'be and 
This latter case can be seen in the discretion accorded to visa officers under 
section 1 1(3) of the Repiations. Though both a positive and negative discretion are 
available, officers have the perception that the two discretions are not equaLq CIC is 
d i k e l y  to appeal a positive exercise of discretion by one of its own and, since a 
successful applicant is dso unlikely to cornplain, any repercussions fkom granting a 
dispensation are either non-existent or inconsequential. On the other hand, officers know 
that an exercise of negative discretion is almost certain to resdt in an application for 
judicial review by the applicant. This invariably resuIts in extra work for the officer. in 
the way of preparation of affidavits, cross-examination on affidavit and the like. If little 
credit is given for such work in overall work targets, an officer rnay be hesitant to engage 
in any decision-making viewed as ca-g an "appeal risk"? Further. notwithstanding 
the notion of civil servant anonymity under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, 
there is the possibility on review of being persondy chastised or otherwise found lacking 
in common sense or decency, an invariably unpleasant expenence.*I Such public 
capture. 
439 The perception a M y  has some grounding in realitty, in part because of the restrictive approach taken 
by the courts with respect to negative discretion. See generally the discussion below in section 3.3.4 
Negative Discretion, conceming the courts* handling of negative discretion, 
See Roy Sainsbury, "Aâmhismtive Justice: Discretion and Procedure in Social Security Decision- 
Making" in Hawkins, ed, The Uses of Dlscretion, supra note 9 at 295. Sainsbury notes that the appeai 
process is double edged. While it forces decision-makers to scrutinize their own decisions more closely 
and d o w s  for bad decisions to be righted, it may also retard discreîionary decision-making. He States, at 
3 19-320, that it may ". . .encourage.. . taking the easy option in hard cases by aiiowing a c l a h  where 
pmhps it is not justifiecl. This prevents appeais, since c m t s  awarded a h e f i t  generally do not 
compIain, and, even ifthe decision is not justifie& there is only a slim possiiitity that the case wil l  be 
scnitinized as part of a monitoring check Such practices are not officiaiiy sanctioned but are attractive to 
busy adjudication officers." 
"' See for exampIe, So v. Canada (Mùr. of EmpZopent & Immigration) (1995), 28 Imm. L.R. (2d) 153,93 
F.T.R. 153 beinafter cited to 28 hm. LX], where the actions of the visa officer are desrnid by Justice 
Rouleau, at 155, as the most blatant example of willfiil bad faith and abuse of discretion he had ever 
encountered during his tenure on the bench, For another example, see also Tmng -Yang Hu v. Mhister of 
Citùenship & Immigration (5 Novernber 1995), (F-C-TD.) [unreportedl where, ahhough the visa officer's 
decisioa was sustained by the court, the court did so using mixed metaphors, sayirrg ". . .wMe the visa 
censure, of course, also carries the risk of wide ranghg negative publicity for the 
employer. Because the media tends to prefer to focus on what has gone wrong, rather 
than what has been done right, a siege mentality cm develop, whereby officials are even 
more hesitant to act for fear of embarrassing themselves and their employer and to avoid 
potential negative career consequences. 
Another significant organkational factor that may dramatically impact upon 
discretionary decision-mabg is the pressure that both the courts and the central 
Unmigration bureaucracy may impose upon functionaries to confom to a single, narrow 
ideal of what discretion is or should be. Such pressure is ofien gussied up as consistency, 
which is generally seen as a good thing and fundamental to our notions of justice and fair 
play. Simply stated, it means that iike cases are to be treated alike. This principle is 
derived largely nom the cornmon law courts, where it is known under the Latin term, 
stare decisis. And indeed, precedent is the platform upon which d e s  are built. 
Discretion, however, exists on the other side of this principle, as a tool for doing justice 
where the d e s  are incapable of doing so. 
The eariier example of the bureaucracy fiowning upon one officer iightly 
ovemiming the decision of another officer is a good specimen of a mild form of the 
favouritism shown to the ideal of consistency. From a management perspective, it is also 
useful to encourage conformity since it aids the achievement of productivity goals. Since 
niles offer the clearest guidance, they are central to any drive for increased efficiency. 
For these reasons, an environment striving for productivity wil1 inevitably relegate 
officer may have been somewhat h a .  in hir asscssmcnt that no dcpaidnicy existed, in my view, it couid 
not be said that his detemiination was so unreasonable as to warrant the interference of the c o ~ "  
discretion to secondary importance, whether or not that result is intended." However, a 
potential d o m i d e  may arise, if decision-makers feel themselves forced into a sort of 
garne playing just to meet production targets. This occurs, for example, when decision 
makers choose to handle a case in one fashion rather than another, even if that other is 
more expeditious, simply because greater credit is somehow given for a particular method 
of case handling. 
In discussing rule con.straints, it must be recognized that an exceedingly 
important source of influence affécting exercise of discretion must come k m  the very 
ideology upon which a particular statutory regime may be founded. Though a statute 
may provide a host of d e s  for application in any case, yet there is inevitably a guiding 
ethos hanging over the whole exercise. In the case of Canadian immigration law, that 
ideology is one of facilitation, rather than control. At common law, the d e  was quite 
simply that no foreigner had a right of entry except with leave, which might be arbitrarily 
withheld or, if grantecl, might be subject to very onerous tems.- The Immigration Act 
represents a fundamental shift fiom the comrnon law position, taking for its primary 
raison d 'etre the facilitation of Mmigrat i~n.~ This principle stands nrst and foremost 
among those declared for our immigration law and wields considerable influence as to 
how discretion is viewed in the immigration bureaucracy, the judiciary and the legal 
Hawkins, mpra note 412 at 39. 
Attorney General of Canada v. Cdn. supra note 152. 
U4 See for example, HczjculwuZa, supra note 269,6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 222 at 226, where the following 
interpretive guidance is provided: 
. . .it is important to bear in mind that Parliament's intention m enacting the Immigration Act is to 
defîne Canada's immigration policy both to Cananians and to those who wish to come here h m  
abroad. Such a policy cannot exist without complex reguiations, a good many of which appear to 
be restrictive in nature, but the poticy shouid always be in-reted in positive tem. Zïze purpose 
of the statute ir to pennit immigration, not prevent it. [emphasis added] 
community gene~alfy.~ And it is this concept, positioned as a sort of "super-de" over 
all other des,  which percolates down to the lowest levels of the immigration bureaucracy 
and provides an animus for dl other Notwithstanding this, however, it is also 
true that our immigration law does provide for controls in various circumstances. The 
conflict is resolved simply by a compromise that says immigration shall occur imless 
otherwise prohibited. 
It is apparent then that decision-makers can be subjected to competing, 
antagonistic influences that pull in opposite directions. These can be contained in the 
d e s  themselves or they may be found in the approach taken toward the d e s .  The fact 
of potentially cross purposes being embodied in a single system creates a sort of 
administrative schizophrenia that is indeed a hallmark of our immigration Law. For 
example, while the system tends to favour niles and is wary of discretionary power, yet 
strict adherence to rules is synonymous with b~reaucracy.~~~ Though, it is often a fine 
and difficult h e  to walk between compassion and indifference, it is nonetheless one that 
our immigration system demands unrelentingly. The difficulty of following that h e  is 
" Skeptics will, of course, cite parti& cases as examples militating agak t  the proposition that the 
bureaucracy sees itseif primarily as facilitation onented Such cases, however, need not be viewed as 
disproving. Of the ten objectives listed in S. 3 of the Act, eight are essentially directed to facilitation while 
only three have a predominant control orientation. The public, on the other hand, appears to have a much 
more mixed understanding of the purposes of the Act, as reflected in opinion polls and the media. Some of 
this is doubtless attn'butable to lack of familiarity with the Act and media influence which tends to dwell on 
sensational cases that represent the extrema of what immigration is really about. 
At leas& it does so in the case of those whose prirnary job fimction is to process immigrant applications. 
There is, however, an interesting dichotomy in philosophy that seems to obtain within différent branches of 
CIC. Port of Enûy officers, for example, appear to be more affected by a control orientation than are visa 
officers situated abroad, engaged primarily in seletion. Drning my four year tenure as Deputy Immigration 
Program Manager at the Canaâian Consulate G e n d  in Seattle, Washington, the tension between these 
two outlooks was a constant source of frustration, since the fdout h m  control decisions at nearby border 
crossing points invariably wound up at the Consuiate for ultimate resolutiou. In many cases, a ciifference 
in philosophy between the POE and the Condate was apparent. The problem was not simply a 
POE/Consulate one, however, for a more or l e s  rigid control orientation could also be seen between 
such that discretion may harden over time into des, which become a shield to deflect 
criticism. The bureaumat may tend to act more bureaucraticdy in order to avoid 
responsibiiity for difficult decisions that are seen as ris@. 
The real question, of course, is how to keep discretion dive in order to avoid 
bureaucratization. Obviously, fimctionaries within the system must be empowered to feel 
that they have authority to mold the discretionary d e s .  Likewise, they need to have time 
and be rewarded for taking the effort to ameliorate and individualize the d e s ,  rather than 
blindly adhering to and applying them. There must also be a sense of institutional 
support for such efforts. An undue focus on productivity and fiscal concerns will 
inevitably displace independent action in favour of rote, high volume routine, which 
gives litde quater to discretion. In a situation of restructuruig and re-engineering, the 
answer does lie, at least in part, by reducing work burdens that add no value. In this way, 
resources may be &eed up to devote to the minority of cases where value is added by 
intensive, individualized judgmeat. So too, since discretion is a habit best acquired fkom 
experience and practice, shifting discretion to specialized centres focused on particdar 
aspects of discretion rnay offer better use of resources. Officers dealing exclusively with 
a waiver decision can hone their skills in that one particular area. Likewise, officers 
dealing with discretion only at selection interviews wiîi develop expertise in that 
particular situation. Expertise must eventually beget efficiency. Both of these, of course, 
are strategies that have been adopted by CIC. The gains f?om such innovations, however, 
can be adversely impacted by excessive emphasis on productivity and so CIC needs to 
POE's, with kger  volume POE's tending to be more lenient 
See generally Wade, supra note 36 at 360-366 on "ûver-Rigid Poiicies". 
remain alive to the necessity for a proper balance between these items. as it continues 
restructuring. 
2.3.3 Relational Distance 
While discretion can be a useful tool for adapting d e s  during periods of rapid 
social change, yet institutional change may also work to limit the availability. utility or 
efficaciousness of discretion. Downsinng and restructuring within CIC has led to 
centraiization of resources in high volume fiow centres. Given that client contact is not 
part of the nomai operating methodology of such facilities, the availability of 
adjudicative discretion is inevitably reduced. This may be both good and bad. A lack of 
intimacy between the adjudicator and the subject, while fostering greater objectivity, may 
also result in more indifference? Thus, geographic isolation or physical insulation c m  
give rise to a distance that is potentially capable of being both facilitative and restrictive. 
Such a separation between decision-maker and applicant is referred to by social scientists 
as relational distance. Relational distance, however, goes beyond mere physical 
separation. It also implicates an important connection between discretionary decision 
making and the social and professional backgrounds of the decision-makers. The social 
status of both adjudicator and client are factors that can increase or lessen relational 
distance between these parties. The greater the relational distance, the greater the 
likelihood that discretion will not be exercised in the applicant's favour, while the 
opposite holds tme where the separation is less. The character of both adjudicator and 
applicant are thus highly relevant, according to this theory. 
MS. Baumgartner, "The Myth of Discretion" in Hawkins, ed, The Uses ofDiscretion, supra note 9, 
In respect of the decision-makers, Feldrnan posits that profasionals, Like doctors 
and lawyers, hired by bureaucraties tend to behave less bureaucratically than do other 
types of w ~ r k e r s . ~ ~  These bureaucrats, rather than shrinking fkom discretion, prefer 
instead to engage it actively in carrying out their duties. And, "[wlhen there is a conflict, 
professionals tend to value theü professional judgment over their bureaucratic duties and 
affiliation"." Beyond professional formation and experience, decision-makers also bring 
to their work social backgrounds that may influence how they react in the use of their 
power. A person fbm a particular socio-econornic background is more likely to relate 
favourably to others with a similar background, since they wiiî feel a greater personal 
connection? In a system dealing with immigrants, a practical effect of this influence is 
that one could expect immigration officers with some recent immigrant experience in 
their family or close circle to be more generally predisposed towards immigrants. 
Another aspect of the concept of relational distance relates to the social statw of 
both decision-maker and applicant. In particular, social scientists describe a connection 
between high status and case outcomes. As Baumgartner states, "[wlealth and 
prominence have a consistent and pattemed effect on official decision-making.. .."" She 
assets that a higher status official will generally tend to be more authoritative in their 
decision-making than is a lower status official. On the bais  of her studies of legal 
personnel, Baumgartner concludes that if perrnitted to exercise fkee choice, they will 
129 at 131. 
Feldman, supra note 4 IO at 166- 167. 
450 Id. The obvious implication seerns to be that w h m  more discrrtiomy decision-making is desimi, then 
a more highly educated staff is necessary, Convmely, a less skilled work force would seem to lead to a 
less discretionary environment. 
Baumgartner, supra note 448 at f 52. 
'= Id. at142. 
consistently favour some gmups of people over others for reasons that are not strictly 
related to the dictates of the law. For example, she observes that black judges are less 
Iikely to convict than are white judges and that better educated juries tend to convict more 
ofien than their less weil-educated counte~parts.~ The upshot is that legal personnel are 
not so interchangeable as legal ideology might claim, or at Ieast desire? Rather, those 
personnel tend to respond in ways that are consistent with their social background, 
culturai identity and other f i e n c e s .  
Moreover, since moral evaluation is implicated in decision-making, the makeup 
of the applicants themselves is an important source of influence on any discretionary 
decision-making. In the case of immigration, the importance of this notion is not to be 
underestimated. In marginal cases, at any rate, where a positive application of discretion 
may be necessary to overcome an impediment, it suggests that a high status applicant is 
more Iikely to receive the benefit of any doubt. However, it does not stop at the notion 
that some types of applicants may be favoured by some types of decision-makers. It also 
means that advocates too wiU tend to work harder for clients considered by them to be 
high status? Thus, they may atternpf for example, to obtain special treatment for such 
clients like pre-vetting of the application by the intended office of filing, or a conference 
with the officer in charge to discuss handling of the case." Certainly, if sociologists are 
correct in ascnbing considerable importance to social standing of an applicant as an 
4" Id. at 155. 
454 Id- at 156. 
45S It is not uncoxnmon, for example, to receive representations on a case wherein the statement is thrown 
out that "these are good people." The apparent implication is that the applicants are high status and hence 
desirable. 
Such mdividualized taaiment is prohibited by CïC. See CIC OM OP98- 15PE 98- 13, "Policy and 
Instructions on dealing with client representativesw, supra note 376. Howevef, this does not prevent some 
influence on discretionary decision-making, then this is a point not lost on lawyers and 
consultants. It may be one reason why they wilI persist in their efforts to make personal 
contacts with decision-makers. By doing so, they will hope to gauge the decision-maker 
and obtain a sense of what sorts of factors, including social status, may be considered 
particularly weighty or relevant to that decision-maker. Although the status of the 
applicant is not likely to be the only factor determining how a case will be handled, it 
may be a significant one in the mincis of some decision-makers. More familiarity with the 
particular decision-maker thus enables advocates to predict more accurately the sorts of 
decisions that might be expected. 
The notion of client status and respectability has other interesting implications. 
The importance of paper-screening is such that the client must have their best foot 
forward if they are not only to clear this important hurdle, but also to gain a waiver of 
interview. And good advocates know that the applicant's "respectability" may mean the 
diffaence between smooth sailing, a rough ride or no ride at dl. Regrettably, therefore, 
in the current environment, it seems there must inevitably occur some favouitisrn for 
clients with sufncient resources or wherewithal to seek out a professional to ensure the 
job of presentation is done right. It is not just a case of application preparation expertise 
that is being purchased though. Immigration middlemen also make it their job to discem 
patterns of acceptance and rejection, so that they may offer advice to clients as to where 
best to file their applications. 
Certainly, it is this which underlies the entire matter of f o m  shopping, a well- 
m e r s  fiom attempting to seek it out nonetheles. 
known phenornenon in immigration case pro~essing.~ Forum shopping goes on because 
no geographical restrictions are imposed under Canadian immigration law to iimit where 
applicants might apply. Since applicants are not obiiged to submit their applications to 
the visa office serving their country of origh, they are fkee to apply wherever they 
choose. for whatever reasom suit them. While the legislative condition which gives rise 
to forum shopping is easily dehed, the reasons why it goes on are more cornplex. Those 
reasons may be illegitimate, such as a criminal hoping to slip through undetected at a visa 
post where his notoriety is not k n ~ w n . ~  Or.they may be more banai, relating to the fact 
457 See for example, Pauktte Peirol, ''Rules for business immigrants pamed - Bid to fut h u d  by urging 
entrepreneur applicants to appfy in home nations cded  bad for econorny" ne fï'oronto) Globe and Mail 
(12 March 1997) A6, discussing a meeting between CIC officiais and a CBA delegation, At that meeting, 
CIC urged that business immigrants and skilied workers apply for immigration at the post serving their 
home country. CIC hopes to reduce the risk of criminaIs gaining entry to Canada by discouraging f o m  
shopping amongst certain categorieç of applicants. The idea was not well received by the CBA, as 
evidenced by the following: 
Catherine Ann Sas, a Vancouver lawyer who was at the meeting, said the association agrees in 
principle that applicants shodd apply fiom theu home corntries - but oniy when there is a level, 
and predictable, playing field in terms of processing times. 'It's not fair to have sorne clients wait 
two years and others only four months." She and 0 t h  Iawyers readily admit to "visa shopping," 
or hmting for relativefy hassle-free and efficient foreign missions to process their clients' 
applications. And that will iikely continue util the processing backlogs are cleared, they Say. 
Visa offices in cities such as Los Angeles, BufT'o, SeattIe, London, Manila and Damsacus, for 
example, are known to process applications far more quickly than those in Beijing, New Delhi and 
Belgrade. ""If your home country is slow, you have no choice, no recourse. And this, I find 
offaive to people in China and India, where volumes are high and resources are d o m "  Ms. Sas 
said "If you have ail  posts operating on the same level, with a six-to- 12 month waiting period, 
then you won't see people shopping aromd," she addeci 
It is difncult to deny that ifd offices offered the same processing speed, much fonim shopping wodd 
likely be ended On the subject of processing delays, however, it is interesthg to note that one person's 
problem may be another's opportunity. For example, pnor to the take over of Hong Kong by China on 
Jdy 1, f 997, the demand for immigration out of Hong Kong was tremendous. AAer the take over, 
however, and the calming of many fears as to the likely implications of mainiand Chinese d e  for Hong 
Kong residents, that dema~d has now ebbed Interestingly, as weU, while speed of processing is often cited 
as the justification for fonun shopping, it is not always speed that is sought. in the case of Hong Kong 
residents, theù case nles were to be found scattered amongst ahost al l  visa p s t s  worldwide. In sorne 
cases, their interest was sometimes not in fast processing, but rather lengthy processing. With one eye on 
the take over date, their prefmnce seans to have been just to have a case in the queue, as a sort of 
insurance policy. Accordmgly, such applicants were williog to wait as long as possible to get a final 
decision. Missed int-ews were common. If pressured under threat of refusal to attend at a rescheduled 
date, a request for the nle to be transferred to another office was often the remit. 
This problem is a signincant one and causes much embarrassment for the department. For a couple of 
that one post may be more convenient because of good transportation linlcs or because it 
holds the promise of faster case processing. More saliently for the present discussion, 
however, it may also occur because of a perception that a particuiar office may, for any 
number of reasons, including status or respectability of particular types of clients, be 
more willing to engage discretion than another. 
Whatever the reasons, the o p p o d t y  for forum shopping afTords a significant 
opportunity for outside actors to exert influence on the workings of the system. 
Schneider refers to this as "publicly enforced private government"? It is most effective 
on those parts of the system which are least affécted by rigid d e s  and allow for 
discretionary decision making. During recent reorganktion, there was a period where 
CIC actively studied its physical resources in order to determine which offices could be 
reduced or eliminated and which could be enlargeci by centralization of labour and capital 
assets. While the potential cuts were under consideration, some advocates handling large 
volumes of cases saw an opportunity to maximize the potential success for their cases. 
Carefid always to mind the h e  between legitimate advocacy and conduct unbecoming, 
they would inquire about specifics of individual office decision-making in an effort to 
ascertain whether the particular office was more or less disposed to be large and liberal in 
examples, see " h g  suspect let into Canada", supra note 1 15, and "AIieged triad leader's entry traced to 
bid to save jobs", supra note 364. Though cases of hi& profle criminafs entering Canada on visas issued 
directiy to them are comparatively few in number, they always attract much adverse media attention, 
Invariably, such entries are traced to forum shopping and îhe actor haWig taken advantage of an 
unsuspecthg immigration post, far removed h m  their country of ongin- For this reason, CIC has issued a 
policy directive making mandatory the necessity of record checks for non-resident applications. Any 
mission receiving an application fiom a person not n o d y  tesident in the territory of the mission is 
required to conduct a record check with the mission responsibIe for the applicant's usual place of 
residency. See CIC "AU Mission Message - OFB197" 25 August 1995. 
This problem has also prompted the depariment to recently designate 9 "Busineçs Immigrant Centres". 
See CIC News ReIease 98-27, supra note 404. 
459 Schneider, supra note 2 18 at 56. 
its interpretation of the Act and Regulations and in the use of discretion? Given the 
nature of the bureaucratic tendency to empire building, the lawyers were sensitive to the 
pressures upon individual office managers at that period, when office cuts were under 
contemplation, to justify the existence of their operations. As a result, they were not 
loath to dangle the expectation of an increased file load as a plum in hopes of obtaining a 
favourable reaction fiom a beleaguered office?' In the end, CIC appeared to make office 
closures based upon rationalkations focused more on overall geographic sense, and less 
on work voIumes in particular offices. 
Relational distance may be a phenomenon that is reaching its fullest potential in 
the 1990's. As is apparent h m  CIC's example, it has been seized upon as a way to 
hcrease productivity and reduce costs through reduction of personal interaction with 
cIients. However, it is not a phenomenon limiteci to immigration law. It is, in fact, a 
trend that now affects many industries. Advances in the potential of electronic 
communication and advent of the Intemet have made much of this possible. From email 
to Internet shopping, the need for direct human contact has been reduced across many 
facets of life today." As the capability of alternative methods of communication and 
interaction has grown, so too has acceptance of impersonal transactions, even from 
For a brief discussion of some of the ethical issues faced by lawyers in advising theîr clients about 
which visa office to £ïie with, see Cecii L. Rotenberg, Q.C. and Robert J. Moorhouse, "A Practice Note: 
Ethics and Muencing Your Client's Choice of V i a  Offices" (1995) 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 271. 
' 1 am unaware of any agreements of any kind king formed between consultants and an office of CIC. 
Nonetheless, this does not obviate the fact that there was method behind the madness displayed by such 
consultants in their efforts to ferret out which offices they hoped might be more rlisposed to a large and 
l f b d  approach to selection, and the use of discretion in particuiar, as a means to draw clientele to justïfjr 
the continued existence of the office. 
a See for example, ''The Virtuai Bankei' The floronto] Ghbe and Mail Repon on Business Magazine 
(March, 1998) 106, detailing the experience of the Vancouver-based Citizens Bank of Canada, which 
maintains no physical retail branches and which operates entirely via telephone, fax and the internet, 
According to Lin& Crornpton, the banlr's managa, their clientele are unconcmed about the lack of 
institutions that were once seen as intensely personal, such as goverment, It is not 
therefore a case of "pining for the good old days". Rather, the importance of relational 
distance is to recognize its impacts and to be aware of its drawbacks. In this way, its 
benefits may be fùlly realized and its shortcomings rninimized. 
2.3.4 Foms of Decision-Making 
Social scientists offer a couple of competing theories to explain the forms that 
decision-making can take. The first is rationul decision theov which is premised upon 
the view that decisions are purposive choices made by informed, disinterested, and 
calculating actors working with a clear set of individual or orgatzizational goals.a The 
central focus of this theory is oniy on the end producf with the result that any lack of 
unifonnity in outcomes is eschewed. This is, of course, the decision-making 
methodology prefmed in legal and judicial circles, where consistency is an important 
goal. The major criticism of this theoretical method is that it fails to account for the fact 
that decision-makers may not always be entirely disinterested in the outcomes of the 
cases before them. For example, it rnight happen that immigration officers, as members 
of the communities to which intendhg immigrants are destineci, may be consciously or 
unconsciously infiuenced by their own perceptions as to what qualities in an immigrant 
might be most suitable to facilitate adaptation to a particular comm~ni ty .~  In the 
Independent category particularly, the use of a "personai suitability factor" in the 
selection process seems designed to prornote consideration of what might be termed 
personal contact that v i d  banking irnplies, especially because of the convenience that it offers. 
See generalfy Hawkins, supra note 412 at 20-24. 
O f  course, leaving aside for the moment the question as to whether such a consideration is at ail 
4%ommufllty standards" and other unenumerateci criteria Likewise, as in most areas of 
decision-making, immigration decision-makers may be faced with goals that are not 
aiways fkee of conflict. Thus, while an officer mîght have a production target to meet for 
immigrant decisions, it may be such that he or she is struggkg to meet it. The result is 
that only b4clean" cases are finaiized, while "problem" cases, involving greater effort, are 
left aside. Ciearly, the officer in such a situation is not entuely disinteresteci or 
dispassionate as to which cases might be approved and which are refbsed or simply never 
resolved. 
The Nahrralkt Perspective, on the other hand, has notions of context and meaning 
central to it. It prefers to focus on the processes of decision-mag. It has shown, in an 
extemal sense, how an appreciation of context and pattern is valuabte in extending the 
focus beyond the individual case and in an intenor sense by exploring the significance of 
meaning to individual legd actors who must choose. It draws attention to the need of an 
individual or organization for survivd. People not only follow d e s ,  they make d e s ,  
noms, and patterns of expected behaviour. Rational decision theory says that decisions 
are a result of conscious planning for particular outcomes, whiie naturalisrn says these 
decisions and actions are not the result of choice or conscious planning. Naturalism, as a 
more holistic approach, emphasizes that decision m a h g  is a collective pro ces^.^^ 
Neither theory is entirely persuasive since, as we have seen throughout this study 
of sociologicai methods, the decision making process is infinitely complex and it is 
difficult to Say with any certainty just how influentid particular factors may be in a given 
legitimate. 
a Hawkins, supra note 4 12 at 26. 
case. A factor considered important in one case rnay prove to be negligible in another. 
This may be so because of 0 t h  surrounding details, or it rnay be so because one 
decision-rnaker rnay not be as troubled by it as another. Indeed, Feldman points out that 
an obvious criticism of the sociological approach must be the lack of weight it accords to 
the notion of individual choice? Though it is realistic, and doubtless necessary, to take 
cognizance of the mdtitude of social and organizational factors which rnay constrain and 
tame the supposed Eee-wheeling nature of discretion, yet that nature should not be 
altogether overlooked. Examples of decisions that appear to go against the conventional 
tide occur fkequently. And though these rnay well be just exceptions to the d e ,  yet they 
do exist. 
Sociologists might explain these as the resuit of a deviant decision-maker who 
either feels suniciently empowered to nsk stepping out of the realrn of the expected or is 
simply so ostracized as to feel no identification with the social forces in play dl around 
her. Another view might be to suggest that these decisions are actually the result of 
justice in action - that discretionary decisions are being made against the d e s  precisely 
because the d e s  are unjust. Whatever the case, it seems prudent to admit that individual 
choice remains a wild-card in the sociologicai deck. Likewise, another criticism must be 
the limited weight that sociology extends to legal d e s  a s  a factor influencing the use of 
discretionary power?' For sociologists, the emphasis is on informal d e s .  Yet, it must 
be conceded that legal d e s  still have an important and influentid d e ,  though it rnay not 
David FelRrnan_ supra note 183 at 289. 
Set for example Hawkins, supra note 412 at 13 who, in summarising the view of sociologists 
conceming the niles that may effect the exercise of discretion, posits that "[tlhese d e s ,  however, tend not 
to be legal, but social and organi7ntiona.i in character." 
be quite as strong as traditionai jurisp~dents may have thought, or even desired. At a 
minimum, it is likeIy that legal d e s  retain an influence at least as great as  that of more 
iaformal des. 
Sociology teiis us that discretionary decision-making is an enterprise that is both 
intensely personal and yet also inevitably collective. Each decision-maker is unique in 
thek outlook and in the personal influences that shape their worldview. However, each 
also is part of a larger whole and it is a whole which c m  exert considerable pressure in a 
particular direction, especially where legal d e s  exist to guide judgment. At best, 
therefore, it may be safe to Say simply that it is likely a mixture of al1 these intemal and 
extemal forces that go into any decision. Notwithstanding this, however, there is stiil 
cogency in social scientists' assertion that discretion does not necessaily result in 
arbitrariness or capriciousness. Thus, we r e m  to their observation that what may appear 
irrational is actually the predictable result of these intemal and extemal forces which 
work to foster regularity. It is simply, therefore, a matter of recognizing and collating the 
forces. If this is done, then the end result typically wil1 produce few surprises. 
CHAPTER 3 - The Limits of Discretion 
3.1 Introduction 
The amount of discretion available to any administrative tribunal is a factor of the 
constituent Legislation establishuig the tribunal. Even then, however, the ambit of such 
discretion is directly controlied by any review panel which oversees its operations. In the 
case of Independent immigrant selection, that review panel is the Triai Division of the 
Federai Court. In this chapter the handling of discretion within overseas Independent 
immigrant selection processes by the courts is examhed and the impact that individual 
decisions have had on the availability of discretion, in both a procedural and a substantive 
sense, is traced. In this post-Charter era, with its emphasis on individual rights, 1 argue 
that the courts' attention has been focused primarily on safeguarding applicant rights, 
with the resdt that administrative discretion has been significantly circumscribed. This is 
so, both in the application of substantive discretion to individual cases and in the 
procedural discretion available to administrators for formulating new ways and methods 
of dealing more expeditiously with case processing. On the substantive side, for 
example, it is seen in the approach that the courts have adopted with respect to the 
selection criteria, which have been taken as fuced, specific and comprehensive measures 
for qualification, rather than as a generai framework withh which selection is conducted. 
Similarly, on the procedural side, the courts have exhibiteci intolerance for procedural 
innovations perceived as impinging in some way upon the right of an applicant to a fidi 
and fair hearing. 
It is in fact a more positivist approach which the courts have followed. This 
approach has involved scant attention to the difficulties of  the legislative drafter' the 
larger public policy underlying Independent selection and the pressures and constraints 
facing administrators in maintaining an overseas selection network that is both fair to 
applicants and to the public interest. The practical consequemes court decisions have had 
on development and application of the Independent immigrant selection systern are 
examined in a number of examples aven in this chapter. 1 conclude consideration of the 
courts' handfing of discretion by offiring some suggestions as  to the balance that should 
be sought in Independent immigrant selection matters and how it might be better effected. 
Since this chapter is about the limits of discretion, 1 also examine some of the extra- 
judicial sources of influence that are engaged to contain or  manipulate it. That discussion 
includes some analysis as to how such influences work in the selection system and 
opinions as to their efficacy. 
3.2 Judicial Review 
In Canadian immigration law, the domain of discretionary power is found at the 
interstices between the formal law and d e s  encapsulated in statutes and regulations and 
the policy guidance set out in Immigration Department manuals and Operations 
Mernoranda. The central purpose of CIC policy formulations is to provide interpretative 
guidance as to how discretionary power shodd be wielded to fil1 in blanks le& in the 
written law. However, even in the presence of detailed guidance, the proper exercise of 
discretionary power is hardly uncontroversial. Regardless of how specific and 
comprehensive they may purport to be, even the guideluies themselves will require some 
interpretation and judgrnent in their application. Moreover, a determination of the proper 
use of the guidelines is inevitably coloured by the philosophical approach of the person or 
agency considering their application in individual instances. In practice, the two groups 
most intimately involved with the workings of the immigration system - Iawyen and 
consultants, on one side, and the bureaucracy on the other - bring broadly disparate views 
to the interpretation of guidehm and actuai usage of discretion. Those views can be 
roughly divided between the positivist d e  of law appmach and the broader view of 
administrative action espoused by the hctionalist camp. Positioned between these two 
groups is the judiciary, whose role it is to keep discretionary power and nile of law ideals 
in an optimum balance? 
O w  "rule of Iaw" system, of course, does not permit discretion to exist without 
limits upon its use. The legd limits are prescnbed by what are called variously as '%ad 
faith"¶ "excess of jurisdiction", "dishonesty", "failure to exercise jwisdiction" or 
"irrelevant considerations"? Since the nile of Iaw mandates that regular courts should 
exercise an oversight function in respect of administrative tribunals, the boundaries of 
these legal limits have in fact Iargely been a judicial creation. The common law practice 
of stare decisis has seen the Limits expounded and expanded, in an inmemental fashion, 
over the course of many case decisions? Such an inmemental approach, of course, 
-H.w. Arthurs, however, would simpüfy this description even fiitther by assertmg h t  there are r edy  
only two oppasing views, those harboured by adminimative tri'bunals and the opposite view held by 
members of the judiciary and the bar. The bar and bench, in his view, being drawn fiom the same 
intellectuai pooi, are unifonn in their suspicions against anministrative power and processes and their 
devotion to judicial review as the uitimate and best fonn of protection f?om anministrative excesses. See 
generaily H.W. Arthurs, "Protection aganist Judicial Revied', supra note 62 at 277. 
4~ For fiiller discussion of the content of these concepts withia the context of immigration law and practice? 
see below, section Review: A Bifiucated Approach. 
See for example, Grey, supro note 1. Writing m 1979, he observed that a period of expansion of 
means that the matter of limits is conticually in a state of some flux and contingent, to 
some extent, upon all  of the circumstances of a given case."' Despite this, the general 
principles which guide the courts' review of discretionary power are reasonably clear and 
can be stated with some precision. 
The principle concem on judicial review is fmt and foremost on the propriety of 
the process that was utilized by a tribunal. Because of the focus on process, the exercise 
of judicial review is most centrally a study of procedural rights and whether they were 
properly observeci? In the mythology of bench and bar, the administrative process is 
sometimes portrayed as a stniggle of classic proportions, pitting the collective and 
massive might of the government, in the guise of its administrative machinery, on the one 
hand, against the lone individual, yeaming for justice, on the other? Certainly, a 
cornparison of the apparently unlimited resources of the goveniment, on the one hanci, 
and the usually restricted means of the affected private party, on the other, reinforces the 
view by some that judicial review is an inherentIy unequal struggle, with individuals at a 
disadvantage. 
Although this somewhat melodramatically overstates the case, it is not farfetched 
judicial control of administrative discretion was then underway. A lot of water has passed under the bridge 
since then and the case is perhaps more strongly made today that, at least in immigration rnatters, there is 
ample evidence of a judiciai trend towards greater control of discretionary power. See generaiiy 
CHAPTER 3 - The Limits of Discretion, below, for more on this. 
"' See for example Grey, ibid. at 132, who posited that the trend to expansion of review of discretion was 
justined by a corresponding expansion of government and inherent increased potentid for abuse. 
4rr See generally Evans, supra note 2 at 36 to 44. 
4n See for exaniple, HJ. M o r d ,  "Appeah Against Admhkmtive Decisions: 1, The Function of Judicial 
Review" (1962) 5 Can. Pub. Admin. 46. Although this article was h t t e n  some time ago, it semes to 
remind how deeply the roots of mistnist of adminimative power go. Lawford, at 47, provides the 
foiiowing example: 
Speaking to the Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference in ûttawa in September, 1960, 
Donald McInnes of Halifax, President of the Canadian Bar Association, urged lawyers to preserve 
the rights of individu& '%om the hand of ruthless and untrained administrative bodies". 
to Say that there continues to be a certain amount of mistrust of administrative tribunals 
amongst the judiciary and the bar. The trend in recent h a  to atford greater procedural 
protections to individuals caught in the web of administrative law is a clear manifestation 
of such continuing misgi~ings.~~ Procedural rights are the counterbaiance that offsets 
administrative power and contains discretion. The role of the courts in reviewing 
administrative action is therefore both a study of the scope of procedural rights and the 
limits they impose on discretionary power. 
3.2.1 Jurisdiction 
Courts have long asserted an inherent jurisdiction to supervise the business of 
govemmental actionOm However, in eariier times, this jurisdiction was marked by a 
pronounced teluctance to second-guess administrative outcornes. There has been a 
reversal of this attitude in more recent decades, with courts now exhibiting expanded 
interest and zeal for reining in executive discretion. They have been particdarly 
disdainfil of any declared zone of exclusivity for discretionary power, brushing aside 
even privative clauses476 in enabling legislation to get at the workings of the 
administrative world? Although, at one t h e ,  it was thought that some discretionary 
powers accorded by statute were simply unreviewable, that line of thinking is clearly no 
474 See Evans, supra note 2 at 41-42, who notes that the 'Yaimess" doctrine has resuited in an expansion of 
procedural rights during the last 15 years. 
47s Wade, supm note 36, at 284, notes that "[tlhe courts of law have inherent jurisdiction, as a matter of 
common iaw, to prevent administrative authorities tiom exceeding their powers or neglecting their duties." 
See aiso Evans, id. at 24, discussing courts* inherent jurisdiction to conduct judiciai review. 
476 That is, clauses which purport to deprive courts ofjurisdiction to review administrative actions. 
Canadian immigration legislation does not contain any such clauses. 
" See for example Arthurs, "RethinlOng Admmistra . * tive Law", supra note 30 at 7, who states that privative 
clauses are disregarded "...as a matter of presumption, interpretation, public poiicy, or constitutionai 
pn'mciple". See also Jones and d e V i ,  supra note 86 at 121-122, and Evans, supra note 2 genedy at 
longer in vogue? As de Smith observa, ". . .no statutory power is any longer inherently 
unrevie~able."~ Even an 'Wettered", ''sole" or ''pure" discretionary authority may be 
subject to review for legality in its exercise? Quite simply, the presence of a privative 
clause or use of expansive words, like "udettered", will not prevent a court nom doing 
justice where it sees fit? 
Though unreviewability is no longer a part of our law, this is not to suggest that 
aU discretions are created equal. As was noted earlie-, there is a range of deference 
shown by the courts to discretionary power, depending upon who wields that power, the 
nature of the considerations which are relevant to its exercise and whether it is a "pure" or 
more narrow discretion. Minista's discretion is, of course, notable by the reluctance 
courts evince to intdering with its exercise. But reluctance will nonetheless give way to 
justice and good conscience if illegality, improper motives or illegitimate purposes are 
implicated in its use. Thus, while greater latitude may be allowed to some discretions, 
none are ever completely beyond the pale of judicial oversight? 
813-965. 
See Grey "Discretion in Administtative Law", supra note 1 at 127 where he says, "The final conclusion 
on unreviewability must be that it is no part of our law. Some discretions (e.g., wartime or prerogative 
ones) are stronger (in Dworkin's sense) than others, but ail are subject to review at some point." 
De Smith, supm note 190 at 31 1. 
De Smith, id citing PadfieZd v. MUiirter of Agriculture Fishenenes and Food [1968] A.C. 997 at 1060, 
where Lord Upjohn remarked: 
[Tlhe use of that adjective [unfettered], even m an Act of Parliament, can do nothing to unfetter 
the control which the judiciary have over the executive, namely, that in exercising their powers 
the latter must act IawfiiUy and that is a matter to be determinecl by looking at the Act and its 
scope and object in C O ~ ~ I M ~  a discretion upon the Minister rather than by tfie use of the 
adjectives." 
See for example, J. Grey, "Discretion in Admhktrative Law", Npra note 1 at 108, footnote 8, who 
notes that he attempted vainly to find an example in public law of such bad faith or dishonesty which the 
courts declined to rectifl because of what he cailed "unnviewable discretion". 
au See genefauy above, section 1.5.3 . . Muusterial and Delegated Discretion 
un Evans, supra note 2 at 1021-1022, who observes that there are no "iinlimited public powers" in the 
Canadian legai system and so ". . .it is an essential fûnction of the courts to detennine what those limits are, 
by reference to the terms of the enabling statute, common law principles and the Cbmtitution Ac&, 1867- 
This is the bedrock principle upon which justification for judicial review of 
discretion is founded. The case of Roncareili v. Duplesse contiiins a now famous 
enunciation of this fact by the Supreme Court of Canada The outemost permissible 
limits of discretion are apparent in the dictn of Rand J., who observed: 
A decision to deny or cancel such a priviIegea lies within the "discretion" 
of the Commission; but that means that decision is to be based upon a weighing of 
considerations pertinent to the object of the administration. 
In public regdation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute and 
untrammelled (sic) "discretion," that is that action can be taken on any ground or 
for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator, no 
legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to contemplate an 
u n k t e d  arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however capncious or 
irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute. Fraud and corruption 
in the Commission may not be mentioned in such statutes but they are always 
implied as exceptions. 'Discretion" necessarily implies good faith in discharging 
public duty; there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to 
operate; any clear depamire h m  its lines or objects is just as objectionable as 
h u d  or corruption. Couid an applicant be refùsed a permit because he had been 
born in another province, or because of the colour of his kir? The ordinary 
language of the legislahire cannot be so di~tor ted.~ 
It is clear then that, at a minimum, every official exercising discretionary power 
must use it ody  to carry out the purposes for which it was granted. Motives or reasons 
not foundeâ in the legislation are an abuse of the discretion and illegitimate. According 
to Wade, this d e  is derived fiom several central constitutional doctrines; the nile of law, 
the sovereignty of Parliament and the power of the independent judiciary. AU of these 
corne together to spawn the doctrine of ultra the principle avenue through which 
most judicial interventions occur. "This doctrine merely states that public authorities 
1982." 
a [1959] S.C.R. 121,16 DLJL (2d) 689. 
" In th3 case, a restaurant iipuor iicense. 
Supra note 484, S.CK f 21 at 140. 
Wade, supra note 36 at 8. 
must act within powers given to them by Act of Pa~liament."~ In practice, then, the 
courts are concemed upon review to ensure that the tribunal under scrutiny has observed 
and stayed within the '~urisdiction" of the powers delegated by statute. 
IUnsdiction is typicdy explaineci in administrative law by parsing it into two 
distinct senses; a broad sense, referring to authority for conduct of al1 matters that are 
necessary and proper to carrying out the Iegislated activity, and a narrow sense, relating 
to authority to undertake the paticular activity at dl." Within the broad sense, 
jurisdiction is implicated in such matters as whether irrelevant considerations were taken 
account of in the decision-making process, whether the requisite level of faimess was 
adhered to and whether the decision-maker acted under direction or other improper 
motives. The narrow sense focuses on whether the decision-maker had authonty ab initio 
to take any action, such as rendering a decision, respecting the matter in question. In 
either event, a decision which does not appear to be in accordance with the intentions of 
Parliament will be struck d o ~ n . ~ ~  Where the statute provides no appeal, courts rely upon 
the doctrine of ultra vires to invoke their jurisdiction. This is so since the notion of 
govemment under law implies a presumption not only that discretionary powers should 
be limited in scope, but also that the agency in question should not have fiee reign to 
determine the extent of its own jurisdiction."' 
Since judicial review has ostensibly evolved as a singular focus oversight 
mechanisru, courts profess Little interest in the "merits7' of administrative decisions and, 
Ibid. 
" Jones and deViüars, supra note 86 at 120. 
'90 Wade, supra note 36 at 9. 
491 Evans, supra note 2 at 1023. 
instead, confine their role to procedurai enforcement? The distinction between merits 
and procedure is especially important, since it controls the nature of the hquiry that 
occurs upon judicial review. Couris are concemed only with statutory interpretation and 
administrative processes, and not with actual outcomes. Since only decisions spawned by 
defective processes may be faulted, it means that even good decisions will f d  before bad 
processes. Conversely, good processes may serve to protect bad decisions. 
There are, of course, limits to the doctrine of judicial disinterest in substantive 
decisions and outcomes. Those limits are found in the "rule of reasonableness" that 
overlays d l  of administrative law, and which ". . .cari be used to control the substance of 
an administrative decision.. .."4n Just as a misapprehension as to the scope of its 
authority will cause an administrative tribunal to render a reversible erroP, so too will 
some types of emors that go as much, or more, to substance than procedure. Often 
referred to as an "abuse of discretion", these types of errors are a sub-species of 
jurisdictional error found in administrative outcomes sometirnes characterized as 
"patently unreasonable7'. They arise when a tribiuial is found to be "...acting in bad faith, 
basing the decision on extraneous matters, failing to take relevant factors into account, 
[or] breaching the principles of natural justice.. . .''495 A patently unreasonable emor is to 
492 If it were otherwise, the d t  wouid be to tum the judiciary into a L'supere~ecutive" which JuIius Grey 
says, in "Discretion in Administrative Law", mpra note 1 at 132, ".. .wouid probably be adminiatrativeIy 
unmanageable, as weii as constitutionally undesirable." 
Wade, mpra note 36 at 1 O. 
This type of mor is c d e d  a L'jurisdictional moi'. It was d e s m i  in Syndicat des Employer de 
production du Quebec et de 1 'Acadie v- Gmada Lubour Relations Board [1984] 2 S.CK 412 at 420-42 1 
(S.C.C.), per Beetz J. thusly: "A jurisdictional errer results generaiiy in an excess of jurisdiction or a 
refusal to exercise jurisdiction, whether at the start of the hearing, during it, in the findings or in the order 
disposing of the matter. Such an mor, even ifcommitied in the best possible good faith, wii l  result 
nonetheless in the decision containhg it king set aside." 
495 International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipmvn Distn'ct StaflNurses Association [1975] 1 S .CE 382 at 
389, per Dickson I. (as he then was). 
be distinguished h m  a "mere error of law", which is one ". . .cornmittecl by an 
administrative tribimal in good faith in interpreting or applying a provision of its enabhg 
Act, or of an agreement or other document which it has to interpret and apply within the 
lirnits of its jurisdi~tion."~~ It is an essential part of administrative law d o p a ,  therefore, 
that tribunais have a right to be wrong, but only so long as they have properly observed 
their jurisdiction, and acted fairiy and faithfully in doing so? Thus, the notion of 
judicial review as a limited exercise, focused only on process and procedural rightP, is 
tempered somewhat by the broadness of the concept of jurisdiction. Certainly, it is 
jwisdiction which &or& opportunities for courts to involve themselves in the merits of 
individual decisions, if they are inched to overtum sarne. 
3.2.2 Procedural Review and the Duty of Faimess 
Procedurai rights belonging to applicants translate into procedural duties owed by 
the administrative tribunal. These rights and duties are captured in the terni 'haturd 
justice", which is a common Iaw creation for describing process obligations? It is 
essentially a shorthand phrase concerning the entitlement of an applicant to a decision by 
an impartial decision-maker, afkr a f a .  hearing. It is also known as the doctrine of audi 
'% Syndicat des Employer: supra note 494 at 420. 
'97 However, jurisdiction is a broad concept which aiiows for considerable scope on any review. in the 
opinion of Robert F. Reid, Wot Buttons: An Overview of Recent Developments in Admklmtive Law", in 
Philip Anisnian, & Robert F, Reid, eds., Admintktrutive L4W Issues and Practice (Scarborough, Ont.: 
Carsweli, 1995) 1 at 5, administrative law is essentidy comprised of subjective principles which are held 
out as objective. The concept of jurisdiction is part of this charade, in his view. The practicai implication 
of this is that juridiction may be so broadly constnied as to include review for rnatters touching upon the 
merits of an appiication, even though, in theory, this should not be the case. 
4m See generally Evans, supra note 2 at 36 to 44. 
499 Wade, supra note 36 at 10. See a h  de Smith, supra note 190 at 377-379. 
altemm partem ("hear the other  ide")^, which stipulates that no one shodd be 
'kondemned unheard? As the range of actors, agencies and circumstaflces in which 
duties are owed has expanded, so too has the range of duties. The result is that the tenu 
"naturd justice" has been largely supplanteci today by the more expansive term, "duty to 
act fairIf'.* Upon judicial review, the notion of a "duty of f a i ~ n e s s ' ~ ~  is used as the 
essential yardstick for measuring the fimess of a particular decision. The concept of a 
duty of faimess was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Nicholson v. 
Haldimand-NorfoIk Regional Board of Commissioners of PolicP as applying to al1 
administrative tribunals, regardless of their fiinction. A duty to act fairly, however, is not 
the same as a duty to act judicially. Thus, an immigration officer is obliged to act fakIy, 
but not necessarily to act like a judge? 
Since the duty of faimess is ostensibly a gauge for procedural matters only, it is 
not to be applied to the merits of a particuiar decision. There is always, however, a large 
question to be answered as to how much courts rnay be influenceci by a bad decision in 
fincihg that a bad procedure was u s d m  It is not one that admits of an easy answer, 
p d c d a r l y  since the "duty of fairnessS7 ish d y  a static, fixed measure. As Dickson J. 
Evans, supra note 2 at 41. 
Black S Lav Dictionury, 9' e é  (St Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1979) at 120. 
Evans, supra note 2 at 36. The authors note though, that both 'batural justice" and "duty of faimess" 
create some confiision since they suggest substantive, as weU as procedural rights. 
This principle is known by various other names, such as natuml justice, procedural fairness and so on. 
" p9793 1 S.C.R. 3 11 (S.C.C.). 
S. A. de Smith, Judicial Revïew of Administrative Action, 3d ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1973) at 
208-209, as cited in Nicholson, id. at 324-325, per Laskin J. (as he then was) (speaking for the rnajority). 
This is a question which is pertinent ais0 b the notion of unreasonabIeness. Set for example, Evans, 
supra note 2 at 105 1, who writes: "It may oflen k very tempting for a reviewing court to accede to an 
argument that an agency has abused its discretion because it has aîtached too much or too litde weight to an 
admittedly relevant factor. However, determining the weight to be given to compcting considerations is at 
the very heart of discretion, and courts should n o d y  be reluctant to invalidate an exercise of discretion 
as based upon an "unreasonable** weighing of the relevant considerations." 
(as he then was) pointed out in the MartineazF decision, "[tlhe content of the principles 
of naturai justice and fainiess in application to the individuai cases wiil Vary according to 
the circumstanca of each case.. .." Thus, the extent to which a discretionary power will 
be reviewable depends, in every case, upon al1 of the circumstances. As noted earlier, the 
existence and strength of any countervailing nghts or duties determine the extent to 
which courts will intervene in the exercise of discretionary power. This is true, as well, 
for overseas immigrant processing. Depending upon the level of entitlement, courts will 
be more or less reluctant to review the exercise of power. The usual remedy is to strike 
d o m  the impugned decisionm, and order a rehearing upon proper considerations, or to 
prohibit any fiuther action, as appropriate. 
3.3.3 Review: A Bifurcated Approach 
Independent immigrants and visitors have no statutory nght of appeal? 
Accorduigly, their only means for obtaining an oversight remedy is to apply in the courts 
for judicial re~iew.~lO If dissatisfied with the decision of a visa officer" l, applicants are 
entitled to commence an application for judicial review in the Trial Division of the 
Federal Court.s12 This is to be contrasted with the case of Family Class applicants who 
Martineau v. Mafiqui Imtitution Dbc@lintny Board (No. 2) (1 979). 106 D.LK (3d) 385 at 412, [1980] 
1 S.CK 602 at 630,50 C.C.C. (2d) 353. 
Wade, supra note 36 at 9. 
509 See the Act, S. 770). See &O Brown et al. v. Minister of Employment & Immigration et al. (1988) 3 
IimilLA (26) 299 (Fed T.D.) where the court confirmed that exclusive jurisdiction for hearing appeais in 
f d y  class refiisals lies with the Mgra t ion  Appeal Board (now the IAD). 
'O De Smith, nrpm note 190, at 956, who notes "Where there is no statutory right of appeai, an 
immigrant's only remedy is judicial review." 
"' Because of the g e n d  statutory scheme requiring immigrants and visiton to Canada to obtain a visa 
before presenting themselves at a port of mtry (see the Act, section 9(1)), the decision in dispute wül be 
that of a visa officer, rather than of a domestic immigration officer. 
"' Pursuant to section 1 8(l)(b) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 as am., S.C. 1992, c. 49, the 
triai division of the Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to provide hear applications for relief 
are entitled to appeal a negative decision to the lmmigtation Appeal Division (MD) of 
the RB. The advantages are that IAD appeals are conducted by way of de novo hearing 
and equitable relief is available, even where the original decision is detemiined to have 
been "correct" in law.Jf3 No equitable jurisdiction exists in the courts upon judicial 
review and, since review is not a de novo exercise, it is limited to an examination only of 
the facts and matiers before the original decision-maker and the process by which the 
impugned decision was reached."' 
The grounds for judicial review are contained in section 18.1(4) of the Feded 
Court Act, which reads as follows: 
The Trial Division may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the 
feded board, commission or other tribunal 
acted without jurisdiction or rehed  to exercise its jurisdiction; 
failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural faimess or other 
procedure that it was required by law to observe; 
erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error appears 
on the face of the record; 
based its decision or order on an erroneous hding of fact that it made in a 
perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it; 
acteà, or failed to act, by reason of h u d  or perjured evidence; or 
acted in any other way that was contrary to law. 
Though courts exercise an inherent supervisory function over administrative 
against any decision by a federal board, commission or t n b d .  
P r e d l y ,  the fact that th= is an "affected" Canadian sponsor, whose own rights may be impinged 
by the decision, also provides part of the rationale for the unique appeal provisions relating to the family 
class. See supra note 509, discussing the IAD family class appeal process that involves a de novo hearing. 
Such a hearing, of course, is unavailable to independent immigrants, Note also that the situation of faiIed 
refûgee claimants in Canada is somewhat more complicated than might appear at fïrst glace. If subject to 
a removal order, for example, they are entitled to appeaI against the propriety of that order to the Appeal 
Division of the Immigration and Refûgee Board, which has sole jurisdiction pursuant to section 69.1 of the 
Act. For a review of the jurisdiction and powers of the Appeal Division, see generaïïy Bagambiüe, supra 
note 15 1,295-333. 
"' Since judiciai review is wt a de novo heariag, for -le, new evidence, not available to the original 
decision d e r ,  is not ordinarily permitted to be put before the court on j u d i d  review- 
tribunals5S the Federol Court Act makes that jurisdiction explicit by stating that the 
Court has authority to review the decisions or orders of any federal board, commission or 
other tribunaP6, including those issued by Canadian visa offices located abroad.Jt7 
Beyond connrming the impugned decision, the other possible outcomes of a 
judicial review are specified in section 18.1(3) of the Feded  Court Act. which provides: 
On an application forjudicial review, the Trial Division may 
(a) order a federai board, commission or other tribuai to do any act or h g  it has 
unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing; or 
(b) declare invalid or uniawfùl, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for 
determination in accordance with suchdirections as it considers to be appropriate, 
prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal board, 
commission or other t r i b ~ ~ a i . ~ ' ~  
The remedies available in Federal Court to effect such outcomes are the so-cailed 
prerogative or der^^'^, of which c&orat-i, mandamur and prohibition are the most 
commonly used in the overseas context? To access these remedies, overseas applicants 
must, of course, file an application for judicial review, in Canada, with the Federal 
C o u r P  Al1 applicants affected by a decision of a federal tribunal are subject to a thirty 
day Limitation period, commencing fkom the time the decision was comrnunicated to 
"' See text accompanying note 475, supra. 
Federal Court Act. supra note 5 12, S. l8(l). 
"' Section 82.l(l) of the Imi'ation Act states that an application for judiciai review tmder the Federal 
Court Act may be taken with respect to "any decision or order made, or any matter arising, under this Act 
or the d e s  or regulations thereundei', though such action may only be commenced with leave of the 
court. 
Supra note 5 12. 
See Federal Court Act, S. 18(l)(a), which states that the Trial Division of the F e d d  Court has 
exclusive origid jurisdition ".. . to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of 
mandamus or writ of quo warranta, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or 
other tribunal.. .." 
ao For a discussion of the availabiüty and uses of these medies m inmiigration matters, see Bagambiire, 
supra note 15 1, at 349 - 360. 
ni Section l8.l(l), FederaZ Court Act and section 82.11 l), Inmipution Act. 
them, within which to file their application for judicial r e v i e ~ . ~  For overseas applicants, 
this limitation period poses obvious special challenges. Ifnot already represented, they 
will have to hd, retain and uiseuct counsel in Canada on a priority basis. Altematively, 
an applicant might choose to represent herself. For most persons, however, this may be 
an unlikeIy option, since it would entail research as to the forms and procedures of a 
distantly Iocated foreign court - the Federal Court of Canada. Added to this is the 
necessity of appearances before the court. Beyond the expense such appearances might 
entail, a failed applicant rnight also have to obtain a visitor visa just to obtain entry to 
Canada for the purposes of such appearances? Presumably, because of the peculiar 
difficulties faced by oveneas applicants, an application for review of a visa officer's 
decision is not subject to the ordinary requirement for lave of the Court as a pre- 
condition to commencing such an action? 
Just as the range of matters with which administrative law generally concerns 
itself is bmad, so too does the range of rights, and entitiement to fair procedure, vary. 
Everything is case specific, hinging upon the type of subject matter involved, the type of 
procedure that has been provided for by the legislature and the consequences which may 
accrue to the individual i n ~ o l v e d . ~  This is evident fiom a series of prooouncements by 
" Section 18.1(2), Federal Court Act. 
" Granting of a visitor visa to a failed immigrant applicant is by no means a certain proposition. Like 
every other applicant for a visitor visa, a failed immigrant must rebut the presumption fond at S. 8 of the 
immigration Act, that she is an intendhg irmnigrant. The prior immigrant application clearly adds to the 
difaculties of rebutting that presumption, 
" Pursuant to subsetion 82.1(2) of the immigration Act, decisions of visa officers under sections 9, 10 or 
77 are specificaiiy exempted fkom the requirement of leave. See Bagambiire, supra note 15 1 at 340, who 
suggests that lack of easy access to Canadian courts for foreign based litigants provides the justification for 
the dispensation from the reqpirement of Ieave. He opines that such applicants are less likely to Iaunch 
fnvolous applications or otherwise abuse the facilities of the Federai Court. 
=For discussion of the v-g naüxre of the duty of fairness, see geaedy Evans, supra note 2, at 35-43. 
the Supreme Court of Canada. Estey J., for example, noted that "[w]hile it is tnie that a 
duty to observe procedural fahess, a s  expressed in the maxim audi alteram partem, need 
not be express.. . it will not be implied in every case. It is always a question of constnllng 
the statutory scheme as a whole in order to see to what degree, if any, the legislator 
intended the pruiciple to apply. [footnote omitted]' ~ 2 6  In Cardinal v. Director of k m t  
Imtitutionm, the Court refined this fiutha by stating: 
The existence of a general duty to act fairly will depend on the consideration of 
three factors: (i) the nature of the decision to be made by the administrative body; 
(ii) the relationship existing between that body and the individual; and (iii) the 
effeçt of that decision on the individual's rights.. . . [Wlhenever those three 
elements are to be found, there is a general duty to act fairly on a public decision 
making body. 
While the existence of these three elements provides the minimum threshold for 
invoking a duty of faimess, a more interesting issue concems how they are measured and, 
consequently, the level of fairness owed. Though there is no fixed formula for 
prioritizing the three factors, the impact of the decision on individual rights is obviously a 
serious concern and may be most important. This point was made apparent in Imhe v. 
Canada (Restrictive Trade Practices Comrniss i~n)~.  Estey J., speaking for the Court, 
stressed that the existence of any pmonal impact for the applicant must significantly 
influence the level of faimess owed to her. As he stated, "[flairness is a flexible concept 
and its content varies depending on the nature of the inquiry and the conîequences for the 
individuaZs involved. [emphasis added]"Rp In assessing the du@ of faimess owed in the 
" ~t torney  Geneml of Canada v. Inuit Tupifiat of Canada, [ 19801 2 S.C.R. 735 at 755, per Estey J. for 
the Court. 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 643 at 653, per Ledain J. for the rnajonty. 
sn [1987] 1 S.C.R. 181. 
=rd. at231. 
exercise of discretionary immigration powers, it is essential therefore to ask severai 
questions: to what extent has Parliament intended the duty of fa inas  to apply, what type 
of decision is implicated and what are the ramifications for any individual nghts? 
The last question is particularly cogent when inquiring as to the level of fainiess 
owed to Independent immigrant applicants. Of al1 the immigrant categories, it is manifest 
that Independents have the least at stake in ternis of personal investrnent and potential 
ramifications. Family Class migrants, for example, may face pmanent separation fiom 
close family while Refugees risk potential persecution fkom a denial of opportunity to 
enter Canada. Independents, however, are people who voluntarily seek migration, 
usually in search of better econornic opportunities. They will ordinarily have no 
substantial ties to Canadam and are not subject to the type of pressing humanitarian 
concerns that may affect other applicants. As such, denial of an immigrant visa to them 
will most likeIy involve only the loss of an ~pportunity.~' Accordingly, the entitlement 
of Independent applicants to procedural fairness, at least on the bais  of personal 
consequences, is less than for other categories of immigrants. 
This difference in entitlement to procedural faimess is illustrated by the curious 
- -  - -- - - - - 
no An obvious exception to this would be the "Assisted Relative" subcategory within the Independent class. 
These immigrants are defined at section 2(1) of the Regdations as king an immigrant, other tha.  a 
member of the family class, who has an aunt or uncle, sibhg, child, grandchild or nephew or niece in 
Canada In recognition of this co~ection, while Assisted Relatives are made to q u w  on the ordinary 
Independent selection scale, they are effectively awarded a bonus of five additional points for the fact of a 
relative in Canada. Thus, assisted relatives need obtain only 65 points to qualifl for pemmment residence 
(S. 10(l)(b), immigration Regulatiorts), which is to be compared to the 70 points needed by "regulai' 
independent applicants (S. 9(l)(b)(i), immigration Regtrfations). 
In an effort to minimize any consequences to faiied applicants, CICs application and info~mation 
materials routinely include an admoni.chment that any plans for departure should not be finalized util the 
application has been fidiy approveci See for example, CIC "Applying for Permanent Residence in Canada: 
A Self-Assessrnent Guide and Application Kit for Independent Appiicants" (New Delhi Application Kit 
version (undateci) c o d t e d  for îhk citation) at 24, where the following advice to potential applicants is 
given: "PIease do not quit your job, sel1 or give away your possessions until you have been issued an 
position of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Unmigration law and its seeming 
irrelevance to overseas immigrant selection. Generally, persons applying abroad for 
immigration services have no entitlement to a determination process that incorporates 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms standards. However, other applicants in very simila. 
circumstances, but located in Canada, do benefit from Charter  protection^."^ The overd 
relatioaship of Charter issues to Litigation in the administrative context was noted by 
Wilson J. in Re Singh and M.E.Ia3. 'V, as a matter of statutory interpretation," she 
stated, '%he procedural fairness sought by the appellants is not excludeci by the scheme of 
the m g r a t i o n ]  Act, there is, of course, no bais for mort  to the Charter."sY Quite 
simply, therefore, the Charter is ody relevant in so far as procedural faUness has been 
compromised by a legislatively mandated process. In the absence of such, the applicant 
is left to rely upon the usud panoply of administrative and judicial review remedies. 
More particularly, while the courts have held that Chartet protections extend to al1 
persons physically present in CanadP, they have declined to extend such protections to 
persons dealing with visa offices outside Canadam This, despite apparent rejection by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Singh case, of the American position where such a 
immigrant visa." 
B2 For a bnef discussion of this apparent incongniity, see Waldman, supra note 104, at 2.1 - 2.4,§2.1- 
2.6. 
" Supra note 64. 
Id., 17 D . L E  (4th) 422 at 445. 
See id., per Wilson J. 
" See CMadan ComciZ of Churches v. Chnada [1990] 2 F.C. 534,lO Imm L X  (2d) 81 (C.A.); @d 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 236,88 D.LX (4*) 193 (S.C.C.); and sec also Ruparei v. Minister of EmpIoyment and 
Immigration [1990] 3 F.C. 615,36 F.T.R. 140 (C.A.). The hesitancy of the courts tu extend the nile of 
Canadian law abroad is a matter whose Iogic is somewhat controversial. For a &ticaI view of this 
geographicdy based dichotomy, see Donald Galloway, "The Extraterritorial Application of the Charter to 
Visa Appiicants", (1 99 1) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 335. 
dichotomy is endorse~i.~~~ 
However, it may be that what the courts have refused to do through the h n t  door, 
namely apply the C7zarter to cases processed abroad, has actuaUy been done through the 
back door by legislative enactment. Section 3(f) of the Act  states immigration policies, 
d e s  and regdations are to be designed and administered su as to ". . .not discriminate in 
a manner inconsistent with the Canudian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Thus, 
regardes of whether or not the Charter applies directiy, the standards it mandates for 
prohibited discrimination, which would be encompassed in the notion of procedural 
fairness, certainly do? However, it will obviously be more difficult to obtain the 
Charter's protections when that document is seen not to be directly applicable. And 
certainly, refusal to apply Charter provisions to al1 those dealing with the Canadian 
government, no matter where situated, has created two different standards for procedurai 
fairness that potentially cuts across immigrant categorie~.~~ It follows nom this that 
fainiess in the use of discretion in any individual case, while requiring reference to a 
common standard with other decisions of a iike kind, cm and will vary fkom one type of 
case to another. Since different levels of "interest" or "right" are inherent in the various 
categories of app licaîions, the Ievel of fainiess owed s hi fh accordingly . 
" Singh, supra note 64, 17 D L R  (4th) 422 at 462, where Wiison J. said, "1 mut confess some reluctance 
to adopt this analogy fiom Amencan law that persons who are inside the country are entitied to the 
protection of the Charter while those who are merely seeking entry to the country are  no^" 
The obvious ciifference in not having the Charter apply directfy would be to deprive appiicants of 
certain remedies, for example. 
a9 For example, renigee claimants may apply in Canada or at a visa office abroad Those applying in 
Canada wil i  be entitied to rely directiy upon the Charter wMe those abroad wiU be left to attempt to 
Unport Charter protections indirectty through the device of section 3(f) of the Act. A similar remit is 
possible also for applicants within the famiiy class. Spousal applicants, for example, may be granted a 
discretionary dispensation under S. 1 f4(2) of the Act to allow their cases to be processed fiom within 
Canada. 
Notwithstanding this, there is still a minimum level of faimess due even to those 
who have no k e d  nght to the benefit they seek. A Minister's Penxit, for example, is the 
primary tool under the Imrnigm~ion Act whereby a temporary dispensation h m  the rigid 
letter of the law is granted. With certain excepti~ns,~ the Minister has discretion, 
pursuant to S. 37(1), to gant relief to any person seekïng entry to Canada who is a 
member of an inadmissible class. In exercising that discretion, the courts have held that 
the power to grant a pennit must be exercised fairly and in accordance with phciples 
consistent with the purposes of the Act. In the context of a refugee claim, Wilson J. 
observed that the ". . .Minister is requVed to exercise his discretion to give a permit under 
S. 37 fairly and in accordance with proper principles and, if the Minister fails to do so, the 
Convention refugee may have a right to take proceedings under S. 18(a) of the Federal 
Court Act.'"' The notion that there may be a duty of fairness, even in the absence of any 
nght in the applicant to the service or benefit, is rooted in the hypothesis underlying 
grants of discretionary power that they must be exercised rea~onably.~~ 
But what are the minimal components of procedural fairness in the context of 
Independent processing? CIC's own Immigration Manual summarizes them as follows: 
There are a considetable number of components to the notion of fairness, or natural 
justice, that affect ovefieas processes. These have been reviewed and enunciated by 
the courts in ample fashion over the years. Some of the more important components 
that apply to overseas processes include the following: 
Processing must occur without undue delay; 
YO See S. 37(2) of îhe Act, which prohibits issuance of Permits to persons under an unexecuted removal 
order and failed f a d y  cias appiicants whose appeal has been dismissed by the Appeal Division of the 
m. 
Singh, supra note 64, (1985) 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422 at 448, citing MinUret of Manpower & Immigration v. 
Hardayal(1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 465 at 471, [1978] 1 S.CX 470 at 479,15 N.R 396 (per Spence J.); Re 
Brempong and Minkter of Employment h Immigration (1 98O), 1 13 DLR. ( 3 4  236, (198 11 1 F.C. 21 1.36 
N a  323. 
YZ Wade, supra note 36 at 9. 
Whoever hem, must decide; 
Applicants must have an opportunity to be heard and to respond to any coacerns; 
Decisions must be based upon the Imigration Act and Reguiatiom; and 
All applicants must receive fair and equitable treatrnenttn 
These principles are obviously broad in nature and scope and it rem& for the courts to 
detemiine in every case how they are to be applied and whether or not they have actually 
been met? Particdar examples of their appfication will be exploreci in greater detail later 
in this chapter. Sufnce to Say at this juncture7 though they must be seen as minimum 
standards, yet they provide the essential foundation out of which spruigs the duty of 
fairness applicable to discretionary immigration decision making. 
3.3.3.1 Protecüng Discretion 
The courts have an ambivalent relationship with discretion. On the one hand, they 
are loath to see it "fettered'' and require that it remain open ended. At the same tirne. 
however, they also insist that it be closely confineci and s tn i~ tured .~  It is for this reason 
CIC IM ' 6 0 v e r s ~  Rocessing", Chap. OP- 1, para. 10 (ver. 12-95) at 17- 18. 
IU However, even the notion of procedural faimess and what it entails is hardly fiee fiom competing 
priorites, as exemplified by the following two examples. In Costroman v. Canada (Secretary of State) 
(1994), 81 F.TX 227, McKeown J., in a case where the CKDJ). elected to proceed with a hearing even 
after counsel chose to withdraw, found that the right to a fair hearing takes precedence over the need for a 
quick and speedy hearing. However, see also Singh (Gunnit) v. Canada (Minister of Citizmhip and 
Immigration) (1995), 106 F.T.R. 66 at 70, where Simpson J. opined as follows: "In my view, fairness 
requires that an applicant receive a timely decision." Thus, the only conclusion is that the specific details 
of procedural fairness will fluctuate according to the dictates of justice in every case. 
~4 '  This sort of dialectic approach may well be a factor of the two guidmg principles which Grey, in his . . 
book, Immmigration Lav in Canada, supra note 18 1, ascrii  to admumtrative law generaiiy. He 
characterizes the- at 1, as follows: 
There can be no power or authority exercised by an officia1 without a statutory or a prerogative 
source, and all grants of power are generaiiy to be narrowly constnied. 
Where a discretion is granted to an officiai, the courts wiil not review bis decision on its merits, 
but ody  to see if he stayed within the bounds of his authority and exercised it in a reasonable 
manner. 
As he descnïes it, these two d e s  are somewhat antagonistic and puli m Mixent directions. Though . . 
our adrmnistrative law involves a synthesis of the two, it is not a seamies one and so courts perhaps tend 
to meander h m  side to side, while stili atternpting to steer the middle course. For a more in depth 
discussion of this, see Grey generdy, id, at 1-5. 
that Wade ascribes two broad categones to the conduct of judicial review; one concerned 
with protecting the discretion accorded by Parliament and the other focused on preventing 
its abuse." Sornewhat ironically, then, it seems that judicial review is meant to ensure 
that discretion remains ample, but not too ample. 
In the £kt category, protecting the scope of discretionary power, the courts seek 
to ensure that the power has been exercised by the nghtfid donee, UILfettered and without 
artificial restrictions drawn nom outside the ternis of the grant. These strictures are 
captured in the Latin maxim delegatus non potest delegare, wwhich holds that power 
accorded to one may not be exercised by another. As John Willis States, "[ilts most 
important application.. .is to authorities which are by statute empowered to exercise 
discretions affecthg the rights and interests of the public.. . While it is merely a nite 
of constructionw, rather than a binding legal doctrine, it ensures that the intended donee 
of power is the one to actually use it.Y9 The theory is that by tying the power to the 
donee, accountability is increased, thereby enhancing the likelihood of its responsible 
exercise. Willis notes that this rule of construction is rooted in the concept of the " d e  of 
law" and the notion that govemment officiais and private citizens are dl equal before the 
law." As such, the delegatus nile is intended to prevent interference, whether political 
or otherwise, with the rights and interests of pnvate persons, Save to the extent 
Iegitimately permitteci by statutory provision. Irrespective of the type of power involved, 
" ~ a d e ,  supm note 36 at 9. 
" Willic, "Delegatus Non Potest Delegare?, supm note 215 at 257. 
De Smith, supra note 190 at 358, who notes that courîs have siornethes construed it as a rigid and 
complete doctrine, alIowing of no exceptions. Nonetheless, he points out that it merely raises a rebuttable 
presumption. Conversely, both de Smith, at 358, and Willis, "Delegatus Non Potest Delegare", id. at 260, 
note that tbe presumption is not diacuit to rebut. 
SJg Willis, See also de Smith, id. at 358. 
whether judicial, quasi-judicid, ministerial and so on, the mie against subdelegation is 
applicable."' 
In the case of the Immigration Act, far more powers are delegated to the Minister 
of Immigration than she is able to persondy exercise herself. To get around the d e  
against sub-delegation, Parliament has made express provision in the Act to permit çub- 
delegation of her auth~rity.~~ Notwithstanding this, the convention of ministerial 
responsibility in pariiamentary government ensures that the Minister remains ultimately 
accountable for the proper exercise of any authority she passes on to iower level 
of fi ci al^.^^ Under the Immigration Act, it is ody  immigration and visa officersSs who 
have authority to exercise delegated powers. Further, once seized of a matter, the 
individual visa officer is required to form her own opinions as to the outcome for a case. 
Though she is entitled to seek guidance nom various sources, including colleagues and 
supervising officers, the decision remains hers alone and she must not fetter her discretion 
by following the dictates of those colleagues or super ior~.~~~ 
-- -- 
Sm Wiliis, id. 
De Smith, supra note 190 at 358. 
5=s. 121(1). 
*a See also s 121(2) of the Act which codifies this convention. Any act carried out pursuant to a power 
delegated by the Minister is deemed to have been perforxxed by ber. 
Set definitions of "immigration office? and "visa officer" contained at S. 2 of the Act, which simply 
distinguishes between them according to whether they are exercising their fûnctions inside Canada or 
abroad. In either case, these are officers who have been designated pursuant to s. 109 of the Act. Ln visa 
office practice, there are a couple of more officer designations that art relevant. These are the "Designated 
immigration Officer @IO)" and the "Immigration Program Officer (PO)". The first has been designated 
purmiant to S. 109 of the Act, whiie the Iatter has not. Both categories consist, usuaiiy, of foreign mtionals 
hired Iocaliy in their corntries of residence to hande case processing. Since DI03 have the same authority 
as regular immigration officers, they are able to render decisions on individuai cases. PO'S obviously do 
not possess such authonty. As a matter of expediency, however, they may be found rendering positive 
decisions in cases, smce such decisions are never appeaied. 
In Baluyuz v. Canada (Min. ofEmpIoyment & Immigration), [1992] 3 F.C. 420, 56 F.T.R. 186 (Fed 
T.D.), for example, the appiicant sought to quash the decision of an officer refhsing to intewiew her with 
respect to her application for permanent residence. The applicant's husband was resident in the Phiiippines 
and unable to attend an interview at the Canadian Consuiate in Los Angeles where the application had been 
An obvious question that arises in relation to immigration processing matters 
concenis the position in law of the copious policy manu&, operations memoranda and 
other guidelines issued by the Minister and (SIC Headqwrters to infonn officers in their 
use of discretion. These manuals and policy statements are meant to guide the use of that 
discretion deemed necessary to fiU in cracks and crevices between the d e s .  Where a 
general discretion has been delegated, the courts have upheld the adoption of guideiines 
implemented to inform its exer~ise .~  Such guidelines have been noted to serve, 
legitimately, the purposes of ensuring consistency of decision-making and of providing 
objective standards for the application of general discretion to specific cases.5n Evans, 
for example, offers the foUowing on the legitimacy of guideluies: 
Iodged, The appiicant had explained various cucumstances that d t a t e d  aga& her husband being able to 
attend an interview in the US, then showed up alone for the intemiew. The officer consulted an 
immigration vice-consul about what decision should be made, then told the applicant that the interview 
could not be held in the absence of her spouse. The court found in the result that the officer had failed to 
exercise her own discretion in the mattex, aiiowing her actions to be dictated by the supervising vice- 
consui. Mandamus was issued to order that the interview proceed and that the He be transfmed to the 
Canadian visa office in Manila thereafter, if i n t e ~ e w  of the spouse was necessary. For a similar result, see 
John v, Canada (Min. of Citizemhip & Immigration) (1997). 36 Inm. L E  (2d) 192 (FCTD.) where the 
visa office in Guatemala sent Trinidadian education documents to the visa office in Trinidad for au opinion 
as to their equivalence to Canadian educational atcainment. Based on that opinion, the visa office in 
Guatemala awarded no points for education to the applicant, The court f o n d  this an iinpennissî%le 
fettering of discretion, since the Guatemala office blindly applied the opinion offenxi by the Trinidad 
office. In the view of Heald D.J., the defect could have been remedied by &orhg the applicant an 
opportunity to respond to the equivalence offered by the Trinidad office, which was not done. 
'%sec for example. Burke v. Canada (Employment & Iminigraton Commission) (1994), 79 F.TR 148 
(F.C.TD.). 
See for example, Vidai, nrpm note 21 1, 13 Imm. LX. (2d) 123 at 142-143. where Strayer 1. stated the 
following: 
No doubt when Parliament conferred the power under subs. 114(2) [of the immigration Act] on 
the Govemor in Council to make exceptions to the requirements of the Act and Regulations it 
expected the Govemor m Council to exercise that discretion with some sort of consistency 
throughout the country and not purely arbitrarily or by whmL More particularly, by the principles 
of parliamentary government the Governor m Council must be responsible to Parjiarnent for the 
exercise of his discretion. As the Govemor in Council is in the vast majority of cases dependent 
on the recommen&tions of immigration officers, as approved by the Minister, for the exercise of 
his discretion, it is highly desirable that immigration officers have some sort of guidance as to 
what factors the Mjnister îiünks important m making recommendations to the Governor in 
Council in this respect. 
It is sometimes assume4 especiaily by lawyers, that while a de-bound solution 
to a dispute requires the decision-maker to base it on precedent and general legai 
principles, those exercising discretion need to consult only their own preferences. 
However, this is a caricature of the exacise of discretion. Dismetionary decisons 
must be made not oniy by reference to the statutory piuposes and other legal 
limits of the power, but they should also be infonned by anypolicy objectives 
formulated by the agency, guidelines that it has ksued. and its past practice. 
Arbitrariness is as much the antithesis of the effective exercise of discretion as the 
mechanicd application of d e s  is of the just adminimtion of Iaw. The 
differences between discretionary and rule-based decitions are of degree, not 
kind. [emphasis addedlJp 
However, b h d  adherence to such guidelines is also not permitted. Though the decision- 
maker is entitled to educate herself h m  the guidelines as to what a proper approach may 
be, she must still ensure that her mind mains open to the subtleties and nuances of the 
individual case before her. As Wadenotes, discretion must not be fettered '%y self- 
imposed rules of thumb" and "a distinction must be made between following a consistent 
policy and blindly applying some rigid de."" In CabaFn v. Canada (Mintrter of 
EmpLoyment and 1mmigration)q for example, Joyal J. noted that close adherence to 
ministerial policy not founded in the Act or Regulationr would result in a fettering of 
discretion and, hence, constitute an excess of jurisdiction. Thus, while consistency is 
desirable, it is only desirable to the extent that it allows for flexibility, which rernains of 
the essence to discretion. 
Occasionally, it happens that courts will actually enlarge discretion in their 
'" Supra note 2 at 102 1-1 022. 
Wade, supra note 36 at 9. For a discussion theorking as to possible fettering of discretion by 
Immigration Medicai Officers relying too cIose1y upon guidelines contained in the Medical Officer's 
Haadbook, see P. Harris Auerbach 'Piscretion, Policy and Section 19(l)(a) of the Immigration Act" 
(1990) 6 Journal of Law and Social Policy 133. But, for a view decrying a Iack of guidelines to controt 
Medical Officer discretion, see Roteaberg, "Medicai Inadmissibility: Selection Without Standard?,,, supra 
note 151. 
[1991] 2 F.C. 235, 12 Imm. L E  (2d) 287,40 F.TK 147,49 Admm. L.R. 100 (F.C.T.D.). 
attempts to protect it. In the Imaili case1, for example, CuiIen J. found part of S. 22 of 
the Regulations to be ultra vires the Act, with the result that the discretion of immigration 
medical officers was expandeci. That section had been promuigated pursuant to the 
authority granted the Governor in Council under S. 114(l)(m) of the Act to make 
regdations prescribing factors to be considered in detennllùng whether a person is likely 
to be a danger to public hedth or safety or might cause excessive demand on health or 
social services. Section 22 contained a list of factors medicd officers were required to 
consider in reaching a determination as to the likelihood of excessive demand by an 
immigrant with a health impairment." The factors included any medical reports, 
commuaicability of the disease, whether the supply of the particular health or social 
senice in Canada was somehow limited, what sort of care or hospitalization might be 
required and so on. Bill C-86= had amended S. 114(l)(m) of the Act by deletuig explicit 
reference to excessive demand on health and social services. The Court found this to be 
fatal to the legaiity of the factors set out in section 22 of the ReguZations vis-à-vis 
assessrnent of excessive demand. It was d l  fine, however, as concems public health and 
safety, since reference to those concems had not been eliminated by the C-86 
"' IsntaiZi v. Canada (Min. of Citizmhip & Irnntigmtion) (1995),29 Imm. LX. (2d) 1,100 F.TR 139. 
For an opinion on the effect of this niling, see Rotenberg, "Medical Inadmissibility: Selection Without 
Standard?", supra note 15 1 .  
Every prospective immigrant and their dependants are required to pass a medical examination. Medicai 
test d t s  are assessed and an opinion as to impiications for public health and safety and demand upon 
health and social services is givm by Immigration Medical Officers employed by CIC. That opinion is 
then passed to the visa officer who must consider same in rendering a nnal decision. A visa officer has no 
discretion with respect to a medical opinion Jaf& v. Canado (Min. of Citùenship & Immigmfion) (24 
Oaobn 1995), IMM-4039-93 (F.C.T.D.). The officer also has no authority to review the diagnostic 
assessment by medical officers. However, the duty of faitness reQuires that the visa officer ensure that the 
medical officer's opinion is reasonabie. If not, a visa officer decision based upon an unreasonable medical 
opinion will be set aside. Ajanee v. Canada (Minikter of Citûenship & Immigration) (1996), 33 Jmm. L K  
(2d) 165, 1 10 F.T.R. 172 (F.C.TD,). 
" ~n Act to mend the Imigration Act and ofher Ac& in consequence thereo): S.C. 1992, c. 49. 
amendmentS. Because the amendment had removed the authority upon which the 
excessive demand factors in section 22 resfed, medical officers were found to be unduiy 
fettering their discretion by routinely relying upon the factors as per their former practice. 
Though they were still entitled to consider those factors, they were no longer restricted by 
thern? As Rotenberg and Lam note, the effect of this decision was seemingiy to remove 
lUnits upon the discretion of medical officers in assessing such cases." Thus, the Iist of 
factors were transformeci h m  an authontative guide, structuring and codhing medicai 
officer discretion, to a mere list of factors that couid be considered or ignored, as the 
individual medical officer determined was appropnate. 
3.3.3.2 Controlling Discretion 
Conversely, in controbg the exercise of discretion, the court is concerned to see 
that only that amount of power which was delegated, and no more, is put into play." If 
the administrative action exceeds what was authorized, the decision-maker will be found 
to have exceeded her jwisdiction and the action declared ultra vires the authority granted. 
~4 See also Ludwig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1 W6), 33 Imm L.R (2d) 2 13, 1 1 1 
F.TX 271 (T.D.). Medical officers are guided in their assessments by a Medical Officer's Hanclbook 
reflecting common medical knowledge. A medical officer is entitled to apply the guidance offered th=, 
but only so long as he retains sufficieut flexiiility to look beyond those guidelines and does not feel bound 
by them. 
w i ~ i I i ,  supra note 561,29 hm. L X  (24 lat 5, where the authors offer a case commentary that 
includes the foliowing: "Certainly, when one reads S. 22 of the immigration Regdations with the 
immigration Act, limiîs to the medical officers' discretion were circumscriid, Have these limits been 
removed? Are we leA to the vagaries of each medicd officer as to what he considers to be excessive and 
the facts to be taken into account? [footnote ornitted]" Similariy, see Rotenbag, b'Medical Inadmissbility: 
Selection Without Standard?", supra note 151. The position of CIC is even more clear on this point. In 
Operations Memorandum (OM) IP 96-08/0P 96-05.28 March 1996, "Assessrnent of Medical Excessive 
De~aa~lds A19(l)(a)(ii) and R22". the department notes that "[ilt foilows [ h m  the Imaili decision] that 
we have presently no authority to regulate the assessment of excessive demands. . . . The nilUig does not 
prevent medicai officers f?om deciding if an applicant's admission wouid or might reasonably be expected 
to cause excessive demands. It simply means they must exmise "discretion" ratber than apply the factors 
set out in R22." The OM then goes on to detail how that discretion shouid properly exercised. 
=AS de Smith notes, it is h m  again that the "ruie of Law' is to be s m  in action - delegates may only act 
Grey describes discretion as: 
... a power that is aimost always or always is attacheci to some level of due. 
Review of discretion means determining how f u  the power extends and at what 
point the "duty" is ignored and the correlative "right" violateci. As soon as that 
point is reached, the courts c m  interfere; before that they wiil abstain fkom doing 
~ 0 . ~ ~  
Accordingly, controhg discretion aiso entails some consideration of the balance that 
should be stnick between discretionary power and duties owed to those coming before 
administrative tribunais. 
In Maple Lodge Farms Lhited v. Government of Canada et al.", the Supreme 
Court of Canada reiterated that courts should not Lightly interfere with discretion. 
Speaking for the court, McIntyre J. reaffr,,ed this principle while aiso noting the limits 
for the exercise of discretion, beyond which the courts will intervene to control it. In his 
words: 
It is ... a clearly-estabiished mle that the courts should not interfere with the 
exercise of a discretion by a statutory authority merely because the court might 
have exercised the discretion in a dinerent manner had it been charged with that 
responsibility. Where the statutory discretion has been exercised in good faith 
and, where required, in accordance with the principles of naturd justice, and 
where reliance has not been placed upon considerations irrelevant or extraneous to 
- the statutory purpose, the courts should not interfkre? 
The notion that discretion may only be exercised for the purposes for which it was 
granted is captured under the notion of "good faith". It is this ground of review which 
cornes closest to trenching upon the rnerits of individual administrative decisions - an 
activity which courts ostensibly are hesitant to undertake on judicial review. And yet, 
within the bounds of the power bequeathed to them, and no more. De Smith, supra note 190 at 295. 
957 Grey, "Dismtion in AhinWative Law",  pro note 1 at 108-109. 
sa [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2. 
569 rd. at 7 - 8. 
despite this reluctance, the courts do delve into the merïts of cases upon the justification 
of good faith. Tn conduchg review for this type of misconduct, the content and ambit of 
the power delegated is obviously of geatest concem to the courts. The particulan of the 
type of inappropriate action which wil1 cause the courts to intervene agaùist the decision 
of a triiunal are evident in the staternent of Lord Denning, who said, in relation to a 
power in a govemment minister to issue television licenses: 
Undoubtedly those statutory provisions give the Minister a discretion as to the 
issue and revocation of licenses. But it is a discretion which must be exercised in 
accordance with the law, taking ali relevant considerations into account, omitting 
irrelevant ones, and not being iduenced by any ulterior motivesm 
Lord Denning's dicta gives some idea of the broad scope of the concept of good 
faith. It encompasses a range of problems from perversmess, or patent unreasonability, 
of the decision, to more particular matters such as failure to accord weight to relevant 
considerations. Though good faith involves an examination of motivation and h e  of 
mind of the decision-maker, the courts have held that it is capable of detemination nom 
d l  of the circumstances of a case? This is well illustrated in the So c a s P ,  which 
Rouleau J. described as the most blatant example of wiUfid bad faith and abuse of 
discretion he had ever encomtered during his tenure on the bench? 
The applicant So applied in that instance to the Canadian Consulate General in 
New York as an Independent immigrant pursuant to the occupation of "head chef'. 
no Congreve v. Home m c e ,  [1976] 1 QB. 629 at 649, [1976] 1 All E.R. 697 at 708. 
-' See Smirh v. Vanier (Mwicipality) (1972). 30 D L R  (3d) 386 (Ont. H.C-)y at 390-392, where the Court 
stated: 
In the house of good faith there are many mansions. Good faith or want of it is not an extemai 
fact but rather a state of mind that can be judged by verbal or physical acts. To my mind good 
faith is a composite thmg refmble to ail the relevant circumstances. 
mSo v. Canada. supra note 441,28 Inmi. L X  (2d) 153 Bminafter cited to 28 Imm. LX]. 
lbid at 155. 
Though he had just six years of primary schooling, the applicant had worked for more 
thm twenty years as a chef in restaurants in Hong Kong ad, later, in Canada. In 
addition, he had completed a certifïcate program h Canada whereby he was recognized 
by the Ontatio Chinese Restaurant Association as a "Class 1 Chef in Cantonese Dishes". 
The reviewhg officer, however, discomted this experience and training, saying that it 
was not the sort of fomal program of qualification that would sufnce for the occupation 
of head chef. As a resuit, the applicant was assessed in a lesser occupation that redted 
in fewer points being awarded to him. Further, though So had been living and working in 
Canada for a number of years, apparently becoming suflicientiy weU established to 
accumulate rnoney and property during this tirne, the officer did not rate his chances for 
successfbl establishment highly. He was awarded just four points out of ten for the factor 
of personal suitability as a result. Iri ordering certiorari to quash the decision, Rouleau J. 
stated the following: 
There is simply no question good faith was not present here. . . .Mn making his 
decision, he [ie. the visa officer] clearly disregarded pertinent and relevant facts, 
such as the applicant's twenty years of experience as a chef and bis certificate as a 
Class 1 Chef in Cantonese Dishes, and was inauenced, more aptly describecl as 
obsessed, by factors which should not have played a role in his decision-making 
at dl, such as the applicant's having remained in Canada d e r  his status had 
expired. His conclusion that Mr. So had only a forty per cent chance of becoming 
established in Canada is perverse, in light of the fact the applicant has saved a 
substantial amount of money since his arriva1 in 1990, has purchased two cars and 
has secured gainful employment as a head chef at the rate of $900 per weeken4 
Good faith is also called into question by the fact of how much time and attention 
a visa officer may give to materials and other evidence provided in support of an 
application. While it is a requirement of good faith that due consideration and attention 
be given to each application, the actual amount of such attention wili Vary according to 
the complexity of the matter, the amount of the evidence offered and other circumstances. 
In VUCQ v. Canada (Minfiter of Employment & Immigraton)). for example, Cullen J. 
found that the consideration extended by an immigration officer was inadquate. There, a 
large volume of matenal appears to have been digestecl in the course of a thirty-minute 
interview, after which a negative decision issued. 
By contrast, in the Williams decision? the applicant fded to prove on the 
balance of probabilities that insufncient attention had been devoted to her request for 
humanitarian and compassionate landing under S. 1 14(2) of the Act. Though the 
interview had been 45 minutes in length, and involved presentation of considerable 
materials, the court held nonetheless that it was not credible to infer lack of good faith. 
Noting that the decision was not rendered until five days afler the interview, Muldoon J. 
discounted counsel's premise that "the immigration officer reviews, cogitates and 
ruminates on "h & c" applications, only while seated at his or her desk in a C.I.C. 
~ f f i c e " ~ .  Under al1 of the circumstances, the court was satisfied that there had been due 
consideration of the applicant's materials and evidence. A related concept is that of a 
discretionary decision which is so manifestly wrong that it is said to be perverse on its 
face. Such a decision is symptomatic of both a lack of good faith and a failure to accord 
weight to relevant considerations, or of having given weight to improper considerations. 
In either case, it wiil resuit in a decision to quash the impugned decision? 
-- 
n5(1991) 15 h L J L  (2d) 3 15 (Fe& T.D.). 
s76 Williams v. Canada (Min. of CitUenhip & Immigration) (1996), 32 Imm L A  (2d) 256 (Fed T.D.). 
maid. at 257. 
Se+ Willum v. Canada, stcpra note 220, where the court note4 even in thc absence of writtcn reasons, a 
3.3 The Courts' Handling of Discretion 
'?t cannot be too often pointed out that the "rule of law", on which our democracy 
so largely depends for its sanction, is no stronger or wider than the courts rnay care to 
make it.. .," wote F.R Scott some 60 years ago. These words rernain just as tnie today 
as  does a corollary - that the nile of law wiil brook only that much discretion as the 
courts may choose. Immigration law has provided fertile ground for playing out the 
struggle between discretionary power and ruies in recent years. The reasons are not hard 
to discem. Twenty years ago, in overseas applications at any rate, it was rare to h d  an 
applicant assisted by counseI. Today, it is only a minority that is not assisted to some 
extent or other by a professional in the preparation and submission of their applications. 
And counsel have been resolute in urging the courts to pursue a reductionist, rights 
oriented approach toward immigration law and policy. It is an approach that is largely 
blind both to the wider policy involved and the difficulty of developing precise selection 
measures, capable of being applied worldwide, that are fair and produce consistent 
results. Moreover, it is an approach that has been bought into by the courts, but only in a 
positive way to benefit applicants. Thus, there has been much judicial activism focused 
on constraining negative discretion while, at the same time, nominally at least, a hands 
off approach has been followed with positive discretion. The goal of containing negative 
discretion has been pursued with such single-minded detemination that the courts have 
been seemingly oblivious to the incongruou results that have followed. 
Indeed, the overwhelmùig impression that one obtains fiom reading court 
judgment that fies in the face of reason will be overturned. Though there may be no requirement for 
d e n  reasons, a discretionary decision wlli be set aside where it is r n a n i f ' y  perverse. 
deciQom is that discretion is a highly misuseci administrative tool. Admittedly, 
discretion is a highly used tool, employed daily, in one form or another, in almost every 
application that is processed. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, it is used 
sensibly to the satisfaction of ail. It is, in fact, only the most egregious cases of misuse 
which end up before the courts on judicial review. In many instances, judicial disdain for 
discretion as exercised in the circumstances of the case before the court is weii founded. 
Regrettably , however, it is the indefensible which prompts judicial pronouncements that 
sometimes have the effkct of disabhg discretion in the remaining majority of cases 
where its application had benefits for both administraton and clients. 
3.3.1 Discretion and the Selection Process 
The courts7 handling of discretion, of course, occm in the context of the selection 
scheme provided for by the Act and ReguIatiom. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider 
briefly the approach adopted with respect to selection generally. The preference of the 
immigration bar, who favour a strict nghts based approach to selection, is seen in an 
editorial by C.L. Rotenberg decrying the use of negative dis~ret ion.~ In it, he argues 
that, in certain circumstances, use of such discretion offends against the concept of 
double jeopardy. Citing informal reports fiom other counsel, he notes a trend to refusal of 
Independent applicants for lack of language facility, notwithstanding that such applicants 
may have obtained the necessary 70 d t s  of assessment. in his estimation, this 
constitutes double jeopardy, since language is a factor expressly provided for in the 
- 
" F K  Scott, Comment [1936] Cae Bar Rev. 62 at 66. 
CL. Rotenberg, "Conundnmis - 1. Visa applicant refusal where appiicant has more than 70 units for 
iack of language facility - Double jeopardy?" (1987), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 72. 
selection m e m e s  and should not be counted again when the use of discretion is 
considered. To do otherwise, he contends, would be to accord it greater weight than was 
contemplated by the Governor in Council. Ability to successfully establish has a very 
specific meaning under the regulatory scheme, in his view, and is denned by obtaining an 
award of 70 or more points. ''The weight to be given to a lack of language fluency is 
clearly contemplated by the Govemor in Council as being a numerical factor and no more 
than that.'"' Thus, to consider it again later with respect to R 1 l(3) discretion is to 
effectively count it twice. Clearly, for him, "successfûl establishment" is demonstrated 
by a mechanical application of the selection criteria and is indicated, in a hard and f& 
way, by the caiculation of a numerical value that is either acceptable or unacceptable." 
This assumes, however, that the selection factor system is more than what it r e d y  
is - a sociologicalIy based tool for prognosticatiog fiiture success. It is not an infaliiile 
measure. How could it be? The real quality that the system seeks to gauge is not capable 
of precise calculation. Assessment of language, for example, is not simply a 
measurement of language for its own sake. Rather, it is one factor within a larger system 
of measures meant to serve a higher objective - assessing potentiai for bbsuccessful 
settlementy*. That is the whole point of the exercise. The tdly system rating language 
ability, educational attainment, occupational formation and expenence, age and so on is 
simply a grouping of individuai indicators seen to be relevant to an overall assessrnent of 
settlement potential. To look at any one of the selection factors in isolation fiom ail the 
"' Id. at 74. 
stn Or is it? In a iater article, Mr. Rotenberg admits that, when it cornes to independent immigrant 
selection, "[s]uccessfiil establishment in Canada is the name of the game." This would seem to suggest that 
he has revised his opinion to mcognize that a more hoiistic approach to the selection criteria is appropriate. 
other factors simply distorts the value of that factor by assuming that it is somehow 
complete unto itseIf. Yet, this is what Rotenberg urges when he cites double jeopardy as 
a concept relevant to Independent immigrant selection. 
But obviously, the broadness of the selection criteria suggest that more was 
intended. Occupational assessment Lies at the heart of the selection system.= As a more 
or less objective measure, it is fkee fiorn many of the cornplaints about capriciousness that 
affiict a more discretionary factor, like personal suitabiiity. Still, there is widespread 
criticism that occupational assessment does a poor job of selecting immigrants." This is 
true if what is sought is simply a particular occupational skili set that is readily applicable 
to the cment domestic labour market? Manifestly, however, the selection system is 
intended to capture more - it is meant to weigh human qualities too, as evidenced by the 
personal suitability factor. And, in my experience, the inchoate human qualities, such as 
initiative, adaptability, motivation and so on, are actually the most important. 
Professional engineers, for example, have enjoyed high occupationai demand on 
immigration occupation lists for many years and there is Little doubt that many job 
opportunities exist in engineering fields in Canada However, it is not enough for foreign 
- -  - -  
See C.L. Rotenberg "Conundnim" (1988) 3 Tmm. LX. (2d) 238 at 238. 
U, Four out of nine seleciion factors are directly focwd on occupation. These are occupational demand, 
the educational~training factor, experience and arrangeci employmentldesignated occupation. A afth factor, 
education, also obviously has a close comection to the assessment of occupation. 
Sc+ for exampIe. CIC "Daily Wrap" (4 May, 1998) quohg a stoly by Adrieme Tanna carried in the 
May 4,1998 editions of the Vàncouver Province and Edmonton Journal. According to Tanner, regardless 
of the occupation they are selected against: 
. . .rnost immigrants we chose end up driving taxis, delivering pizzas and washing dishes. Former 
immigration department program manager Donald Cameron calls the point systern for selecting 
immigrants "a siîiy game." Applicants are forced to measure up to "irrelevant" standards for 
occupations they'll never work at in Canada, he says. 
It is simply beyond the scope of thk papa to explore alternative selection systems that might be 
devised. Hence, my focus remains limited to the d e  of discretion in the selection system as presenly 
configured 
engineers to simply turn up in the domestic labour market. Some employers, for 
example, rnay be skeptical as to the value of foreign credentials and experience and may 
prefer a h o w n  commodity - a Canadian trained candidate with Canadiau experience. To 
succeed, immigrants in this position need to be prepared to compete in the job market. 
Though the particular job qualification is a startuig point, it is human qualities like 
motivation, flexibility, initiative and other personal factors which see an Unmigrant best 
through the rough times of settlement in Canada and ensure ultimate success. 
This point was not lost on Parliament. Though it struggied to fashion as objective 
a set of measures as possible, it aiso recognized that the selection system was not 
infaiIi'ble. Thus, it made express provision against the possibility of a failure in the rules 
for qualification by the inclusion of an overriding discretion in S. 11(3) of the 
Regulatiom." If, as Rotenberg asserts, any selection factor was meant to be simply a 
numerical vdue and no more than thai, and if the attainment of 70 units of assessrnent 
was really a conclusive, magic number, then the inclusion of R 1 1(3) is redundant. But 
they are not. R. 1 l(3) discretion was left to hang over the entire selection system, for use 
in a global way, in consideration of the total sum of dl the parts. A reading of that 
subsection makes this apparent: 
(3) A visa O fficer may 
(a) issue im immigrant visa to an immigrant who is not awarded the number of 
units of assesment required by section 9 [ie. independent immigrants] or 10 [ie. 
assisted relative category i m m i ~ t s ]  or who does not meet the requirements of 
subsection (1) or (2), or 
@) refuse to issue an immigrant visa to an immigrant who is awarded the number 
~6 See h g  v. Canada (Ninisier of Employment & Immigration) (1989), 27 F.TR 56 (F.C.T.D.). 
Parliament has recognizcd, through the device of R l l(3) discretion, that ability to successfully estabIish in 
Canada is a considmtion that may outweigh other factors, including accumulation of a specified number 
of points. 
of uni& of assessment reqyired by section 9 or 10, 
if, in his opinion, üiere are good reasons why the nurnber of &ts of assessment 
awarded do not reflect the chances of the particdarinimigrant and his dependants 
of becoming successfûliy established in Canada and those reasons have been 
submitted in writing to, and approved by, a senior immigration officer. 
If it is impermissible to consider the individual parts of the selection system and their 
inter-relationship, when determinhg how best to exercise R 1 l(3) discretion, then what 
else is left? Surely Mr. Rotenberg would not have visa officers considering factors 
uncomected to the enumerated seiection factors? 
3-32 Formalisrn 
Nonetheless, the reductionist course has largely carried the day, with the courts 
seduced to the notion that the selection system, and use of discretion, should be 
approached in a piecemeal way. Thus, the selection factors have been found to be 
individual measmes of specific abilities which rnay not be "double co~nted".~" Not only 
is this contrary to the intent of Parliament, but it leads to an approach where strict 
Zeng v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigation) (1 99 l), 12 Imm. L.R (2d) 167 (Fed- C.A.). 
See ako Ho v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Inmigration) (1994), 88 F.TR 146. The Court found a 
reviewable enor where language ability (assessed undn Item 8 of Schedule 1) was considered in an 
assessment of personal suitability (Item 9 of Schedule 1). The problem of "double-counting" is also 
highlighted in the Immigration Manuais, CIC IM Chap. ûp-5, para. 2.5.3 "Awnaent of occupations", 
where it is stated: 
The officer must use care to avoid a double asessrnent of selection factors: for example, the 
appIicant has already been assessed on their official lauguage capability. However, if the 
occupation is such that Iabour market information indicates that a much higher level of language 
proficiency is requU.ed to work in that occupation AND the appiicaut has not prepared f?nancidy 
or in other ways for these settlawt problems, the officer may consider negative discretion. 
The d e  on double countmg has been ameliorated somewhat by the concession that a discrete factor, 
otherwise assessed on its own, may k considered again in certain circumstances. In particuIar, a factor 
such as age, for example, may be considered under personal suitability, but only insofar as it speaks to the 
applicant's motivation, resourcefirlness and other qualities that are the cna of sufh a personal suitability 
assessment. Ahmad v. Canada (Mnister of Ciiizenship & Immigration) (1998), 40 Imm L X  (2d) 121 
(F.C.T.D.) citing Ping v. Cànada (Mnisfer of Citizenship & Immigration) (1997), 37 I rmn L R  (2d) 135 
(F.C.T.D.); Ste$an v. Çctnada (Mnister of Ci&enship Br Immigration) (1995). 35 Inmr L R  (2d) 2 1 
(F.C.T.D.). 
formalism is demanded fiom the administrative process of selection. Though 
administrative law processes are intended and designed to be expeditious and less 
involveci than judicial procedures, because of the approach adopted by the courts, the 
results in practice have clearly been otherwise. 
The assessment process is govemed by section 6(1) of the Act. It States that: 
. . . any immigrant.. . may be granted landing if it is established to the satisfaction of 
an immigration officer that the immigrant meets the selection standards 
established by the regdations for the purpose of determining whether or not and 
the degree to which the immigrant w i H  be able to become successfully established 
in Canada, as determined in accordance with the regulations. 
That assessment, of course, is conducted in accordance with section 8(1) which provides 
that : 
. . .for the purpose of detemilliuig whether an immigrant and the immigrant's 
dependants.. .wiH be able to become successfully established in Canada, a visa 
officer shaii assess that immigrant or.. . the spouse of that immigrant.. .on the basis 
of each of the factors listed in column 1 of Schedule I? 
Schedule 1 of the Immigration ReguIati011~ goes on to provide a series of nine factors 
against which applications are a s s e s ~ e d . ~ ~  Among other factors, an Independent 
immigrant is selected on the basis of their intended occupation in Canada. To succeeâ, 
however, the applicant must possess any requisite training needed for the occupation, as 
well as  at least one year of relevant experience. 
While the Act establishes the necessity for an assessment, it is not just any 
assessment which will do. According to Rothstein J., "[a@ assessment is not an informal 
This section has been held to place a positive duty upon visa officm to conduct a formai assesment in 
respect of any claimed intended occupation in Canada See @ v. Canada (Min. of Employment & 
Immigration) (1991), 12 Imm. L E  (2d) 172 (Fed CA.). 
1"9 For a lipt of the seledon factors agaimt which Independmis are ocorecl, see Appendk A "Independent 
Immigrant SeIection Gnd", below at page ??? 
or preliminary detennination by a visa officer. The tams "assess" or 6'assessment" mean 
the process of applying to the prospective immigrant the factors listed in column 1 of 
Schedule 1 of the Regulations."" Quite simply then, the visa officer is required to go 
through a fomal process of weighing every claimed intended occupation against al l  of 
the factors set out in the schedule. This is so, no matter how farfetched an intended 
occupation may be. Because of this demand for formality nom the courts, visa offices 
are not able to quickly shmg off unlikely intended occupations by merely pointing out 
that it does not appear to be supported by the evidence on file. Instead, a painstaking 
process of calculating points and justifjkg the number awarded must be conducted for 
each and every potential occupation. It is a not uncommon practice for applicants to list 
multiple intended occupations in an application, many of which may have iittle or no 
basis in the applicant's educational and occupationai grounding. This is not to suggest 
that an applicant should be denied a fair and full assessment for each and every 
occupation. However, the question has to be asked whether the ends of justice might not 
be just as Mly served by allowing for a less cumbersome assessment process for 
occupations which are ill-founded on the evidence presented with an application. An 
assessment conducted in accordance with the Immigration Act and Regdations is a sine 
qua non. However, to require that it be conducted in a rigid, detailed manner for each 
and every part of an application is to impose a formalism that gives no breath of Iife to 
the administrative process to experiment with alternative processing methods beyond 
those of a judicial nature. 
5" Issaeva v. Conada (Min. of Citizaship & Immigration) (1997), 37 Imm L E  (2d) 9 1 at 95 (F.C.T.D.). 
Another example is seen in the Hoballahi decision-', where the applicant had 
been awarded more than enough units to meet the required pass mark in the Assisted 
Relative sub-category of the Independent class. Nonetheless, the visa officer felt the 
applicant would not be able to successfiilly establish himself in Canada and so exercised 
negative discretion under R. 1 l(3) to refuse the application. In doing so, the officer noted 
that the applicant's spouse had no "work skills" to assist settlement. The Court, however, 
noted that the officer had not mentioned in his refiisal letter the assistance the Canadian 
relative might provide to aid settlement. To the Court's minci, it was obvious that the 
officer was aware of such potential support, since the application had been assessed as an 
Assisted Relative. Failure to specifically mention such assistance led the Court to 
conclude that relevant evidence, the potential family support, had not been considered? 
This reasoning, however, imports to the administrative sphere the sort of 
mechanistic approach that is a hallmark of judicial processes. On the facts, one might 
just as easily conclude that the assistance had been properly accounted for. Assisted 
Relatives need obtain only 65 points overall for a pass mark, as compared to 70 for 
regular Independents. In effect, they are given a five point "bonus" in recognition of 
potential family support. hplicitly, the officer recognized this when assessing the 
appiicant at the lower Assisted Relative standard. However, it is apparent also that in 
exercising negative discretion, she did not feel that the family support would be sunicient 
to overcome the applicant's poor settlement prospects. To ask her to expressly and 
explicitly deal with the issue of family support in the exercise of discretion is to ask her to 
Hoballahi v. Canada (Miniifer of Citizenship & Immigration) (1996), 124 F.TK 164,37 Imm LJL 
(2d) 98 (F.C.T.D.) (hereinafter cited to hm. LE). 
effectively "double count" it and accord it more weight than it was appafently meant to 
have? 
Un a number of occasions, CIC has attempted to irnplement streamlined 
procedures, ody  to £hd that it has nui afoul of the courts' notions of faimess. It is very 
much a dance of "one step forward-one step bacK', with CIC and the judiciary ofien 
pulling in different directions. The Lam c a s e  provides an illustration of this 
immigration "two-step." Shui-Man Lam applied for immigration in the self-employed 
catego~y. However, his application was rejected upon initial review (or "paper- 
screening") without the benefit of an intewiew. Lam had failed to provide dlicient 
supporting evidence with his application to convince the visa officer that he could quali@ 
for immigration, even if an interview was held. The Federal Court, however, f o n d  that 
the wording of the regdations was such as to leave no discretion in a visa officer to 
refuse an application without interview. The practical result was that Literally thousands 
of failed applicants had to be afforded an opportunity for interview, no matter how 
hopeless their chances of s ~ c c e s s . ~  It was an immense exercise for CIC that consumed 
592 Id. at 100. 
~ 9 '  Offers of support to Assisted Relatives are to be distinguished h m  sponsorships under the Famiiy 
Class. Family Class sponsorships are formal undertakings, of a iked duration, whereby Canadian residents 
and citizens accept legai responsïbility for settling an immigrant and her family, if any. An offer of support 
to an Assisted Relative is entirely different in kind It is simply an iufonnal promise of help for which 
there is no enforcement rnecbanism under the A c t  or the Regulations. Fwther, with respect to the value of 
offers of support in Assisted Relative cases, it is interesthg to note that the '%onus" was once set at 15. 
Some years ago, however, Parliament evidently felt this overvaiued such offm and so reduced the ''bonus" 
to its present vaiue of 5. 
594 Lam v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration). (1991), 15 Imm. LR. (2d) 275,49 F.T.R.. 200 
(T.D.). 
See Department of External Mairs and international Trade Canada, Telexes OSD-0006 (13 I~t~luary 
1992) and URR-0143 (25 February 1992) "New Caii-In Procedures Foilowing Lam Decision". These 
telexes provided guidance to immigration missions respecting c d h g  for interview appiicants who had 
previously been failed at paper-screening, but were to be afTorded an opportunity for interview as a result 
of hm. 
vast intentiew resources. Just as importantly, it caused many applicants to expend 
considerable tirne, money and effort to attend interviews with little likelihood of success. 
The necessity for these interviews clearly held out false hope for some applicants and 
doubtîess Ied many of them to draw their own conclusions about Canadian justice and 
fair play. In the result, a regdatory amendment was necessary to spell out when a case 
might be refused in the absence of a personal 
The imposition of court-like thinking and processes upon the immigration system 
has led not just to increasing fomalism in the immigration system. It has, in fact, also 
contributed to the bureaucratization of immigration processes, with fiinctionaria hesitant 
to extend themselves, lest they be faulted by the courts. This is evident, for example, in 
the standard form response CIC has developed for dealing with representations by failed 
applicants. Although in practice such representations often cause a visa officer to go back 
and have a "second look" at the file, there is no percentage in revealing this fact, if the 
review still results in a negative decision. Under the Federal Couri Act, an applicant has 
thirty days fkom notification of a tribunal decision to undertake an application for review. 
That limitation period is subject to a form of novation, if the decision-maker responds in 
any sort of substantive fashion to subsequent representations." Appeals, of course, result 
~6 See immigration Regulations, section 1 1.1, which was promulgated in response to the decision in Lam. 
Also see Employrnent and immigration Canada (EIC) Operations Memomdum (OM) IL 92-02 
"immigration Regulatiuns. 1978 - Amendment " (07 A p d  1992), descniing the problems for the 
department arising out of the Lam decision and the necessity for enacting S. 1 1.1 of the Regdations which 
came into effect on February 21, 1992. At 2, it is noted that "Tmmediately . . , [the Lam] decision entitled 
all immigrant applicaats worldwide to a personal interview with a visa officer. It has long been standard 
procedure for visa officers to paper screen applications and only mterview those applicants who had some 
prospect of meeting minimum selection standards. 
Because of the serious consequences of the Lam decision for immigration operations worldwide, the 
amendment to Reguiation 11 was instituted on a priority basis." 
597 Soimu v. Canada (Secretary ofState) (1 994), 83 F.T.R. 285. The court distinguished there between a 
"true review" and a mere "courtesy response", noting that a true review after reîüsai constitutes a decision 
in additional work burdens to visa officm in preparing the file and afidavit evidence for 
judicial review, being available for examination on affidavit, and the like. As a result, a 
standard form letter is usually issued simply advising the applicant that her case was 
previousiy considered on its substantive merits and, where appropnate, for possible 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The response goes on to indicate that the 
matter was refiised on both accounts and that a letter of a certain date was previousIy sent 
to her advising of these events. It concludes by directhg the applicant to submit a fresh 
application, if new or different information is available." The necessity of such an 
empty reply is obviously a direct response to the technicalities of judicial limitation 
periods. Sadly, though, it contributes to an immigration system that is more Byzantine 
and less responsive to clients' needs and interests. 
3.3.3 Positive Discretion 
With respect to the use of discretion in the selection process, however, formalism 
gives way to inconsistency. Immigration counsel, for example, are not consistent in their 
opinions over its usage. While they are vocally critical of negative discretion and claim 
preference for a positivist view wherein the rules are stnctly applied, yet they do not 
hesitate to seek positive discretion to allow exemptions fÏom those d e s .  Certainly, when 
which wii i  start the 30 &y limitation period nuining anew. Likewise, see Dumbrava v. Canada (Min. of 
Citizenshri, & Immigration) (1995), 31 hm. LA. (2d) 76,101 F.T.R. 230 (F.C.T.D.), where the Court 
refused to entertain an application that was outside the 30 day apped period. For a discussion of the 30 
&y Iimitation period, and the apparent perils and probIems it poses for the private bar, see C.L. Rotenberg, 
Annotation to Dumbrava, id, 3 1 Tmm. L.R. (2d) 76 at 77-79. The problem discussed here is larger than 
just the example of novation of limiîaiion periods. It accounts as weii for the reluctance of visa officers to 
provide explanatioxts m the vernacula. in refusal letters h t  might be more meaningfirl to fded applicants. 
-ad, the safe approach is to recite tried and true snippets of the Act and Regdations which wiil sustain a 
refiisal upon review. Though these meet the court.' reqyirements, they o h  are found obtuse and abstract 
by applicants. 
it cornes to positive discretion, their only cornplaint tends to be that it is not used enough. 
Thus it is that positive discretionary policies are the subject of litigation, if withheld h m  
a pdcular  applicant. This is true to the point where even the courts must occasionally 
throw up their hands in hstration at unending attempts to "judiciaiize" positive 
di~cret ion~ and will generally not gant mandamus to force its exercise.' Occasionally, 
though, it seems that the impulse of good judges to want to do the right thing will even 
overwhelm this hesitancy. 
A case in point is the Ting de~ision~~',  where the Court felt obliged to çuggest a 
substantive outcome requiring an exercise of positive discretion. Zhang Xi Ting had 
worked as an interpreter, tour guide and French teacher in Hong Kong. She possessed a 
Bachelor and a Master of Arts degrees korn Chinese universities and was also studying at 
a Quebec university for a second Master's degree. Her application for permanent 
residence as a skiUed worker stated her intended occupation was that of an interpreter in 
Vancouver. B.C. Though Ting was apparently fluent in the French language. the visa 
officer noted that she was much less proficient in Engiish and so awarded only minimal 
points for this language. Noting this deficiency and the negative impact it might have on 
Ting's adaptation to the predominantly EngLish language job market she was destined to, 
the visa officer awarded just four of a possible ten units for personal suitability. The end 
resdt was that Ting obtained only 68 points overall, two short of the tally for a succasfùl 
" See CIC-AU Immigration Message ORD-0361/E, (30 November, 1993) "Rerponrer to Enquiries af tr  
R@aZ Letter fssued". 
" See the comments of Muidoon J. in Khcllon. supro note 185, regardhg a propensity by counsel to 
attempt to bring every aspect of discretion under the sway of the courts. 
Young Y. Canada, supra note 14 1 .  
" Ting v. Ourada (Muiister of Citizmhip & Immigration) (1996), 36 Imm. L X  (2d) 197,122 F.T.R. 238 
(T.D.) (hereinafter cited to h LE). 
application. 
Citing a lack of good faith in the visa officer's seeming failure to take into 
account al1 relevant circumstances (such as the applicant's university training, proficiency 
in three languages and adaptability demonstrated by successful establishment at a French 
University in Quebec), Dubé J. set aside the decision and ordered a re-deterrnination. 
Apparently vexed by the logic of the visa officer's determination, the Court did not leave 
the matter there, however. A confuskg discussion of the proper use of discretion in this 
case was also offered, together with the Court's opinion as to the fitness of the candidate, 
Secondly, the visa officer failed to exercise her discretion under subsection 1 1(3) 
of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 which allows the visa oficer to issue a visa 
to a person who was not awarded the required number of units of assessment if 
there are good reasons why the number of units of assessment awarded do not 
reflect the chances of that particular immigrant of becoming successfb.iiy 
established in Canada. A proper aercise of that discretion would have resuked in 
the w d n g  of two more units s o  as to g m t  o visa io this highly qualifed 
opplicon t. [emphasis added]m 
With respect, Dubé J. appears to have lost sight of the distinction between the 
discretion available to a visa officer under S. 1 l(3) of the ReguIatiom and the discretion 
inherent in assessment of the selection factor of personal suitability. R. 1 l(3) discretion 
may not be employed to award M e r  M t s  of personal suitability, a s  he suggests. 
Instead, its use is restricted to situations, precisely like the one in Ting, where the 
applicant has failed to obtain sufficient points, but appears to have potential for 
settlement in excess of that reflected by the total points award. It cannot be used to boost 
the number of points actual1y awarded for any assessment factor. That involves use of 
Id., 197 at 200. 
any discretion inherent within the calculation of the particular selection factor. Though 
use of the two kinds of discretion is obviously complementary and overlapping in the 
sense of contributhg to the final overall result, they are nonetheless distinct and different. 
In the end, though mandamu did not issue to compel the favourable exercise of 
discretion, the court certaidy left Little doubt for the visa officer about the appropriate 
course of action on reassessment. 
3.3.4 Negative Discretion 
On the other han& any hesitance against c'judicialkïng" discretion fds  away 
when negative discretion is involved, particularly when its application affects substantive 
o u t c ~ m e s . ~  A review of the case law makes clear that, in this current era of a rights 
sensitive approach to immigration, negative discretion has increasingly fallen into 
disfavor with the courts." Accordingly, it is not lightly tolerated and the courts strive to 
contain it whenever possible. This reality is welI illustrateci by the case of Chen? 
The applicant Chen had been living and working in Canada and the U.S. for four 
years when he applied for permanent residence in the Independent category in July, 
1987Y He was in te~ewed in September, 1987 and received a score of 73 units of 
603 Even some procedurai discretion, such as the decision whether to give an applicant a PAQ or a full 
application, may have a substantive impact. As in Choi, supra note 270, for example, handing out a PAQ 
had the effect of depriving Choi of a substantive opportunity to lock in his application, Hence, procedural 
discretion had a substantive outcorne. 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, of course, has been a major influence in recent years, harbingering 
the trend to emphasis on rights. For a review of its application and impact on discretionary decision 
making, see generaily June M- Ross, "Applying the Charter to Discretionary Authority" (1991) 29 Alta. 
LX. 382. 
Chen v. Canada (Min. of Employment & Immigration), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 725,27 Imm. LX. (2d) 1, 179 
N X  70, 123 D.L.R. (4th) 536, rev'g (1994) 22 ImmLR (2d) 213 (Fed. C.A.), rev'g (1991) 13 h m ~  L R
(2d) (Fed. T.D.) 172. 
-The facbl.21 sunmiary provided h m  is drawn fiom the hial court's decision reported at (1991) 13 Imm. 
LK(2d) 174. In particuiar, see ''background fa&" as set out at 174- 177. 
assesment, more than enough to meet the 70 point threshold. In particulin, Chen 
received seven of the possible ten units of assessrnent for the factor of personal 
suitability. At that t he ,  he was advised that his application had been provisiondy 
accepted, subject to completion of medical and security checks. In September, 1988, his 
work permit in the United States expired. By December, 1988, the security checks still 
had yet to be c~rnpleted.~ 
During this long interval, he contacted the visa officer by correspondence on two 
occasions and ". . .offered to pay any "costs or fees" in order to expedite the matter.'- 
Finally, Chen sent a Christmas card to the inte~ewing officer, enclosing the sum of five 
hundred dollars in Amencan fimds and thanking her for her efforts on his behalf The 
officer brought this apparent bribe to the attention of her superiors, who convened a 
M e r  interview for Chen, before a more senior officer. He initially denied sending any 
money when the subject of the "gift" was raised. Pressed on the issue, he eventually 
" One must have some compassion for Chen's plight. Some eighteen month after he had been given 
approval in principle for bis application, he was stiil in a waiting game. Such delay is sure to annoy and 
upset anyone. However, it must be recognized that fault for delay does not dways lie entirely with CIC. 
In Chen's case, it was completion of "background checks* that held up matters. Those checks obviously 
involve verincation of who the applicant is and ensuring that she is not a criminal, security or other sort of 
risk to the public health or safety. This may entail complex and protracted Liaison with police, security and 
other officiais, both domestic and foreign. Relying upon information derived primariry fÏom other 
agencies, CIC nonetheless remains on the firing line for cxiticism with the slow Pace of background checks. 
Though most of the work in completing such checks is ofien not within its actual control, yet it is the 
agency which must d e r  the criticisrns when an applicant is unduly delayed or, worse yet, a war cr imid ,  
senior official of a despotic regime, organized crime kingpin or 0 t h  undesirable is granted entry because 
of a failure in background checking. Every case of immigrant pracessing must involve a balancing of the 
rigbt of the appiicant to speedy processing aga& the right of the Canadian public to be protected This is 
especiaiiy true where, as in Chen's case, the applicant has de l i i te ly  chosen, for reasons known usuaiiy 
only to her, to apply outside of her country of origin. CIC rnakes no secret that processing in such cases is 
delayed by the necessity for r e f d  back to the visa office having geographic responsibizity over the 
appiicant's country of origin. See the procedure described supra, note 458. Thou& delay to the applicant 
is regrettable, the bottom h e  must favour the security of society over the convenience of the applicant. 
Thus, every application kit contains an explicit w a d g  to applicants that they should make no 
preparations to move to Canada untii they achially have a properly issued visa in band. Chen's frustration 
was understandable, but his actions were not. 
recanted and provided various excuses including that it was an Oriental custom to give 
presents to "speciai niends" at holidays and, later, that it was to cover any special costs, 
such as long distance telephone charges or the likeebQ9 Subsequentiy, though the second 
officer did not alter the units of assessment awarded to Chen, a Letter was sent to him 
refuskg his application. Amongst other reasons, the officer invoked negative discretion 
under S. 1 l(3) of the Immigration ReguIatiom to refuçe his application, notwithstanding 
that he had received sufficient units of assessment to qualifi. In the officer's estimation, 
the points actually awarded to Chen did not reflect his true potential for successful 
settlement. 
In the Triai Division of the Federal Court, the grounds upon which negative 
discretion might be used to overcome an otherwise successful assessment was the centrai 
issue. Strayer J. reviewed closely the selection cnteria promulgated in Schedule 1 of the 
Reguiations pursuant to the authonty of the Govemor in Council under S. 114(l)(a) of the 
Act to make regulations.6I0 "While it is nowhere clearly spelled ou&'' he posited, ''the 
selection standards authorized for use by para. 114(l)(a) of the Act, and the actual factors 
identified in Sched. 1 of the Regulations appea. to be essentially related to the ability of 
an immigrant to make a living in Canada or to be economically sutaineci other than by 
the  tat te."^" Because of this apparent emphasis on economic factors as an indicator of 
ability to successfûlIy establish, Strayer J. found it ". . .difficult to read the discretionary 
power granted to a visa officer by subs. 1 l(3) of the Regulations as allowing him to 
'O8 Chen, supra note 606 at 175. 
609 I d  at 176. 
610 See Appendix A, below, which provides a Listing of the selection criteria mandated by Schedule 1 of 
the Regufations. 
ignore the number of units of assessrnent and to detennine, for essentially non-economic 
reasons, that an immigrant does not have a chance of becoming successfblly estabfished 
in Ca~ada?~ In the result, he held that the visa officer's decision had impmperly 
factored in concems about the applicant's potential for "social success" that were 
irrelevant to the statutory selection scheme. 
In the Court of Appeal, the majority foimd the opposite to be tme and so reversed 
the lower court. In their view, while many of the selection factors had an economic 
focus, they were not restricted exclusively to such a focus. Social success, according to 
the court, was inherent dongside economic success in factors such as age, education and 
language ability."l3 The Court also observed that the factor of "personai suitability" was 
defined in the regulation~~'~ as reflecting a person's adaptability, motivation, initiative, 
resourcefulness and other similar qualities. They were unwilling to accept îhat these 
factors were to be Iimited only to ability to earn a living. To do so, they felt, would 
unduiy nanow the phrase '90 become successfully estabtished in Canada" by inserting the 
word "economically" into it? 
Deaiing with a fiirther concem that Strayer I. had about the apparent open ended 
nature of the discretion accorded under S. 1 1 (3), Létoumeau J.A. responded by noting that 
that section also contained the qualifyllig words "good reasons", and that these acted as a 
limiting factor: 
In determining whether there are good reasons to so conclude [that the points 
'" Chen, mpra note 606 at 180. 
Id. at 181. 
'" Per Létoumeau J.A. (Isaac C.J.. concurring). Chen, supra note 605,22 hmu L.R. (2d) 213 at 218. 
At Item 9 of Scheduie X of the Reguiations. 
'" Per Létourneau JA., supra note 613 at 2 19. 
awarded do not r e k t  the immigrant's chances for successfully estabiishing. 
either socially or economically], the visa officer is required to form a personai 
opinion which must have an objectivity foundation. To put it another way, the 
words "good reasomY' import a measure of objectively (sic) in the process and 
ensure that the exercise of discretion under subs. 1 l(3) is justifiable in the 
circumstances and not arbitrary or capriciousOw 
On the other hand, Robertson LA., in dissent, refusecl to accept that subs. 1 l(3) 
could have been intended to vest a broad residual discretion in visa officers. He stated 
that he was ". . . troubled by the prospect of giving judicial recognition to a criterion which 
hinges on notions of "good reasom" and "social success.. ." and ". . .the prospect of being 
called upon to evaiuate the objective merit of visa officers' subjective as~essments."~~ 
Accordingly, he preferred the approach adopted by Strayer J. in the Trial Division. A 
M e r  appeal by Chen to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted, with the result that 
the Trial Division judgment was restored. Regrettably, the Supreme Court issued no 
reasons for doing so, beyond simply expressing a preference for the views of Robertson 
J.A. and Strayer J? 
Chen must be regardai as an important decision for administrative discretion in 
immigration law, not just because it has been followed in subsequent casesdLg, but also 
because of the narrow approach it sanctioned respectkg discretionary power. As was 
evident, even an express statutory grant of power was insufficient to overcome deep 
seated judicial suspicion of negative discretion. The text of section 1 l(3) does not 
6L6 Id. 
'17 Id. at 222, per Robertson J.A. 
Chen, supra note 605, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 725,27 Imm. L R  (2d) 1, 179 N R  70, 123 D.LK (4th) 536 
(S.C.C.). 
See Maria Laveiie, b'Positive and Negative Discretion Under Subsection 1 l(3) of the Regulations" (3 
A p d  1998) 3 (CIC) Litigation Management NewsIetter at 2, where the author States that "[s]ince Chen v, 
M.C.I., aii subsequent cases involving subs. 1 l(3) have foiiowed the Chen focus on economic 
consideratioas." 
explicitly refer to economic ability to estabîish an4 as Létourneau J.A. observed, the 
court was required to employ an ejusdern generis methodology to read meaning into the 
gant of powa that was obvious neither on its face nor in ~ o n t e x t . ~  
It is indeed the case that many of the selection factors enumerated in Schedule 1 
have either a total or partial focus on economic establishment. This is not surpnsing, 
since matters such as job skills, training, work experience and the iike are most readily 
adapted to a points assesment scheme. What is less easily captured is the notion of 
social success - does this person have the wherewithal to get on readily with life in 
Canada, both inside and outside of work? This is not an irrelevant or trivial 
consideration. As was noted in the Court of Appeal, social success is a consideration 
evident in many of the selection factors, alongside the notion of economic success. 
Certaidy, the two are not nearly as neatly separable as the Trial Division, the minonty in 
the Court of Apped and the Supreme Court would have one beiieve. Successful 
economic establishment, for example, must inevitabiy entail familiarizhg oneself to a 
sufncient degree with basic matters such as employment and tax Iaws, regdations 
. . 
pertaining to personal hances, housing issues and the like. Indeed, successful economic 
establishment must even involve the acquisition of some howledge of socially 
acceptable workplace behaviour and etiquette. These d l  import a healthy degree of social 
-- 
mu S n  for example, Phiùp L. Bryden, "Developments m Adminimative Law: The 1994-95 Term" (1996), 
7 SCLX (2d) 27 at 77, where the author notes that fiom the viewpoint of statutory interpretation, the 
decision in Chen is ~lllprising. In his view, it is not obvious h m  a textual standpoint that R 1 l(3) 
discretion should be limitted to the matter of verifyïng that the points system is a true reflection of potential 
for economic establishment alone. As a remit, he ph, id. at 77-80, that the decision may be explained as 
a reaction to two concems. First is the courts' traditionai misûust of grants of broad discretion, particuiariy 
where it is employed in a negative fashion, and a related fear of an increased volume of litigation, if bbsocial 
adaptation" was a ground for refusing applicants. Second is concern that the selection system not be used 
as an informal mechaniSm for, effectively, delivering punishment meant to protect the mtegnty of the 
Further, it is simplistic to suggest that abihty to economicaIly establish is just a 
question of being able to get a job. Assuming that minimum wage standards reflect a 
bottom üne, or at least an officially sanctioned one at any rate, as to the level of h o m e  
needed to provide a reasonable Livelihood in our society, it is hard to imagine any able 
bodied immigrant who will not be capable of establishing economically. Certainly, many 
menial labour jobs paying minimum wage require no particular ski11 set or even a .  ability 
to read, write or speak one of Canada's official languages. As a result, a refusal on 
negative discretion wodd appear tenuous for lack of any job skilIs or training. 
Certainly, it seems that the Courts went to some lengths to h d  sufEcient 
justification to limit R 1 I(3) discretion in the fashion that was done. Robertson J.A.'s 
difficdty with the notion of courts havhg to judge objectively the subjective decisions of 
visa officers, for example, rings hollow. It is actually a cornmonplace for them to be 
cdled upon to engage in such activity upon judicid review. This is part of the reason that 
judicial review claims not to be interested in the merits of a decision, only the manner by 
which it was reached. Similarly, the strictly economic focus adopted in Chen appears 
repetitive. By judicial interpretation, negative discretion under S. 1 1(3)(b) has been 
Iimited to the same considerations covered in S. 19(l)(b) of the Act. It reads as follows: 
lg(l)  No person s h d  be granted admission who is a member of any of the 
foIIowing classes: . . . 
@) pmons who there are reasonable grounds to believe are or will be unable 
or u n w i h g  to support themselves and those persons who are dependent 
on them for care and support, except persons who have satisfied an 
Unmigration officer that adequate arrangements, other than those that 
involve social assistance, have been made for their care and support; . . . 
immigration system. 
It is questionable to coaceive that Parliament would have intended to duplicate this 
express power elsewhere in the legislative regimeea 
Unfominately, Strayer J. and Robertson J.A. appear to have concluded that the 
exercise of negative discretion in Chen was Little more than a covert attempt to punish the 
applicant for potentially criminal behaviour, and so used whatever justifications were at 
hand to strike it down." However, this focus ignores the fact that the behaviour 
concemed had a direct bearing upon the qualities and attributes being selected for. 
Irrespective of whether or not his actions were criminal, the inappropriateness of the 
approach made by Chen is strikllig and spoke directly to the notion of adaptability that is 
central to the selection criteria Even those who might regard Chen as good law will 
likely concede it is built on bad facts.- This was not a case of a confiised foreigner, 
hampered by language barriers, and otherwise addled by his f b t  encounter with western 
bureaucracy. In reality, Chen was a well-educated professional who had been working at 
"' This point appears not to have been argued in any level of court in Chen. 
622 Under Canadian Iaw, there are a couple of possible offences that may have been c o d t t e d  by C'en. 
Under the Immigration Act itself, for example, S. 94(l)(m) makes it an offence for anyone to kuowingly 
induce any person to contravene a provision of the Act Chen's "@Y', of course, wodd have to have been 
offered intentionaliy as an inducement to the visa officer to issue a visa somehow contrary to the scheme 
provided for by the Act. More likely, however, is the offence of "fkaud on the govement" pursuant to S. 
121(1) of the Cnminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am., which provides: 
Every one commits an offence who 
(a) directly or indirectly 
(0 gives, offers, or agrees to give or offer to an official . . . 
a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for cooperation, assistance, 
exercise of influence or an act or omission in connection with 
(ii) the transaction of business with or aay matter of business relating to the government . . . 
whether or not, in fact, the official is able to cooperate, render assistance, exetcise influence or do 
or omit to do what is proposed, as the case may be.. .. 
Under S. 121(3), every such offence is pimishable by way of indiclment and liable to a maximum term 
of imprisonment of up to five years. 
This much appears to be conceded even by Robertson JA.  hmiseif in his diuenting opinion, whm he 
States, "[u]ndoubtedly, there are those who wiii view the disposition of this apped in terms of achieving a 
just result. My concems are also noted in the prospect of bemg called upon to evaluatc the objective merit 
universities in Canada and the US. for five years before this episode. His inability to 
profit h m  al l  of that experience surely speaks volumes about his adaptabiüty? 
Moreover, this was not a case of theorizing as to how he might adapt. Surely his actual 
performance was as  good an indicator of fbture performance as any selection aiteria that 
legislators might be inspired to deviseF Admittedy, it is a set of facts which raises the 
interesting7 but diflicult, question as to how much immigrants are expected to adapt to 
our ~oc ie ty"~  and how far society should be expected to accommodate individual and 
cultural differences. At a minimum, however, the iine must be drawn at the threshold of 
criminal activity. 
There is another aspect to the concern that immigration law was being used to 
mete out punishment. The c o u -  themselves have always had an inherent jurisdiction to 
control and protect their own processes, as witness the contempt proceedings in 
Bhumager. It is a jurisdiction, however, which they obviously are unwilling to allow 
for administrative tribunals. Speaking from personal experience, the problem of 
inappropriate, and even illicif approaches to visa officers in hopes of expediting an 
of visa officers' subjective assessments." Chen, supra note 605,22 Tmm. L k  (2d) 213 at 222. 
a Not to mntion that his actions would have been improper even in his country of origin. Certaidy, 
newspaper accounts of official comrption trials in China malce evident that briiery of a pubric officiai is 
also an off'ce there, notwithstanding imy custom to the contnuy. 
" The selection procas is meant to bc a forward looking exercise. Singh (Gunnif) v. canada, supra note 
544 at 70. Givcn the prospective nature of an assessrnent of potentiai for successfid settiement, the need 
for some discretion is indispensible since the matter entails weighing a variety characteristics that are 
incapable of reduction to precise matiiematicd calculations. 
" Clearly, legislators mtended that some adaptation by the immigrant take place. This is obvious nom the 
fact that the selection factor of personal suitability specificaily identifies "adaptability" as a relevant 
consideration, though obviousIy the courts have narrowed it to economic adaptability. This is seen aIsa in 
statements fiom Parliament that suggest a wider adaptability, invoIving social settlement, is also within the 
expectations of legislators. Regdatory Impact Analysis Statement SOR 92/101 (6 February 1992), for 
example, in descn'bing various changes bemg made to hmüy dependency defînitions, begins by stating 
that, "[ïjmmigrants coming to Canada are expected to accept the Canadian cuitural reality." 
AS noted earlier, m section 32  Judiciai Review, the prerogative Rrnedies offéred by courts are 
application is fairy common and it is a rare visa officer who does not have a story to 
relate about such advances. Indeed, they are apparently sornetimes taken even to the 
highest levels of governxnent? It is interesthg to note that at the time the facts of the 
Chen case arose in 1988, there were no mechanisms available under the Immigrnton Act 
to ded with an act or omission that might give nse to criminal iiability, but which had yet 
to be prosecuted. Perhaps in response to the Chen decision itself, the Act was amended in 
1993 by Bill C-86m to p h g  this apparent 10ophole.~ 
discretionary and may be withheld, if the appficant does not "corne to equity with clean hands". See aIso 
Bagambiire, supra note 15 1, at 355. 
See for example Shar Levine and Andnw Phillips, 'Fitizenship on sale" MacIeun 's (1 M y  1996) 14 at 
14-15, which de- an incident where even the Prime Minister was evidentiy asked to intemene in an 
immigration case: 
The image is striking, but not completely revealing. Prime Minister Jean Chretien d e s  out fiom 
the pages of a Taiwanese-Canadian newspaper and clasps the band of Gordon Fu, the president of 
a hi&-profile company that speciatizes in immigration fiom Taiwan to Canada. What the 
photograph does not show is that during the private meeting in îhe Prime Minister's Office in 
Ottawa on Feb. 28, Fu took the highiy musuai step of personally handing Chretien a letter asking 
that the Prime Minister speed up his application for permanent residence in Canada. Fu was angry 
that although he heads the biggest c o d t i n g  company in what has become the hottest Asian 
market for Canadian business immigration, his own application had been stailed by federal 
officials. . . . Later, however, Fu achowledged that it was inappropriate for him to ask the Prime 
MUiister to intervene in his case. "That is a mistake," he said, adding that bbcultural ciifferences" 
between Canada and Taiwan accounted for his gesture. 
It is beyond my abilities and the scope of this papa to canvas the issue in other than a cursory fashion. 
For the reverse twist on illicit approaches, however, see Adrienne Tanner* "Immigration Scaxns Probed" 
Ine Vancouver Province (03 February 1998) A2. That story details aiiegations of bnies k i n g  solicited by 
l o d y  engaged staff in Canadian visa offices in New Delhi and Islamabad. According to Surrey, B.C. 
M.F. Gurmant Grewal, who raised the aiiegations, the ". . .hiring of foreign nationais to work at 
immigration offices is risky because they have no interest in Canada." 
6w Supra note 563. 
ao For a summary of the many changes wrought by C-84 se+ CIC OM IS 93-01(e) of 12 January, 1993. In 
particular, C-86 added the foilowing provisions to section 19 of the Act: 
(1) No person shall be granted admission who is a mernbcr of any of the followhg classes: 
(cl) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe 
(ii) have committed outside Canada an act or omission that constitutes an offence under the laws 
of the place where the act or omission occurred and thai, if committed in Canada, wodd constitute 
an offence that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament by a maximum term of 
imprisonment of ten years or more.. .. 
(2) No immigrant and, except as provideci m subsection (3), no visitor shail be granted admission 
if the immigrant or visitor is a member of any of the following classes: 
(al) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe 
(ii) have committed outside Canada an act or omission that constitutes an offence under the laws 
of the place where the act or omission occurred and that, ifcouxnitted in Canada, wouid constitute 
Dubious justifications were met also by a lack of balance in the approach 
employed. Rather than a fhctional assessment involving some consideration of the 
purposes of the legislation and the nature of the problern before the decision-maker, the 
Courts' focus was primady fixated on the proceduraï rights of the applicant. When 
account was taken of the purposes of the Immigration Act, it was done so in a unitary 
fashion, emphasiàng only that the act was meant to facilitate immigration. In their haste 
to contain negative discretion, though, the Courts may have failed to appreciate the wider 
implications that follow nom the approach employ. In particular, if negative discretion 
under subsection 11(3)(b) is lirnited to economic considerations only, then the corollary 
must also be true - that positive discretion under subsection 1 1(3)(a) is Wrewise limited. 
Judicial interpretation of negative discretion thus seems to have put a fetter on positive 
dis~retion.~~' 
More generally, by fighting the "good fight" on negative discretion, under the 
banner of the rule of law, the courts may have reinforced the notion that a discretionary 
policy, at least when it is positive in character, is largely beyond the pale of judicial 
an offence that may be punishable by way of indiciment under any Act of Parliament by a 
maximum tenn of imprisonment of less than ten years .... 
Representations on case Nes extohg the social skiils and virtues of applicants are common. For 
example, many app1icant.s provide idonnation as  to their past participation in volunîary community service 
work. In light of Chen, though, such information is arguably irrelevant, d e s s  it can somehow be iinked to 
ability to participate in the economy. 
However, CIC's own Immigration M a n d  continues to suggest a holistic approach toward use of 
positive discretion. CIC IM Chap. -5, para. 4.2 provides that "[d]iscretion may be used to overcome 
insufficient mits of assessment, a lack of employment experience in a specific occupationai group or the 
fact that the applicant's occupational skilis are not among those selected as open for immigration." It is 
clear fiom this that CIC itselfrecognizes the limitations of the selection system set out at Schedule 1 to the 
Regdations and prefers its visa officers to take a broader view of what the appiïcant has to offer. This is 
so, to the pomt of ignoring the occupational fàctors which are at the heart of the economic establishment 
potentiai that the courts in Chen were so preoccupied with. 
supervisionPU Certainly, by shuttuig down negative discretion, it would be tenuous for 
them at the same tirne to adopt an activist role to enlarge positive discretion. The best 
that c m  be done, thaefore, is for the courts to foilow their traditionai course of insisting 
only that positive discretion not be unduly fettered. Thus, cases like Chen may also stand 
for the proposition that the many positive discretionary policies of CIC are to rem& 
simply that - voluntary policies which, subject to occasional interventions by the courts, 
immigration officers are largely f?ee to apply or, most poignantly, not apply. 
A case in point may be the ment retrenchment by CIC on a discretionary policy 
concerning children of immigrant families separateci because of an obligation to complete 
compdsory military service. In some countries, permission to emigrate is not given 
unless and until the required period of s e ~ c e  is completed. Typically, a family that 
migrates to Canada before their children are of an age to serve in the military is forced to 
leave those children behind* until the obligation is fulnlled. In many cases, such chiidren 
have met d existing immigration requirements and are even issued immigrant visas with 
the rest of the family. But, they are unable to use the visas because exit permission is not 
forthcoming. Lfthe rest of the family has migrated to Canada in advance of a child 
gaining exit permission, under the dependency rules contained in the Regdations there is 
a possibility that permanent sepration may occur. Upon completion of the military 
service, the child often is too old and not sufficiently dependent to qualify for sponsorship 
as a "dependa.~t'*~~ in the Family Class. As such, their only recourse is to apply in the 
a2 The courtr' treatment of applications for "humanitanan and compassionate" consideration available 
under section 114(2) of the Act has been marked by a rehctance to a'judicialize" this positive discretion 
made. See for example, Yhap, supra note 200, Vidal7 supra note 21 1 and Kahion, supra note 185, 
a3 Defined at section 2(1) of the ReguZurions. The most common scaiano is kt, by the time of 
Assisted Relative subcategory of the Independent class. However, if their occupational 
background is comprised only of military service, the child is unlikely to obtain suficient 
unie of assessrnent to qualify on their own merits for a visa to Canada. Recogniang that 
there might be a significant humanitarian component to such cases, CIC had an informa1 
policy to favourably process such applicants.~ It was a policy, of course, that had no 
foundation in the Act or Regzdatio~s. Instead, it was based upon coments contained in a 
Regulatory Impact Andysis Statement descrïbing the effect of certain regulatory changes 
undertaken in 1992."' Thst policy, however, has now apparmtly been re~cinded.~ 
completion of military service, the children are over the 19 year age cutoff set by the family class 
dennition. 
6Y CICs critics might point out that such pragmatistn may only be necessary because CIC has not 
implemented d e s  in the Act or Regdations to deal with these situations. However, the rejoinder is 
contained in an excerpt fkom the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement SOR 92/10106FEB92, the IX text 
of which is cited infia at note 635, where the practicai difficuities of cirafting "a definition which would 
satisfjc al1 culhual n o m  or cover all situations" is noted. 
"' The entire policy of CIC in this nspect was set out in an AU Immigration Mission telex (Mmber ORD- 
0017, O 1 Febniary 1994) entided "Immigration Policy; Overage DependentsY*, as foiiows: 
Several posts have sought guidance on whether to include dependents doing compulsory military 
se~ce.,(sic) This matter was deaIt with in the "Regulatory Impact M y s i s  Statement SOR 
92/10 1 06FEB92" and the pertinent paragraph h m  this statement is worth repeating. It reads 
quote Immigrants coming to Canada are expected to accept the Canadian cultural reality. 
Furthemore, in many cultures, children begh working early and are already independent before 
they reach the age of 19. It would be impossr%le to corne up with a definition which would satis@ 
all cultural noms or cover d situations. A person perfonning military service is n o d y  no 
longer considered dependent on bis parents. Those under the age of 19 at the time of the 
application would, however, be eligiile and could come to Canada once they have cornpleted their 
service, provided they were stdi iinmamed unquote. The bottom b e ,  therefore, is that a child 
doing comgulsory military service is a dependent only if the parent has submitted the application 
prior to the childas (sic) nineteenth birthday and the child remains unmam'ed. 
According to this policy then, so long as the parents of a child submitîed an application for permanent 
residence in Canada before their chiid attained 19 years of age (the cutoff age for consideration as an 
"accompanying dependent" in the parents application), the parents could proceed to Canada and have the 
chiid join them later, a h  military selrice obligations were rendered In practice, the chiid was required to 
subrnit an application as an Assisted Relative, with such application king approved on discretion pursuant 
to this policy. Effectively, this left a large window of opportunity for the child that is illustrated by the 
following example. If the cbild entered fidi time pst-secondary studies before at&ining the age of 19, the 
abfity to qualiS. as a dependent was continueci, smce children of any age continuously engaged in fbli time 
sbldies nom the age of 19 are deemed dependent upon their parents. If that chiid completcd 5 years of 
pst-secondary education h m  18 years of age, followed by 2 years of compulsory miïitary s e ~ c e ,  she 
was mtitled to favourable prorasing at 25 years of age, notwithstanding that her parents had gone to 
Cana& some 7 years eariier. 
In the end, therefore, the courts' treatment of negative discretion in Chol seems to 
have sent a signal to the bureaucracy to folIow the tendency noted by H.W. Arthurs, and 
others in the fiuictionaiist camp, to do as little as is necessary to ca-g out its mandate. 
It is ironic that the d e  of law approach argued for in cases of negative discretion may 
well encourage development of case processing habits in immigration officers that are 
more "discrete" than "discreet" in character?' It seems that the concept of the nile of law 
has been left in a weakened condition. The wording and context of s. 1 l(3) clearly 
suggest that the discretion granted was meant to be a broader tool, capturing situations 
that speak to who the applicant is overall. The notion of adaptability, in particular, is 
centrai to the power and such adaptability must, of necessity, include some willingness in 
the applicant to buy into the fi.mdamentai institutions and mechanisms of our society. 
Few would argue that concepts containeci within the notion of the d e  of law shouid not 
at least point up a reasonable minimum level of "buy in" that rnight be expected. Among 
See Lexbase Sending 1998 - Juiy/Augrcst (Vol. 9, Issue 7) at 2, where under the heading of 
"Dependency and Compulsory Military Service" an extract is given of a leiter &ted June 17,1998 fiom 
the Director G e n d  Selection Branch, CIUHQ to lawyer Peter Larlee. Apparentiy responding to a query 
fkom ML Larlee regarding the policy set out in Al1 immigration Mission telex (Number ORD-0017,Ol 
February 1994), supra note 635, the Director General states that CIC actually has no policy to grant 
favourable consideration to dependents forced to undergo compuisory military service. Though some 
missions had processed dependents in such situations favourably for a number of years, the Director 
General suggests that this treatment proceeded fiom a misunderstanding of the meaning and effect of the 
Regdatory Impact Analysk Statement in question. 
637 My thanks to Carter Hoppe, Barrister and Solicitor, for pointing out the difference between these two 
adjectives. That difference is apparent nom the following dictionary entries: 
dismete (di-Wtt) adjective 
Constituting a separate thing; distinct. 
Consisting of unco~~nected distinct parts. See synonyms at distinct. 
-dis*creet (dî-skrêt') adjective 
Marked by, exercising, or showing prudence and wise self-restraint in speech and behavior; 
circumspect. 
Free fiom ostentation or pretension; modest. 
The American Hmrage@ Dictionary of the Enghfi Language, Third Edition copyright Q 1992 by 
Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version ficensed h m  INSO Corporation. Ali rights reserved. 
Cited fkom Microsoft Corp. Bookshelfl996W Edition. 
those concepts are an acceptance of the notion of a society govemed by the d e  of law, 
where each is expected to abide by the laws of the community, to accept both the burdais 
and benefits imposed by those laws and to accept that an orderly society involves 
accommodation for both individual rights and the nghts of the whole community. And 
certainly, the centrai premise of the rule of law is that no one has the right to expect that 
they may disregard the law for their own b d t .  It is M y  illogical, therefore, that 
wihgness to abide by the hdamental d e s  of society is no part of the process by 
which mernbership is gained to that society. 
3.3.5 Personal Suitability 
The courts' treatment of R 1 l(3) discretion has been mirmred in its' handling of 
the selection factor of personal suitability. It is assessed pursuant to Factor 9 of Schedule 
1 to the Regzdations, which provides as follows: 
Units of assessrnent shail be awarded on the basis of an interview with the person 
to reflect the personal suitability of the person and his dependants to become 
successfully established in Canada based on the person's adaptability, motivation, 
initiative, resourcefulness and other sirnilar qualities. 
Personal suitability is, of course, the most subjective of the selection cntena and so a 
good deal of discretion is inherent in its application. Of the potential total of 97 points 
that may be awarded to a prospective immigrant purniant to the selection factors, 
persona1 suitability is worth a maximum of 10 points. Because its comparative value is 
low, many applicants are able to obtain a pass mark (and to have the interview waived as 
a result) even without obtaining any points for personal suitabiiity. Similarly, an 
applicant may not be failed for obtaining zero d t s  for personal suitability. As such, it is 
sometimes necessary to combine lack of personal suitability with section 1 1(3) negative 
discretion to found a refùsal, unless the applicant is also unqualifieci on other grounds, 
such as obtaining insufncient uni& overall? In fact, when a refusal is indicated, the 
ordi- visa office practice is to refuse directîy on the selection criteria, if possibie, 
rather than on discretion. As Chen illustrates, discretionary refusals are subject to the 
strictest smtiny in the courts and so it is infïnitely more defeosible, and simpler, to deny 
an application on a strict application of the selection criteria 
Because this factor empiuys terminology conceming "successful establishment" 
similar to that in R. 1 1(3), it too has been limited by judicial interpretation to 
consideration of potential for economic success alone. The consequences, however, are 
even more fat reaching than is the case with R 1 l(3) discretion. With this factor, it is no 
longer jwt a case of ignorhg illegal or improper behaviour. hcredibly, according to the 
case law, a proper application of the personai suitability factor may actually demand that 
such behaviour be rewarded with additional uni& of assessment for personal suitability! 
In Kim Miilmg, for example, the applicant had been living and working illegally in 
Canada as a hairdresser for fifteen years. Upon his application for permanent residence 
as a Self-Employed hairdresser, the visa officer awarded o d y  four uni& of assessment for 
personal suitability. Commenting upon this aspect of the case, the Court stated: 
[The Sel f-employed class, a subset of the Independent]. . . category usually 
involves a judgment as to whether a prospective immigrant possesses qualities 
(such as resourcefulness) that make it likely that he or she will be able to become 
" For the need to combine low personai suitability with an exucise of negative discretion, see CIC iM 
Chap. OP-5, para 4.3. The question of what weight a subjective factor iilce personal suitability should be 
@en in any seiection system is obviously one that the legislative dtafters must have considered when 
devising the selection criteria. At present, it represents 10 uni6 out of a potential maximm of 97 units. 
There is, of course, no one correct answer and everything wiU depend upon such considerations as the type 
of qualities king selected for, preferences regarding a d e s  based selection system and the like. 
"9 Kim Mui (20 March, 1998) Federai Court File No. MM-1079-97 (F.C.T.D.) as cited in Lexbase, (May 
1998 Smding) 9. 
established in Canada. It does seem perverse that a person who has been 
established here for 25 years was not @en thefiII IOpoints. ... It is clear that in 
making the first a~se~smmr the vim oficer was strongb infmced by the fact 
that the applcant had been an illegal immigrant in Canada for so many years. 
[emphasis addedIw 
The message is clear - those who establish themselva in defiance of Canadian law 
actually enhance the chances for a successful application later on. It is incredible to 
comprehend that such an inducement to unlawfiil behaviour could be offered by a 
regulatory scheme that ostensibly is predicated upon providing for an orderly flow of 
migration. In one masterful stroke of judicial interpretation, the selection system is 
furned on its head and its entire ralron d'etre undennined. Those who pay no heed to the 
d e s  can actually derive an advantage over those who do. This illogical and incongnious 
result makes a mockery of the rule of law and sen& a dubious message to the world 
about how our legal system operates and what Canadian society stands for. And, it is a 
result that significantly alters the balance between fadtation and control that is the chief 
hallmark of the Iegislative regime conceived of by Parliament. The consequences remain 
to be M y  appreciated and realized. Clearly, however, they are potentiaiiy far reaching 
and could strike to the very fouridation upon which the immigrant selection system rests - 
namely, public confidence in the handling of immigration matters."' 
3.3.6 The Case for a Rule 
The need for shoring up the control side of the Mmigration equation is 
particularly acute because of an increasing disjunction between the legislation and the 
650 Id., 9 at 10. 
"' For a discussion of the importance of maintaihg a proper balance between the facilitation and conîrol 
objectives, see infia note 68 1 and accompanying text. 
way immigration is actually conducted. The move to a more mechanistic approach to 
selection has been accompanied by the development of a sort of self-selecting, honour 
system, with interviews the exception and most applications proved only by docmentary 
evidence. In such an environment, uicreased opportunities for h u d  and deceit are 
obvious and the tools available under the present statutory regime are not wholly 
adequate to penalize and discourage misconduct and hud.  The present Act and 
Regdations were devised more than twenty years ago, in a different the ,  before the 
Charter. A time doubtless when it seemed a more certain proposition that broad residual 
discretion could be used to papa over any shortcornings in regdatory language. But the 
law does not stand still and a new state of evolution in thought about discretionary power 
has corne to pass. Broad substantive discretion is no longer the utilitarian tool it rnay 
once have been. This alone should give pause to legislators to consider the need for an 
explicit d e  to protect the integrity of the selection system. However, the problem is not 
solely confined to the fact that substantive negative discretion has been neutered. In fact, 
it is aiso exacerbated by the trend to reductionism and formalisrn in the courts, which 
encourages strict construction of any gromds for exclusion. It is a trend that has severely 
M t e d  the efficacy of even the few exclusionary tools that are in the legislation. 
Section 9(3) of the Act places a positive obligation upon applicants for 
tnithfùlness in their dealings with immigration authorities. It reads: 
Every person s h d  atlswer trutfifiilly al1 questions put to that person by a visa 
officer and shdl produce such documentation as may be required by the visa 
officer for the purpose of establishing that his admission would not be contrary to 
this Act or the regulations. 
The courts have interpreted this section to cover only falsehoods directiy related to the 
actual grounds for selection. If the misinformation is not material to the grounds for 
selection, at the t h e  when a decision conceming admissibility is made, then it cannot be 
used as a basis for refusal? Further, it is only falsehoods that concern the applicant7s 
own grounds for admissibility that will sustain a refusal? Thus, even where the 
applicant participates in presentation of false documentation to the visa office to support 
the alleged dependency of a ciaimed dependant, for example, it is ody the dependant, and 
not the principal applicant who may be denied a visa 
AU of this fails to recognize the creative ways in which deception is practiced on 
visa offices. One bit of deceit, for example, may be used to found another. Thus, an 
applicant may c l a h  kinship with another person who is not actually their relative. Once 
in Canada, the unmigrant may be eligible to sponsor the third party in the Family Class, 
even though a proper relationship does not exist In countries where the keeping of birth 
and marriage records is poor or non-existent, visa offices ofien are forced of necessity to 
rely upon farnily information suppliai in pnor applications to determine kinship in later 
sponsored cases. This is just one example and it is obvious that the limits for creative 
deceit are expanded where, as in the cment environment of reduced resources and cost 
cutting rneasures, it is weli known that verification of information is unlikely or 
improbable. 
This is not to suggest, however, that unlawful or deceptive behaviour shouid be an 
"2 Kang v. Minkter of  Employment & Immigration (1981), [1981] 2 F.C. 807,37 N E  55 (Fed CA.), leave to 
appeal to S.C.C. refùsed 39 N.R 3531.1 (S.C.C.), wtiere it was held that Iying on an application does not render 
an applicant inadmissible mder section 19(2)(d) of the Act. See also Smdhu v. Canada (Min- of Employment 
& Immigration) (1989), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 3 12 (Imm. RB.). With respect, the Kang decision is an example of 
where technical legal reasoning leads to a disconnection between legidative mtent and substantive justice, on 
the one ha.& and procedumi fairness on the other. 
6U Mundi v. Canada (Mn. of Employment & Immigration) (1985), 63 N.R. 3 1424  DL& (4') 285 (Fed. 
automatic or complete bar to entry. On the contrary. It is in the best traditions of our 
conceptions of justice and compassion to forgive and forget. Equaiiy so, however, 
transgressions should not be a reason for reward. Rewards must be made to accrue fkom 
adhering to the rules, not b m  ignoring them. This is fimdamentdy the way a just 
society under the mie of law must operate. What might be appropriate, therefore, is 
simply that immigration misconduct should be one factor which, legitimately, may be 
accounted for in any overail assessrnent of likelihood for successful establishment. If it 
involves a matter, such as deportation or conviction for an offence under the Immigraton 
Act, for which a separate rehabilitation process is prescribed, then a grant of rehabilitation 
would render it spent? h o t  otherwise spent, then it should be an item that the 
prospective immigrant is required to address and resolve positively. At a minimum, it 
should not be a reason for reward. Anything less sen& the wrong message. As one 
newspaper editonalist has stated: 
We must have d e s  for deciding who qualifies [for immigration to Canada] - and 
one of the first qualifications rnust be a willingness to live by them. To do 
otherwise is UfZfair to the millions of foreigners who would make excellent 
Canadians, but patiently wait outside in line for their t ~ r n . ~ ~  
The case for an explicit mie denying visas to dishonest applicants is all the more 
compelling in the absence of any consensus or plan for regulating the immigration 
consulting commilnity and the advantage that has been taken of the reduced ability of CIC 
to closely scrutinize each and every application. Certainly, it is a refom that seems likely 
C.A.). 
This wouid be consistent with the g e n d  scheme for rehabiiitation fkom rriminal offences that is 
covered by section 19 of the Act. Smce a pardon or approvd of permanent rehabilitation is a precondition 
to the issuance of an immigrant visa, off- already pardoned cannot not f o m  the bais  for a negative 
tkding on personal suitability or settlement potential, 
as CIC 'Paiiy Wrap" (05 January. 1998) at 6. quoting an editorial h m  the January 3, 1998 edition of the 
to enjoy a broad consensus of support amongst reputable immigration advisors who have 
been urging govemment action on this issue for some tirne. Cecil Rotenberg, for 
example, has noted the need for more stringent controls. Speaking generally about thr 
lack of regulation that d o w s  anyone to becorne an ' ' ~ g r a t i o n  consuitant, he is quoted 
as observing that: 
. . . m h e  minister [of Immigration] has refbed to senously consider some 
sort of licensing process to regulate who can represent potential immigrants. 
Banisters and solicitors, as the only legal representatives authorized by the 
province to deal with matters of legal interpretation, are not provided any greater 
standing than a 'representative' in a foreign jurisdiction. 
As a result, said Mr. Rotenberg, the public has no way of howing who is 
sufficiently qualifieci to act on behalfof a potential immigrant. What is the effect 
on the cturent systern? 'Traud, like mosquitos, wiii corne into a room through 
any crack which is left open," warned Mr. Rotenberg. "And h u d  has certainly 
entered the room. Just this past year aione in Toronto, I have dealt with countless 
cases involving b u d  by immigration consultants. And this is o d y  what 1 have 
seen. Just imagine what else is out there." . . . 
The govenunent is downsizing the Unmigration rninistry's staff by at least 
20 per cent, he pointed out, and is encouraging "risk managementy', a theory that 
potential immigrants do not need an interview where their documents are 
adequate. ''This is an invitation to more hud,'' said ML Rotenberg. "The wide 
prevalence of h u d  in our immigration system has helped to create a cynicism by 
which Canadians and foreignen alike laugh at our 1aws.'- 
Although part of the answer in combating h u d  may be in regulating the 
immigration consuking commm.ityy it is unlikely that CIC wodd willingiy assume such a 
burden. Certainlys in the overseas context, such regulation wodd only be possible if CIC 
were responsible for venfying who the consultant is and whether she has somehow been 
properly accredited. However, in an era of cutbacks and reductions, there is Little interest 
in acquiring new responsibilities, let alone one that is on the peripheries of the 
Edmonton Journal. 
~6 Adam Szweras, "Authoritative immigration lawyer calls for ~ f o r m  of ciment system" The Lawyers WeeekZy 
(13 December 1996) Vol. 16, No. 30 at 12. 
department's real business. 
The oniy practical compromise, therefore, is to ensure that a clear connection is 
made between the benefit of a visa and the behaviour that will result in its gant. Often, 
both the applicant and their advocate may be Iocated outside of Canada and so beyond the 
pale of any effective enforcement by our laws. Quite simply, the denial of a visa is the 
most direct and efficacious sanction and is more likely to have a salutary efEect than any 
other penalty that might be devised. But how best to incorporate a mechanisrn into the 
selection system to prevent the "guilty'' fiom being rewarded? Realistically, the tide is 
now so generaily against discretionary power that any enlargement of it is unlikely. The 
focus on rights that predominates in the current legal and political environment is so 
fimiy entrenched that it is inconceivable that the courts might reverse themselves or even 
that sui3icient support for such a turn might be found among legislators or the general 
public. Moreover, it is not just a question of overcoming reluctance in the bar, the 
judiciary or at the political level. Even the immigration bureaucracy is unlikely to 
support this option. The curent direction in immigration matters is to ever more 
reductionism and a greater emphasis on rules. The only feasible option therefore is to 
create a nile in the legislative scheme to give CIC jurisdiction to protect the integrity of 
its proce~ses .~ That is the preferable method in any event, since it afTords opportunities 
for debate and consensus as to what sorts of behaviours are to be censureci, the factors to 
be considered, the extent of any penalties and the process for rehabilitation. Clearly, 
however, the penalty should involve at lest  some period of disqualification h m  the 
a7 See Bryden, supra note 620, for a similar view that the object of protection of the immigration system is 
best achieved by express mechanisms incorporated in the Iegislation, rather than by a roundabout method 
prize of a visa 
But a rule is not enough. The courts will also have a role to play, if system 
integriw is to be safeguardd They need to be prepared to adopt a bctional, pragmatic 
approach to their review of any cases where a visa has been denied in such circumstances. 
This rnust entail weighing not just the applicant's right to a fair process, but also the 
objectives of the immigration Iegislation and the public interest in a maintaining a 
reputable system of facilitation that involves controls and qualification on the basis of 
merit or other stipulated criteria nie weighing m u t  also recognize that, at Ieast in the 
case of Independent migrants, denial of a visa involves, at best, the withholding of an 
opportunity and not a vested right. Making clear that an application can be refused for 
deceit or malfeasance, even where the miteria have been met, will go some distance not 
only to ensure integrity, but also to restore some of the public confidence Rotenberg feels 
has been lost. 
3.3.7 Shortwmings of Judicial Review 
As is apparent, the process of judicial review has not been one characterized by 
much tolerance for negative discretionary action. Many argue, of course, that that is as it 
should be. Certainly, the purpose of review is to infuse accountability. Of necessity, 
accountability entails the adherence to some standards and limits. Moreover, there can be 
no quarrel that it is properly the role of the courts both to ensure that those limits have 
been obsemed and, where necessary, to demarcate the lirnits. Still, a serious question to 
be asked concerns how weil the courts have perfonned their supervisory fûnction in 
using the seletion criteria. 
overseas immigrant selection rnatters. More often than not, the atlswer seerns to be that 
there is much room for irnprovernent. 
The central reason for tbis is that the courts too ofien are ill-infonned of aU the 
realities and subtleties of the processes they supervise, or have hadequate information 
placed before them as to the signficance of information that drove a decision. Such 
deficits leave them ill-equipped to provide balanceci, well-reasoned decisions, based upon 
a proper weighting of aU relevant rnatters. The problem of incomplete information about 
overseas processes was highlighted by Mr. Justice Rothstein in the Issueva case. In 
discussing the requh-ement for assessment of occupations under the regulatory scheme, he 
noted that : 
[tlhere was no evidence before me as to the amount of time and effort involved in 
an assessment according to the Act and Regdations as opposed to an informa1 
preliminary determination in cases where a visa ofncer is of the opinion a 
prospective immigrant is not qualified in a claimed occupation. I cannot conclude 
that cornpliance with the Immigration Act  and Regdations is an onerous, tirne- 
consuming process that would be uflfeasonable to impose upon visa officers." 
Obviously, where there is an absence of evidence, the court will be hesitant to make a 
determination that wouid inevitably have to be based upon speculation and conjecture. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that Rothstein J. was unwihg  to grant any flexibiiity in the 
matter before him. 
A similar problem was evident also in the Chen case. For example, the question 
of why the applicant should be rejected on negative discretion when his personal 
suitability points were so high was not directly addressed in the reported case de~is ions .~~ 
Supra note 590 at 96. 
649 Chen received a totai score of 73, with 7 out of a possl'ble 10 uni@ of assessrnent awarded for the factor 
of persona1 suitability. 
However, it was very likely a factor in the min& of the judges as they struggled to 
rationalize a discretionary power to reject an applicant who had both surpassed the 
necessary overall points threshold and who had achieved a very respectable personal 
suitability assessment"0 Certainly, it seems illogical that an applicant should have such a 
high personal suitability rating while simultaneously being rejected on negative 
discretion. Frior to the Chen decision, however, it was not obvious that a low personal 
suitabifity score should be a preîondition to the exercise of negative discretion under R. 
1 l(3). This is particularly tme since personal suitability may not be used to "double 
count" other factors?' Given the apparent need for personai suitability to be considered 
as a discrete factor in its own nght, it is k l y  that the visa officer felt no particular 
compulsion to lower personal suitability points, prior to employing negative discretion? 
Rather, positive or negative discretion appeared to be the only tool for dealing with the 
Anecdotally, fkom personal discussions with couwl  nom the Department of Justice, 1 understand that 
this issue was raised at the Supreme Court by a question h m  one of the justices. Couusel, however, was 
apparentiy unfamiliar with the subtleties of overseas immigrant processes and was able to offer no 
expianation why the personai suitability points were not lowered, either in tandem with the decision to 
employ negative discretion or alone (to the point where the appiicant would have failed to achieve a pass 
mark). 
"' See supra note 587 and accompanying text discussing "double-counting". 
The case is now otherwise. In Light of this decision, CIC has issued instructions to visa officers to 
ensure that an award of personal suitability points is consistent with a decision to invoke negative 
discretion. See CIC IM Chap. OP-5, "Independent Immigrant Processing" , para. 4.3 (ver. 06-97) 
Wegative Discretion" where the foiiowing is stated: 
The court [in Chen] observed that it is conceivable that discretionary power under 
R11(3) codd properly be used where an immigrant was so lackmg in one of the factors Med in 
Column 1 [of Scheduie 1 of the ReguIattions] that a zero rating [for personal suitability] wouid not 
adequately reflect the negative impact of that deficiency of (sic) his abiiity to become successfûiiy 
established. This point was not specincally argued. 
Further it is recognized that the obligation to reduct personal suitabiiïty to zero as a 
precondition to the use of negative discretion would be extremely restrictive. Therefore, m certain 
instances, you may h d  that the use of negative discretion is warranteci aithough personal 
suitability has not been reduced to zero. These cases may give rise to litigation on this very point 
and cases must be carefiilly documeated to exphin why you have not reduced the personai 
suitability assessrnent to zero before resorting to negative discretion. It is expected however, that 
cases recommended for the use of negative discretion wiil aiways rdect low personal suitability 
assessment. 
'total packagey'. Regardless of how many units were received for any particular item of 
assesment, and regardless of the total number of points received overall, it appeared 
prior to Chen that discretion, either positive or negative, codd be used to overcome any 
failings or idiosyncrasies of the points system. Since C'lien, however, no such flexibility 
is available to the decision-maker. Personal suitability should now reflect potential use 
of discretion, if a negative decision is to survive scrutiny upon judicial review." 
This is an unfortunate restriction, particularly since it does not recognize the 
realities of the processing system and the peculiarities of the Computerized Immigration 
Processing System (CAPS) used overseas for immigrant processing. As was evident in 
Chen, processing in an individuai case can sometimes consume a lengthy pexiod of time 
and, as in Chen, relevant information rnay not corne to light until after the selection 
decision had been made. Although the selection decision rnay be made on one date, yet 
the case may not be halized until another more distant date. The most common reasons 
for significant delay between selection decision and nnal disposition generally have very 
Little to do with the visa office directly, or the visa officer concemed. The two most 
common reasons are delay in obtaining background checks and medicd  clearance^.^^ 
Very often these two items are not complete at the time a selection decision is rendered. 
In between selection and hnalization, ofien while awaiting the results of either of these 
two, the discovery of new information may give pause to the visa officer to reconsider 
Although CIC continues to employ positive discretion as a tool for dealing with the "total package", 
notwithstaoding the limitations placed upon negative discretion. See supra note 63 1. 
OY See imûucti011~ given by CIC to visa officers, supra note 652. 
" In ih recent reorganization efforîs, CM3 has made tremendous gains in speeding up the avaiiabifity of 
medicd results. Formerly, medicals were completed by medical staff empIoyed by Health and Wetfare 
Canada. However, those medical staff w a e  intcgrated into CIC and the initiative to speed up medical 
clearances has yielded g d  results. It is background checks which remai. the single greatest source of 
whether the selection decision, or at least a particular element of it, was correctly made. 
However, the pecutiar design of the CAIPS system renders it difficult to revisit 
selection decisions, once they are entered. Ostensibly because of concerns about 
manipulation of data, CAIPS was designed to allow only a "once through", linear type of 
processing f'ctiona. with data captined permanently once entered? Iaformation once 
entered on the CAIPS record cannot be changed f i er  the particula. activity is completed. 
Thus, notes placed in the electronic file cannot later be deleted or altered. Likewise, once 
the selection decision screen has been completed, it is not possible to go back and reduce 
the points awarded for a particular factor, such as personal suitability" The only 
possible way an addition or correction to the points taily can be accomplished is to close 
the file, by showing it as "refiised" or 'kithdrawdw, and then reopening it. Such a 
process, however. leaves a permanent record on the file that it was closed and re-opened. 
Franlcly, a refusal on negative discretion that shows this kind of history is bound to look 
somewhat contrived and to raise suspicions as to what actually went on. T'us, a practicd 
result of the peculiarities of the CAIPS system is that they place ernphasis on the 
-- - - - - - - - - - - -- 
dday. For a related discussion on background checks, see supra note 607. 
C A P S  was conceived in the Iate 1980's as a replacement for a papa based system that was used in CIC. 
It first went into service in 1990 in U.S. visa offices. The structurai design of CAPS is not sophisticated 
It simply adapted and converted to an electronic format, the various steps that were part of the papa based 
process it replaced - paper-screening (called the "T-11" stage in the papa system), selection decision (T- 
12) and finai decision (T-13). The papa system was obviously based on the premise that al1 parts of a 
processing stage would be completed more or less simultaneously. 
M y  informai understanding is that CIC was d e l ï ï t e l y  forced to design the system in this f&on in 
order to allay fears h m  the bar and the bench that " c o d o n s "  wodd be made to Hes aAer the fact, 
when it became apparent that an appeal or review action was to be taken, The CAIPS record fomis a part 
of the official He, which is made available m appeaf situations dong with any papa 6ie that may exiSt. 
* In f a a  1 understand that the question was raised on appcal in the S.C.C. as to why Mr. Chen's points for 
personal suitability were not reduced aAer the fact, but that counsel were t.maware of the peculiatIy hear 
nature of the C A P S  program and so the question was unanswered See also note 650, supra. 
" To show it as "accepted" resuits in finalization of the case and generation of a printed visa. It should be 
recognized also that closing the file in one of these two methods and then reopening it only enables the 
necessity of getting the selection decision "right" before it is entered 
In light of such practical consideratioas, it is not surprishg that the officer in 
Chen should have prefmed to follow a straightforward path involving reliance upon 
discretion alone. Regrettably, the reasons for the lack of a zero rating on personal 
suitability were apparently never placed before the court. And, without a detailed 
understanding of the fimctioning of the CAISP system, it may have been easy for the 
reviewing courts to misinterpret what took place and why. Had a low rating on persond 
suitability been present, Chen would have failed on points and the issue on review rnight 
have simply revolved around the propriety of the number of units awarded for this factor. 
Alternatively, assuming substantive negative discretion would still have been the central 
issue, a better correlation between suitability points and the exercise of negative 
discretion might have caused a different reaction amongst the judges. The courts might 
have been less tempted to read too much into the manner of handling of Chen's 
application and may never have gone so as far as to restrict substantive discretion to 
purely economic considerations. Either way, it does seem as though Chen is a bad 
decision, based as it is upon apparent miscues by the department and a misapprehension 
of the workings of the selection system by the courts. 
Another example of the courts' lack of appreciation for the realities and subtleties 
of overseas immigration processes is seen in the Choi case6@. The appellant inquired at 
the Commission for Canada in Hong Kong about the rquirements for immigration and 
was given a Re-Application Questionnaire (PAQ). The PAQ is used to enable applicants 
seiection screen, so that the points taUy can be manipdated Che notes previously entered in the 
electronic file di remain extant in the reopened file and may ody be added to, but not altered or defeted. 
to obtain an informal assessment of their ability to qualify for immigration, prior to 
payment of the significant, non-refûndable processing fees that a regular application 
entails." Choi received a favourable assasment on his PAQ and so later submitted a full 
application. However, the Open Occupations L i s P  was changed in the interim so that 
bis occupation no longer was included and so his application was failed for Iack of 
"occupationai demand'? There is Little to fauit with the court's determination that 
faimess required that Choi be processed on the basis of the criteria on which he was 
encouraged to apply. However, in obiter, the court went on to specdate that CIC policy 
was to deliberately withhold information nom appiicants about the differences between a 
PAQ and a full application. In the corirt's view, the PAQ involved less processing effort 
on the part of visa officers, giving rise to an irresistible conclusion that intemal 
departmentai policy was to favour its use over that of ordinary applications. 
The reaiity, however, is exactly the opposite. Because of CIC workload 
accounting methods, visa officer preference is actuaily to deal with complete 
applications. Officer productivity is rneasured largely via the CAPS system, which 
counts only decisions made on full applications. PAQ's have never been rneasured in 
CAIPS and, other than an informal, intemal office accomting method to ensure the PAQ 
Supra note 270. 
" CIC IM Chap. OP-5, para. 2.1, which notes that "[tlhe PAQ serves as an initial means of assessing an 
independent appiicant's ability to meet the selection criteria without requiring the completion of formai 
applications for permanent admission (IMM 008) and payment of cost recovery fees." 
The Open Occupations List contains a list of occupations in which mdependent immigrants may qualify 
for immigration to Canada, 
Item 4 of Scheduie 1. Failure to obtain at Ieast one unit of assessnent for this factor resuIts in automatic 
refusal of the application in accordance with section 11(2)(a) of the Regulations. Only occupations 
contained on the Open Occupations List arr awarded points for occupational demanci. The importance for 
an applicant to have experience in an occupation contained on the Open Occupations List is therefore 
obvious. 
ioad is spread equitably arnongst officers, screening of PAQ's generally receives little 
credit in the workload measure of individual decision-makers. Raîher than reducing the 
worlcload burden on officers, the PAQ actually increases it, and does so in a mariner for 
which visa officers are likely to receive linle recognition. The distribution of PAQ's to 
the public proceeds, therefore, not from admlliistrative economy, but rather fkom a sense 
of client service and an attempt to obviate the impact of non-rehdable fees. However, 
the Court's wiliingness to h d  ulterior motives suggests that the attempt was misguided 
and is an apparent example of field sensitivity falling before appellate r e v i e ~ . ~  
The result has been the virtual elimlliation of the PAQ system and consequent Ioss 
to applicants of a fiee, expert opinion about their chances for success. Distribution uf 
PAQ's is now an immigration post-specific activity, with their use left to the discretion of 
individual program managers." While some posts continue to use them, most do not. 
The decision in Choi doubtless spurred development of better application materials by 
CIC. In particular, application kits are now provided which contain suificient 
idormation to enable potential applicants to self-assess their own chances for s ~ c c e s s . ~ ~  
The problem of insufficient information arises not only with respect to 
procedures, but also in consideration of foreign evidence. The interface betwem 
Canadian law and foreign evidence is a centrai feature of selection conducted abroad. 
664 See for example, H. Wade MacLauchlan, "Developments in Administrative Law: the 1990-9 1 Tem" 
(1992) 3 Sup. Ct. L. Rex(2d) 29, where the author discusses the dangers of field sensitivity being 
countermanded by evidentiary review, 
" S n  ClC IM Chap. OP-5, para. 2.1 "Submission of applications" which -tes: 
The use of Prebnbry  Application Questionnaires (PAQ's) is the decision of the prograrn 
manager based upon processing abnormalities at the post which do not lend themselves to the 
sending of a self-assessrnent kit. 
Though application materiais are now more complete. they are also somewhat more complicated The 
formalism demanded by the Choi decision may have served, at Ieast in some measure, to drive more clients 
The major advantage of overseas selection is that the visa office, by being located in the 
particular locality, is able to develop expert howledge about local culture, customs and 
laws and is well placed to assess their significance vis-à-vis the selection criteria 
Canadian courts, on the other hand, while expert in the interpretation and application of 
Canadian law, are at a disadvantage with respect to foreign evidence. Certainly, what 
may seem so obvious at a visa office abroad oftentimes is a matter whose relevance or 
importance is obscure and puzzling in a Canadian courtroom. Commonly, therefore, 
courts are reliant upon the visa office for an explanation of such evidence. Unfortunately, 
the provision of useful explanations is an uneven practice. 
For exarnple, in the recent case of Yong Qi B u  et al. it appears that the visa 
office did a poor job of leaving a sufncient record on the file to explain the significance 
of a piece of evidence that was crucial to the final decision. There, a visa officer in 
Beijing found that one daughter had a different 'TIokou" number nom other family 
members, which led her to question whether the daughter was tnily a member of that 
family. In reviewing the matter, Reed J. stated that he ". . . could fhd nothing in the file 
that explains what a Hokou number signifies.'- Accordingly, he found the number to be 
a c'problematic" basis for rejecting evidence fiom the daughter as to her relationship to 
other family members. In other words, the court did not fkd reliance upon the Hokou 
number to be inherently unfiair. Rather, it was simply a lack of evidence as to its 
significance that led to the rejection. Presumably, had the visa officer done a better job of 
to seek the services of immigration consultants. 
Yong Qi Zhu et al- v- Çanada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigrction) (14 October 1997) Federai Court 
File No. IMM-2710-96 V.C.T.D.) [unreportedl per Reed J., as cited in k b a s e  (December 1997 Sending) 
at 6-7. 
explaining the import of the Hokou number and any other relevant subtleties of the types 
of proof dealt with locdy by her in the Beijing visa office, the result might have been 
diffierent- 
Clearly, if their decisions are to be sustained on appeal, visa officers need to 
recognize the importance of rnaintaining transparent processes that include proper 
explanations of the relevance and weight attached to evidence. This is important, not just 
because it aids the court, but it also aids Department of Justice lawyers who represent 
CIC on judicial reviews. Many of those counsel, like the courts, have limited exposure to 
and understanding of the ways and methods of visa offices and the particular evidence 
that they deal with. Full and complete information is essential to their preparation, if an 
adequate defense is to be mounted. And indeed, the responsibility for providing fidi 
information to the court upon review is a shared one between the visa officer and Justice 
counsel. The visa officer is obviously best situated to explain and place on the record of 
the file relevant local circumstances that have ai3ected processing. However, Justice 
counsel, for the5 part, must ensure that they alert visa officers as to any items of likely 
importance that have been overlooked or not fully explainecl. Indeed, the role of Justice 
counsel, as an intennediary between the courts and the visa office, is to anticipate items 
that may capture the courts' attention and ensure that explicit afndavit evidence fiom the 
visa officer, explaining same, is placed before the courts. 
The problem of inadquate information is one that the courts themselves 
recognize, but over which they apparently have Little control. The fault in this respect lies 
to some extent with court processes and conventions that militate against a proactive role 
for judges. For example, the conventions of statutory interpretation prevent them h m  
going outside the borders of a statute to interpret its meaning. Likewise, the court has 
Limiteci abiiïty to compel evidence, even when it is obvious that fiirther information is 
needed? However, it is compounded too by a certain hardness of attitude that courts 
exhibit towards administrative tribunals. Though the administrative sphere is intended to 
be more informal and expeditious than judicial proceedings, the courts have been 
reluctant to make many concessions, at least to immigration law at any rate. Thus, 
arguments of economic impwticality in canyuig out detailed, individualized processing 
of immigration applications have been consistently rejected. In Re Singh, for example, 
Wilson J. dismissed such arguments in the context of Refûgee ~la l lns~ '~  and that attitude 
has carried over as well to Independent processing."' Certainly, the courts have been 
oblivious to the problems of visa offices in dealing with volume and have tended to be 
critical only of perceived shortcomings of visa office practice. It is an attitude which has 
required immigration tribunals to behave much like courts and which has harnpered the 
innovativeness of administrators to ded with the problem of volume. This has been an 
See for example, id. at 7. where the Court speculated about problems in the Beijing visa office. Reed J. 
observed: 
. . . that everything about this file indicates a nished and over-hasty decision by the visa officer. It 
may be that the Beijing visa office is simply understaffed for the work load It may be that there 
are organizational problems there. The court cannot h o w  what the siîziatiun is, but it looks fiom 
the file as though many of the problems that arose with this decision were the resuit of a too- 
hurried review of the applicants' situation and a too-hasty decision malong process [emphasis 
added]. 
" See Singh, nrpm note 64. The conclusion as to a possible judicuù double standard seems irresistible 
when one considen those IcmarkS in iight of the court's decision in Canadian CounciZ of Churches, pro 
note 536. Speakuig for the court, Cory J. appears to have reiied upon such economic arguments to 
cirruniscribe public interest standing whm he stated, 88 D.L.R. (49 193 at 204, that, "[i]t is essential that a 
balance be stnick between ensurhg access to the courts and preserving judiciai resources." 
m 9 e e  for example, the comments of Rothstein J. m the Issaeva case, supra note 590, dismisshg any 
suggestion ". . . h t  cornpliance with the Immigration Act and Regdations is an onerous and time 
consuming process that wodd be unreasonable to impose upon visa officers." 
especiaIly important issue during this era of declining res~u rces .~  
Moreover, notwithstanding the signincant expertise that inevitably arises nom 
deaiing with large caseloads, the courts have been relucfant to invest much confidence in 
the expertise of immigration decision-makers of nrst instance. Thus, while greater 
deference has been accorded to specialized t r i b d s  which courts consider to be expert in 
their particular field, it is not every such tribunal that will benefit fiom such deference. 
Securities commissions are a notable example of an agency whose expertise engenders 
great respect fiom the courts? in the immigration field, however, the courts have been 
loath to accept that either CIC or the IRB are expert panels desenring of any signifïcant 
deference6", notwithstanding that they deal with large volumes of cases. This attitude 
was captured in Connor v. Canada (Min. of Citizemhip and where the 
Court observed that although volume may generate significant experience, it is a double- 
edged sword, having also "a deadening and fatiguing effe~t '*~~ that may duil expertise. 
The courts' apparent lack of regard for administrative tribunais has larger 
consequences that are not confineci just to the tribunal concemed. Philip Bryden, in an 
essay on the Chen decision, posits that that decision was motivated by a desire to provide 
For a cogent discussion of the potential effects arising from an insistence by the courtç on formahm 
during a perïod when the mourc& of administrative ag&cies are restricted, Ge Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 
"Judicial Review of Agency Actions In A Period of Diminishing Agency Resources" (1997) 49 Ad- L. 
Rev 61. Among the short-tenn effects, he cites a potential circular phenornenon where, in response to 
judicid criticisms, resources are reallocated wit& the agency to concentrate on those types of decisions 
which are regularly subjected to review. This can lead to poorer decision m a h g  andorgreater delays in 
that larger subset of decisions that are not regularly reviewed The remiction of quaiity mthe larger kbset 
then leads to a greater caseload in the courts, as more applicants seck review. 
" Sec Perm v. British C o l d i a  Sem'ries Commission et al., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; 168 N E  321; 46 
B.C.A.C. 1,75 W.A.C. 1; [1994] 7 W.W.R. 1; 92 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145. 
m4 See note 74 for a fiirtber discussion of this matter- 
67s Id* 
676 Id. at 68. 
a unifving theory on use of discretion? He urges the courts, however, to adopt an 
attitude in administrative law that is more concerned with individual trees and less with 
the forest, as a whole. In his opinion, productive gains are likelier to be achieved by 
focusing more on the inevitable subtle variation that is present in every case. Certainly, 
this is to the point so far as discretion is concemed. Given its inherent characteristic as a 
case-sensitive tool, the courts should be hesitant to extend themselves too fa.  in 
developing an overarching approach to guide its use. Yet, it must be recognized also that 
there is some peril in the path recommended by Bryden. In bis seminal article, "The New 
P r ~ p e r t y ' ~ ~ ,  Charles A. Reich noted the problems that arise when courts approach each 
case as unique, concerning only the particular litigants uivolved, and having no broader 
'public interest" implications. In his view, such an approach is based upon a 
"fundamental fdlacy" that involves a narrowing of the public interest to an irrelevant 
point. 
The Chen decision may actually involve a blend of the problems identified by 
Bryden and Reich. As Bryden states, the courts in Chen were at pains to offer an 
ovemching approach to discretion. However, it appears that it was an approach driven 
equdly by a suspicion of discretion and by a desire to place rights out of the reach of 
discretion. Thus, the unimg theory may be as much about protecting Bghts as it is 
about discretionary power. Moreover, it is a result that appears to be based upon the 
fdacy described by Reich, ~ 4 . h  scant regard having been given to the public interest? . 
6n Supra note 620 at 80. 
(1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733 at 776-7. Reich's work provides a now ciassic view of the co~ec t ion  between 
the growth of governxuent Largesse and the rise of the admmistrative state. 
The problem of public interest standing m immigration rnatters is suggestive also of a buy-in to Reich's 
The public is intimately af5écted by immigration and so, not unreasonably, has an 
expectation that the program is being managed on their behalfin an orderly fashion, 
consistent with the legislation. This necessarily involves not just facilitation, but also 
control. 
Moreover, while the Court in Chen brushed aside concerns about a just resdt in 
favour of judicial convenience~ it was clearly a choice made without regard to the larger 
public interest in immigration ma- and any damage that might be inflicted on it. The 
Immigrnton Act and Regulations are shot through with oppominities for discretionary 
processing outside of the normal operation of the d e s .  By including such opportunities, 
it is clear that Parliament intendeci that immigration processing include not just a fair 
process, but aiso some measure of substantive justice. It is an intention, however, that 
has apparentiy eluded the courts. In their desire to protect rights, they have been b k d  to, 
or have deliberately overlooked that the public interest in immigration includes a desire 
that real justice be done. Certainiy, the popular understanding of our immigration Law is 
that it is meant to facilitate entry of deserving persons while simultaneously excluding the 
undeserving. More sirnply put, these are the notions of control and facilitation which are 
at the heart of the current immigration regime. The evidence for this view is to be fond  
everywhere in the press. The public is outraged whenever bureaucratic obstinacy denies 
entry to apparently deserving applicants. But the public is equally outraged when 
criminals or other undesirables are let in. Quite obviously, the public interest is 
faiiacy. See for example, the decision in Canadian Council of Churches, supra note 536, where the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in the context of a chailenge to provisions of the hmigrntion Act, dealt with the 
issue of public interest standing. That decision makes clear that mterested third parties wiu not easiiy gain 
standaig. 
stimulateci whenever a discomiection betweai their perceptions of immigration processes 
and the reality of those processes occurs. Decisions that focus exclusively on process and 
take no heed of substantive justice ru. the risk of erodiug public confidence in the ability 
of government to exercise control over immigration. And that is a high stakes game with 
potentially fa<. reaching consequences. As the United Nations has noted, balancing 
facilitation and controi are essential to the "immigration contracPt which exists between 
the Canadian Governrnent and the public. That contract engenden high public support 
for high levels of immigration primarily because of the appearance that those charged 
with carrying out the policy are exercising some control. 
Further, the courts have employed a two pronged approach that has sought to keep 
positive discretion broad, while simuitaneously narrowing negative discretion. This 
approach has also served to de-emphasize the broader goals and purposes for which 
immigration is undertaken and contributed to a seeming lack of balance between the 
wider interests of Canadian society and the rights of individual applicants. Moreover, the 
formalistic approach of the courts to applicant nghts has been pursued without concem 
for the means and ability of CIC to respond, and without regard for administrative 
flexibility and what might be just and appropriate in the particular circumstances. This 
approach has occasiondly forced CIC into a game of legislative amendment, creating a 
- .  new, more specific d e  whenever the consequences of a court decision constraining 
See the conmients of M. .  Justice Robertson in Chen, cited supra at note 623. 
"' UNEfCR, 'The State of the World's RejÜgees 1995 (Mord: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 2 12, 
where it is stated: 'Vnder the ~ ~ I I K I S  of this arrangement [ie. the '"immigration contract''], immigration is 
carefûlly controiled, but diowed on the basis of openly-stated criteria: family reunification, labour 
r e m e n t s ,  exiucational anci profesrionai qualifications, iinguistic c o ~ e t m a  nd employment-creating 
capitai." The article gws on to note, at 213, that the value of such contracts has been recognized by the 
Director General of IOM who sees them as contriiuting to the goal of orderly worldwide migration 
discretion have simply not been reconcilable with the public interest or the cause of 
administrative flexibility? Usually, of course, the discretion in question has involved 
practices seen as adversely impacting the rights of applicants. The resuit is a potentially 
spiraling circle of judicial action and legislative reaction that has a net effect of increasing 
the complexity of immigraton Iaw and d e s .  This is ironic, since there are few who 
would agree that increased complexity is a desirab1 e feature of any immigration system. 
CertainIy, it leads to the formalism that is captured in the epithet "bureaucracy" often 
thrown out in fhstration by those who have been stymied by seeming indifference and a 
wall of Iegal jargon. 
Courts need to be mindful, therefore, that the limits of discretion implicate the 
public interest and that it is not always just a case of how best to contain discretion. 
Thus, they might do well to follow a course of action that blends the approaches 
suggested by Bryden and Reich. The focus indeed should be on individual trees, but 
there should be awareness also that there are always two trees to be considered. The 
proper line is to give consideration to the needs and interests of both, and to strike a 
balance that is reasonable and just for both. Margaret Young has noted in her treatise on 
Constitutional issues in immigration law that it is a "very Litigious field'- of law whose 
increasing complexity is to be seen in the size of its goveming statute.* That 
processes. 
6a A case in point is the Lam decision, where the Court refùsed to accept that there could be any discretion 
in visa officers to refbse an application without interview. For details of this case and the reaction it 
provoked fiom CIC, see supra note 594 and accornpanying text. 
au Supra note 1 1 1 at 2. 
6U Id, at 3, where the author notes that the Immigrufion Act mcreased in size between its 1952 and 1978 
versions fiom 34 pages to 122. This, of course, taices no account of the compendious regdations, policy 
manuais, operations memoranda and other materials issued to guide irnplementation and application of 
Canada's immigration program. 
litigiousness and complexity has seen opportunities for the courts tu exercise their 
supervisory h c t i o n  in immigration matters expandexi and increased. With respect to 
discretion, it is obviously a supenrisory fiinction that they have engaged actively. It is no 
exaggeration to Say, thmefore, that sorne of the most sipnincant lirnits on discretion have 
been those set by the courts. And yet, if the series of misapprehensions which Chen was 
founded upon are any indication, both administrators and courts should be hesitant to find 
too much precedent, not just in Chen, but in any particula. case involving the use of 
discretion. 
This is not to be overly critical of the courts. A fia& assessrnent must be that 
they do the best they can with what they are given to work with. However, as was 
demonstrated in Issaeva and Zhu, the courts themselves are often acutely aware of the 
shortcomings in their understanding of the processes they supervise and the fnistration 
evident in those cases must be seen as something of a cry for help. As I have suggested, 
some of the help must corne h m  CIC and its counsel, who need to make more effort to 
ensure that the courts are given full and complete information. Likewise, however, the 
courts need to show more flexibility and employ a more holistic approach to immigration 
law - one that strikes a better balance between the interests of applicants and of society. 
Fair process is essentiai, but that is not enough. It is tirne to consider also the need for 
substantively good decisions, right for both Canada and the individuals concemed. The 
starting point must be a better appreciation of the unique considerations that apply to 
Independent immigrant selection. The nght of Independent applicants to a faK process is 
beyond reproach. However, it must be recognized also that this nght is not incompatible 
with substantive justice. This is especially tme when one considers that these are 
applicants with no higher vested interest. By definition, they do not have a close 
conuection to Canada and their selection is conducted largely for reasons of national 
interest. The only red consequeme to them of a negative decision is the loss of an 
opportunity to migrate. Accordingly, the courts should be prepared to p t  more leeway 
to decision-makers with respect to discretionary power. 1 do not suggest, however, that 
they abdicate their supervisory role. However, if more latitude is granted, it may provide 
encouragement to fùnctionaries to take more risks and to more effectively and actively 
engage their discretionary authority. 
The hctionalist school of jurisprudence has argued in favour of a different 
supervisory mechanisni for administrative tribuaals than that of judicial review. 
However, in my view, there is not enough wrong with the institution of judicid review to 
warrant its wholesale dismantling. The necessity of a fair and reputable review process is 
obvious - visa officers are not infallible. This is not a case of admitting incornpetence or 
incapability. It is simply a reality that the complexity of the law, the weight of 
institutional pressures, and a host of other factors ensure that not every decision in every 
case is uitimately the right one. It is so in every other area of law and it is no different in 
immigration law. Further, the alternatives to judicial review do not appear to offer any 
greater hope of rectitude, acceptance and satisfaction than the courts. And it is not that 
the courts are incapable or unwihg  to serve the ends of justice. Recognizing this, the 
alternative is clear. The cumnt mechanisms must be made to pdorm at optimum 
efficiency. At a minimum, this requires better information before the courts and a better 
understanding of the processes they supervise. 
3.4 ExfraJudiciaI Influences on Discretion 
While this chapter has focused much on the limits set for discretionary power by 
the courts, it is important dso to recognize that there are other actors, outside of the 
judicial sphere, who have a role to play with regard to those Limits. 
3.4.1 The Minister 
Accepting the sociological thesis that the discretion of a visa officer is Likely to be 
iufîuenced by a host of factors and inputs, and if such influences can be conceived of as a 
pyramid of persuasion, with the greatest influence and control found at the pinnacle, then 
it is obvious that the Minister of 'Immigration stands alone at the summit. Legally and 
politically, it is she who bears ultimate responsibility in the courts, in ParliamenP and in 
the forum of public opinion, for each and every exercise of dismetionary authority. It is 
to her that discretionary authority, both substantive and procedural, is granted under the 
Act and Regulations and it is through her delegation that such power is passed on to lower 
level officials. 
Though the Minister's office is large and she is assisted by an able contingent of 
officials, it is simply not possible for her to attend personally to every case that might 
warrant an exercise of substantive discretion. As a redt ,  direct exercise of discretion is 
limited by her to exceptional circumstances. In Independent cases, her involvement 
typically arises in one of two ways. Either the application irnplicates some form of 
- - - - -- -  - 
as Under the Act, for example, the Minister is required yearly to provide Parliament with the foïlowing: 
1. An immigration plan detailing estimates of immigration leveis for the coming year - s.7; and 
2- A report detailing how many Minister's Permits have been issued to inadmissible persons in 
the previous year, and the reasons therefore - S. 37(7). 
For more generaliy on the responsïbilities of Ministers and the role of Parliament as a fonn of extra- 
inadmissibility which requires her sanction alone to overcorne or representations are 
made directly to her office for a dispensation or other action. In cases of inadmissibility 
requiring her direct involvement, the matter is straightfomard. She retains authority to 
approve or deny entry and is fkee to follow the dictates of her conscience. Though she 
will be idionnecl by the recommendations of the field officer, she may choose to ignore 
such recomrnendation~.~ 
In other instances, where her authority has been delegated, it is rare that she will 
intewene directly to instruct a local office how to act. More ofien, her involvement in 
delegated decisions arises once a negative determination has been reached. For example, 
the visa office rnay be unwilling to grant approval of rehabilitation in a minor criminal 
conviction case or may be unwilling to extend discretion under sections 2.1 or 1 1(3) of 
the Regulatiom. There is nothhg to prevent an applicant from approachhg the 
Minister's office to plead for reconsideration. Though it is u n d  for the Minister to act 
unilaterally in a substantive way, it does regularly happa that she will be swayed to 
recommend a second look by the visa office. Her procedural discretion thus seems to be 
easier to cal1 upon. And, fkankly, once the Minister's attention has been drawn to a case, 
it does place some pressure upon the examining officer to at least ensure that fûU and due 
consideration is given the matter. Further, her scrutiny often serves to ensure that prompt 
attention is given to an application that perhaps has been overlooked and lying moribuud. 
judicial control, see de Smith, supra note 190 at 37-40. 
See Larng, supra note 235. The refitsal of discreîionary relief by higher officials, notwithstanding the 
recommendation of mvestigating officials is not uncornmon- Under a previous Minister, for example, it 
was difficult to obtain approvaI for rehabilitation of impaired driving convictions. Presumably, in an 
atrnosphere of heightened awmess of this issue in Canada, tliese types of convictioas were seen as too 
poiïticatly sensitive. This result foilows, of course, from the principle that discretion may not be uuduly 
fettered, Hence, notwithstanding any report by an investigating officer, the dtimate hoIder of the authority 
Either way, her interest generally will galvanize the attention of her officiais and ensure 
that the strictest level of faUness is observed. 
Appeals to the Minister for exercise of her positive authority are regdarly made 
by applicants who have failed to qualify for immigration in the ordinary course. Where 
she does not choose to exercise that authority in favour of such an applicant, resort is 
sometimes had to politicai action to force her hand. Media coverage, for example, is 
often sought by failed inland claimants as a means of capturing the Minister's personai 
attention, or even embmsing her to action. This type of action generally works best 
where the applicant can present sympathetic circumstances that touch the public heart and 
mind. Sometimes, this is done in spectacular fashion where, for example, failed Refugee 
claimants subject to removal seek sanctuary in churches. This approach relies on the 
applicant's ability to generate suflicient media coverage in Canada and so is not much of 
an option for applicants located outside the ~ o u n t r y . ~  Even for those within Canada, the 
efficacy of this approach is mixed at best. The Minister will naturaily be hesitant to 
accord special treatment to any particular individual. To do so would be to encourage 
simila. applications and could, in the long run, detract fiom the integrity of the regular 
p r o ~ e s s . ~  As a result, many of the sanctuary seekers h d  that they have simply traded 
. - - -- . -- - - - -. -- 
mut act mdependently. 
Though it k to be ioted that -y Independent applicants are a d y  residmt in Canada, on mident or 
employment authorizatio11~, or even without statu, at the same time that their applications are in process at 
a visa office outside of Canada. 
" The slippery slope of exceptions is to been sem in a recent news story conceming a famîly that has 
taken church sanctuary. Advocates in that case are guoad as saying that the d e s  must bt "bat" to aUow 
them to stay in Canada, because a simiiar exception was apparentiy made for another family in Wrc 
c ~ c e s .  See CIC "Ddy Wrapn (14 Juiy 1998) at 3, cihg a story âom the July 13,1998 edition of 
the St. John TeZegraph Jountd 
one unhappy fate for an equally unhappy one of seIf-imposed imprisonment.~ 
The nature of discretion is such that it leaves the Minister subject to criticism 
fiom both sides of the debate. For example, she rnay be cxiticized for being too fiee with 
her discretion in issuing Minister's Perrnits to facilitate the entry of convicted criminals to 
I 
Canada? Yet, at the same tirne, the same critics may decry failure to exercise discretion 
on behalf of someone who has taken church smctuary. The task of answering these 
cxiticisms is made even more difflcult because of the Privacy Act, which prevents the 
govemment nom publicly disclosing any information relating to a particdar applicant.@' 
Thus, while the applicant may seek out notoriety in the media, the department's response 
to allegations of application mishandling, or even abuse of discretion, must often be 
Limited to a simple 'ho comment", if consent to disclosure of information has not been 
given. 
Additionally, political action is not simply limited to the device of putting 
departmental policy or practice under the intense glare of media and public scrutiny. 
Other fonuns exist as well to attempt to exert influence on discretionary authority, 
For a recent example, se+ CIC "Daily Wrap" (2 Aprii 1998) at 3, quoting a story from the A p d  2, 1998 
edition of the The Toronto Star. It details the refiisal of the Minister to gant a stay of deportation for a 
Palestinian family that has taken up sanctuary in a Toronto church. The Miaister's lack of inclination to 
budge on such matters, of course, leaves her subject to much personal Criticism. The article, for example, 
quotes immigration Iawyer Mendel Green as saying that "This is the most hard-hearted minister 1 have 
corne across in my 38 years of practising." 
6x1 See, for example, CIC "Daily Wrap" (9 June 1998) at 1, citing editoriais from the June 9, 1998 editions 
of the Ottawa Citizen and Ottava Sun criticking the Minister for being too lax in issuance of Minister's 
Permits enabling convicted criminals to enter Cana&. 
@' For more on the Priwcy Act and the privacy rights of mdividuaIs, see below section 3.4-4 Human 
Rights, Privacy and Access to information Because of an applicant's right to privacy, it is also the case 
that individuai departmental decisions are udikely to be ever chaiienged by anyone, Save the appiicant. 
Even if some member of the public did leam of an individuai decision which they wished to chalienge, it is 
unlikely that they would ever gaining standing to pursue an action. See Canadian Council of Churches, 
supra note 536 where the court seiterated the criteria applicable to the question of standing and evidenced 
an unwiilingness to tolerate lightly interventions by third parties not directly impiicated in a suit. 
sometimes on a broader scale, so as to effect systemic change. De Smith, for example, 
observes that judicid review has often been employed as a fonn of political action? 
Those dissatisfied with the state of the law, including immigration law, have sometimes 
chosen to employ judicial review as a means of holding up govemment policy and 
procedures to scmtiny and embarrasment. He notes, however, that while such action 
may have a salutary effect in the short term, it often achieves littie of lasting 
consequence. This is so, since the govemment often may cure any defect by the simple 
expedient of amending the  la^.^^ Sometimes, however, the change is more substantial 
and long-lived. A notable Canadian example is the Singh case, which led to the creation 
of the IRB and implementation of more extensive safeguards for consideration of claims 
by refbgee claimants. More commonly, however, lasting change is best ef5ected where 
the judicial intervention is more narrow and focused, such as in the matter of construction 
and interpretation of a provision. Such a result is evident, for example, with respect to 
the negative discretion accorded to visa officers under section 1 1(3) of the ReguIati0n.s 
and the manner in which it has been namwed by judicial interpretation? 
3.4.2 Members of Parliament 
While the Minister is often too busy herself to attend personally to individual 
cases, the case is quite the opposite for Membm of Parliament (M.P.)? In Independent 
De Smith, supra note 190 at 23. 
S a  for example, the h m  case, supra note 594, which made interviews for assessing the factor of 
"personal suitability" rnandatory. To overcome this re@emenh section 1 1.1 was added to the 
Regulations. 
See discussion in section 3.3.4 Negative Discretion, above. 
65~' hdeed, one of the fïrst place many applicants seek assistance in immigration matters is at an M P . 3  
office. See for example, the advice of colimmist Joe Serge in the Toronto Star (October 25, 1997 edition) 
advising one reader, seeking advice on how to accelerate processing of his wife's application for 
cases, the assistance of an M.P. is usually sought by a relative or Wend of the applicant 
who is resident in Canada. The importance of the immigration portfolio varies among 
electoral ridings. dependhg upon the immigrant make up of each riding. In the large 
urban centers of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, however, immigration cornplaints 
and requests for assistance can form up to 80% of an M.P.3 constituency w ~ r k i o a d . ~  
Because of this, many ME'S and their staff  spend a great deal of thne preparing and 
submitting representations on immigration cases. Indeed, such representations may 
number into the tens of thousands in any given yearY The nature of those 
representations range fiom simple queries regarding status of an application and the stage 
of processing it may be at, to pleas for reconsideration of failed applications and requests 
for favourable discretionary pro~essing.~ 
The quality and efficacy of M.P interventions, of course, varies widely. The most 
effective seem to be those who undertake a thorough examination and are familiar with 
the rnerits and demerits of a case before approaching the responsible visa office. In rny 
experience. however, this sort of cornmonsense approach escapes too many M.P.3 and so 
permanent residence, to contact his local M.P. Cited fiom digest of article as given in CIC "Daily Wiap" 
(27 October 1 997). 
W6 See **Ire over Immigration" Macleans (20 Ianuary 1997) 14. According to Toronto MI. Demis Milis, 
the time consumed by immigration issues is so vast that his oflice has little attention to give to other issues. 
Fmstrated, Mills pins much of the blame for his workload on the cutbacks that have been experïenced by 
CIC in recent years. The article quotes a disgusted Miils as saying that this immigration workload ". . .is a 
most unfair demand on MPs." He ad& that it is time for money to be put back into CIC ". . .to relieve 
politicians of their burden." The article concludes by noting the importance of the immigration issue for 
many M.P.'s. In Milis' words, "[tJhings don't look too good for any of us FIP.'S]. .if we can't deliver on 
immigration files." 
For example, in 1997 the visa office in New Deihi, India aione received over 4000 representations fiom 
M.P.'s. My thanks to Mr. Jean Roberge, immigration Program Manager, New Delhi, for this information. 
Ironicaily, to an outside obsmcr, it might appear that, in the Canadian legal system, a trafnc ticket is a 
more Unportant matter than a grant of permanent residence and, ultimattely, of citizenship. This is so since 
M9.% are forbidden fiom intervening in regular court processes, yet may legitimately attempt to idluence 
immigration decision malters. 
greatly blunts the force of their interventions. Like any other advocate, M.P.3 need to 
appreciate that there is often more depth to a case than may be apparent h m  hearing one 
side only. Reacting to constituent concems is, of course, part of the hinction of an M.P. 
However, an effective, good faith intervention demands more than simply pummehg an 
immigration officiai for claimed delay or mishandling. While it may play well back in 
the constituency, the confbntational style is rarely efficacious. Substantive discretion is 
more often effectively manipulated by reasoned, logical arguments, and less often by 
irnpassioned rhetoric. UnfortunateIy, it seems to be a rare M P  who will have spent any 
time grasping the substantive aspects of a case. 
Frankly, the object of the exercise too o h  seems to be simply one of giving the 
appearance to a constituent that something substantive has been done on their behalf by 
the M.P.3 office. It is an appearance that is also reinforced by the apparent abandon with 
which M.P.'s will give personai references. Quite commonly, M.P. ' s offer personal 
assurances and character references, either for the applicant (less cornmon in Independent 
cases for the obvious reason that the applicant is not in Canada and so unlikely to be 
known by the M.P. directly) or, more commonly, for the Canadian "sponsor" and the 
depth of their cornmitment to supporthg the appiicant? Such approaches, of course, 
decrease in efficacy with the number of references and assurances an M.P. is known to 
give. Although, a s  a matter of departmental policy, CIC has undertaken to respond 
within several days to M.P. representations, no other special consideration is given to 
699 There is no accountability on M.P.'s for the refefences they provide in support of immigration 
applications. It is a problem that is seen most giaringiy in applications for visitor visas. Typicaily, an M.P. 
wiii provide a character reference for the famiiy to be visited in Canada and a bold personal assurance that 
any terms placed upon a visa issued to the applicant will be sttictiy observed. When the visa applicant later 
them. M P . 3  are simply one other interested party to whom an official may be 
accountable - nothhg more or less. They have no ability to demand a particula. 
substantive o ~ t c o m e . ~  For these reasons, then, it is not ofien that M.P.'s are able to 
idluence substantive outcomes in immigration cases. 
Although, as Page confknsml, the ability of M.P.'s to influence particular 
outcomes is doubtful, they are clearly effective as a .  oversight mechanian to ensure that 
cases are not overlooked or forgotten. Their position and profile is such that their 
representaîions carry significant weight, at least in so far a s  procedural matters are 
concemed. They have access to the Minister and the public forum of Parliament, and so 
hold a tnunp card to ensure that any dereliction of duty, or even simple mishandling, will 
not go unnoticed. AccordingIy, their interventions can be a usefbi and economical means 
for asserthg control over discretionary power, at least to the extent of ensuring integrity 
in its application. The attentions of an M.P. may spur new action on an application that 
has languished for want of attention, with the result that an overdue processing step may 
be taken. Altematively, such attentions may serve also to ensure that scmpulous faUness 
is adhered to in the exercise of substantive discretion, 
overstays in Canada or otherwise fails to observe those terms, there simply are no consequemes to the M.P. 
'O0 For an article discussing generaUy the role of M.P.'s as a form of redress outside of the courts, see AIan 
C. Page, "M.P.s and the Redress of Grievances" (1985) Public Law 1. This article observes that M P . 3  
really came to be inundated with requests for ilssistance 2Lfter the Second World War, with the rise of the 
welfare state. interestingly, the article, (though speaking of Britain but with similar applicabiiity to 
Canada) doubts that Ml'. representations resuit in many diffefent decisions than would otherwise have 
been the case. Though it seems that such intewentions make iittle différence to actuai outcomes, the author 
does still note a number of advantages, such as making constituents feel better by having someone that will 
l i s ta  to them. 
mi rd. 
3.4.3 The Role for Counsel 
As discussed earlier, the continuhg cutbacks in CIC have fuel4 increased roles 
for lawyers and consultants." CIC no longer has the capacity to provide individualized 
service, information and counseling. The result is a potential bonanza for lawyers and 
consultants. However, these two groups have so far shown little aptitude for capitalking 
on the new opportunities. In the case of la-, a large part of the prublem seems to 
stem from a lack of attention to details and an hability to get over an adversarial 
m i n d ~ e t . ~ ~  Lawyers are trained as litigators and spend most of their careers dealing with 
judicial and quasi-judicial types of triblmals where formality is the nom and there are 
often opposing parties to be represented. The visa application process, however, does not 
fit into such a mold and lawyers seem to have difficulty adjusting to this. 
-- - 
'O2 The role of immigration c o d t m t s  who are not lawyers has recently been called into question by the 
decision in Law Society of B. C. v. Mangat (1 4 August 1997) Vancouver Docket No. Cg329 1 0 (B.C.S.C.) 
[unreported]. In that case, the Law Society sought and obtained an injunction to prevent the defendant, a 
non-iawyer, fiom representing clients at immigration hearings. in granhg the injunction, the court agreed 
that the Immigration Act does not authorize non-lawyers to represent clients, for a fee, in such hearings. 
Further, the court found that even if this reasoning was incorrect, federd law, such as the Immigration Act, 
couid not be used to trench upon an area of provincial jurisdiction, such as regdation of the Iegai 
profession- The case is curreatiy under apped to the B.C. Court of Appeal and its ultimate outcome 
remains to be sem. However, its impact, at Ieast for overseas processing, is likely to be minimal. At most, 
it would simply drive consultants offshore, beyond the reach of any Iaw society, where many of them 
already have offices. Alternatively, it might force some cod tan t s  to work under the auspices of a 
lawyer, where a number of them already have their practices Iocated. For some analysis and comrnentary 
on the Mangat decision, see Robert Matas, "Immigration hearings in iimbo" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail 
(20 August 1997) Al. 
'O3 TheTe is a unique nature to mimigration practice that brings with it many challenges not seen in other 
areas of the law. For a review of some of those cmenges, see Derek Lundy, "Unique ethical problems 
face immigration lawyers" (1996) l6:3O The Luwyers WeeWy 1 1. For an exaxxcple descnbing a case where 
an immigration Iawycr claims to have been duped by his clients, see Cecil L. Rotenberg, Q-C. and Robert J- 
Moorhouse ' ~ c t i c e  Note to the Profession" (1995) 30 Imm. L X  (2d) 273, That Note describes the woes 
of one Toronto lawyer who assisted a "delegatio of more than 80 so-called Chinese investors" to corne to 
Cana& on a fact finding visit only to find that all of them disappeared shortiy after &val. He was left to 
disabuse the R.C.M.P. of the notion that he was operating a "sophisticated alien smuggling" operation. 
Sirnilarly, many lawyers seem to be harnpered by a traditional mindset that prefers 
suspicions of ill-gotten motives by visa officers. Such a mindset is abundantiy apparent 
in the views of one eminent counsel, for example, who observes that: 
"Immigration officers (visa officers) recoil in homr at the doctrine of procedural 
fairness because they contemplate that such doctrine rnay not in itself be f& to 
them. In their seMce which presentiy makes ever-increasing demands upon 
onicers to process an ever-increasing volume of cases with historically less 
resources, the obligation to provide procedural fainiess is regarded as a millstone 
around their neck. However that may be, quaiity of service dernands procedural 
faimess, especialiy if the Immigration Service of Canada is ever going to obtain 
respect fiom Canadians and the appropriate overseas ethnic communities where 
immigration is being recruited.'m 
Though written some years ago, my interactions with the immigration bar suggest that the 
attitude evident in this passage is still faVly common. Regrettably, these worcis evidence 
a lack of any insight or concession to the inte- of rank and file visa officers and 
highlight the lack of common ground that obtains between the bar and the bureaucracy. 
Not surprisingly, instead of a cooperative relationship, theirs is sadly one containing 
significant elements of muhial mistnist and suspicion.7m 
At the risk of perhaps generalizing too much, my observation has been that visa 
officers prefer to view immigrant selection as more of an exercise in substantive justice, 
while lawyers tend to fix their gaze ahost  exclusively on procedure. The penchant for 
procedure, of course, is a habit consistent with training and expenence aimed at gearing 
lawyers to hc t ion  in the adversarial forum of courts. Because of it, many lawyers bring 
" CL. Rotenberg, "Conundrumsn (1987) 1 Imm LA. (2d) 72 at 75. 
For a thogght provoking article on a divergence of aims and objectives between govemmcnt policy and 
lawyers' interests, and the possible consequences of same, see Peter Tomplch, "Immigration: 
Govemments and Lawyers on a Colhion Course" (1995) 17 Loy. LA.  Int'l& Cornp. LJ. 89 1. The 
author cites a widaiing gulf betwccn the positions of these two interests that b markcd by ever more 
fkactious confrontation. In his view, at 891, such confrontation is "...of iittie benefit to either side 
and.. .may weaken the democratic process in those counhies that value it most." 
an adversarial mindset to their immigration practice. Such an attitude, however, often 
entails modes of operation and methods of practice that are unsuited to effective visa 
office advocacy. This is particularly true where the objective may be to induce and 
influence an exercise of discretionary power. The object of a visa office intewiew is to 
ascertain reality and detemine how the law is applicable to mch reality. The d e  of the 
visa officer is to a u r d  an impartial assessrnent of the facts and the law applicable to 
them. They shodd have no vested interest in the matter and no preference as to the 
outcome. 
Lawyers, on the other hand, are not bound by considerations of impartiality. They 
are advocates in the service of a client and so are expected to put forth their best effort for 
that client. However, the point is sometimes lost on lawyers that the visa officer is the 
decision-maker, rather than the adversary. And in the absence of a true adversarial 
process, the legitimacy and efficacy of adversaial methods and tactics becomes 
questionable. Threats, bullying and use of pressure tactics, for example, often simply 
produce intransigence rather than the desired decisi~n.'~ Likewise, counsel blunt their 
own effectiveness by employing the m a l  panoply of adversarial tactics, such as over- 
glorifying their client's virtues while glossing over, tnvializing or ignoring altogether a 
fadt which rnay be a significant stumbling block to a successful application. A one sided 
approach to visa office advocacy is rarely so effective as a balanced approach, where 
pluses and minuses are acknowledged and deait with openly. Certainly, a visa officer 
who senses honesty and forthrightness in the presentation of an application is far more 
The tactics can range h m  3attling'' on an offica to her supaiors to threatening judicial review. For 
the most part, thesc tend to bc ineffective and usually resuit in even p a t e r  intransigence on the part of the 
likely to be co-opted as an ''ally" to aid the applicant to overcome any substantive 
problems. Where the case presents no unusual features, there is still importance to 
fostering a relationship of respect and cooperation. Procedurd discretion exists to favour 
the client with faster, l e s  intense pmcessllig and this discretion is more likely to be 
swayed where the decision-maker reposes confidence and trust in the advocate. The 
importance of this relationship is difficult tu overestimate, particdarly in the cwent era 
where the client's advocate may well be the decision-maker's sole source of information. 
The practicd result has been a continuing faim of lawyers to M y  understand 
and capitalize on the changes going on within CIC. AU of the restnicturing and re- 
engineering has literally driven clients into their m s  because of the bewildering array of 
documents and iaformation now required of applicants. The curent need in immigration 
is for increased cooperation, rather than increased litigiousness. Recognizing this, CIC 
lawiched an outreach initiative captured in the notion of "immigration partnerships", 
which involved a conscious effort to provide more and better information and 
communication with the bar and consulting communities. However, the initial flush of 
anticipation over partnerships has now faded. CIC has perhaps become more realistic in 
its expectations of what the profession is willing and able to deliver in tams of 
application quality and integrity and just how willing counsel are to support new 
initiatives. For example, the development of the "one-step application" concept of file 
decision-der. 
mr In faUnas, some lawyers do appear to have some recognition of the opportunities and chaiienges that 
BPR changes have presented to theni, See Owen, "List of 'designated occupations' for immigrant 
selection is being expanded", supra note 358, where the reaction of CBA membcrs to various BPR changes 
is given. For example, 'Teter Rekai of Toronto's Rekai and Johnson thought that there would be more 
need for Iawyers under the new regime. "But we will be different people and so wiii the visa officers," he 
predicted. The system is becoming more complex and numerid, he said. It wiU be working more on 
processing should have been a boon to immigration advisers? Under this concepf the 
applicant ran the risk of having her application rejected in its entirety, for example, with 
no processing undertaken at all, if it was not totally complete. Unable to easily access a 
iive person at CIC to assist with application preparation and submission, many applicants, 
*rrvt dcularly those unfkmiliar with Engiish or French, nanirally tunieci for information and 
assistance where they could fhd it, most often for a fee. The concept failed to catch on 
however. Though thei-e were some design and delivery problems highlighted by pilots 
that were undertaken, these were not intra~table.~ A significant reason for its demise 
was simply the unwillingness of immigration advocates to ernbrace it. 
Immigration consultants710 do not d e r  so much Eom the adversarial rnindset of 
the lawyers. Unfortunately, this does not mean that they are any better at dealing with 
visa offices. There is a significant problem of competence that a.Eects this group, largely 
because there is no regdation of the business of immigration consulting and so no 
standards conceming capability and integrity?" The problem is noted in a submission 
made by the C.B.A. to a Parliarnentary Cornmittee on Citize~l~hip and Immigration: 
Anyone can set up business as an immigration consultant, regardless of 
qualification. These immigration consultants are not subject to any test of 
competency before they provide advice to would-be immigrants and refugee 
claimants. Where former employees of Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
paper, by mail.'"' 
See text accompanying note 370, supra. 
The obvious problem was the issue of bblock-in" disnissed supra, in text accompanying note 372. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, it suffices to define "immigration consultants" as "non- 
lawyers", being persons who are not members of and licensed to practice law by any provincial Iaw society 
in Canada, 
"' nie problem of competence, of course, is not one Mted just to consuitants, though it does seem more 
apparent with this group than with Iawyers. See, for example, Craig Harper, "Refugee lawyers say 'inept' 
colleagues hurt practice" (24 May 1996) 16:3 me Lawym WeeHy 3. The article lists cornplaints by 
lawyem against other mernbers of îheir profession who are deged to iack even the most basic skiils and 
knowledge for deaiing with refigee cases. 
establish immigration consulting businesses, they may indeed possess a higher 
level of cornpetency than fly-by-night immigration consultants who prey on 
would-be immigrants. The concern, however, is with the standard of competency 
in general. At present, no fderal or provincial regdation governs the 
qualification of immigration ~oasultants."~ 
These concerns have prompted some consuitants to band together to form the 
Organization of Professional Immigration Consultants (O.P.I.C.). One of the primary 
objectives of O.P.I.C. is to increase the cornpetence of its mernbers by providuig training. 
However, participation in the organization rem& voluntiiry and so many of the worst 
consultants rernain beyond the reach even of the minimal supervision offered by 0PIC.713 
Although the C.B.A. would like CIC to 5e involveci in regulating consultants, it is not 
likely that CIC will soon assume such responsibility."' As a result, the cment 
environment within which private immigration advice and assistance are offered 
continues to be characterized by extremes in cornpetence and capability, both within the 
Canadian Bar Association, "Submission on immigration Consultants" (Submission to Parliamentary 
Standing Cornmittee on Citizenship and Immigration) (June, 1995) at 13. Although the C.B.A. submission 
concedes something to those consultants who are former employees of CIC, I would offer that an even 
betîer case is to be made for them. At the risk of king accused of bias, it has nonetheless been my 
experience that former CIC officers tend to be amongst those who are most effective in deaiing with visa 
offices, This is, of corne, a generalization and I admit also to having d d t  with some notable exceptions 
to this d e .  Ln generai, however, former departmental employees are most likely to understand the nature 
of the workload and pressures in a visa office and to put extra care into application preparation, so as to 
rniniinize the hstrations of the processing officer. My perception is that because of their experience 
inside the visa office, such practitioners appreciate better the importance of getting details right. 
"' OPIC bas no mandatory authority even over those cod tan t s  who opt to join the organisrirtion. See 
OPIC, "Code of Etùics & Rules of Professional Conduct" (OPIC, mdated), where it is stated that members 
"voluntady submit to the smtiny and discipline necessary to maintain high standards of ethical practice." 
Although OPIC has a comptamts process, the most serious penalties appear to be an "order" to return the 
client's fee andor termination of membership in OPIC- Even the "order" to retuni a fee, however, is not 
enforceable by any compulsive means on the part of OPIC. 
'14 See, for example, H. Gremberg, "immigration Alert No. 27 - Unofficial Minutes of CBA and CIC 
Meeting on November 4,1996" (Toronto: CBA, 6 November 1996). At that meeting, while the CBA 
expressed its desire that CIC shodd assume responsi'bility for reguiating codtants,  the department 
expressed its reluctance to do so. In particular, CIC noted that such responsïbiiity would necessady 
involve additional costs to the department and, in an environment of fiscal restraint, CIC was Unwrely to 
convince the Finance and Treasury Board of the Govenunent of Canada to malce more fun& available to it 
for this purpose. 
bar and the consulting community. These range fiom the very good to the very bad and 
even into the realm of the dishonest and deceitfÛPs 
Notwithstanding this, it is clear that to constnictively participate in the new 
paradigm of visa processing, professional advisors of al1 sûipw need to get beyond their 
traditional habits and practices. This is particularly true since the need for good quality 
professional assistance is greater than ever before. The fhdamentals for any professional 
immigration advisor who wishes to capably represent her clients must be integrity and 
scnipulous attention to detail. Like any other field of advocacy, advocates in the 
immigration world quickly develop a reptation regarding their reiiability and 
trustworthyness and visa offices do share information amongst themselves on such 
matters. Even the rumou. of a lack of integrity in a particular advocate can be damaging. 
Any advocate tamished by the iillnt of a lack of ethics or diligence wiIi h d  that 
p r o c e d d  discretion will rarely be exercised, with the resuit that few of their applications 
will enjoy the benefit of a waiver of interview. Such a taht may aiso a e c t  the exercise 
of substantive discretion, with circumstances cited to justify same subjected to more 
rigorous scrutiny and the benefit of doubt Iess easily granted. This is only nahual in an 
atmosphere where CIC decision makers may never meet the client and are forced to rely 
more and more on the information collectecl, interpreted and presented by the applicant's 
See for example, David Hogben, 'Wegligence, h u d  alleged in immigration business" Vancower Sun (8 
November 1995), as cited m DFAIT "INFOFLASH" (8 November 1995). The article details concerns by 
the Law Society of B.C. that immigrant applicants are bemg preyed upon by unscrupdos and mcompetent 
immigration consultants. See also CIC ''Dady Wrap" (14 May 1998) 1, citing a story fiom the May 14, 
1998 edition of the Vancouver Sun where Reform Party immigration critic John Reynolds cornplains that a 
'Vancouver immigration consultant charged with passport forgery, people-smuggliag and other crimes 
shouldn't be allowed to remain in busmess." The story relates that the consuitant was charged in March, 
1998 ".. .with 18 counts, uicluding forgery, assadt, h t e n i n g  and counselling (sic) his clients to lie to 
immigration officers. Since the charges were iaid, Rezaei [the codtant] has continued to operate his 
counsel. It should be obvious, then, that much depends upon the reptation of the 
advocate. 
Attention to integrity must also be combined with the acquirement of new skiIls. 
In particda., for too long it seems that advocates have viewed the preparation of the 
application for permanent residence - the basic IMM8 application foxm - as a mere 
clerical matter, best left to a secretary or junior in their office. Such an attitude misses the 
point entirely. It is no longer adequate to simply fill out that fom in the haphazard 
manner of former days. The M M 8  is the essential, central document by which all 
immigration processing is carried out. In an atmosphere where there is no loziger much 
capacity in the system to remedy mistakes, the proper completion of this document is 
crucial. In a very real sense, the IMM8 is the application. It provides a road map to the 
appticant's file and is the reference guide to wbich aU else is appended. This is 
particularly true for screening officers who may see dozens of files in a day. For them, 
the IMM8 is the starhg point and, while an application may contain reams of supporting 
materia17'6, no other document is ordinarily studied, reviewed and referred to in the same 
intensive manner as the IMM8. The importance of givùig complete and accurate 
information in this document is reinforceci by the fact that it contains a declaration, which 
the applicant must sign, attesting to same. AccordingIy, advisors must appreciate and 
understand the significance of every bit of information sought in the application and must 
ensure that it is presented in an immediately useable fashion. 
business at 204-1 149 Hornby, directly across the street from the Canada Immigration Centre." 
'16 Indeed, too ofien an appiication contains supporthg information that is of litfie or w d value. The 
glaring nature o f  such a problem k highiighted when the nle contains such f ldf but then lacks oher very 
relevant information. 
For advocates, the importance of the infiormation gathering stage to their client's 
ovemll chances for success cannot be stresseci enough. Officers no longer have the same 
time available to veri@ missing, unclear or erroneous information. Since faimess at the 
paper-screening stage does not require an oral hearing, applicants may be refuseci if it is 
not clear on the face of the application that they qualiQ. Likewise, while the paper- 
screening officer may not be the officer to ultimately approve the application, that £ïrst 
oEcer wields the discretionary procedural authority to waive the necessity of interview. 
Recognizing that discretion may be influencecl by a host of sociological and 
organizational factors, the job of the advocate should be to make the life of the paper- 
screening officer as easy as possible. Ail necessary Monnation to justify waiver should 
be submitted ab initio with the application. On the cher hand, superfluous or gratuitous 
information should be omitted, lest it create a negative impression of obsequiousness or a 
lack of sincerity."' 
Similarly, counsel need to appreciate the role of screening officers, or case 
analysts as they are called at some posts, who may review dozens of applications in a day. 
These officers face productivity measures which ensure that they have only a finite 
'" in my experience, there is no end to the irrelevant information that counsel will submit with an 
application, apparently on the theory that more is better, For example, one applicant's counsel thought it 
necessary to submit a letter showing that she had been one of eight persons wiMmg the " S d e  Campaign" 
at her place of employ. Wodd counsel have the selection process conducted on the basis of look? Other 
examples 1 have encountered include submission of a certificate from an ice skating course that the 
applicant took. Although this was presumribly intended to suggest preparation for life in Canada, it is 
equally suggestive of a m-ve perception of what skills are really necessary. Perhaps the most amusing and 
perplexing example 1 have encountered was that of a couple whose child was born to them in Canada, 
whiie on a month long tourist visit. At mtenriew, they presented the child's passport to ver* that she was 
a Canadian citizen, Perhaps to emphasize the fact that they did mdeed have a Canadian relative, a smali 
plastic bag was then pulled out and presented to me. On closer inspection, it was revealed to contain the 
child's now desiccated and shriveled up umbilical corci, which had been stapled to a card issued by the 
hospital. In the face of this overwhelrning evidmce, there was clearly no basis to dispute the citizenship of 
the child. 
amount of time to spend on any one application. In case of doubt, their inclination may 
be to refer the matter to interview where ambiguities and doubts can be explored more 
Mly, in a block of time that specincaliy ailotted to the case for that purpose. 
Accordingly, a simple, but effective technique to sway any discretion in favour of an 
applicant is to M y  utilize the IMM8 application fom. Too often, out of laziness or 
habit, counsel choose not to fiII out boxes on the MM8 deahg  with education and work 
experience and simply include a note to "see attached". The ht ra t ion  level of the 
screening officer with this device inmeases in proportion to the amount of material that 
has been attached to a file and the fkequency with which they are directed to "see 
attached". There is never an excuse for not filling out the education and work history 
portions of the IMMS, particularly since these are meant only to cover the most recent 
employment and education. Filling out the education box, for example, with kindergarten 
and grade school information is the hallmark of a marpuiaiiy competent counsel. Instead, 
the point of the exercise is prirnarily to determine what is the highest level of education 
that an applicant possesses. If an applicant has more relevant education than can be 
included in the MM8 (which is rare), then the details should be listed in reverse order 
with the highest level of education listed k t  and so on. Similarly, unless the client has a 
very spotty and inconsistent work history, there is little reason that the highlights of that 
work history camot be provided on the -8. 
Understanding the IMM8 and integrity corne together with the assessrnent of 
language proficiency. The fom asks applicants to indicate whether they speak, read and 
write English and French "fluently", 'bvell", "with diflicultf' or 'hot at all". It is hard to 
accept that a serious effort to gauge language ability has been undertaken, for example, 
where fiuency is indicated but the applicant attends intemiew with an interpreter. While 
the categorïes for language ability are hardly certain and precise, there is sufficient clarity 
in these categorizations that egregious over-estimation invariably refiects poorly on 
counsel. Additiondly, the IMM8 form seeks information about any affiliation or 
associations the applicant has had with groups such as political parties, student and 
vocational organizations and whether any rnilitary service has been undertaken. Too 
ofien, such infornation is not rnentioned at aii by the applicant. This information is used 
to assess the background of the applicant and gauge whether they pose any sort of 
security risk. Counsel who omit to mention any such affiliation do so at their client's 
peril. Should the information corne out at intenriew, the inclination of a decision-maker 
to recommend a positive exercise of discretion is likely to be negatively impacted by the 
appearance of subtemige and deliberate concealment. Similarly, considerable delay can 
be occasioned to the applicant's file, since background checks that could have been 
commenced on receipt of the application may wait until d e r  interview. The same is true 
for other questions which ask whether the applicant bas ever had serious health problems, 
a criminal record or has ever been denied a visa anywhere, been deported or denied entry 
to any country. Providing details up fiont invariably saves fiutration and delay later on. 
It is important to recognize that while the big prize fiom the paper-screening stage 
for many applicants will be a waiver of intewiew. this is not the only benefit. For some, 
simply clearing paper-screening to enter an interview queue may enhance their chances 
for success. As in so much of immigration work, it is often easiest to refuse applicants at 
the fiont end, before the case has tirne to develop new complexities. The f.urther into the 
process the applicant goa. the more involvement required of the decision-maker to 
document and justifjt a refbsal. Thus, even if an inteMevu is required, the chances for 
refiisal diminish greatly d e r  paper-screening. This is particularly true of discretionary 
decision-making. It is infinitely more difficult to refuse an applicant, at least fiom a 
psychological standpoint, once a personal connection has been made at interview. 
Similarly, counsel who have asked for an exercise of discretionary power offen seern to 
have adequately counseled their clients as to the importance of demonstrating at interview 
those positive qualities which are likely to impel a .  officer to look favourably on their 
appiication. Even a sense of humour, though a trivial matter, c m  be important to 
establishing a sufiicient rapport with the decision-maker that will swing any doubt in 
their favour. The reality is that the exercise of discretion is made easier when the officer 
is lefi with a sense of ease about an applicant and is familiar with them as a person, and 
not just as a file. 
In the event that the client is affected by a problem or condition which may render 
them inadmissible, counsel will obviously be seeking a gant of positive substantive 
discretionary authority to overcome sarne. Pointing up such problems at the time of 
submission of the application is obviously a better ploy than leaving it to be discovered 
by the visa officer at interview. But this is not enough. Again, counsel should approach 
the task of seeking such discretion with the view that anything that can be done to make 
the decision-maker's task easier should be done. This may involve some research and 
attention to preparation of the application submission that counsel may not be used to, but 
the benefits will follow. Specifically, counsei should not leave the task at ?he point where 
the problem has been highlighted. Rather, they should idenw the ground of 
inadmissibility and locate it in the statutory regime set out in section 19 of the Act. Most 
effectively, counsel should provide cogent, articulate reasons why the ground should be 
overcome. In this regard, it is aiways impressive to cite h m  the policy manuals for 
guidance as to why and how a ground of inadmissibility should be o v e r ~ o m e . ~ ~ ~  Further, 
if the ground for inadmissibility involves criminality, counsel would do well to provide 
copies of ail indictments and police reports, together with a copy of the foreign criminai 
statute under which the applicant was convicted The process of rehaiiilitation h m  
criminal inadmissibility requires that the visa officer detennine whether the foreign 
offence has an equivalent under Canadian criminal law. By supplying al1 of this 
information up fkont, counsel is also weli positioned to offer an opinion as to the likely 
Canadian equivalent, if any. Oftentimes, a foreign offence may be equivaient to two or 
more different offences, of d i f f e ~ g  senousness, under Canadiau law. B y  proactively 
approaching the question of equivalency, counsel is better positioned to infhence the 
officer's interpretative discretion as to which of a range of potentiai offences is achiaiiy 
the most equivalent to the foreign offence. 
In its submission to the Parliarnentary Standing Cornmittee on Citizenship and 
Immigration, the Canadian Ba.  Association cited exorbitant fees charged by consultants 
for simple services as  a justification for action to regulate immigration con~ultants.7~~ An 
example was even &en of one consultant who '%ad charged $500 6 ' j ~ t  for f i k g  out a 
form'"'[footnote omitted] .m In the majoriw of visa office cases, the fiUing out of one 
form - the IMM8 - will be the most significant task undertaken by an advocate for her 
'Is The number of advocates 1 have corne across who seem to be unaware even of the existence of the 
policy man@ is astounding. This reference source should be a basic part of any immigration 
professional's iiirary. 
'19 CBA., "Subrnission on Tmmigration Consultants", supra note 712 at 13. 
client. An advocate who approaches this task with diligence and attention will jusw 
their "$500", since its completion cm mean the ciifference between the burden of 
interview and the benefit of waiver, or even the dinerence between acceptance and 
rejection. Moreover, since the majority of cases may be waived the necessity of 
interview, the rest of an advocate's involvement in case processing rnay simply be of a 
"hmd holding" varietPt, requiring little or no involveci advocacy or speciai expertise. 
The most effective counsel tend to be those who take the tirne and effort to 
appreciate the pressures that decision-makers face, who seek to understand the nature of 
the process by which a discretionary decision will be made and who pay care and 
attention to presenting facts and evidence in a marner that is logical and consistent. As 
discussed, this often involves simple things, yet they tend not to be done ofien enough in 
p r a c t ~ e . ~  In the current era, however, a failure to attend to details could weU mean a 
failure to draw upon available discretion. Caveat emptor then to the client left to choose 
-- - - - - 
no Id. at 14. 
For example, assisting the client to gather other information, secure medical testmg and the me. 
A favourite example which causes visa officers much consternation and suspicion as to counsel's 
competence is to be found in Business Class applications. The tendency of counsel is to submit a foot deep 
pile of paper to ver@ assets, business experience and the me. Consisting of financial statements, 
statistical data, banking infoxmation and other smiilarly tedious documen~, they rarely rnake compeUing 
reading. Given the innate denseness of these types of materials, the importance of logical sequencing and 
adequate explanations is heightened. Yet, rarely are such documents provided in any sort of order or with 
any description and summary of theh contents and purported significance. The inevitable impression 
given is that what is sought is obfhcation, rather than clarification. Likewise, another simple but effective 
technique that eludes many counsel concerns providing an estimate as to how many units of assessment an 
Independent applicant should be awarded. Some advisors provide no assessment at ail while otbers will 
provide only a global figure. Providing a points taUy, with a specific breakdowu of the estimated pomts for 
each of the selection criteria, shouid be routine for any advisor. It ai& the screening officer to ensure that 
their own assessrnent is correct and serves to dispel the notion that the advisor has exaggerated 
qualifications or simply made an arithrnetical error to overestimate the available points. Similady, it is 
foolhatdy for a professional advisor to submit an Independent application without specificaiiy stating what 
is the applicant's intended occupation in Canada. What may be pdectly obvious to the advisor, who 
probably has met the client and has personal knowledge of her, may not be so obvious to a visa officer 
reviewing the applicatioa If left to guess as to what the intended occupation might be, the officer may 
well determine that the applicant has no experience relevant to the General Occupaions List, with the 
her advisor. Whether her fees are well spent or misspent may depend largely upon care to 
details. 
3.4.4 Human Rights, Privacy and Access to Information 
Another source of potential control over discretionary power that bears mention 
concerns use of the human rights complaint process under the Canadian Human Rights 
Act? As was noted in the Menghani casem, Canadian human rights iegislation rnay be 
applicable to overseas Independent immigrant pmcessing, though very specific 
circwnstances need to be present. In particular, for the Human Rights tribunal to have 
jurisdiction, there must be an "afkted" relative in Canada to launch a complaint. Wide 
grounds for complaint, such as discrimination on the basis of source country, leave plenty 
of scope for such applications. C W y ,  hproperly exercised discretion may cause a 
discriminatory effect or may proceed fkom a discriminatory basis. Either way, the 
exercise is potentially subject to Human Rights Act jurisdiction. 
Two pieces of legislation, the Access to Informutio Actm and the Privacy ActM 
also exert some control over the use of discretionary authority, because of the openness in 
govemment operations which they mandate? The Privocy Act has two major functions: 
it allows individuals access to personal information that the govemment has collected 
about them and it provides protection to individuals by circumscribing how such 
- 
result that the application is refirsed, 
RS.C. 1985, C. El-6. 
Supra note 175. 
ns Access to Infonnation Act, c. A-1, R.S.C. 1985, 
Supra note 249. 
See generally Access to Information Act and Privacy Act (ï.nfonnation booklet), id. 
information may be use& whom it may be disclosed to and under what ~ircumstances.~ 
In the immigration conte- the Privacy Act access procedures allow an applicant, or their 
representative, to obtain a copy of their immigration nle h m  the relevant visa office. 
The complete contents of a nle, h m  the case notes to medical reports and other 
information are availabie for inspection. The obvious benefit, at least in so far as 
controlling discretionary power is concerned, is that it enables an applicant to peruse the 
information to verify its accuracy, ensure that it was interpreted in a correct fashion and 
discover the rationale for the manner in which decision making was conducted. 
While the Privacy Act enables individuais to access their own file, the Access to 
Information Act has broader application. This statute permits Canadian citizens or 
permanent residents to access noncase specific information held by federal govemment 
i~stitutions.~ An access request can be used to obtain copies of almost any document 
that is found in a federal govemment office?' An example in the area of immigration 
law might be any policy document, either in CIC headquarters or at a visa office abroad, 
which provides guidance as to how discretion should be exercised. If the policy guidance 
has not otherwise been made public, then an access request provides a practical avenue 
for its discovery. 
Through the two tools of access to information and the CAPS database, CIC 
operates in something of a fishbowl. Indeed, because of them, there is probably no other 
governrnent deparûnent or tribunal in Canada that operates under the sarne intense 
Id. at 7. 
729 rd. at 4. 
See g e n d y  id. at 4. Exemptions are aiiowed under the Accers to Infimation Act for materiiii whose 
release might cause hann or be contrary to law. 
scrutiny that CIC receives. The combination of these two has enabled private operators 
to mine CIC databases for even the finest bit of data. For example, the Lexbase fkm, 
which bilis itselfas 'The National Monnation Network for Immigration Fractitioners'', 
has so inundateci CIC with access requests as to keep several employees very busy 
answering them. And the results of those requests are telling. The information is 
packaged in the form of a monthiy newsletter and sold to subscribers who are provided 
bighly detailed particulars of CIC's intemal operatiom. In a recent issue of the 
newsletter, for example, case processing statistics conceming the pass, fail and interview 
waiver rates of individual employees within the Buffalo RPC and Buffao visa office 
were given? 
While there is a broad justice objective to be served in having the operations of 
individual visa offices subject to such scrutiny, a note of caution must be sounded as well. 
As the sociological discussion earlier in this study pointed out, institutional and operative 
considerations may influence the exercise of discretion just as much as legal constraints. 
In the case of the Buffalo statistics, for example, there is perhaps a double whamrny to be 
contended with. First, making the statistics available amongst officers within a given 
work unit, so that each decision maker is made accountable relative to others within her 
unit, creates pressure for conforrnity in decition making. But, having those statistics 
available publicly adds a f.urther dimension, as officers are made individually accountable 
in a very public way."* No longer do nameless, faceless civil servants toi1 in senrice to 
"' 'Wew Lexbase "Waiver" Chart #1: 1997 Waiver Rates by Category, by Exnployee" Lexbare 
(August(September 1997 Sending) 2. 
" Whiie the "New Lexbase Waiver Chart #In, id, =fers to those individuai e~1lp10yees only by their 
initiais, this is sufficient to m e  that the decision makers in question wiii be identitiable and known to the 
the Minister who bears notional responsibility for each and every decision. Rather, each 
is now in the spotlight with relentless gathering and publication of their individual 
productivity measures a constant factor in the back of their rnindsm With few 
opportunities to justify or defend their actions, both to headqwrters mandarins who 
monitor such things and to the public who consume them, the pressure to conform and 
not stand out by reason of undue Ieniency or untoward severity becornes significant. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to plumb the exact linkage between 
publication of such statistics and outputs, intuitively one senses that a correlation will 
exist, if there are no proper controls over their usage. There is also a question to be asked 
conceming the uses to which such information is put to by sources outside the 
department. The fact that such information is regularly sought and provided to 
immigration practitioners in a monthly newsletter certainly suggests that it is valuable to 
them. Comparing statistics between offices, and now even between individual officers 
within an office, is clearly meant to enable advisors to counsel clients as to where and 
when to lodge a particular type of application, so as to best enhance its chances of 
success. This issue presents features, such as the impact upon the public interest, 
immigration system design and the Idce, which eclipse the more immediate focus of this 
paper and so will not be pursued fiuther. SSuffice to Say, discretionary decision making is 
likely to be impacted when cornpetition between offices and individual decision makers 
clientele, such as Iawyers and consuitants, with whom they deal- 
"' The matter actuaUy hi& closer to home for civil servants because their email is also subject to access 
requests. See for exampie, Caro1 Turner-Trusca '%sident's Report" P ! S O  Update (iivewsiettw of the 
Professional Association of Fomgn S m c e  Wcers)  15: 1 (Jan- 1998) at 1, where it is noted that 
several PAFSO mernbers in CIC have had their emaiI accounts accessed Pursuant to those requests, the 
". . .members have been asked to supply the entire contents of their e-mail account for extended periods of 
time (up to six months).  .." Of course, even personal messages found in the email account are subject ta 
c m  be fostered by the provision of statistics. In an atmosphere where the weU being of 
an office, or even of an individual decision-maker, may be in jeopardy because of 
institutional or other changes, the provision of such statistics cm exacerbate the situation. 
Conceivably, they may give nse to pressures pushing dismtionary decision making to 
becorne irrationd or divorced nom the particdars of each individual case, for reasons 
that have little to do with the facts presented? 
public disclosure pursuant to an access request. 
'Y See for example, "AUeged ûiad leader's enky traced to bid to save jobs", supra note 364. That article 
suggests that the alleged triad leader was able to obtain a visa at the Los Angeles visa office because of an 
overly generous waiver policy. The exercise of discretion to waive mterviews was apparently motivated, at 
least m part, by concerns about the continueci viability of the office. 
CHAPTER 4 - CONCLUSIONS 
"Comptissima republicae, plurimae 1egaSm 
4.1 Discretion Now 
Discretion is a broad, multi-purpose administrative tool that has many facets. It 
exists in tandem with d e s  to aid their interpretation and to fiil in gaps left by d e s .  It 
may be positive or negative in its effect and it occurs both in matters of procedure and 
substance. In the face of impossibility of devising complete, self-executing rules for 
immigrant selection, discretion has long been seen as essential for canying out of 
Parliament's will in this area of public law. There is, in fact, broad consensus that the 
existence of some discretion is essential in immigration law. However, that consensus 
evaporates when consideration of discretion moves beyond generaiities to specific issues 
conceming its scope, application and usage. How much, under what circumstances and 
of what character are hotly debated questions. 
Parliament's will in immigration matters, broadly expressed in the objectives 
contained in the Immigration Act, is both expansive and selective. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the formulation of discretion in our current immigration regime possesses both 
positive and negative facets - a power to include and also to exclude. The issue of a dual 
character for discretion has been the central focal point of bureaucratie and judicial 
interest. Intervention and reformulation have followed that interest, with the result that a 
TU 'The worse the state, the more laws it has-" T.R. Reid, "The World Accordmg To Rome" (August 
1997) 192 National Geographic 54 at 64. Reid attributes tbis quotation to the Roman historian Tacitus. 
significant make over of immigration discretion has taken place. 
"The very concept of administrative discretion involves a right to choose between 
more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people 
to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred.'- This pronouncement by Lord 
Diplock in Turne.de Metro. Borough Council describes the essence of discretion - 
choice. In recent years, however, that choice has been narrowed and redcted by a 
confluence of movements, originating in the courts and the immigration bureaucracy, to 
reduce the availabiiity and scope of substantive discretionary power. Though each side 
has acted independently for different reasons and motives, the result has been something 
of a loosely coordinated action whereby substantive discretion has been caught in the 
jaws of a narrowing vise. 
In rethinking discretion, the bureaucracy and the judiciary have approached the 
matter fiom di fferent viewpoints and for different reasons. The philosophical footing 
fiom which courts have proceeded has largely followed a Diceyan orientation centered on 
the concept of the d e  of law. Thus, while the amplitude of positive discretion has been 
assiduously nurtured, there has simuitaneously been an emphasis on control and 
reduction of negative discretion. It is a viewpoint that is untroubled by the inconsistency 
of these apparently contrary approaches to the two sides of ~iiscretion?~ This is because 
the root focus in both instances has proceeded nom a consideration of applicant rights. 
Thus, regardless of whether p r o c e d d  or substantive discretion is involved, any 
- - 
" Secretav of Stateefor Educ. & Science v. Tameride Metro. Borough Councii, [1977l A.C. 1 0 14 at 1064. 
Evans, supra note 2, noting that the holding of contrary opinions about discretion is not uncornmon. 
Thus, those who see threats to liierty and the d e  of law in negative discretion may hold the opposite view 
of positive discretion used to confer benefits. 
impingement upon rights or entitlements has been met by the strictest scmtiny and 
control. 
Most often, judicial intervention agaiust discretionary power has been justified by 
the fïnding that its exercise has involved an untoward infigement upon the nght to 
faimess. The courts have been particularly bothered by the broad scope of substantive 
negative discretion. Thus, judicial interpretation has been employed to read meaning into 
the express delegation of such discretion in the Regulutiom to restrict its usage to matters 
related to the ability of an Mmigrant to economically establish in Canada. At the same 
time, the amplitude of positive substantive discretion has been guarded by the stricture 
against unlawfül fettering of discretion. 
Procedural discretion, on the other hand, has enjoyed something of a renaissance. 
This is because its negative side tends to have far less impact than is the case for 
substantive discretion and its positive usage is uncontroversial. Generally, therefore, 
judicial interventions with respect to procedurai discretion have been lirnited to occasions 
where it has been used negatively to somehow UIlfairIy deprive an applicant of an 
entitlement or right that was due to ber? Clearly, the most important reason for the 
flowering of procedural discretion has been the fimctional benefits it has provided to the 
bureaucracy. It has been a major source of the increased efficiencies that were needed 
because of labour reductions mandated by the fiscal austerity imposed upon CIC. Since 
applicants have also benefited h m  such efficiencies, there has no cause for cornplaint 
See for example, the Choi decision, mpra note 270, where the visa office exercised procedural 
discretion to give the applicant a PAQ, rather than an ordmary application fonn. This decision adverseIy 
affected the applicant's nght to "lock in" his application prior to a regdatory change On the other hand, a 
procedurai decision not to waive au interview does not adversely affect any accrued substantive rights the 
and so littie reason for such discretion to a-t judicial notice. 
A cornmon rallying cry against negative discretion has centered upon its apparent 
incompatibility with a central precept of the d e  of law - that there should be no 
penalization, Save as clearly defined by law. Reference to the concept of the mle of law 
has followed a similar pattern to that of judicial intervention on discretion generally. It is 
cited in relation to negative discretion but never mentioned with respect to positive 
discretion. Thus, though the rule of law mandates that the law should apply to all 
equdiy, it is nowhere to be seen when government moves positively to grant visas 
outside of the ordinary processes provided for by lawOn9 In immigration matters at any 
rate, the rule of law seems to be more a matter of convenience than one of necessity and 
strict practice. Thus, discretion in the courts' conception is very large when employed as 
a positive instrument for qualification, but much namwer when used to disqualify. For 
most applicants, therefore, the immigration application process will involve only a 
figurative toss of a two headed coin - one side allowing for qualification by the rules with 
the other allowing qualification by the exercise of discretionary power. 
The other viewpoint, common to the bureaucracy, is more utilitarian and derives 
its philosophical inspiration fiom the hctionalist viewpoint. It prefers a broader view of 
discretion, both positive and negative, as a tool for supplementing the shortcornings of the 
applicant may have. Interview is the ordinary requirement and so failure to waive same has ody deprived 
the appiicant of a speciai benefit, not a right. 
739 See for example, CIC, "Daiiy Wrap" (21 October 1997), providing the foiiowing digest of a s t q  cited 
to articles in the October 2 1, 1997 editions of the Ottawa Citizen, Financial Post and Hamilton Spectator: 
"Prime Minister Jean Chretien said yesterday he is ready to offa a visa to a retired Russian navy captain 
charged with treason for his work on nuclear poiiution. m] Russian Prime Minister was quoted as 
saying the Mi. Nikitin would be fice to go once justice has nin its course. He is accused of high ireason for 
having publicize [sic J the danger of poiiution posed by aging Rwian nuclear submarine [sic]. Mr. Nikitin 
applied in late 1993 to emigrate to Canada." 
des. That viewpoht, however, has been tempered in the last five or six years by fiscal 
imperatives and practical concems that militate agahst costly, labour intensive 
processing methods. The exercise of substantive discretion, of course, involves very 
individualized processing. Regardless of whether such discretion is used positively or 
negatively, each decision demands a considerable cornmitment of tirne and energy h m  a 
decision-maker. In an era of restraint and reduction, it is inevitable that use of such 
discretion should be eschewed. So too, the lessons drawn against positive substantive 
discretion h m  fiscal Unperatives have also been drawn against substantive negative 
discretion. Substantive discretion, whether positive or negative, is simply very intensive 
by nature and hence "expensive". Moreover, working under the supervision of the courts, 
the bureaucracy has had to reckon with judicial disdain for any f o m  of negative 
discretion. These two trends have worked to reduce the scope and availability of dl 
substantive discretion, both positive and negative. While some substantive discretion 
remains available, primarily because it is explicitly provided for in the legislation, it is 
clearly no longer favoured by the bureaucracy as a tool of general application. On the 
other hand, the use of procedural discretion has been encouraged and enhanced because 
of the savings in labour and resources it offers. 
Thus it is that a combination of jurisprudential trends and a tight fiscal 
environment have left substantive discretion in a reduced state. Though the judiciary and 
the bureaucracy hold apparently divergent views on most aspects of discretion, it is 
interesting to observe that they have convergeci in a preference for a more black and 
white, niles based system. The judiciary favours such a system because of the assurances 
it appears to offer for safeguarding applicant rights, while the bureaucracy sees efficiency 
and savings in it. Ironically then, one tugs towards d e s  as a way to enhance 
individiialized processing while the other sees an opportunity in rules to increase 
efficiencies by reducing individualid processing. 
There is another shared commonality to the approaches employed by the 
bureaucracy and the bench. Both have involved a downplaying of the public interest in 
immigration matters. The notion of a public trust has long animated immigration law and 
policy, and visa officers have tended to be very conscious of the fact that they are public 
servants. As such, they tended to believe that their fmt degiance was to the public trust, 
and not necessarily to the client at the counter. According to CIC management, however, 
such a mindset is no longer susfainable. This is evident in the statement of Raphael 
Girard, former Assistant Deputy Minister (Operations) who, in 1993, ". . .aclcnowIedged 
that most of his officers have a different perspective &om his. They think the client is the 
general public. He thinks bowever, that] the client is ''the person standing at the 
~ i c k e t . ' " ~ ~  The courts, for their part, have also pursued a course of focusing ody  on the 
individual applicant. The reasons for this are rooted in the nature of judicial review and 
the singuiar focus it has upon procedure. This focus bas been followed without regard to 
the substantive consequences that may flow f?om particuiar decisions and is epitomized 
by the notion that even '%ad decisions" wiii be mstained by "good procedures" and vice 
versa. 
Whatever the reasons for it, it is clear that the pressures exerted by both the 
judiciary and the bureaucracy have reduced the usage of substantive discretion and are 
adding impetus for the creation of a more d e s  oriented selection system. That system 
has yet to be M y  devised, but much recent interest and activity suggests that refom may 
corne sooner rather tha. later."' The ways and meam of immigration processing have 
been radically affected by the divergent, but yet converging, trends of judicial formalism 
and bureaucratic formalism. Whatever the course of any hiture refom, the present 
situation is clear. The relentless progress of judicial intervention and bureaucratic 
expediency have combined to whittle d o m  the scope and availability of substantive 
discretion, but enhance the use of positive procedural discretion. In either case, discretion 
is now primarily an instrument of positivisrn - for inclusion substantively or for 
procedural convenience. 
4.2 Refonning Discretion - Immigration Legisla Uve Revie w Report 
The role of discretionary power within immigration law and processes remains a 
topic of current interest as witnessed by the fact that attention has been paid to it in a 
recent study of possible future directions for refom. Commissioned by the Minister of 
Immigration, that shidy, entitled "Nat Just Numbers - A Canadian Framework for 
Future Immigration has suggested radical structurai, procedural and substantive 
changes affecthg al l  aspects of immigration law. Acting on a one year mandate to advise 
the Minister, the Legislative Review Advisory Group which undertook the study singled 
out discretion for special attention. In so far as selection of Independent immigrants is 
concemed, the group's principal concIusion was that the necessity for a "general 
" Gerald Owen, supra note 358 at 10. 
"' See generaiiy Chapter 2, above, disaiaing initiatives by the bureaucracy to reduce substantive 
discretion. Also, see below, section 4.2 Refonning Discretion - immigration LegisIative Review 
Report, for a discussion of proposais for reworking discretion offered by a legisiative review group that 
was set up by the Ministex. 
discretionary power" resting in the han& of visa officers could be eliminated through 
adoption of completely objective selection criteria Regrettably, no details of what such a 
selection system might actually look like have been offered by the Group and so some 
very important context for assessing their recommendations is lacking. Likewise, such a 
move naively overlooks the poiitical nature of immigration po l i~y '~  and assumes that the 
world can be made black and white, with few exceptions for difficdt cases. 
The new vision of discretion offered by the Advisory Group is set out in five 
recommendations found at Chapter 10 of the Executive Surnmary, under the title of 
'Xethinking Discretion: Residual Powers." The primary recommendation, number 168, 
reads as follows: 
The Immigration and Citizenship Act should provide for only two types of 
extraordinary powers to be exercised, at two different levels and not subject to 
delegation: 
(i) measures taken in the national interest by the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration; 
(ii) measures in a situation of dependency of a person on a Canadian citizen or 
landed immigrant, or vice versa, taken by the director general of the region 
c~ncerned .~~  
The obvious key features of th& recommendation are that they seek to control the 
exercise of discretionary power by reducing its application and centraking it in the hands 
- 
742 Legislative Review Advisoiy Group, (Ottawa: Ministrr of Public Works and Governmmt SeMces, 
1997). 
The highly political nature of immigration law and policy may be evident fiom the intense interest and 
ahos t  universai, negative reaction which has greeted the LegisIative Review Report, See, for example, 
Ross Howard "Immigrant groups take on Ottawa" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 February 1998) Al, 
detailing strong criticisms to various aspects of the Report by immigrant groups, the Canadian Bar 
Association, non-governmental organizations and other "stakeholders". See also Irwin Block, 
"Immigration proposai denouncedn The ~alrlfàx] Smdq Dai& News (8 March 1998) which descnies, for 
example, a brief on the proposais presented by the National Association of Canadians of Origins in India 
(NACOI) to the Minister of Immigration at a Montreai public hearing. NACOI stated it was opposed to the 
proposal for a ". . .CO=-standards system, saying it would eliminate those who meet requirements in one 
area but are deficient in others." Likewise, the group feels that "[s]uggestions that the new policy recover 
immigrant recruitment costs also discrimiua- against applications fiom poorer corntries.. .." 
of a select group of high level officials. Unfortunately, if this is meant to appease the 
critics of discretion, it has fallen short of the mark. The criticisms, of course, are not just 
limited to concerm about the application of discretion. They also arise, perhaps just as 
fiequently, with respect to its non-application since there are many who argue that 
discretion is simply not used enough. And hard cases are unlikely to disappear just 
because more objective selection criteria are adopted. Those cases will rernain and, in al1 
Likelihood, discretion will simply be driven M e r  underground with line officers 
devising creative solutions to bridge the gap between the form of statutory enactment and 
the substance of legislative intent. 
The proposal to centralize discretion is also a retroga.de move that fails to draw 
upon previous experience. Centralization would simply restore much of the situation that 
passage of Bills C-8674s and C-44" had earlier sought to deviate, where long backlogs of 
inadmissibility cases awaited personal consideration by the Minister or other high level 
officials. For example, even routine discretionary decisions, such as rehabilitation for a 
very old, minor criminal offence would be re-centralized in the Minister's office. The 
delegation to Program Managers in local offices, in Canada and abroad, of discretionary 
authority over such cases that was effected by Bill C-86 resulted in a ciramatic 
improvernent in client service, with no apparent reduction in protection of the Canadian 
p~bl ic .7~~ 1s it possible that the Review Cornmittee has envisioned a way to completely 
- - -- 
Tu Supra note 742 at 37. 
See for example, notc 123 supra, descn'bing delegation of authority over R 2.1 "hurnanitKiaa and 
compassionate" discretion to local program managers, 
7'6 See supra note 3 13 regarding delegation of rehabilitatian authorïty for minor criminal convictions to 
local program managers. 
For example, the waiting period for approvai of rehabilitation in minor criminal conviction cases was 
reduced fiom an average of 18-24 months to a matter of weeks. 
objectiQ statutory inadmissibility provisions so that discretion will not often be needed to 
deai with sarne? Ifso, they have not given any indication of it in their report. 
Moreover, the proposai to centralize discretion increases the risk for political 
interference, since such power will be wielded only by the Minister and a select group of 
senior oEncials. This gmup may be more subject to political manipulation because of the 
sensitivity and awareness which they mut maintain for public sentiments on immigration 
related issues. Not that this awareness is bad. On the contrary, it is actually necessary for 
the larger objective of ensuring that overail policy and practice maintab the necessary 
high Ievel of public support that is crucial to a successfbi program. However, it is an 
awareness that is uzlllecessary to decisions in the types of routine matters which are 
currently handled within individual visa offices. Moreover, it is an awareness which may 
be difficult to counterbalance by a mere paper review of an individual case. 
Although some discretion has been provided for by the Advisory Group, likely 
because of a realization of the impossibility of legislatively providing for every case, its 
complete rernoval nom local offices would simply increase bureaucracy and delays. 
Under cwent law and practice, authority for discretion in routine matters has been 
localized where it is needed - at the point of contact with the client. Such routine matters 
are characterized by the fact that the discretion involved is unlikely to implicate 
significant concems regarding the wider issues of public health, saféty, sec* or 
expense. Where such concems are evident, then discretion has been retained at higher 
levels, where a balancing of those concems with the interests of the particular applicant 
can best be c h e d  out. This dichotomy has worked well to ensure a fair state of 
equilibrium in immigration law, with due regard for the nghts of individual applicants 
and the public interest. This split jurisdiction has enhanced the ability of Canadian 
immigration law to provide humane, individuaiized responses that maximize justice both 
for applicants and the public. 
Centralking all discreton, however, is Likely only to throw that equilibrium out of 
balance. In fact, it may actuaily work to enhance arbitrarhess, since it will sewe to 
decrease accountability by insulating decision-makers h m  clients. It is a situation where 
field sensitivity may well be allowed to f d  before headquarfers' and political 
imperatives. Certainly, splendid isolation seems to be the goal of recommendation 170, 
which is an adjunct to 168. It States that the Minister or Director G e n d  would have no 
obligation to consider whether to exercise their residual discretionary power, wodd not 
be required to provide reasons and any decision would be h a l .  This is hardly a move to 
enhance the transparency which the cornmittee otherwise appears to favour and does 
nothing to M e r  accountability. 
Similady, if the Cornmittee's intention was to reduce litigation by referrïng to 
decisions of the Minister or a Director General as "Euial", experience shows that courts 
are unlikely to be impressed by this attempt to constnict a privative clause and will still 
fhd reason to assume jurisdiction. Admittedly, however, courts do tend to show more 
deference to discretionary decisions made by officiais at the highest levels of the 
bureaucracy, with the result that this recommendation would likely make discretion 
harder to challenge successfidly. Accordingly, the position of the department might 
enjoy some overd enhancement, through some reduction of the litigation burden. 
However, the gains in this respect are likely to be minimal and may be outweighed by the 
costs in temis of client satisfaction and public confidence that would likely be inherent in 
any move to what is maniféstly a more secretive type of process for discretionary 
decision making. Recommendation 168 suggests a lack of confidence in the judgment of 
those who deal directly with the clients on a day to day basis and assumes that 
discretionary power is somehow enhanced and legitimized by its concentration at the 
highest levels. The reality, however, is that even under this proposai, the higher authority 
would still be dependent upon the judgement and recommendations of those field officers 
who actually conduct the investigations. The difference is that any semblance of 
substantive accountability is dispenseci ~ i t h . ' ~  
In its place, the cornmittee has offered a sort of procedural accountability that is 
unlikely to satisQ critics. Recommendation 169 stipulates that an annual report should 
be made to Parliament summarizing the circumstanca and fiequency of the usage of 
di~cretion.'~~ As a global tool, such a report is usefbl to shed light on general trends in the 
usage of discretion within the system. Such political accountability is desirable and is to 
be encouraged. But it is not a substitute for providing reasons directly in individuai cases 
to those personally afTected by such de~isions.'~ 
Beyond the structural aspect to the proposal contained in recommendation 168, 
'41 This is in fact the situation that presentiy obtains with respect to certain types of discretionary powers 
that remain centtalized in the Minister's office. For example, approval of permanent rehabilitation in cases 
invoIving more serious crimMal conviction cases must stiu corne £hm the Minister's office. A similai. 
situation exists with respect to authority to issue temporary entry Minister's permits in such cases, where 
approval must be granted by a Director General in a regional headquarters- Accordingiy, whiIe the 
investigating officer may recommend that approval be graated in a given case, the Minister is fi-ee to ignore 
that recommendation. See Leung, supra note 235. And, in the absence of any requirement for reasons, this 
leaves even the field officer in the awkward position of attempting to explain a decision whose ratiode 
may not be obvious. 
749 In fact, a partial report to this effect is aiready given to Parliament pursuant to the Minister's obligation 
under section 37(7) of the Ac t  to detail annually for Parliament the number of Minister's Pennits that have 
been issued by her department, 
'50 There may weU be cabin circumstances, puch as cases implicating national security concerns, where 
some secrecy may be justifiable. However, as a general matter, there se- M e  justincation for denying 
there is also a substantive elemmt to be considered. The proposal assumes that d types 
of residual discretionary decision making powers can be easily isolated into 1 of 2 types 
and that they are all of a suficient weight or gravity to justib consideration only by the 
Minister or a Director General. Yet, a large variety of situations may raise the 
requirement for some discretionary decision-making. For example, one type of 
inadmissibility may implicate a whole range of seriousness. Thus, criminai 
inadmissibility arising f?om a shopiifting conviction cannot be compared to a conviction 
for murder. And a positive decision to grant entry, for example, is different in kind f b r n  
a negative decision to exclude. Thus, declaring a person to be a danger to the Canadian 
public is an infinitely different decision from deciding whether an applicant is in need of 
discretionary processing because of the existence of a situation of dependency. 
Manifestly, al1 such decisions are not of similar importance or gravity. While some 
decisions, like that of declaring a person to be a danger to the public, are of a sufficiently 
serious and extraordinary nature to justie consideration at the highest levels, others, like 
dependency, are best dealt with at a local office level where experience and expertise in 
such matten is aiready present. And again, the notion that discretion could be reduced in 
the fashion suggested assumes that it is possible to devise a complete legislative scheme 
of d e s  that codd achieve an almost perfect balance between the public interest in 
immigration and the interests of applicants. 
The recommendations on discretionary residual power also suffer h m  ambiguity. 
Recommendation 168 taiks about the Minister acting in the "National Interest" but no 
definition has been offered for this term. Use of the term "national interest" appears to 
reasons m more rnundane cases. 
assume that every such case wiil implicate a weighty issue. However, one example 
serves to illustrate that this may miss the mark, at least insofar as overseas immigrant 
selection is concemed. Independent overseas applicants who f d  one or two points short 
of the mark needed for a clear pass, but who otherwise appear to have good potential for 
settling in Canada, are routinely approved on discretion in current practice. Such 
decisions are quickly made in local offices by the interviewing officer, albeit with the 
concurrence of a senior officer. This is not just efficacious but also sensible, since it is 
the interviewing officer who is best placed to understand all of the subtleties and equities 
of a given case. Under recommendation 168, however, it seems that such a case could 
only be approved by the intervention of the Minister, who would need to be satisfied of 
some "national interest" angle. It is simply unacceptable, both fiom the perspective of 
administrative efficiency and in terms of fahess to the applicant, that such a 
straight50rward matter should require direct approval by the Minister. The measures 
respecting "dependencf also appear designed to promote a drive towards a mles based 
system that wodd have none of the flexibiiity which is the hallmark of current law and 
practice."' Recommendation 168 allows that only Directors General may approve 
dependency cases. Under recommendation 171, dependency could only be claimed on 
behalf of those close relatives of a Canadian sponsor who fail to meet some statutory 
requirernent, but who otherwise meet the Family Class definitionnm 
75' The entire measures respecting dependency are contained in reco~lllllendations 168, 17 1 and 272. The 
review group is inconsistent in its terminology even within these few clauses, using the term "dependency" 
in 168 and 172, whiie &O r e f e g  to "complete dependmcy" in 171. 
Pursuant to the dennition of 'Yamiy" h d  at section 2(1) of the Act, the Family Class curreptly 
inchdes the spouse, the chiidren and the parents of a Canadian citizen or pexmanent resident, The Review 
Group has recornmended a considerable expansion of the group of persons who might qualw in the 
F d y  Class to include any "relative" and even "close personal acquaintances of the sponsor's choice." 
And in the end, what is most important to understand overall about the 
Committee's recommen&tions on residual powers is that they are predicated upon the 
move towards a more d e s  based system, with a r d t a n t  decline in the availability of 
discretion, both positive and negative. This is made clear by their statement favouring 
the adoption ". . .of an objective selection process [which] would mean that a generai 
discretionary power would no longer be necessary for a visa o f f i ~ e r . ' ~ ~  The danger 
inherent in such a move is that there may well arise a situation of disconnection between 
expectations and resuits. Just as the reduction of negative discretion may result in the 
approval of more cases seen to be undeseming, so too it may foilow that there is an 
increase in the nurnber of deserving cases that are rejected because no tools are available 
to approve them. 
In the end, ail stakeholders, includùig the public, applicants, their advocates and 
functionaries within the system, may find that the rethinking offered by the Cornmittee 
has not improved the supposed deficiencies of the current system. The Legislative 
Review Advisory Group has clearly been influencecl in its efforts by a positivist view of 
the world that sees codification as a complete panacea. There are pros and cons to such a 
development and so it is may be more a matter of personal opinion as to whether such a 
development is good or bad. However, the potential cost and risks of such an approach 
need to be fully appreciated. Discretion is the means by which the human element has 
long been incorporated into the immigration system. Circumscribing its use must 
See the Executive Summary, Not Jtrst Numbers ", Legisiative Review Advisory Group, (Ottawa: Minister 
of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), generaiiy at "Chaptm 5 - The F d y :  Essential for 
Success" .at 1 8 - 20. 
' ~ 3  ibid. at I l .  
inevitably detract h m  the capability to provide individuaiized resuits that can bridge the 
deficiencies between legislative intent and drafter's language sometimes apparent in the 
law. Any reduction of discretion is Iücely therefore to implicate also a reduction of the 
humanity and compassion for which the program has been renowned. A less humane 
system is not likely to be in anyone's interest and it is this result which must be fully 
considered. Unfortunately, the proposals offered by the Advisory Group do not appear to 
offer any significant measufes to take up the shortfidi that would likely follow their 
prescription. The brevity of the reco~ll~llendations on "Rethinking Discretion" suggests, 
however, that the proposals have not proceeded h m  full and in-depth mearch and study 
of this issue.'% Accordingly, any move to act on these recomrnendations would be ill 
advised unless and until the totality of the necessity for and usage of discretion in 
immigration law and practice, and the implications for its reduction and centrafization, 
are better defined and understood. 
As the name of the report suggests, and as the Cornmittee has stressed in its 
introduction, immigration is not just about numbers. Rather, it is about people. And an 
incredibly diverse range of people at that. It is about a dynamic, human movement which 
ebbs and flows with world events. The immigrant pool is drawn fkom an -te varieV 
of local conditions worldwide that are best dealt with by generalized legislation, 
stipulating minimum standards, that is capable of some flexibility in its local application. 
Particularly in an overseas selection context, both applicants and the public agenda are 
7Y Indeed, the Legislative Review Advisory Group admits as much, ibid, where the foilowing statements 
are made: "are caution that our recommen&tions were often made m iight of the lirnited research and &ta 
avaiiabIe. We encourage aii parties to strengthen research a d  d y s i s  activities both b i d e  and outside of 
government." 
better served by delegation of authority to program managers in local offices to deai with 
conditions as they are found at the selection source. It is this type of flexibility which 
ensures that the best possible fit between legslative intent and actual practice is achieved. 
Many of the cornplaints about immigration delivery stem not h m  the availability of 
discretion, but rather the lack of it. And they stem dso h m  cornpendious des, imposed 
by legislation and judicial interpretation, which foster bureaucratie responses. The 
Advisory Group's proposals for discretion, as conceived, wodd simply hamstRng CIC's 
ability to respond in a timely and appropriate fashion to shifting events and priorities. 
Fixing the d e s  affêcting procedures in the stone of statute is actually Likely to have the 
opposite effect from that envisioned by the Cornmittee. Likewise, it will limit the 
responses available by bctionaries within the system, leading to M e r  
bureaucratization rather than less. Many of those who study the administrative realm 
have noted a tendency for bureaucracy to do as  linle as is required by the courts and their 
political masters when carrying out their mandate. Reducing discretion, and hence 
personal responsibility for individual cases may be in nobody's interest, particularly if the 
cost is a devaluation of the humanity of applicants and of the public interest in 
immigration. It is this feature which has been so central to the successes of the Canadian 
immigration program. Discretion recognizes that no legislative scherne is ever perfect 
and ailows for individualized responses that suit the particular circumstances. Reducing 
discretion in the manner suggested by the Advisory Group is likely only to take away the 
"focus on people"'55 which the Group claims to fav0ur.7~ If immigration is to be more 
'" Supra note 742 at 2. 
' ~ 5  Most of the public interest in the Review Committee's Report has been taken up by proposais that d 
than just a ninnbers garne, it is this fact which must be recognized and reckoned. If not, 
then it may tnùy corne to pass that bureaucracy will reign triumphant. 
4.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
In an article about the enduring influence of ancient Rome, T.R. Reid makes the 
point that one of the most important components of the Roman legacy may be the 
comprehensive collection of statutory and case law surviving fiom that period. But it is 
not the particulars of the individuai cases and statutes themselves which are so central to 
that legacy. Rather, it is the jurisprudentiai ethos which they represent, a desire to 
regularize the law in ail its expressions, functions and processes that is of exceeding 
importance. They reflect a hunger for clarity, certainty and precision that fond  its 
expression in a penchant for precedent and a compulsion to organize, typi@ and 
categorize. It is a hunger which we stiii know today and its essence is captured in one 
haliowed doctrine that remains a touchstone for al1 western legal systems. It is, of course, 
the d e  of Zmv. which draws upon "[tlhe ideal of written law as a shield - to protect 
immigrants should have either be fluent in English or French, or be responsiile themselves for the costs of 
language training. C M y ,  the public consultations convened by the Minister have been dominated by 
this particular issue. See, for example, "The language of immigration" [editorial] The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (5 March, 1998) A22. As that editorid notes, closing off immigration only to those fluent in English 
or French is hardy redistic. This is so for a number of reasons, not least of which is the fact that there 
simply are not enough potential immigrants with such skiiis to meet Canada's immigration needs. Caught 
between the jaws of a declining birth rate and an aging population, immigration - in significant numbers - 
is essential to Canada's continued prosperity, accordmg to most demographic predictions. Thus, as the 
Globe editorial asks, "Why waste any more time discussing such a regressive idea?" Other U-conceived 
proposais are apparent as well in the Report, such as the recornmendation to expand the family class by 
allowing sponsor's to defme themselves who wiii be included Again, the Globe editorialist rightly 
dismisses such unworkable inanity by saying "[tlhe panel's recommen&tions to expand faznily-class 
immigration - to the ridiculous lengths of welcoming anyone "known and emotionally important" to a 
sponsor - should see the same fate as thc ianguage requirement." UnfortunateIy, such hot-button proposais 
have diverteci attention from what is tniiy signifïcant - that the Report suggests a fitndamental restructuring 
of immigration law and policy that encompasses a shiA away from an individualized proceshg orientation 
to one that is more des  based, with l e s  capacity for dealing with the exccptional or the u n d .  Whether 
individuals against one another and against the awesome power of the state.. . .'?- 
Although this doctrine is ultimately attn'butable to the Greeks, Reid posits that it 
was the Romans who perfected its practice and that it is their conception of it that 
continues to innuence our law today. Judging h m  the volumes of statute and case law 
evident in any law ùirary, it is clear that we have learned the lesson well. Certainly, our 
propensity to favour written law is manifest in the massive regulatory and legislative 
intervention that now takes place in a l l  facets of our s o ~ i e t y . ~ ~  Immigration law, in 
particular, has not been immune to the trend of micro-management by legislative fiat?' 
The d e  of law has brought many of the once broad vistas of discretionary common law 
unmigration powers under the plow of detailed regulatory enactment. But as the 
quotation at the start of this chapter ilîustrate~~~, even the Romans themselves may have 
been ambivalent about the extent of justice actually inherent in written law. More 
poignantly, if it be true, it offers a decidedy sobering comment on the cment state of our 
socieîy. 
It seems only natural to those schooled in the westem legal tradition to extol the 
or not we reaily want this is whcre the debate shodd lie. Sadly, however, as is too often the case, pubtic 
debate in immigration seems more concerned about superficiai details than fundamental approach. 
7n T K  Reid. supra note 735 at 63-64. 
Perhaps the most notable exvnple of preference for written law in Canadian society is the advent of the 
Charter of Righis and Freedom. Prior to its promulgation in 1982, Canada possessed a mosîiy unwritten 
constitution, Iargely developed in case law, foiîowing the British exampie. 
749 See for example, Margaret Young, supra note 1 i t , at footnote 1 on page 3, where the author notes 
that "Canada's ht immigration statute m 1869 had 14 pages; by 1952, it had reached 34 pages." Also, id. 
at 3, she observes that the cumot Immigration Act (R.S.C. 1 985, c. 1-2) ". . .came into effea in 1978.. . .Its 
length - 122 pages - illustrates the complexity of modem immigration reguIatio~~[footnate omitted]" This 
compiexity is fùrther demonsûated, in her view, id. at 4-5, by the fact that the Act is supplemmted by 
equaiiy lengthy reguIations, al1 of which require interpretative and application guidance that is found in a 
multi-volume set of policy and procedure manuals published by the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC). 
7a T h e  wone the state, the more ïaws it bas. Supro note 735. 
vii.tues of M e n  law. But it is not the only viewpoint on the matter. Reid notes that the 
Chinese empire, as old and storied as that of the Romans, actually developed a 
jurisprudential outlook that eschewed the biases of the rule of law that favour wmitten te- 
''Confucius and his disciples down through the centuries distmsted M e n  laws. A dusty 
statute book was too inflexible to handle the infinite variety of human experience, the 
Chinese sages felt. They chose to tmst people, not laws - to rely on innate human 
goodness as the best guarantee of a civil so~iety.'~~' He notes a tenaciousness to this 
philosophy which continues to induce hesitancy and circumspection. "Even today," Reid 
writes, '?he concept of written law and written contract is fairly weak in China and other 
East Asian nations within its cultural ambit? 
For western legal systems that purport to follow the nile of law, it is important to 
remember that discretionary power is hardly a new or alien adjunct to our law. Reid 
observes, for example, that while one uniforrn system of law was an essential glue 
binding the many far-flung and variegated portions of the ancient Roman empire 
together, yet it was fiexibility of application and enforcement which gave that glue its 
staying power through many centuries? Such flexibility, or discretion if you will, 
permitted regard for local peculiarities and individual circumstances while still adhering 
to the overall imperial standard. The case is no different today, even after dl these 
centuries. Though the Par Romana has long since passeci away, the Roman notion of 
 discret!^ in application remains equally as enduring and vital a legacy to our systern of 
law and conception ofjustice as  the d e  of law itself. 
''' T X  Reid, supra note 735 at 64. (August 1997) 
7Q Id. 
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt but that our fht loyalty is to the notion of the 
'hile of law"? And the importance of this fact cannot be overstated. From it springs the 
chief incident that devotion to this principle entails and one which is a hallmark of our 
modem society - a pronounced propensity to reduce every particle of the law, nom its 
nghts and fkeedoms to its duties and obligations, to written fom. In an environment of 
this type, the notion of discretionary power nahually causes discornfort and anxiety. 
Such power, by its very nature, is incapable of reduction to a precise factual statement- 
At best, it can be guided by policy statements and contained by judicial interpretations 
and pronouncements, but never whoiiy reduced to an unequivocal calcdation or a simple 
mechanicd application. And it is this irnprecision that troubles devotees of the nile of 
law most. 
Though ail signs point toward development of a more rules based immigration 
selection system, it must be recognized that the complete elimination of discretionary 
power will never be possible nor, for that matter, desirable. There is always a question of 
fit - of applying the des to the particda. facts of each case. Without some flexibility of 
interpretation and application, such a fit is difncuit to obtain. And the need for some 
flexibility in Unmigration matters is perhaps more cogent than for any other area of Iaw. 
Immigration d e s  m u t  be capable of worldwide application under an infinite variety of 
cùcurnstances. We know f?om experience that it is v W y  impossible to devise d e s  
that wiU deliver the desired r d t s  in every case. The myriad possibilities of human 
T E  Reid, 'The Power and the Glory of the Roman Empire" (July, 1997) 192 National Geographic 2 at 30. 
7aFor evidence of the high esteem with which we regard this principle, one need look na firrther than the 
preamble to the Gznadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, where it is accorded recognition, second only - 
to the supremacy of God. 
experience are simply too great. In any case, this sort of interpretive discretion is not all 
that controversid, particulariy as the judicial review process closely monitors it and has 
remedies well suited to addressing it. The same may be said for procedural discretion. 
The real problem, of course, is what to do about substantive discretion. 
On the negative side of the equation, conceming whom to exclude, the answer is 
obvious and poses Little moral or intellectual challenge. Our notions of justice and 
fairness irresistibly impel us to formulate ever more concise d e s  to keep out the 
undesirabie. Certaidy, this is in accordance with that part of the d e  of law which states 
that no one should be "condemned", Save as expressly provided for by law. The case for 
inclusion, however, is less capable of reduction to a set formula While d e s  do a good 
job of ensuring procedural faimess, they do not always render substantive justice. Even a 
fair process occasionail y produces d a i r  redts.  Admittedy , substantive justice is 
difficult to achieve and that is why most of our efforts have been concentrateci on 
producing procedural justice?' The attainment of substantive justice is also hampered by 
our preference for predictability and certainty. Indeed, it is the knowledge of these 
limitations that seems to continually prompt us to query whether technical adherence to 
the rules and procedures of our statutory scheme is reaUy producing Wllment of the 
social philosophy that is embodied in our immigration law. Inevitably, our notions of 
fundamental justice involve some consideration of substantive justice and the attainment 
of fair, humane results. Positive substantive discretion remains the essentid means by 
which an indispensable human element is kneaded into the fibers of the law, and a link 
See for aample, Arthurs, nrpm note 30 at Z, who feels that courts are more disposai to judging the 
technicalities of abused discretion, rather than the substance. 
secured between the science of rules and procedures and the art of intuition and common 
sense. 
The shortcomings of d e s ,  of course, are heightened because of the way that 
Independent selection is conceived and conducted The focal point of the exercise is to 
find people who wiil be able to sustain themselves and make a contribution to the 
econornic vitality of our country. Though we employ any number of selection cnteria, 
such as occupation, language and education, to sort among potential candidates, it is not 
these paaicular qualifications which are most important to successful establishment. 
Instead, they are ones such as adaptability, motivation, initiative and resourcefulness, 
innate and unique to each individual applicant, that are not so neatly reducible to a system 
of mechanistic d e s .  They are laudable qualities which we do want to select for. Though 
we can recognize them when we see them, devising a system of d e s  to mesure them 
rem- simply a sociologist's pipe dream. The result is that some discretion has always 
been necessary to overcome the deficiencies of the rules in meitsuring and rewarding such 
qualities. Accepting then that the overail objectives of the selection system are always 
more important than the technical points by which it is administered, some residual 
discretion, particdarly at the operational level where the d e s  are put into practice, is 
essential if a tyranny of d e s  is to be avoided and the substantive goals of the selection 
systern met. 
Despite the difnculties of using the notion of 4csuccessful settlement" as a 
selection standard, this does not mean that it should be discarded. In reality, the results 
Eom its use have been impressive. A high level of Independent migration has been 
sustained over a long period of tirne precisely because those selected have been able to 
sustair? themselves and make a contribution to the economic and cultural vitality of this 
country. It is simply a case, therefore, of doing a better job at containing and structuring 
the residual discretion fhat must accompany use of this standard. If properly cabined and 
closely focused, the advantages of discretion wiU be promoted and ifs negative aspects 
Limited. But any residual discretion must retain both a positive and a negative character. 
Just as the d e s  may fail in a positive way to select those who should be included, it may 
also fail in a negative way. 
A point too often lost in the debate over discretion in immigration matters is that 
the public interesf and the interests of applicants are not inconsistent. Rather, in many 
ways, they are CO-extensive. The public interest is present in the need for a selection 
systern that is fair, open and honest with applicants. Quite simply, it demands that justice 
be done in every case. Thus, in some cases, it will require that a person who does not 
meet the strict qualifications be granted entry nonetheless. In other cases, it will mean 
that a person who has qualined on the criteria must be denied entry, if the basis for her 
selection appears enonmus and is iikeIy to lave her unable to be self-sustaining in the 
economy. It mut be this way since the public is intimately a fk ted  by immigrant 
selection decisions and it is the public that is lefi, socially, financially and even mordly, 
to pick up any pieces h m  a dyshctional selection process. With respect, therefore, it is 
naïve to view iminigation as simply a question of focusing on the cüent at the counter. 
A sustainable program must factor in the needs of another client, the public, whose 
interests are also affectai by each selection decision. 
In this post-Charter era in Canada, the trend in all areas of law has been to place 
greater emphasis on rights and to favour niles as  the means for safeguarding those rights. 
The bureaucratic and judicial initiatives outlined in this study are simply a manifestation 
of those preferences in the phcular  field of immigration law. hdeed, it may be that the 
checkered history of broad substantive discretion in immigration matters added extra 
cogency to the arguments in favour of d e s  and nghts in this area of  la^.'^ Whatever the 
case, it is important to recognize the current state of evolution of immigration law and the 
path that is likely to be followed in the near future. Certainly, substantive discretion is 
now in decline and it is unrealistic to expect that a greater availability of it, even if it were 
desirable, would be attainable. It is patent that a broad, residual discretion is no longer 
palatable and there is simply no significant will or interest in any quafter to swim against 
this tide. Accordingly, the way forward is clear. 
Efforts should be undertaken to develop a more comprehensive systern of d e s  
governing immigrant selection. The current Act and Regulations, devised some twenty 
years ago, were built around the notion that a general discretionary power could be used 
to supplement any shortcomings in the d e s .  This premise is no longer valid. The vision 
for substantive discretion EOW points to it being, at best, a secondas. or incidental 
element of any selection system, rather than at the heart. Greater specificity and clarity in 
statute and regulation are central to current notions of justice and fair play. If properly 
conceived, a more comprehensive set of d e s  for immigration offers the potential 
advantage of satisfjmg judiciai, bureaucratic and client needs. The key, however, is not 
just more d e s .  Rather, selection criteria need to be simpler and better dehed than is 
presently the case. The danger of too many niles is that they may become convoluted and 
impenetrable, if too much specificity is attempted. Thus, what is needed is a more 
- - 
766 See Tuca-Turner and Saqat-Mehta, supm note 12. 
generic selection system, rather than one focusing on the minutiae of education, work 
experience and skills, and the like. While selection might benefit from less specincity, it 
is clear that exclusion must be approached from the opposite direction. More 
particularity rather than less is necessary, if exclusionary decisions are to be sustained in 
the courts. Thus, it is essentiai that groimds for exclusion should be codified in detail in 
the selection regime. Such specificity is more in keeping with current notions of justice 
and fair play, and enables those to be excluded to discem early and clearly the potential 
barrier to entry. 
In Re Singh, Wilson J. accepted an argument by counsel for a Refugee applicant 
that Charter protections must apply equally to al1 applicants dealing with the Canadian 
govemment, both within Canada and outside its borders at visa offices abroad. To do 
otherwise, she opined, would be to create a duplicitous situation encouraging applicants 
to disregard o u  immigration laws, in order to have their claim heard in Canada. She 
accepted that a geographic boundary for the Charter would create an environment that 
". . .would . . .reward those who sought to evade the operation of our immigration laws 
over those who presented their cases openly at the first available ~ppominity.'''~~ Though 
speaking about the particular circumstances of Refugee claimants, Wilson J.3 wisdom is 
sound and has application to the immigration system whole. If efforts are not made to 
avoid the scenario of effectively "punishing the hocent  and rewarding the guiltf', then 
the notion of the d e  of law is seriously undeRnined. Ultunately, such a development 
leads to the sort of cynicism that saps the popular base of support on which immigration 
policy rests. Should a general collapse of public confidence follow, it would have 
&ous consequences for dl aspects of the program. Unforhuntely, our system as 
currently devised and operated is so overwhehed by devotion at the altar of process that 
it is b h d  to the delicate balance between facilitation and contd that Parfiament saw fit 
to establish within the immigration legislative scheme. It is ironic that in the name of 
faimess, we restrict the application of discretion to the point where even good d e s  are 
allowed to spawn bad decisions. 
The need for balance is obvious. The public interest demands it and the causes of 
justice and faimess deserve it. RecogniPng the current penchant for d e s ,  consideration 
should be given to formdating a specific d e  Linking applicant integrity with the 
pnvilege of a visa Any deliberate attempt at hud, deception or other maXeasance that is 
significant and material, either to a present or a fiiture visa application, should be a 
ground for refusal. There is no reason in good conscience or in law, why applicants 
should not be expected to display integrity as a key for qualification. Certainly, it is a 
quality that is valued and prized in Canada and there is an important message to be sent to 
prospective members of our commimity as to the methods and functioning of the society 
that they are interested to join. Likewise, there is a certain skepticism amongst the 
Canadian public as to whether effective control is maintained over the immigration 
program. A clear comection between behaviour in applying for a visa and issuance of 
the visa itself would serve to camy forward these objectives. A penalty involving 
disqualification fkom a visa, perhaps for a minimum period of three or five years, would 
be appropriate. 
Re~ogniang that some discretion will remain both indispensable and desirable in 
'" Supra note 64, 17 D.LR (4&) 422 at 463, 
our immigration system, then some accommodation of it will be necessary. It is an 
accommodation that will require cooperation h m  both CIC and the courts. For its part, 
CIC needs to de-emphasize statistics and numbers. The fiscal concems of recent years 
have forced CIC into a mold of wringing ever-greater productivity gains from existing 
personnel and resources. Such efforts are driven by the yearly numbers cmch and the 
need for CIC to deliver on the target amounced by the Minister. Meeting those targets 
may become a priority, even at the expense of the quality of service a c W y  delivered. 
While the number of immigrant landings is closely monitored and tabulated, there are few 
measures of quality of service in the system. 1 do not suggest that statistics can ever be 
totally eliminated. They do serve a useful planning fiuiction. However, the adverse 
impact of a singular focus on numbers must be recognized and conceded. And with such 
recognition must corne a more realistic appraisal of the numbers that are deliverable, 
while yet maintaining a sufFicient Ievel of quality and satisfaction. Further, the system 
has few measures for determinhg which officers dehered quality product and few 
rewards for individual efforts to this end. More c m  certainly be dont in this regard. And 
de-emphasizing numbers would go far to empowering officers to use more judgment and 
common sense and to more readily and effectively engage the discretion they possess to 
ensure humanity and compassion remain an integral part of our selection system. 
The courts, as overseers of the Unmigration process, need to be a full partner in 
the search for a just system that is fair, both to applicants and to the public interest. This 
wiil require less of a nghts focus and more consideration of what justice in a particular 
case really requires. To achieve this, the courts might adopt a two-part procedure for 
assessing whether any particular decision is fair, both procedurally and substantively. 
The first branch of the test would be to ask whether the procedure was flaweâ, as is 
presently the case. h o t ,  then that is the end of the inquiry. If a flaw is found, however, 
then the second branch of the inquiry would be to ask whether substantive justice was 
nonetheless done, considering ali of the circumstances. Was the r e d t  fair, considering 
the goals and objectives of the immigration legislation and the level of entitlement the 
applicant had to the particdar type of visa? If so, then substantive justice has been 
rendered. Given that this test is similar to that under which courts guide issuance of their 
own prerogative remedies, a radical rethinking of the administrative process wodd not be 
required. It is simply a case of recognizing that immigrant selection must be a pragrnatic 
process, weighing d l  of the equities in each particular case and baiancing the public 
interest and the rights of individuai applicants. 
Some concrete steps towards improving the mechanism of judicial review are also 
needed. Visa officers must do a better job of documenting thei. decisions so that it is 
readily apparent on appeal what has gone on and why. CIC Public Relations staff might 
consider ways to better publicize the means, methods and processes of visa offices and to 
highlight the many problems that aise in applying domestic immigration law in diverse 
foreign settings. CIC litigation staff and counsel need to be more proactive in educating 
the courts as to the realities of overseas processing and to ensure that all relevant facts 
and materials are before the courts. hdeed, CIC ne& to work more closely with Justice 
stafYwho represent CIC to ensure their training is adequate and that they have a M l  
understanding of overseas immigration processes. Likewise, the courts need to recognize 
the limits of their knowledge and understanding and to seek out better education and 
training and dernand more information fiom counsel when they see it is lacking. Given 
the volume of visa office iitigation before the federal courts, even their training would 
likely benefit fiom more information about, or even £k t  haud exposure to, the operations 
of a visa office? 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the evolution I have attempted to detail in 
this work has been the fact that it has taken place largely unnoticed. Certainly, most of 
the change has occurred as result of quiet developments in the courts and the bureaucracy, 
with little public recognition or significant opportwiity for discussion and debate. The 
importance of meanin@ discussion is obvious, given the profound, fiuiAamental changes 
that are underway and which are completely transforming the way immigrants are selected. 
Our immigration law and its selection processes reflect our society, our legal system and 
our values. That they should be in p e d  of becomuig hidebound by d e s  and devoid of 
significant human contact is a worrying proposition. This is particularly tme if the 
transformation is contrary to the popular conception of how the immigration program is 
constituted and operated Regrettably, there is Little significant media coverage of the 
actud realities of immigration processing. Instead, sensationalisrn and worst case 
scenarios seem to be the ody items that regularly gamer media attention. The resdt is 
that the public is il1 informecl and has a false impression of how immigration r e d y  
works. 
The two trends of judicial formalism and bureaucratie expedience should be part 
of a larger debate about how and why immigration processing is undertaken, for what 
This need not involve lengthy and expensive taxpayer fùnded m e t s  to exotic lands. Even a short trip 
from Toronto to the Bunalo visa office, or from Vancouver to the Seattle visa office, would suffice to give 
the sort of exposure that would educak and idem as to how a visa office operates and under what 
conditions. 
purpose. and in what way it should be shaped. In this way, it might betterreflect who and 
what we are as a nation. The ment Legistative Review report and the attention it gave to 
discretionary authority offered some hope of focusing attention and starting the process of 
debate and dialogue. Unfortunately, the debate that has been generated by that report has 
been hijacked by emotional, but largely inconsequential issues, such as a proposal that all 
immigrants shodd possess a certain levei of language skills. Caught between an aging 
population and a dwindling birth rate7? a high level of immigration is demographically 
necessary if we are to sustain the economic growth of Canada. With a stated objective of 
delivering more than two hundred thousand landings per year, the real problem for 
Canadian immigration has been one of hding suffïcient numbers of skilled, talented 
immigrants who will be able to succasfidiy establish quickly and easily. Limiting the 
pool of potential applicants to those already fluent in English or French is a proposal hard 
to take senously. There simply are not enough English and French speakers available to 
meet the Ianding targets. In the meantime, however, attention has been diverted nom real 
issues of substance. The proposa1 for reworbg of discretion, for example, that is 
contained in the report will clearly have a profound impact upon the ways of means of 
immigration, if implernented. Presumably, action will be taken in the near hture to 
implement at least some parts of the Advisory Group's recommendations. The need for 
broad debate and consensus thus r e m a b  urgent and important. Before legislation is 
drafted and a brave new world of immigration processing cast into the Stone of statute, 
'* Statistics Canada predicts that naturai population p w t h  in Canada will approach zero by the year 2020. 
Also, in 1996, Statistics Canada estimated that newborns accounted for only 47% of Canada's popdation 
increase, while mimigration contriiuted the remahhg 53%. See CIC '?3aily Wrap" (26 June 1998) at 1, 
c ihg  stories in the June 25,1998 editions of the HaliJm Chronicle Herald, Toronto Sun, Winnipeg Free 
fundamental issues, such as a continueci role for discretion, should be placed on the public 
agenda If not, it may be that few will be happy with the end dt, particularly if it 
means that immigrant processing is reduced to a mere d e s  based number crunch. 
Press, Edmonton Sun and Saskatoon Star Phoena. 
APPENDIX A- Independent Immigrant Selection Grid 
1 1. Education 
3. Experience  
4. Occupational demand 
designated occupation 
Points awarded for each level of 
educatio~liil attaiament, beginning with 5 
points for simple completion of high 
school up to 16 points for a masters or 
doctoral level mïversity degree. 
Related to Factor 4. Points awarded 
according to normal training and education 
required for the ~articular occupation. 
Points awarded according to years of 
experience in an occupation. Less than 
one year of full t h e  experience will result 
in a failed amlication. 
Occupations open to prospective 
immigrants in Canada are set out in the 
"General Occupations List".'"' Every 
independent immigrant must list an 
intended occupation in Canada. If the 
occupation is not on the List, then the 
application fails. 
Bonus points for applicants who have a 
confumed job offer in C d a ,  or who are 
going to work in certain prescribed Wgh 
demand" occupations. 
Formerly known as "Specific Vocationai Preparation". This name was derived fkom the Canadian 
Classification and Dictionary of Occupations ("CCDO") (Ha Que.: Min. of Supply & Services, 1978), 
which was replaced May 1, 1997 by the National Occupatiod Classification guide ('WC'') (Ottawa: 
Min, of Supply & Services, 1993). Both of these manuais are essenMy catalogues listing occupations 
and descn'bing the duties inherent in the occupations and the type of training and education that wouid 
normdy be required to carry out the parti& occupation. 
Current version dated May 1,1997. if an applicant does not show their mtnided occupation as one of 
the occupations contained on the list, îhe application will ordinariiy fail for iack of "occupational demand". 
1 6. Demographic factor 1 The bblevels control" which is adjusted 1 10 (presentiy 1 
1 1 age. 2 points deducted for each year above 1 1 
7. Age 
1 1 both of French and English. Maximum 9 1 1 
fhm thne to time by CIC. 
10 points awarded to those 21-44 years of 
8. Language ability 
1 1 points for "W language and 6 for 1 1 
set at 8) 
10 
or below that range. 
Points awarded for fluency in either or 
that aid successful settlernent, such as 
adaptability, motivation, resourcefihess, 
and initiative. 
15 
9. Personal suitabiiity 
*Table adapted fiom CIC, Applying for Permanent Residence in Cànada: A SeIf-Assessrnent Guide and 
Application Kit for Independent Applicantr. 
Based on the foregoing grid, Independent unmigrants must obtain 70 points 
overall to qualify for admission to Canada Assisteci Relative applicants effectively 
receive five '%onus points" for having a relative in Canada, thus reducing the threshold 
they require for a "pass" mark to only 65 points. Likewise, Business immigrants receive 
fkom 30-45 bonus points (30 for self-employed, 45 for entrepreneurs and investors), 
which has a sixnilar reducing effect on the number of units needed to quai@. In addition, 
Business immigrants are not subject to d l  of the factors on the grid? 
"second" language. 
Points awarded at an interview for skills 
7-12 For more detaiïs, see subsections 8(1)@) & (c) of the Reguiations which provide exemptions from 
certain selection grid factors for self-employed, entrepreneur and investor applicants. 
10 
APPENDIX B - lndependent Immigrant Selection Process Chart 
Application Receipt and Inmm plete-Rejected 
Acknowiedgernent 
File Review ("Paper-screeningn) 1 (-i 
1 Interview Waiver - 1  1 Non-waiver of Interview I 
1 Paper Process I Interview 
' ' t  Statutory Bars - S. 19 *[-CI 
Visa lssuance Permit lssuance 11 
APPENDlX C - ISSUING AND UCTENDING MINISTER'S PERMITS 
Level of Concurrence Repuiredm 
Authority for issuance of Minister's Pennits to overcome inadmissibility grounds 
contained in section 19 of the Immigration Act is divided between three different 
locations. Generally, the Muiister has retained direct authonty for dealing with those 
grounds of inadmissibility which are considered most serious. In such cases, visa offices 
must obtain approvai h the Minister, at National Headquarfers, prior to issuance of a 
Minister's Permit. In the case of medical inadmissibility, visa offices wili need to obtain 
the approvd of the Regional Headquarters serving the applicant's province of destination, 
before Pennit issuance. Authority in all  other cases rests with program managers at visa 
offices abroad. 
A National Headquarters 
Criminality [Al g(l)(c)(c. l),(c.2)] where the person is a prospective immigrant 
(including those persons who have visitor status and whose application is being 
processed in Canada or outside of Canada). 
Al1 recommendations in criminal cases should be addressed to the Director, Case Review 
(BCM), Case Management Branch, NHQ. 
War crimes and crimes against humanity [Al g(l)(i)] 
Any recommendation about someune falling into this class of inadmissibility must be 
scrutinized by Case Management Branch (BCD). Address your recommendation to 
Security Review @CZ) in BCD and copy the geographic desk in the International Region 
( R n -  
Security and Public Safety - section 1 g(l)(d), (e), (f), (g), &), (l) 
AU recommendations in security or public safety cases should be addressed to the 
Security Review. (BCZ), Case Management Branch @CD), NHQ. Concurrence may be 
sought h m  NHQ without reference to RHQ where the recommendation originates in 
Canada. When the recommendation onginates outside of Canada, visa posts will seek 
concurrence fiom NHQ and copy the information to Regional authorities/CIC1s in 
provinces where the inadmissible person is deshed. 
Adapted fiom CIC M OP-19, Appendix A "Issuing and Extendhg Minister's Permits" (ver. 01-97) at 
21. 
B. Reaional Headauarters 
Medical Inadmissibility - section 1 g(I)(a) 
C. Local Level (CIC or Visa office) 
Criminal Inadmissibility - Visiton 
Criminai Inadmissibility - Immigrants - section l9(2)(a), (a 1) or (b) 
Al1 other cases 
APPENDIX D - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
A more highly rules based system of selection for Independent immigrants should be 
devised Central to any such system is a need for more generic selection criteria that 
do not inherently require the making of overly fine distinctions. 
Since the purpose of any selection system that might be devised is to select those with 
potentiai to establish and settle successfûlly in Canada, the concept of bbsuccessful 
settlement", and the measures against which it is to be assessed, should be dehed  
with specificity and clarity. 
Broad residual substantive discretion should not be a feature of any such system. 
R e c 0 g n . g  the need for a mechanism to aileviate against rule failure, however, some 
residual substantive discretion, but only of a highty restricted variety, should be 
provided for in the selection system design. Such discretion should be limited in its 
scope by tying its use to the concept of successfid settlemcnt Any exercise of such 
discretion unrelated to the definition of successfùl settlement would be invalid- Other 
than for this limited purpose, discretion should not avaiIable as a g e n d  exclusionary 
mecfianism. 
To the extent possible and practical, discretionary power should be localized in the 
field offices where it is to be exercised. 
CIC should evaluate the emphasis that is placed on statistics within the organization 
and the effect that this may have upon the use of discretionary power and the quality 
of decision-making generally. 
In conducting judicial review in Independent selection matters, courts should adopt a 
2 part test allowing consideration of substantive justice, as well as procedural faimess. 
A specific rule allowing for exclusion in instances involving deiiberate 
misrepresentation or other willfitl non-cornpliance with immigration law should be 
devised. The rule should include a mechanism for obtaining relief fiom its operation. 
More debate and discussion on the operations of the immigration system as a whole, 
and on the particular role of dimetion ùi that system, is desirable. 
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